Simon & Ors. v. State of Karnataka -2004 (2) SCC 694

“14…………mere identification of an accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. Courts generally look for corroboration of the sole testimony of the witnesses in court so as to fix the identity of the accused who are strangers to them in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. It has also to be borne in mind that the aspect of identification parade belongs to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim a test identification parade. Mere failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. What weight is to be attached to such identification is a matter for the courts of fact to examine. In appropriate cases, it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration……….”

Challamane Huchha Gowda Vs M R Tirumala and Anr 2004(1) SCC 453

CPC - order 21 - execution - setting aside of sell- decree money was deposited by JD and objection to sell was filed before confirmation of sell- no formal application for setting aside was move. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as "It is also a settled position of law that a mere non-mentioning or wrong mentioning of a provision in an application is not a ground to reject an application. Since, there is no bar in treating the objection (filed in the present case) as an application to setting aside the sale."

Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs State of West Bengal, 6 (2004) 3 SCC 349

Hon,ble Court observed as "Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity- seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, court must be careful to see that a body of persons or a member of the public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or othoblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases, with exemplary costs."

In C.M Beena Vs PN Ramachandra Rao 2004 (3) SCC 595

 Hon’ble Supreme Court of India explained a Licence as under

"Only a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms given to the occupant while the owner retains the control or possession over the premises results in a licence being created; for the owner retains legal possession while all that the licensee gets is a permission to use the premises for a particular purpose or in a particular manner and but for the permission so given the occupation would have been unlawful."

Esher Singh Vs State of AP (2004) 11 SCC 585

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under "Crucial words in the provision are "charged and tried". The use of the expression "charged and tried" imposes cumulative conditions. Firstly, the two persons who are the accused and the co- accused in the sense used by the legislature under Section 15, must be charged in the same trial, and secondly, they must be tried together. Kalpnath Rai case has been overruled in Nalini case making the position clear that the confession of a co- accused is substantive evidence."

Pramod Mandal Vs State of Bihar (2004) 13 SCC 150

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under "It is neither possible nor prudent to lay down any invariable rule as to the period within which a test identification parade must be held, or the number of witnesses who must correctly identify the accused, to sustain his conviction. These matters must be left to the courts of fact to decide in the facts and circumstances of each case. If a rule is laid down prescribing a period within which the test identification parade must be held, it would only benefit the professional criminals in whose cases the arrests are delayed as the police have no clear clue about their identity, they being persons unknown to the victims. They, therefore, have only to avoid their arrest for the prescribed period to avoid conviction. Similarly, there may be offences which by their very nature may be witnessed by a single witness, such as rape. The offender may be unknown to the victim and the case depends solely on the identification by the victim, who is otherwise found to be truthful and reliable. What justification can be pleaded to contend that such cases must necessarily result in acquittal because of there being only one identifying witness? Prudence therefore demands that these matters must be left to the wisdom of the courts of fact which must consider all aspects of the matter in the light of the evidence on record before pronouncing upon the acceptability or rejection of such identification.

K Anbazhagan Vs Superintendent of Police (2004) 3 SCC 767

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
“Free and fair trial is sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution. It is trite law that justice should not only be done but it should be seen to have been done. If the criminal trial is not free and fair and not free from bias, judicial fairness and the criminal justice system would be at stake shaking the confidence of the public in the system and woe would be the rule of law. It is important to note that in such a case the question is not whether the petitioner is actually biased but the question is whether the circumstances are such that there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner."

Shanti Kumar Panda Vs Shakuntala Devi (2004) 1 SCC 438

Hon'ble Supreme Court observed-
A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal court.

C.M. BEENA v. P.N. RAMCHANDRA RAO AIR 2004 SC 2103

The suit property is a shop situated on the ground floor of a building known as 'Woodlands Building' on the M.G. Road, Ernakulam. The respondent filed a civil suit seeking issuance of mandatory injunction directing the appellants to hand over vacant possession over the shop to the respondent on the ground that the license to occupy the suit premises was terminated.
According to the respondent the premises in occupation of the appellant is a car parking place. As between the parties there exists a document dated April 1, 1981 executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent which is styled as a deed of licence. The document begins with a recital -- "Whereas licensee is desirous of having the use of the premises for conducting stationery shop in room ............in Woodlands building, intended as car parking space for lodgers at the time of construction". The next Para states -- "And whereas the licensor is willing to grant licence to the licensee in respect of the aforesaid room for the purpose of carrying on business in stationery goods as licensee of the premises".
Evans & Smith state in The Law of Landlord and Tenant (Fourth Edition) - " A lease, because it confers an estate in land, is much more than a mere personal or contractual agreement for the occupation of a freeholder's land by a tenant, A lease, whether fixed-term or periodic, confers a right in property, enabling the tenant to exclude all third parties, including the landlord, from possession, for the duration of the lease, in return for which a rent or periodical payment is reserved out of the land. A contractual licence confers no more than a permission on the occupier to do some act on the owner's land which would otherwise constitute a trespass.
If the effect of the instrument is to give the holder the exclusive right of occupation of the land, though subject to certain reservations, or to a restriction of the purposes for which it may be used, it is prima facie a lease; if the contract is merely for the use of the property in a certain way and on certain terms, while it remains in the possession and under the control of the owner, it is a licence.
It is thus clear that the present one is not a case where the possession or control of the premises was retained by the respondent while the appellant was only permitted to make such use of the premises as would have been unlawful but for the permission given.
The lessors gave notice purporting to terminate the tenancy by the end of the September 1959. They stated in the notice that the lessees had sub-let the premises and that the lessors required the plot for purpose of putting up construction on it.
Before the High Court, the main contention of the appellants was that, since a fresh tenancy by holding over was created by the acceptance of rent by the lessors after the determination of the lease by efflux of time, the appellants were entitled to six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy, as the lease originally granted was for a manufacturing purpose, and therefore, the lease created by the holding over was also for same purpose.
The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy of any kind. If a tenant remains in possession after the determination of the lease, the common law rule is that he is a tenant at sufferance. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without his consent. The former is a tenant holding over or a tenant at will and the latter is a tenant at sufferance in English Law.
If the tenant has the statutory right to remain in possession, and if he pays the rent, that will not normally be referable to an offer for his continuing in possession which can be converted into a contract by acceptance thereof by the landlord. We do not say that the operation of Section 116 is always excluded whatever might be the circumstances under which the tenant pays the rent and the landlord accepts it.
We have already held the whole basis of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is that, in case of normal tenancy, a landlord is entitled, where he does not accept the rent after the notice to quit, to file a suit in ejectment and obtain a decree for possession, and so his acceptance of rent is an unequivocal act referable only to his desire to assent to the tenant continuing in possession. That is not so where Rent Act exists; and if the tenant says that landlord accepted the rent not as statutory tenant but only as legal rent indicating his assent to the tenant's continuing in possession, it is for the tenant to establish it.
If he tenders the rent as the rent payable under the statutory tenancy, the landlord cannot, by accepting it as rent, create a tenancy by holding over. In such a case the parties would not be ad idem and there will be no consensus.

Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi (2004) 1 SCC 438

A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal court. An order passed by the Executive Magistrate in proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code is an order by a criminal court and that too based on a summary enquiry. The order is entitled to respect and wait before the competent court at the interlocutory stage. At the stage of final adjudication of rights, which would be on the evidence adduced before the court, the order of the Magistrate is only one out of several pieces of evidence.

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2004)12 SCC 118

Court explained the scope of "precautionary principle" observing that it requires anticipatory action to be taken to prevent harm. The harm can be prevented even on a reasonable suspicion. It is not always necessary that there should be direct evidence of harm to the environment. The concept of "sustainable development" has been explained that it covers the development that meets the needs of the person without compromising the ability of the future generation to meet their own needs. It means the development, that can take place and which can be sustained by nature/ecology with or without mitigation. In such eventuality, a balance has to be struck, for the reason that if the activity is allowed to go, there may be irreparable damage to the environment and there may be irreparable damage to the economic interest.

Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2004 (10) SCC 657

For Evidence Act sec 27
(1) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mind that the provisions has nothing to do with the question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescription relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make facts discovered admissible.
(2) The fact must be discovered.
(3)The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accused's own act.
(4) The person giving information must be accused of an offence.
(5) He must be in the custody of a police officer.
(6) The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to.
(7) Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the facts discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible.

U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal (2004) 11 SCC 402

allegations of mala-fides must inspire confidence of the Court and ought not to be entertained on the mere asking of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference would ordinarily be made with an order of transfer. That the burden of proving mala-fides is on a person leveling such allegations and the burden is heavy, admits of no legal ambiguity. Mere assertion or bald statement is not enough to discharge the heavy burden that the law imposes upon the person leveling allegations of mala-fides; it must be supported by requisite materials.

Anil Kumar v. State of U.P. (2004) 13 SCC 257

There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to theaccused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent.

Tangerine Electronics Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Chemicals, Mumbai 2004 (1) RCR (Rent) 652 The word "property" has nowhere been defined under the Transfer of Property Act. The Civil Procedure Code also does not define the term "property". The term 'property' possesses a variety of different applications having different degrees and includes, in its widest sense, all a person's legal rights, of whatever description. In its ordinary and general meaning, the property is not only the thing which is subject matter of ownership but also includes dominium or the right of ownership or partial ownership and it indicates and describes every possible interest which a party can have, and will include any benefit that a person is entitled to take out of the property of another. A lease, in the generic sense, is the form of encumbrance which consists in a right to the possession and use of the property owned by some other person. From this definition of word "lease", it is clear that lease creates an interest in the property and unless there is a transfer of such interest, there can be no lease. The creation of an interest in the immovable property is a test to determine whether the transaction is lease. Thus, it is a transfer of right to enjoy the property leased and by way of lease, the lessee gets the tight to remain in occupation of the premises on payment of rent. It cannot be seriously disputed that tenant's right to remain in occupation of the non-residential tenanted premises is a property.31. It would be seen from Section 60 that all saleable property which belongs to the judgment-debtor may be attached and sold in execution of the decree against him subject to Proviso to sub-Section (1). Similarly, the saleable property over which the judgment-debtor has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefits may also be attached and sold. Property may not belong to the judgment-debtor and yet he may have a disposing power over it exercisable for his own benefit. In such cases, the property is liable to attachment and sale subject to proviso to sub-Section (1). From what we have discussed above, it is clear that the tenancy right of the non-residential premises is a property and is saleable within the meaning of Section 60 of Civil Procedure Code. There was no bar whatsoever under sub- Section (1) of Section 15 to attach and sell the leasehold interest of a lessee in the premises leased out for non-residential purpose. that the tenant's right to remain in occupation of the non-residential premises governed by the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 is a property; such property is saleable and the tenant has disposing power over the interest of tenancy for his benefit and in view thereof, we hold that the interest of the tenant of non-residential premises to which the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 applies is attachable and saleable in execution of the decree against the tenant.

CPC- Sec 34 Clariant International Ltd. v. Securities & Exchange Board of India, (2004) 8 SCC 524 the interest can be awarded in terms of an agreement or statutory provisions and it can also be awarded by reason of usage or trade having the force of law or on equitable considerations but the same cannot be awarded by way of damages except in cases where money due is wrongfully withheld and there are equitable grounds therefor, for which a written demand is mandatory. It was further held that in absence of any agreement or statutory provision or a mercantile usage, interest payable can be only at the market rate and such interest is payable upon establishment of totality of circumstances justifying exercise of such equitable jurisdiction. It was also held that in ascertaining the rate of interest the courts of law can take judicial notice of both inflation as also fall in bank rate of interest. The bank rate of interest both for commercial purposes and other purposes has been the subject-matter of statutory provisions as also the judge-made laws

CrPC –Sec 239 Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, (SC) 2004 CriLJ 4609 The next challenge of the learned counsel for the appellant made to the finding of the High Court that once a plea is recorded in a summons case it is not open to the accused person to seek a discharge cannot also be accepted. The case involving a summons case is covered by Chapter XX of the Code which does not contemplates a stage of discharge like Section 239 which provides for a discharge in a warrant case. Therefore, in our opinion the High Court was correct in coming to the conclusion once the plea of the accused is recorded under Section 252 of the Code the procedure contemplated under Chapter XX has to be followed which is to take the trial to its logical conclusion. As observed by us in Adalat Prasad's case the only remedy available to an aggrieved accused to challenge an order in an interlocutory stage is the extraordinary remedy under Section 482 of the Code and not by way of an application to recall the summons or to seek discharge which is not contemplated in the trial of a summons case.