Cpc – Sec 21 Jurisdiction Subhash Mahadevasa Habib v. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas, AIR 2007 (SC) 1828 What is relevant in this context is the legal effect of the so-called finding in O.S. No. 4 of 1972 that the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1971 was passed by a court which had no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass that decree. The Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas, an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied. It may be noted that Section 21 provided that no objection as to place the suing can be allowed by even an appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. Though Section 21A of the Code speaks of a suit not being maintainable for challenging the validity of a prior decree between the same parties on a ground based on an objection as to "the place of suing", there is no reason to restrict its operation only to an objection based on territorial jurisdiction and excluding from its purview a defect based on pecuniary jurisdiction. But the fact that Section 21(2) or Section 21A of the Code may not apply would not make any difference in view of the fact that the position was covered by the relevant provision in the Suits Valuation Act. Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 578 (Section 99 of the present Code covering errors or irregularity) of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over a suit had exercised it by reason of under-valuation could not be entertained by an appellate court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at or before the hearing at which the issues were first framed or the appellate court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that the over-valuing or under-valuing of the suit has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit. There was some confusion about the content of the Section.

Cpc – Sec 21 Jurisdiction Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu & Anr. 1966(1) SCR 461 Section 21 is a statutory recognition of the principle that the defect as to the place of suing under Sections 15 to 20 of the Code may be waived and that even independently of Section 21, a defendant may waive the objection and may be subsequently precluded from taking it.

Cpc – Sec 21 Jurisdiction Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath 1962(2) SCR 747 "It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure."

U.P. Rent Act – fixation of rent Abdul Jalil v. Special Judge E.C. Act/Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 2007 (4) RCR (Civil) 675 (Allahabad) under the Temporary Rent Control Act No. 3 of 1947 the rent was freezed at the level of 1940 and that in the present U.P. Rent Act No. 13 of 1972 has freezed the rent to those prevailing immediately before the date of commencement of the Act i.e. 15th July, 1972 or in case of a building let out subsequently, the rental value of the building on the date of letting. There is virtually no provision for revision of rent as a result of inflation and rise in price of immovable properties except on account of improvement as defined under Section 3(n), or as a result of increase in taxes (Section-7); or in case of commercial buildings let out by public religious institutions (Section 9-A). Since the Rent Control Act does not contain any alike provision for fixing of quantum of rent in absence of agreed rent. It becomes the duty of the Court to grant mense profits even though they are not asked for in order to meet the ends of justice provided enquiry is made under Order 20 Rule 12 C.P.C. before passing the decree. Covering the period prior institution of suit till the delivery of possession for ascertaining the mesne profits. This power and duty is imposed by CPC by order 2 Rule 12 dealing with mense profits. On the date of suit except for purpose of eviction, the tenant loses his contract and identity/status as tenant though he happens to be occupying the premises on account of procedural delay. The rights of the landlord are therefore crystallized on the date of suit. Procedural delay in disposal of suit cannot adversely effecting his rights. The statute provides the mode of fixation of standard rent of tenant under Section 9 of the Act but in those cases where there is total absence of any agreed rent on the date of suit. This Court need not delve on the questions regarding validity of the provisions relating to fixation of standard rent in the present (UP Rent ) Act, as they have already been declared ultra vires by this Court in Milap Chandra Jain vs State of UP. In cases of monthly tenancy, the life of tenancy is only one month. It starts from a particular day of the month and end after thirty-days/one month. Thereafter in next month a fresh tenancy is created. The suit is filed after determination of tenancy hence there exists no relationship of landlord and tenant on date of suit. There is no prohibition under Rent Act against termination of tenancy.

Rent Chiranji Lal v. Kunwar Prasad and another AIR 1963 Allahabad 249 When a tenant refused to vacate the accommodation after his tenancy is terminated, he becomes trespasser and liable to pay the landlord mesne profits. These are to be assessed according to the reasonable market value of the premises. If the rent represents a fair value mesne profits may be assessed at the amount of the rent, but if the real value is higher than the rent, mesne profits must be assessed at a higher value. I cannot accept learned counsel's agreement that this value should be equal to the controlled rent and no more.

Rent Rattan Arya etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and another AIR 1986 SC 1444 the Apex Court has laid down the law that the Court can take judicial notice of enormous manifold increase of rents throughout the country, particularly in urban area

Res judicata Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail, AIR 1995 (SC) 1205 It must, therefore, be that all the persons who have right, title and interest are made parties to the suit and that they should have knowledge that the right, title and interest would be in adjudication and the finding or the decree therein would operate as a res judicata to their right, title and interest in the subject-matter of the former suit. Even in their absence a decree could be passed and it may be used as an evidence of the plaintiff's title either accepted or negatived therein. The doctrine of res judicata would apply even though the party against whom it is ought to be enforced, was not eo-nomine made a party nor entered appearance nor did he contest the question. The doctrine of res judicata must, however, be applied to co-defendants with great care and caution. The reason is that fraud is an extrinsic collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of court of justice. If a party obtains a decree from the court by practicing fraud or collusion, be cannot be allowed to say that the matter is res judicata and cannot be re-opened. There can also be no question of res judicata in a case where signs of fraud or collusion are transparently pregnant or apparent from the facts on record. Therefore, in applying the doctrine of res judicata between co-defendant or co-plaintiff, care must, of necessity, be taken by courts to see that there must in fact be a conflict of interest between the co-defendants or co-plaintiffs concerned and it is necessary to decide the conflict in order to give relief which the plaintiff in the suit claimed and the question must have been directly and substantially in issue and was finally decided therein. As found by the appellate court, Maqdoom was playing fraud upon his creditors by creating false oral gifts or spurious claims of mortgages with a view to defraud them. Section 44 of the Evidence Act envisages that any party to a suit or proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree, which is relevant under s.40, 41 or 42 has been obtained by fraud or collusion. Under s.40, the existence of the judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.

Mahomedan Law by Mulla- gift, minor, Guardian Under s. 147 of the Principles of Mahomedan Law by Mulla, 19th Ed., Edited by Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah, envisages that writing is not essential to the validity of a gift either of movable or of immovable property. Section 148 requires that it is essential, to the validity of a gift, that the donor should divest himself completely of all ownership and dominion over the subject of the gift. Under s.149, three essentials to the validity of the gift should be, (i) a declaration of gift by the donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee and (iii) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee as mentioned in s.150. If these conditions are complied with, the gift is complete. Section 150 specifically mentions that for a valid gift there should be delivery of possession of the subject of the gift and taking of possession of the gift by the donee, actually or constructively. Then only gift is complete. Section 152 envisages that where donor is in possession, a gift of immovable property of which the donor is in actual possession is not complete unless the donor physically departs from the premises with all his goods and chattels and the donee formally enters into possession. It would, thus, be clear that though gift by a Mohammadan is not required to be in writing and consequently need not be registered under the Registration Act, a gift to be complete, there should be a declaration of the gift by the donor, acceptance of the gift, expressed or implied, by or on behalf of the donee and delivery of possession of the property, the subject-matter of the gift by the donor to the donee. The donee should take delivery of the possession of that property either actually or constructively. On proof of these essential conditions, the gift becomes complete and valid. In case of immovable property in the possession of the donor, he should completely divest himself physically of the subject of the gift. No evidence has been adduced to establish declaration of the gift, acceptance of the gift by or on behalf of the minor or delivery of possession or taking possession or who had accepted the gift actually or constructively. Admittedly he was in possession and enjoyment of the property till it was sold to the appellant. Equally, in Mohamadan Law mother cannot act nor be appointed as property guardian of the minor. She equally cannot act as legal guardian. Section 348 defines "minor" to mean "a person who has not completed the age of eighteen years". Section 349 provides that "all application for the appointment of a guardian of the person of property or both of a minor are to be made under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890". Section 359 enumerates the persons entitled, in the order mentioned therein, to be guardian of the property of a minor, namely, (1) the father, (2) the executor appointed by the father's will; (3) the paternal grand father; and (4) the executor appointed by the will of the paternal grand father. Section 362 limits the power of the legal guardian to alienate immovable property except in the circumstances enumerated therein. Similarly, the court guardian has no power to mortgage or charge or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise and part with possession of immovable property of the ward or to lease that property except with the previous permission of the court and subject to the conditions mentioned in s.363.

Parnership V.H. Patel & Company v. Hirubhai Himabhai Patel, 2000(2) RCR (Civil) 735 (SC) While mere disagreement or quarrel arising from impropriety of partners is not sufficient ground for dissolution, interference should not be refused where it is shown to the satisfaction of the adjudicating authority that the conduct of a partner has been such that it is not reasonably practicable for other partners to carry on the business in partnership. For instance, dissolution should be ordered if it is shown that the conduct of a partner has resulted in destruction of mutual trust or confidence which is the very basis for proper conduct of partnership.

CPC- sec 11 Munni Bibi v. Trilokinath, 58 IA 158, 165, where it has been said that to apply the rule of res judicata as between co-defendants three conditions are requisite. "(1) There must be a conflict of interest between the defendants concerned; (2) it must be necessary to decide this conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims; and (3) the question between the defendants must have been finally decided."

CPC- sec 11 Iftikhar Ahmed v. Syed Meharban Ali, AIR 1974 (SC) 749 We see no reason why a previous decision should not operate as res judicata between co-plaintiffs if all these conditions are mutatis mutandis satisfied.

TPA-Sec 53 A, Rohan v. Moolchand Bakhru , 1999 (4) Civ.C.C. 171 The case of the defendants is that they were placed into possession of the property in dispute in part performance of the agreement to sell arrived at in 1968 on payment of part of the sale consideration and as such their possession is protected under Section 53-A. Transfer of property Act.1882. Alternatively their case is that they have become the owners of the property in dispute by virtue of their continuous adverse possession since 1968. Suffice to say that since the defendants are claiming to be in possession of the property in dispute in part performance of the agreement to sell the plea of title by adverse possession is not available to them. The possession of the defendants in the present case is not unlawful. The possession of the defendants in the present case is not unlawful. They were initially placed in permissive possession of the property in dispute by the plaintiffs. Thereafter their possession was lawful under Section 53-A, Transfer of property Act, 1882. They being transferees from tenants-in-common are not liable to mesne profits.

Code of Civil Procedure- Section 2(12) Mesne profits Nathuni Prasad Singh and others v. Bishwanath Singh Sharma and others, AIR 1978 SC 30 has held that the very foundation of the cause of action for mesne profits is wrongful possession of the defendant. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Hukum Singh Nadir Singh v. Hakumat Rai Nihal Chand, AIR 1968 P&H 110 has held that it is only a person who is entitled to actual possession that can claim mesne profits.

TPA-Sec 53 A Nathulal v. Phool chand, AIR 1970 SC 546 land down the conditions necessary for making out the defence of part performance are : (1) that the transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. (2) that the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract. (3) that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract. (4) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.

TPA-Sec 53 A, adverse possession Mohan Lal (deceased) through his L.Rs. Kachru and others v. Mira Abdul Gaffar and another, AIR 1996 SC 910 the defendant had raised two pleas in his defence. One that having remained in possession from March 8, 1956 he had perfected his title by prescription. Secondly he pleaded that he was entitled to retain is possession by operation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. it was held. "As regard the first plea it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement he must disclaim hi right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that he latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years. i.e. upto completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi nec precario. Since the appellants claim is founded on Section 53-A. It goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.”

Limitation Act- Section 19, 20 DCM Financial Services Ltd. v. M/s. Sunil Kala, 2002(3) RCR (Civil) 118 (Delhi) It is contended that even in the case of a post-dated cheque, the date of payment would be the earliest date on which the cheque would have been payable i.e. the date of cheque. In the present case, cheque for Rs. 99,863/- was dated 14th November, 1995 and the suit was filed on 11th December, 1998. It is contended that to be within limitation the suit must have been filed by 13th November, 1998. The plaintiffs'. case is that it was on the request of defendants that they did not send the cheque to their bankers for clearance and it was ultimately encashed on 12th December, 1995. Since the plaintiffs were stopped from presenting the cheque for encashment, they have claimed that fresh period of limitation accrued to them. prima facie I am of the opinion that if the debtor himself requests the creditor to postpone the presentation of the cheque, which request is accepted by the creditor, it would amount to postponement of the date of payment itself. on account of the request of the defendants, prima facie in my view it would be the date of encashment of the cheque which would give a fresh period of limitation to the plaintiffs. as the question whether the cheque dated 14th November, 1995 was not presented on the same date and was presented on 12th December, 1995 at the request of the defendant is a question of fact which would be determined after the trial of the case.

Limitation Act- Section 19, 20 Rajesh Kumari v. Prem Chand Jain,1998 AIR (Delhi) 80 On the language of Section 19 abovesaid, it is clear that the payment may be made either against the principal or on account of interest. In either case, the payment will be on account of the debt which is all that the provision requires. It is also settled that this provision is to be interpreted liberally so as to save the suits from being barred by limitation so long as its benefit can reasonaly be extended to assist a claim, otherwise legal and sustainable. A payment by cheque satisfies the requirement of Section 19 inasmuch as the acknowledgement of payment appears in the handwriting of or in a writing signed by the person making the payment in the form of a cheque. It is clear from the abovesaid observations that unconditional acceptance of cheque is payment; conditional acceptance of cheque is payment subject to realisation thereof. SC clearly recognises payment by cheque a valid mode of payment and lawful tender unless such mode is excluded by agreement of the parties. Thus, dishonouring of the cheque results in not extinguishing the liability of the debtor to the extent of the amount of the cheque; nevertheless the cheque remains an effective payment for the purpose of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Limitation Act- Section 20 Jiwan Lal Acharya v. Rameshwar Lal Aggarwala, AIR 1967 SC 1118 "Where therefore the payment is by cheque and is conditional, the mere delivery of the cheque on a particular date does not mean that the payment was made on that date unless the cheque was accepted as unconditional payment. Where the cheque is not accepted as an unconditional payment, it can only be treated as a conditional payment. In such a case the payment for purposes of S. 20 would be the date on which the cheque would be actually payable at the earliest assuming that it will be honoured".

Limitation Act- Section 20 Mauris Mayahas v. W. Morley and others, AIR 1925 Cal. 937 "If a cheque is given in part payment of a debt, the fresh period of limitation under S. 20 should be computed from the actual giving of the cheque and not from the time when the Bank pays cash for it.”

Limitation Act Section 19, 20 Gori Lal v. Ramjee Lal, AIR 1961 MP 346, "If one bears in mind that the word "payment" has been used in two different senses, it would be clear that the moment the negotiable instrument is handed over and accepted by the creditor and is in the debtor's handwriting, there has been a payment for the purposes of Section 20, Limitation Act and a fresh period of limitation has already started. If the negotiable instrument is dishonoured subsequently the creditor, no doubt, can fall back on his original claim. But the new term of limitation (sic) of the subsequent happening. To link S. 20 with the subsequent honouring of the negotiable instrument would indeed lead to absurd results. The debtor has intended and at all events represented to the creditor that the negotiable instrument is good, and thereby the creditor has for his part, been given a feeling of security with a fresh term of limitation. If it turns out that the debtor's negotiable instrument is dishonoured (or as for that matter the currency notes that he has given turn out to be counterfeit) this fresh term of limitation cannot be blocked. Again, if one looks to the equity side of it, a payment which the debtor means as a sheer pretence, but the creditor accepts as genuine, cannot certainly deprive the latter of what S. 20 has already given him. Thus I would hold that the passing of the cheque is payment for the purpose of S. 20 and if the other conditions were fulfilled, a fresh term of limitation started from that date, whether or not it is subsequently honoured. That way the suit of the plaintiff was not time-barred."

Adoption Bhimashya v. Janabi @ Janawwa, 2007 (3) RCR (Civil) 534 (SC) Custom must be ancient, certain and reasonable as is generally said. It will be noticed that in the definition in Cl. (a) of Section 3 of the Act, the expression 'ancient' is not used, but what is intended is observance of custom or usage for a long time. The English rule that a 'custom, in order that it may be legal and binding, must have been used so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary' has not been strictly applied to Indian conditions. All that is necessary to prove is that the custom or usage has been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such invariability and continuity as to show that it has by common consent been submitted to as the established governing rule in any local area, tribe, community, group of family. Certainty and reasonableness are indispensable elements of the rule. For determination of the question whether there is a valid custom or not, it has been emphasized that it must not be opposed to public policy. A "custom", in order to be binding, must derive its force from the fact that by long usage it has obtained the force of law, but the English rule that "a custom in order that it may be legal and binding, must have been used so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary" should not be strictly applied to Indian Conditions.

Custom Mookka Kone v. Ammakutti Ammal (AIR 1928 Mad 299 (FB)), where custom is set up to prove that it is at variance with the ordinary law, it has to be proved that it is not opposed to public policy and that it is ancient, invariable, continuous, notorious, not expressly forbidden by the legislature and not opposed to morality or public policy.

Chitty on Contracts, 28th edition at page 838, it is stated : "Objects which on grounds of public policy invalidate contracts may, for convenience, be generally classified into five groups : first objects which are illegal by common law or by legislation: secondly, objects injurious to good government either in the field of domestic or foreign affairs: thirdly, objects which interfere with the proper working of the machinery of justice; fourthly, objects, injurious to marriage and morality; and fifthly, objects economically against the public interest. This classification is adopted primarily for case of exposition. Certain cases do not fit clearly into any of these five categories."

State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, AIR 2005 (SC) 3401 it would not, in our opinion, be correct to contend that public policy is capable of being given a precise definition. What is 'opposed to public policy' would be a matter depending upon the nature of the transaction. The pleadings of the parties and the materials brought on record would be relevant so as to enable the court to judge the concept as to what is for public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest at the relevant point of time as contra-distinguished from the policy of a particular government. A law dealing with the rights of a citizen is required to be clear and unambiguous. Doctrine of public policy is contained in a branch of common law, it is governed by precedents. The phraseology 'opposed to public policy' may embrace within its fold such acts which are likely to deprave, corrupt or injurious to the public morality and, thus, essentially should be a matter of legislative policy. 63. Hence, it becomes amply clear that it is not possible to define Public policy with precision at any point of time. It is not for the executive to fill these gray areas as the said power rests with judiciary. Whenever interpretation of the concept "public policy" is required to be considered it is for the judiciary to do so and in doing so even the power of the judiciary is very limited. 70. So far as amendments made by other States are concerned, we are of the opinion that any order passed by a Sub-Registrar or Registrar refusing to register a document pursuant to any notification issued under Section 22-A of the Act would not be reopened.

Mental Cruelty The concept of cruelty has been dealt with in Halsbury's Laws of England [Vol.13, 4th Edition Para 1269] as under : "The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that the entire matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that rule is of special value when the cruelty consists not of violent acts but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or taunts. In cases where no violence is averred, it is undesirable to consider judicial pronouncements with a view to creating certain categories of acts or conduct as having or lacking the nature or quality which renders them capable or incapable in all circumstances of amounting to cruelty; for it is the effect of the conduct rather than its nature which is of paramount importance in assessing a complaint of cruelty. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact and previously decided cases have little, if any, value. The court should bear in mind the physical and mental condition of the parties as well as their social status, and should consider the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other, weighing all incidents and quarrels between the spouses from that point of view; further, the conduct alleged must be examined in the light of the complainant's capacity for endurance and the extent to which that capacity is known to the other spouse".

status of wife Colebrooke in his book 'Digest of Hindu Law' Vol. II describes the status of wife at p. 158 thus :"A wife is considered as half the body of her husband, equally sharing the fruit of pure and impure act: whether she ascend the pile after him, or survive for the benefit of her husband, she is a faithful wife". This being the position after marriage, it is manifest that the law enjoins a corresponding duty on the husband to maintain his wife and look after her comforts and to provide her food and raiments. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his wife is entitled as of right to be maintained out of such properties. The claim of a Hindu widow to be maintained is not an empty formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession or indulgence, grace or gratis or generosity but is a valuabale spiritual and moral right which flows from the spiritual and temporal relationship of the husband and wife. As the wife is in a sense a part of the body of her husband, she becomes co-owner of the property of her husband though in a subordinate sense. Although the right of maintenance does not perse create a legal charge on the property of her husband yet the wife can enforce this right by moving the Court for passing a decree for maintenance by creating a charge. This right is available only so long as the wife continues to be chaste. Thus the position is that the right of maintenance may amount to a legal charge if such a charge is created either by an agreement between the parties or by a decree. Mulla in his book "Hindu Law", 14th Edn., describes the incidents and characteristics of Hindu wife's right to maintenance and observes thus at p. 597 : "A wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband, whether he possesses property or not. When a man with his eyes open marries a girl accustomed to a certain style of living, he undertakes the obligation of maintaining her in that style. The maintenance of a wife by her husband is a matter of personal obligation arising from the very existence of the relationship, and quite independent of the possession by the husband of any property, ancestral or self-acquired."

HSA-Sec14 Vaddeboyina Tulasamma v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi, AIR 1977(SC) 1944 properties in question were acquired by the appellant under the compromise in lieu or satisfaction of her right of maintenance, it is sub-section (1) and not sub-section (2) of Section 14 which would be applicable and hence the appellant must be deemed to have become full owner of the properties notwithstanding that the compromise prescribed a limited interest for her in the properties. (1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on the property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow; (2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property, i. e. it is a jus and rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court; (3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow's right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance; (4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu Law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right ; (5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her coownership is of a subordinate nature; and (6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance.

HSA-Sec14 Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad 387, 'only to remove the disability of women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of which a women's right was restricted"

CrPC-Sec439 Gurcharan Singh and others v. State (Delhi Adminsitration), 1978(2) SCR 358 " Section 439(1) Cr. P.C. of the new Code, on the other hand, confers special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session in respect of bail. Unlike under Section 437(1) there is no ban imposed under Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. against granting of bail by the High Court or the Court of Session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is, however, legitimate to suppose that the High Court or the Court of Session will be approached by an accused only after he has failed before the Magistrate and after the investigation has progressed throwing light on the evidence and circumstances implicating the accused. Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session will have to exercise its judicial discretion in considering the question of granting of bail under Section 439(1) Cr.P.C. of the new Code. The overriding considerations in granting bail to which we adverted to earlier and which are common both in the case of Section 437(1) and Section 439(1) Cr.P.C. of the new Code are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood, of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many valuable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out. The question of cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. of the new Code is certainly different from admission to bail under Section 439(1) Cr.P.C. The decisions of the various High Courts cited before us are mainly with regard to the admission to bail by the High Court under Section 498 Cr.P.C. (old). Power of the High Court or of the Sessions Judge to admit persons to bail under Section 498 Cr. P.C. (old) was always held to be wide without any express limitations in law. In considering the question of b ail justice to both sides governs the judicious exercise of the Court's judicial discretion."

DV ACT S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra,(2007)3 SCC 169 Interpreting the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act this Court in held that even a wife could not claim a right of residence in the property belonging to her mother-in-law, stating : "17. There is no such law in India like the British Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, and in any case, the rights which may be available under any law can only be as against the husband and not against the father-in-law or mother-in-law. 18. Here, the house in question belongs to the mother-in-law of Smt Taruna Batra and it does not belong to her husband Amit Batra. Hence, Smt Taruna Batra cannot claim any right to live in the said house. 19. Appellant 2, the mother-in-law of Smt Taruna Batra has stated that she had taken a loan for acquiring the house and it is not a joint family property. We see no reason to disbelieve this statement."

HAMA-Sec19 Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh, 2000(2) RCR(Civil) 719 : (2000)6 SCC 310 This provision clearly indicates that if the widowed daughter- in-law is a destitute and has no earnings of her own or other property and if she has nothing to fall back upon for maintenance on the estate of her husband or father or mother or from the estate of her son or daughter, if any, then she can fall back upon the estate of her father-in-law. This provision also indicates that in case of a widowed daughter-in-law of the family if she has no income of her own or no estate of her husband to fall back upon for maintenance, then she can legitimately claim maintenance from her father or mother. On the facts of the present case, therefore, it has to be held that Appellant 1, who was a destitute widowed daughter of the testator and who was staying with him and was being maintained by him in his lifetime, had nothing to fall back upon so far as her deceased husband's estate was concerned and she had no estate of her own. Consequently, as per Section 19(1)(a) she could claim maintenance from the estate of her father even during her father's lifetime. This was a pre-existing right of the widowed daughter qua testator's estate in his own lifetime and this right which was tried to be crystallised in the Will in her favour after his demise fell squarely within the provisions of Section 22(2) of the Maintenance Act."

Maintenance Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat, 1996(3) RCR(Criminal) 147 : (1996)4 SCC 479 " We have given serious thought and consideration to the submissions made above by the learned counsel for the appellant and notice that Dhayalal Hirachand, the husband of Respondent 2 Smt Manjulaben, has been found to be a person of sufficient means and income. It is also true that there are 5 natural born sons of Respondent 2 besides 2 daughters, who are all major. It is also a fact that Dalip one of the sons had contested the Municipal Election and two other sons are carrying on various businesses. According to the Law of the Land with regard to maintenance, there is an obligation of the husband to maintain his wife which does not arise by reason of any contract - express or implied - but out of jural relationship of husband and wife consequent to the performance of marriage. Such an obligation of the husband to maintain his wife arises irrespective of the fact whether he has or has no property, as it is considered an imperative duty and a solemn obligation of the husband to maintain his wife."

HAMA Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslabeen Ashokbhai Patel , AIR 2008 (SC) 2675 Maintenance of a married wife, during subsistence of marriage, is on the husband. It is a personal obligation. The obligation to maintain a daughter-in-law arises only when the husband has died. Such an obligation can also be met from the properties of which the husband is a co-sharer and not otherwise. For invoking the said provision, the husband must have a share in the property. The property in the name of the mother-in-law can neither be a subject matter of attachment nor during the life time of the husband, his personal liability to maintain his wife can be directed to be enforced against such property. Right to object in terms of Section 84 of the Code to which reliance has been placed by Mr. Mayur Shah, could not have been invoked by the wife as she has no independent claim over the property. The said provisions also could not have been invoked for the purpose of execution of a decree. Unnamalai Ammal v. F.W. Wilson, AIR 1921 Madras 1187 the obligation to maintain wife by a husband has been held to be a personal obligation. The right of property is no longer a fundamental right. But still it is a constitutional right. Apart from constitutional right it is also a human right. The procedures laid down for deprivation thereof must be scrupulously complied with.

Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 14(1) Palchuri Henumayamma v. Tadikamalla Kotlingam, AIR 2001(SC) 3062 Recitals in the Will providing that the wife of the testator should enjoy all his properties as her life estate and that only after her death his property be divided between his daughters. The Will settled properties on the widow for her maintenance.

TPA-Sec 106 Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 (SC) 1262 expression `room in a hotel' must take colour from the context or the collocation of words in which it has been used; in other words, its meaning should be determined noscitur a sociis. The reason why I think so may be explained by an illustration. Suppose there is a big room inside a hotel; in a physical sense it is a room in a hotel, but let us suppose that it is let out, to take an extreme example, as a timber godown. Will it still be a room in a hotel, though in a physical sense it is a room of the building which is used as a hotel ? I think it would be doing violence to the context if the expression `room in a hotel' is interpreted in a strictly literal sense. On the view which I take a room in a hotel must fulfil two conditions : (1) it must be part of a hotel in the physical sense and (2) its user must be connected with the general purpose of the hotel of which it is a part. In the case under our consideration the spaces were let out for carrying on the business of a hair dresser. Such a business I consider to be one of the amenities which a modern hotel provides. The circumstance that people not resident in the hotel might also be served by the hair dresser does not alter the position; it is still an amenity for the residents in the hotel to have a hair dressing saloon within the hotel itself. All these amenities are connected with the hotel business and a barber's shop within the hotel premises is no exception. These are my reasons for holding that the rooms in question were rooms in a hotel within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Rent Control Act, 1947, and the respondent was not entitled to ask for fixation of fair or standard rent for the same. [(Subarao J, in minority)There is a marked distinction between a lease and a licence. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease of immoveable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration for a price paid or promised. Under Section 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A lease is therefore a transfer of an interest in land. The interest transferred is called the leasehold interest. The lessor parts with his right to enjoy the property during the term of the lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that right to the exclusion of the lessor. Whereas Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act defines a licence thus : "Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do or continue to do, in or upon the immoveable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence." Under the aforesaid section, if a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a licence. The legal possession, therefore, continues to be with the owner of the property, but the licensee is permitted to make use of the premises for a particular purpose. But for the permission, his occupation would be unlawful. It does not create in his favour any estate or interest in the property. There is, therefore, clear distinction between the two concepts. The dividing line is clear though sometimes it becomes very thin or even blurred. At one time it was thought that the test of exclusive possession was infallible and if a person was given exclusive possession of a premises, it would conclusively establish that he was a lessee. But there was a change and the recent trend of judicial opinion is reflected in Errington v. Errington, 1952-1 All ER 149, wherein Lord Denning reviewing the case law on the subject summarizes the result of his discussion thus at p. 155 : "The result of all these cases is that, although a person who is let into exclusive possession is, `prima facie', to he considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy." The Court of Appeal again in Cobb v. Lane, 1952-1 All ER 1199, considered the legal position and laid down that the intention of the parties was the real test for ascertaining the character of a document. At p. 1201, Somervell L.J., stated : ". . . . . . . the solution that would seem to have been found is, as one would expect, that it must depend on the intention of the parties." Denning L.J. said much to the same effect at p. 1202 : "The question in all these cases is one of intention : Did the circumstances and the conduct of the parties show that all that was intended was that the occupier should have a personal privilege with no interest in the land ?" The following propositions may, therefore, be taken as well-established : (1) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form; (2) the real test is the intention of the parties - whether they intended to create a lease or a licence; (3) if the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease; but, if it only permits another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a licence; and (4) if under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, `prima facie', he is considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be established which negative the intention to create a lease.]

CrPC-Sec 392 Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb v. State of U.P., 2006 CrLJ(SC) 1121 One of the judges holding in favour of acquittal of the accused. The other judge favoured conviction. Matter referred to third judge.There is no rule that third judge should lean towards acquittal. Third judge was free to resolve the difference as he thought fit.

CrPC-Sec 174 Eqbal Baig v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1987 SC 923 the non-mention of name of an eye-witness in the inquest report could not be a ground to reject his testimony.

CrPC-Sec 174 Podda Narayana v. State of A.P., AIR 1975 SC 1252 the proceedings under Section 174 have a very limited scope. The object of the proceedings is merely to ascertain whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances or an unnatural death and if so what is the apparent cause of the death. The question regarding the details as to how the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what circumstances he was assaulted is foreign to the ambit and scope of the proceedings under Section 174. Neither in practice nor in law was it necessary for the police to mention those details in the inquest report. It is, therefore, not necessary to enter all the details of the overt acts in the inquest report.

IPC-Sec149 Alauddin Mian v. State of Bihar, 1989(1) RCR(Criminal) 628 : AIR 1989 SC 1456 "....... This Section creates specific offence and makes every member of the unlawful assembly liable for the offence or offences committed in the course of the occurrence provided the same was/were committed in prosecution of the common object or was/were such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. Since this Section imposes a constructive penal liability, it must be safely construed as it seeks to punish members of an unlawful assembly for the offence or offences committed by their associate or associates in carrying out the common object of the assembly. What is important in each case is to find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the common object of the assembly or was one which the members knew to be likely to be committed. There must be a nexus between the common object and the offence committed and if it is found that the same was committed to accomplish the common object every member of the assembly will become liable for the same. Therefore, any offence committed by a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of anyone or more of the five objects mentioned in Section 141 will render his companions constituting the unlawful assembly liable for that offence with the aid of Section 149, it is not the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 149 to render every member of an unlawful assembly liable to punishment for every offence committed by one or more of its members. In order to invoke Section 149 it must be shown that the incriminating act was done to accomplish the common object of the unlawful assembly. Even if an act incidental to the common object is committed to accomplish the common object of the unlawful assembly, it must be within the knowledge of other members as one likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. If the members of the assembly knew or were aware of the likelihood of a particular offence being committed in prosecution of the common object, they would be liable for the same under Section 149."

IPC-Sec 149 Mizaji v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 572, "The first part of Section 149 IPC means that the offence committed in prosecution of the common object must be one which is committed with a view to accomplish the common object. It is not necessary that there should be a preconcert in the sense of a meeting of the members of the unlawful assembly as to the common object; it is enough if it is adopted by all the members and is shared by all of them. In order that the case may fall under the first part, the offence committed must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused were members. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section 149 if it can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed. The expression 'know' does not mean a mere possibility, such as might or might not happen. Though it can be said that when an offence is committed in prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an offence which the members of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object that does not make the converse proposition true; there may be cases which would come within the second part but not within the first. The distinction between the two parts of Section 149 Indian Penal Code cannot be ignored or obliterated. In every case it would be an issue to be determined whether the offence committed falls within the first part of Section 149 as explained above or it was an offence such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object and falls within the second part."

Rent Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas, AIR 1980 (SC) 587 Court has the jurisdiction to extend time for deposit or payment of monthly rent falling due after the filing of the suit.

TPA Jones vs Morgan Citation No. [2001] EWCA Civ 995 The position, following the repeal of the usury laws, is that there is now no rule in equity which precludes a lender from stipulating for any collateral advantage, provided that the stipulation is not (i) unfair or unconscionable, (ii) in the nature of a penalty clogging the equity of redemption or (iii) inconsistent with or repugnant to the right to redeem - see Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Company Limited [1914] AC 25, 61.

TPA Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat Company [1914] AC 23, which came before the House of Lords some ten years after the quartet of appeals to which I have just referred. The appellants were a firm of woolbrokers who had lent to the respondent company the sum of £10,000 on the security of a floating charge over its undertaking. The agreement for loan provided that, for a period of five years, the appellants should have a right of first refusal over all sheepskins sold by the company. The company paid off the loan, but the appellants claimed that they were entitled to continue to exercise their right of first refusal. It was held that the right of first refusal formed no part of the mortgage transaction; it was a collateral contract entered into as a condition of the company obtaining the loan; and that the appellants were entitled to enforce it. As I have indicated the House of Lords took the opportunity to review the principles relating to collateral advantages obtained in connection with mortgage transactions. The substantive speeches were those of Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor, and Lord Parker of Waddington. The Earl of Halsbury and Lord Atkinson expressly agreed with both of them. Lord Mersey also agreed, but added some words of his own, including the well known observation that the equitable doctrine prohibiting the imposition of a clog on the mortgagor's right to redeem is "like an unruly dog, which, if not securely chained to its own kennel, is prone to wander into places where it ought not to be".

Evidence-sec 43 Muhammad Haneefa v. State of Kerala, (Kerala)(FB) 2006(2) RCR (criminal) 253 (i) The inherent powers of the High Court reserved and recognised under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are sweeping and awesome; but such powers can be invoked only - (a) to give effect to any order passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure or (b) to prevent abuse of process of any court or (c) otherwise to secure the ends of justice Such powers may have to be exercised in an appropriate case to render justice even beyond the law. (ii) Considering the nature, width and amplitude of the powers, it would be unnecessary, inexpedient and imprudent to prescribe or stipulate any straitjacket formula to identify cases where such powers can or need not be invoked. (iii) But such powers can be invoked only in exceptional and rare cases and cannot be invoked as a matter of course. Where the Code provides methods and procedures to deal with the given situation, in the absence of exceptional and compelling reasons, invocation of the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not necessary or permissible. (iv) The fact that an accused can seek discharge/dropping of proceedings/acquittal under the relevant provisions of the Code in the normal course could certainly be a justifiable reason, in the absence of exceptional and compelling reasons, for the High Court not invoking its extraordinary powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (v) In a trial against the co-accused the prosecution is not called upon, nor is it expected to adduce evidence against the absconding co-accused. In such trial the prosecution cannot be held to have the opportunity or obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding co-accused The fact that the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in the trial against the co-accused is no reason to assume that he shall not tender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such later trial. (vi) On the basis of materials placed before the High Court in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which materials can be placed before the court in appropriate proceedings before the subordinate courts) such extraordinary inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot normally be invoked, unless such materials are of an unimpeachable nature which can be translated into legal evidence in the course of trial. (vii) The judgment of acquittal of a co-accused in a criminal trial is not admissible under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act to bar the subsequent trial of the absconding coaccused and cannot hence, be reckoned as a relevant document while considering the prayer to quash the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Such judgments will be admissible only to show as to who were the parties in the earlier proceedings or the factum of acquittal. (viii) While considering the prayer for invocation of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction to serve the ends of justice, it is perfectly permissible for the court to consider the bona fides - the cleanliness of the hands of the seeker. If he is a fugitive from justice having absconded or jumped bail without sufficient reason or having waited for manipulation of hostility of witnesses, such improper conduct would certainly be a justifiable reason for the court to refuse to invoke its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (ix) The fact that the co-accused have secured acquittal in the trial against them in the absence of absconding co-accused cannot by itself be reckoned as a relevant circumstance while considering invocation of the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (x) A judgment not inter parties cannot justify the invocation of the doctrine of issue estoppel under the Indian law at present. (xi) Conscious of the above general principles, the High Court has to consider in each case whether the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deserve to be invoked. Judicial wisdom, sagacity, sobriety and circumspection have to be pressed into service to identify that rare and exceptional case where invocation of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction is warranted to bring about premature termination of proceedings subject of course to the general principles narrated above.

Appeal Raja Ram v. State of M.P., (1994 SCC(Crl.) 573) in the case of non-appealing accused identical to the case of the appellants, the benefit of altered conviction and sentence must also be made available to such non-appealing accused also. It must be noticed in this connection that it was only after the full trial that the benefit of the appellate judgment was extended to the non appealing accused.

Evidence Sec 43 Ali Hasan v. State, (1975 Crl.LJ. 345) following the decision in Kharkan's case (AIR 1965 SC 83) held that neither reasons (sic) for decision in later case. The contention was that the accused in that case was acquitted in an earlier case and a certified copy of the judgment in that case was attempted to be produced. It was held that even if the certified copy of judgment was accepted as additional evidence, it does not in any way advance the case of the accused since the judgment produced can be utilised for the purpose of showing that he was acquitted in the sessions trial. Neither the evidence on record nor the reasons contained the judgment can be taken into consideration for deciding the present appeal. The reasoning in the earlier judgment could not he relied upon as it proceeded on evidence which was recorded separately and which was considered separately. It was also noticed that the sessions trial which ended in acquittal was connected with a dacoity and the acquittal was on the ground that the identification witness did not have sufficient opportunity to recognise the accused.

Witness-Appeal Mst. Harkori v. State of Rajasthan, (AIR 1998 SC 1491) when the conviction was based on evidence of two witnesses and leave to appeal was refused to two out of the three convicts, in appeal by the third convict the evidence of the two witnesses could not be held to be unbelievable.

Evidence- issue estoppel Mcllkenny v. Chief Constable, ((1980)2 All ER 227) The accused alleged in the criminal proceedings that he was assaulted by police officers to procure confession while in custody. But the assault was not proved and the accused convicted. Civil proceedings were also initiated by the accused against the police officers claiming damages for assault. The questions arose as to whether "issue estoppel" will apply and whether the civil action is an abuse of process of court. It was held that the plaintiffs were estopped from raising in their action against the chief constable the issue whether they had been assaulted by his police officers because that issue had already been finally determined against them by a court of competent jurisdiction in the criminal proceedings to which they were parties and in those proceedings they had a full and fair opportunity of presenting their case and in all the circumstances it would not be just to allow them to reopen the issue.

CrPC-Sec 300 Amritlal Ratilal Mehta v. State of Gujarat, ((1980)1 SCC 121) an earlier finding which has attained finality is binding in the subsequent proceedings in the case. The question is not whether the ingredients of the two offences are the same or substantially the same. That question would be relevant if the plea was one autrefois acquit or autrefois convict. The question is not even of 'Issue estoppel' properly so called as there were no separate trials. The question really is about the binding force and the conclusive nature, at later stage of a case, of a finding of fact finally determined at an earlier stage of the case which would depend on the question as to what the allegations were, what facts were required to be proved and what findings were arrived at.

CrPC-Sec 204 Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, 2005(1) Apex Criminal 30 the question arose for consideration was when process was issued under Section 204 Cr.P.C. what is the remedy available against the same. It was held that issuance of a process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. is a preliminary step in trial contemplated in Chapter 20 (Sections 251 to 259) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is, therefore, an interlocutory order which cannot be reviewed, reconsidered or recalled by the Magistrate, there being no provision therefor in the Code. The remedy available to an aggrieved accused is the extraordinary remedy under Section 482 and not by way of application to recall the summons or to seek discharge, the latter not being contemplated in trial of a summons case.

CrPC-Sec 482 Emperor v. Sukh Dev, (1929 Lahore 705) the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing an act which would conflict with any of the provisions of law or general principles of criminal jurisprudence.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Khujji alias Surendra Tiwari Vs. State of Madhya PradeshCriminal Appeal No. 413 of 1982 It seems to be well settled by the decisions of this Court Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana SC1975; Rabinder Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa SC1976 and Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka SC1979 that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof.

CrPC- Sec 173 Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Vs. R.S. Pai and Anr.SUPREME COURT Decided On: 03.04.2002 Normally, the investigating Officer is required to produce all the relevant documents at the time of submitting the charge-sheet. At the same time, as there is no specific prohibition, it cannot be held that the additional documents cannot be produced subsequently. If some mistake is committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting the report or charge-sheet, it is always open to the Investigating Officer to produce the same with the permission of the Court.

Further investigation Rajneesh Kumar Singhal Vs. The State (National Capital Territory of Delhi) HIGH COURT OF DELHI Criminal Misc. (Main) No. 113 of 1997 Magistrate is empowered to direct police to further investigate after filing of challan & even after taking cognizance of offence.

Further investigation Rajneesh Kumar Singhal Vs. The State (National Capital Territory of Delhi) HIGH COURT OF DELHI Criminal Misc. (Main) No. 113 of 1997 Magistrate is empowered to direct police to further investigate after filing of challan & even after taking cognizance of offence.

CrPC-Sec 156, 190 Tula Ram and Ors. Vs. Kishore Singh, SUPREME COURT Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1976 Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned. appears in Chapter 12 which deals with information to the Police and the powers of the police to investigate a crime. This section is therefore placed in a Chapter different from Chapter 14 which deals with initiation of proceedings against an accused person. It is, therefore, clear that Sections 190 and 156(3) are mutually exclusive and work in totally different spheres. In other words, the position is that even if a Magistrate receives a complaint under Section 190 he can act under Section 156(3) provided that he does not take cognizance. The position, therefore, is that while Chapter 14 deals with post cognizance stage Chapter 12 so far as the Magistrate is concerned deals with pre-cognizance stage, that is to say once a Magistrate starts acting under Section 190 and the provisions following he cannot resort to Section 156(3). Mr. Mukherjee vehemently contended before us that in view of this essential distinction once the Magistrate chooses to act under Section 156(3) of the Code it was not open to him to revive the complaint, take cognisance and issue process against the accused Counsel argued that the Magistrate in such a case has two alternatives and two alternatives only either he could direct re-investigation if he was not satisfied with the final report of the police or he could straightaway issue process to the accused under Section 204. In the instant case the Magistrate has done neither but has chosen to proceed under Section 190(1)(a) and Section 200 of. the Code and thereafter issued process against the accused under Section 204. Attractive though the argument appears to be we are however unable to accept the same. In the first place, the argument is based on a fallacy that when a Magistrate orders investigation under Section 156(3) the complaint disappears and goes out of existence. The provisions of Section 262 of the present Code debar a Magistrate from directing investigation on a complaint where the offence charged is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions. On the allegations of the complainant the offence complained of was clearly triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions and therefore it is obvious that the Magistrate was completely debarred from directing the complaint filed before him to be investigated by the police under Section 202 of the Code. But the Magistrate's powers under Section 156(3) of the Code to order investigation by the police have not been touched or affected by Section 202 because these powers are exercised even before cognizance is taken. In other words, Section 202 would apply only to cases where the Magistrate has taken cognizance and chooses to enquire into the complaint either himself or through any other agency. But there may be circumstances as in the present case where the Magistrate before taking cognizance of the case himself chooses to order a pure and simple investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. The question is, having done so is he debarred from proceeding with the complaint according to the provisions of Sections 190, 200 and 204 of the Code after receipt of the final report by the police? We see absolutely no bar to such a course being adopted by the Magistrate.

CrPC- Sec 200 Abhinandan Jha and Ors. Dinesh Mishra [1967] 3 S.C.R. 668 while a Magistrate can order the police to investigate the complaint it has no power to compel the police to submit a charge-sheet on a final report being submitted by the police. In such cases a Magistrate can either order re-investigation or dispose of the complaint according to law.

IPC-Sec 377 "Brother John Antony v. State 1992 CRI. L. J. 1352 Acts alleged against accused falling into two categories (1) Sexual intercourse per OS (mouth) and (2) manipulation and movement of penis of accused whilst being held by victims in such way as to create orifice like thing for making manipulated movement of insertion and withdrawal till ejaculation of semen. Both categories of acts fall within sweep of unnatural carnal offences. "SODOMY : Non coital carnal copulation with a member of the same or opposite sex, e.g., per anus or per os (mouth). BUGGERY : Intercourse per anux by a man with a man or woman; or intercourse per anux or per vaginam by a man or a woman with an animal. BESTIALITY : Sexual intercourse by a human being with a lower animal. TRIBADISM : Friction of the external genital organs by one woman on another by mutual bodily contact for the gratification of the sexual desire. SADISM : A form of sexual perversion in which the infliction of pain and torture act as sexual stimulants. MASOCHISM : Opposite of sadism and sexual gratification is sought from the desire to be beaten , tormented or humiliated by one's sexual partner. FETICHISM : Experiencing sexual excitement leading to orgasm from some part of the body of a woman or some article belonging to her. EXHIBITIONISM : Exposure of genital organs in Public." Section 377, IPC de hors the Explanation appended to it consists of the following ingredients:- "(1) A person accused of this offence had carnal intercourse with man woman or animal; (2) Such intercourse was against the order of nature; and (3) Such act by the person accused of the offence was done voluntarily."

CrPC- Sec 313 State of Madhya PradeshVs. Balu AIR2005SC222 The argument of non-consideration of the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. to the effect that there was animosity between the family of the victim and the accused is liable to be rejected because one of the defences of the accused is that there was consent on the part of the victim to have sex with him. These two stands being self-contradictory, cannot be accepted. 10 months punishment for is not sufficient.

CrPC- Sec 313 Mani Kumar Thapa Vs. State of Sikkim AIR2002SC2920 The Court also held that in such a situation a false answer can also be counted as providing "a missing link" in completing the chain. If the said principle in law is to be accepted, the statement of the appellant made under Section 313 Cr.PC being palpably false and there being cogent evidence adduced by the prosecution to show that the appellant had given two other versions as to the incident of 12.2.1988, we will have to proceed on the basis that the appellant has not explained the inculpating circumstances established by the prosecution against him which would from an additional link in the chain of circumstances.

TPA-Sec 106 Munshi Hossain Baksh v. Khudiram Mukherjee, 1971 RCR (Rent) 493 if after determination of tenancy or its expiry, money is tendered by the tenant as rent, and not as statutory rent in discharge of his obligations, and is accepted as such, a fresh tenancy by holding over is created unless there is prohibition against the exercise of jurisdiction by Court in respect of the lessor's right to obtain possession.

Evidence- Sec 73 Under the Indian Evidence Act, two direct methods of proving the handwriting of a person are : a) by an admission of a person who wrote it; b) by the evidence of some witness who saw it being written by that person. Apart from these, there are some other methods of proof of handwriting by option. They are: 1) by the evidence of a handwriting expert (Section 45). 2) by the evidence of a witness acquainted with the handwriting of the person who is said to have written the disputed writing (Section 47). 3) opinion formed by the Court itself on comparison made of the disputed writings with the admitted or specimen writings (Section 73). A subsequent writing of an accused taken under the direction of the court is in substance a specimen writing obtained for comparison of the disputed writing with it. Though, Section 73 does not specifically say as to who could make such a comparison but reading Section 73 as a whole, it is obvious that it is the Court which has to make the comparison and it may form the opinion itself by comparing the disputed and the admitted writings or seek the assistance of an expert, to put before the Court all the material, together with reasons, which induce the expert to come to a conclusion that the disputed and the admitted writings are of one and the same author so that the court may form its own opinion by its own assessment of the report of the expert based on the data furnished by the expert. The function of an handwriting expert is to opine after a scientific comparison of the disputed writing with the admitted (specimen) writing with regard to the points of similarity and dissimilarity in the two set of writings. The language of Section 73 does not permit any court to give a direction to an accused to give his specimen writing for comparison in a proceeding which may subsequently be instituted in some other competent court. Section 73 of the Evidence Act in our opinion cannot be made use of for collecting , specimen writings during the investigation and recourse to it can be had only when the enquiry or the trial court before which proceedings are pending requires the writing for the purpose of enabling it to compare' the same. A court holding an enquiry under the CrPC is indeed entitled under Section 73 of the Evidence Act to direct an accused person appearing before it to give his specimen handwriting to enable the court by which he may be subsequently tried to compare it with the disputed writings. Therefore, in our opinion the court which can issue a direction to the person to give his specimen writing can either by the court holding the enquiry under the CrPC or the court trying the accused person with a view to enable it to compare the specimen writings with the writings alleged to have been written by such a person. A court which is not holding an enquiry under the CrPC or conducting the trial is not permitted, on the plain language of Section 73 of the Evidence Act, to issue any direction of the nature contained in the second paragraph of Section 73 of the Evidence Act.

Evidence- Sec 27 Sukhvinder Singh and Ors. Vs.State of Punjab 1994(2)SCALE877 only so much of the statement of an accused is admissible in evidence as distinctly leads to the discovery of a fact. Therefore, once the fact has been discovered. Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot again be made use of to 're-discover' the discovered fact. It would be a total misuse-even abuse-of the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Evidence-Sec 73 Vipin Kumar Vs. State 139(2007)DLT470 in Sukhvinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0783/1994. No doubt the Supreme Court, in the facts of that case, has in no uncertain terms held that Section 73 of Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be used during investigation. However, the case in hand is quite different. The specimen handwriting of the accused was not taken pursuant to directions under Section 73 of Code of Criminal Procedure and thereforee, the judgment is of no avail. However, this point stands settled by an eleven (11) Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad 1961 (2) Crl. L. J. 856, which neither makes the taking of handwriting of an accused illegal nor is it hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.

CrPC –Sec 239 Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, (SC) 2004 CriLJ 4609 The next challenge of the learned counsel for the appellant made to the finding of the High Court that once a plea is recorded in a summons case it is not open to the accused person to seek a discharge cannot also be accepted. The case involving a summons case is covered by Chapter XX of the Code which does not contemplates a stage of discharge like Section 239 which provides for a discharge in a warrant case. Therefore, in our opinion the High Court was correct in coming to the conclusion once the plea of the accused is recorded under Section 252 of the Code the procedure contemplated under Chapter XX has to be followed which is to take the trial to its logical conclusion. As observed by us in Adalat Prasad's case the only remedy available to an aggrieved accused to challenge an order in an interlocutory stage is the extraordinary remedy under Section 482 of the Code and not by way of an application to recall the summons or to seek discharge which is not contemplated in the trial of a summons case.

IPC-Sec498A Santa Devi and Ors. Vs. State 99(2002)DLT604 "In Roshan Kumar Tiwari v. State of Delhi2000(II) AD (Cr.)DHC 836 it was held by this court, on similar facts, that the offences under Section 498A/406 IPC were continuing offences."

CrPC-Sec 227 Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar , (SC) 2008 (4) RCR (Criminal)924 At the stage of framing the charge, Court cannot look into defence material. However, in some very rare cases the Court is justified in looking into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, if such material convincingly establishes that the whole prosecution version is totally absurd, preposterous or concocted.

Speedy Trial PANKAJ KUMAR vs MAHARASHTRA & ORS. S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 2843 of 2006) The purport of the expression "rarest of rare cases" has been explained very recently in Som Mittal (supra). Speaking for the three-Judge Bench, Hon'ble the Chief Justice has said thus: "When the words 'rarest of rare cases' are used after the words sparingly and with circumspection' while describing the scope of Section 482, those words merely emphasize and reiterate what is intended to be conveyed by the words sparingly and with circumspection'. They mean that the power under Section 482 to quash proceedings should not be used mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The expression "rarest of rare cases" is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences under Section 302 IPC, but to emphasize that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with circumspection." (i)fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily; (ii) right to speedy trial flowing from article 21encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; (iii) in every case where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is --who is responsible for the delay?; (iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on-- what is called, the systemic delays; (v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case; (vi) ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors--'balancing test' or 'balancing process'--and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied; (vii) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the court feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial; (viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint; (ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.

"Witnesses" as Bentham said: are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of trial process.

IPC- Sec 304A Thakur Singh vs State of Punjab, (2003) 9SCC 208, Supreme Court applied the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur and held that this doctrine comes into play and the burden shifts on the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part.

knowledge Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 1997 edition explains the word `knowledge' as certain perception of truth, act or state of knowing that which is or may be known, acquaintance with things ascertainable, reasonable conviction, anything which may be subject of human instructions. While drawing distinction between knowledge, actual knowledge and knowledge relatable to different expressions, it describes as under: “1) `Knowledge' is confined to the personal knowledge of the person who has to deliver the account, including the information contained in all the documents which he possesses or has custody of, or to which he is entitled, but no further.... 2) `Knowledge' and `actual knowledge' have sometimes been held to be synonymous. The `knowledge' as used in a contract by which a fidelity and causality company bound itself to make good (to a ban) such pecuniary loss as the latter might sustain by reason of the fraud or dishonesty of a named employee in connection with his duties, providing that the contract would be void if the bank continued in its service an employee of whose untrustworthiness they had knowledge, means actual knowledge and not constructive. 3) Knowledge and Belief-` knowledge' is nothing more than men's firm belief, and is distinguished from `belief' in that the latter includes things which do not make a very deep impression on the memory., The difference is ordinarily merely in degree. 4) The meaning of the word `belief' and `knowledge', as defined by lexicographers, will show that there is a distinct and well defined difference between them.`Believe' is defined by Webster to mean to exercise trust or confidence, and by the Century Dictionary, to exercise belief in, to be perused upon evidence, arguments, and deductions, or by other circumstances other than personal knowledge. `Knowledge' , according to Webster, is the act or state of knowing , clear perception of fact, that which is or may be known. According to the Century Dictionary it means acquaintance with things ascertained or ascertainable, specific information. 5) Knowledge of the law- `The knowledge of the law with which every man is charged includes a knowledge of the constituent facts which make the law. That the Legislature enacted a certain law is a fact, but a knowledge of the law imputed to every man comprises a knowledge of that fact. That a certain law is valid or void is another fact, but every man is presumed to know whether it is valid or void, else he could not know the law”. Oxford Dictionary of the word `knowledge' is: “The fact of knowing a thing, state, etc or (in general sense person, acquaintance, familiarity gained by experience”). Acquaintance with a fact, perception, or certain information of a fact or matter, state of being aware or informed, consciousness (of anything). The object is usually a proposition expressed or implied, e.g., the knowledge that a person is poor, knowledge of his poverty..”

CrPC- Sec 313 State of M.P. vs Balu, 2005(1) SCC 108, Contradictory statement of the accused within the ambit of section 313, even may result in rejection of both such versions. In that case the accused claimed animosity between the parties that is victim's family and his family and on the other hand, pleaded consent of the victim for having sex with him in the case of offences under Section 376 of IPC, which was a stand full of contradictions, exaggerations or embellishment.

CrPC- Sec 313 Anthony D'Souza and ors. Vs State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 258, "... By now it is well established principle of law that in a case of circumstantial evidence where an accused offers false answer in his examination under section 313 against the established facts that can be counted as providing a missing link for completing the chain.

Evidence-Sec 26 Nishi Kant Jha vs State of Bihar (AIR 1969 SC 422) as the evidence on the record disproves the exculpatory part of the respondent's statement in the trial court, it is clearly permissible to accept that part of the statement which accords with the evidence on the record, and to act upon it”.

CrPC- Sec 313 State of U.P. vs. Lakhmi, AIR 1998 SC 1007. "As a legal proposition we cannot agree with the High Court that statement of an accused recorded under section 313 of the Code does not deserve any value of utility if it contains inculpatory admissions. The need of law for examining the accused with reference to incriminating circumstances appearing against him in prosecution evidence is not for observance of a ritual in a trial, nor is it a mere formality. It has a salutary purpose. It enables the Court to be apprised of what the indicted persons has to say about the circumstances pitted against him by the prosecution. Answers to the questions may sometimes by flat denial or outright repudiation of those circumstances. In certain cases accused would offer some explanations to incriminating circumstances. In very rare instances accused may even admit or own incriminating circumstances adduced against him, perhaps for the purpose of adopting legally recognized defences. In all such cases the Court gets the advantage of knowing his version about those aspects and it helps the Court to effectively appreciate and evaluate the evidence in the case. If an accused admits any incriminating circumstance appearing in evidence against him there is no warrant that those admissions should altogether be ignored merely on the ground that such admissions were advanced as a defence strategy. Sub-section (4) of section 313 of the Code contains necessary support to the legal position that answers given by the accused during such examination are intended to be considered by the Court. The words "may be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial" in sub-section (4) would amount to a legislative guideline for the Court to give due weight to such answers, though it does not that such answers could be made the sole basis of any finding."

CrPC- Sec 313 State of Maharastra Vs Alester Pereria(Bom.High Court, Cr. Appeal 430 of 2007) It is thus well established in law that admission or confession of accused in the statement under section 313 of the Code recorded in the course of trial can be acted upon and the Court can rely on these confessions to proceed to convict him. `Knowledge' is again distinguishable from `reason to believe'. The term 'knowledge' contains higher degree while the term 'reason to believe' is a matter of lesser degree. In the first, the person has direct appeal to his sense, while in the latter, there is sufficient cause to believe. While determining knowledge in relation to an event, the conduct of the person prior to and at the time of the event is of relevant consideration. Actus reus requires that to constitute a crime there must be a result brought about by human conduct, to physical event, which law prohibits. When an individual pursues or follows a line of conduct, he is expected to produce certain results. Final events or results may be the outcome of different events or it may be the result of a single act. If the end result is prohibited in law and if knowledge would have to be construed in the events of that case in relation to the evidence on record, the onus obviously is on the prosecution to prove the chain of acts even to attribute knowledge to the accused. The concept of `knowledge' has to be understood and applied to the facts of a given case in complete contra-distinction to the words `information' or `reasons to believe'. There may be difference of degree but that difference has to be kept in mind, as that alone is the paramount consideration even at the stage of framing charge whether under sections 300, 302 or 304 and for that matter, 304 (I) or (II) of the IPC.

CrPC- Sec 313 Rattan Singh vs State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 768, “Learned counsel for the appellant tried to make out much from the fact that no finger impression of Sheela Devi was found on the gun. We do not find any consequence on account of it in this case. In fact, appellant did not seriously dispute when the trial Judge put the question to him regarding that circumstance during his examination under section 313 of th Code of Criminal Procedure (question no. 25 related to the evidence that gun was produced by Sheela Devi and was taken into possession by the police. The answer was taken into possession by the police. The answer given by the appellant to that question was “I do not know”). Examination of the accused under section 313 of the Code is not a mere formality. Answers given by the accused to the questions put to him during such examination have a practical utility for Criminal Courts. Apart from affording an opportunity to the delinquent to explain incriminating circumstances against him, they would help the court in appreciating the entire evidence adduced in the court during trial. Ex PI – gun- admittedly belongs to the assailant. Therefore, when PW 10 said in court that she succeeded in snatching it from the assailant and she surrendered it to the police, we see no reason to disbelieve her, particularly in view of the evasive answer given by the appellant to the question concerned”

CrPC-Sec 313 Hariram vs State of Maharashtra (1977 Criminal Law Journal 383). The omission to put report of the Director, Central Food Laboratory, to the accused cannot vitiate the proceedings when it is shown that the accused was aware of the report, which was brought to his attention in his statement.

CrPC- Sec 313 Ajit KumarChowdhry vs State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 2058, if the accused denies the recovery then omission to ask further question in relation to the stolen property would not cause any prejudice to the accused as the basic fact already stands denied by the accused.

CrPC- Sec 204 Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (SC) 2004(7) JT 243 “If we analyse the reasons given by this Court in the said case of Mathew then we notice that the said view is based on the following facts : (a) The jurisdiction of the Magistrate to issue process arises only if the complaint contains the allegations involving the commission of a crime; (b) If the process is issued without there being an allegation in the complaint involving the accused in the commission of a crime it is open to the summoned accused to approach the court issuing summons and convince the court that there is no such allegation in the complaint which requires his summoning; (c) For so recalling the order of summons no specific provision of law is required; (d) The order of issuing process is an interim order and not a judgment hence it can be varied or recalled. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused or any material implicating the accused or in contravention of provision of Sections 200 & 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief an aggrieved accused can obtain at that stage is not by invoking Section 203 of the Code because the Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplate a review of an order. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of Code.”

CrPC- Sec 319 Brindaban Das and others Vs.State of West Bengal (S.L.P. (Crl.) NO.6853 of 2006) The fulcrum on which the invocation of Section 319 Cr.P.C. rests is whether the summoning of persons other than the named accused would make such a difference to the prosecution as would enable it not only to prove its case but to also secure the conviction of the persons summoned.

CrPC- Sec 319 Rajender Singh vs. State of U.P. [2007 (7) SCC 378] where it was reiterated that although a person may not have been charge-sheeted by the Investigating Agency or may have been discharged at an earlier stage, the Court could summon such person to face trial if it appeared to the Court that an offence had been committed by such person. It was held that while the decision to proceed or not to proceed against a person under Section 319 of the Code was in the discretion of the Trial Court, the said decision would have to be taken after the Court applied its mind to the evidence before it.

CrPC- Sec 319 Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ram Kishan Rastogi, [1983 (1) SCC 1] "In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the Court that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed have also committed the offence Court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. But, we would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken.”

CrPC- Sec 319 Michael Machado vs. CBI, [2000 (3) SCC 262] where the essential conditions for the exercise of power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. had been considered and it was held that the power under Section 319 vested in the Court should be used sparingly and the evidence on which the same was to be invoked should indicate a reasonable prospect of conviction of the persons to be summoned. This Court went on to hold that mere suspicion of the involvement of the person concerned in the offence was not enough, particularly when a large number of witnesses had been examined and no evidence on which conviction could be ecured had been adduced on behalf of the prosecution.

IPC- sec 304A Kuldeep Singh vs.: State of Himachal Pradesh AIR2008SC3062 the vehicle was being driven at a very high speed. Evidence on record show that more than 50 persons were there in the truck and the appellant was driving the same at a very high speed. One of the witnesses has stated that the truck was being driven as if it was an aeroplane. Therefore, the conviction as recorded cannot be faulted.

Suman Kapur v. Sudhir Kapur , 2008 (4) RCR (Civil) 837 (SC) The husband tried his level best to keep the marriage tie to subsist and made all attempts to persuade the wife explaining and convincing her about the sacred relations of husband and wife, the need and necessity of child in their life and also feelings of his parents who wanted to become grand parents. According to the High Court, however, nothing could persuade the wife who was only after her career. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, the Court held that the trial Court did not commit any error of fact or of law in passing the decree for divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. However, in our opinion, the respondent-husband should not have re-married before the expiry of period stipulated for filling Special Leave to Appeal in this Court by the wife. on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, in our opinion, ends of justice would be met if we direct the respondent-husband to pay an amount of Rs. Five lakhs to the appellant-wife.

Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, 2007(2) RCR (Criminal) 515 (SC) In 24 American Jurisprudence 2d, the term "mental cruelty" has been defined as under : "Mental Cruelty as a course of unprovoked conduct toward one's spouse which causes embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish so as to render the spouse's life miserable and unendurable. The plaintiff must show a course of conduct on the part of the defendant which so endangers the physical or mental health of the plaintiff as to render continued cohabitation unsafe or improper, although the plaintiff need not establish actual instances of physical abuse." Conduct of such a character as to have caused danger to life, limb, or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. [see : Russell v. Russell (1895) P. 315 (CA)]. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system etc. etc. What may be mental cruelty now may not remain a mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any strait-jacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking aforementioned factors in consideration. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive. (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. (viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. (xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilization without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.