CBI is not an authority

In Sh Navendra Kumar Vs UOI, Gauhati High Court on 08.10.13 declared constitution of CBI as ultra virus and also explains what is an obiter dictum as under,

“So far as constitution of police force is concerned, Union and the State, both have legislative competence to enact laws on ‘ police’. However, so far as law, enacted by Parliament, is concerned, it can operate only in the ‘Union territories’ and not in any ‘ State’, because ‘police’ is a subject falling under State List”

“The State, in D Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik Vs State of AP AIR 1974 SC 2092 which had acted on executive instructions in installing live high-voltage wire on the walls of the jail, could not justify installation of this mechanism on the basis of a ‘law’ or ‘ procedure established by law’ inasmuch as the executive instructions, which had been acted upon, were held by the Supreme Court to be not a ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a) nor could these instructions, according to the Supreme Court, fall within the expression, “procedure established by law’, as envisaged by Article 21.”

“The elaborate discussions on the concepts of ratio decidendi and obiter dicta, made in the cases pointed above, can be summarized as follows:

(a) A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is the essence, in a decision, is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or the principles on which a question before a Court has been decided, is alone binding as a precedent.

(b) In a given case, two questions may arise before a Court for its determination. The Court may determine both, although only one of them may be necessary for the ultimate decision of the case. The question, which was necessary for the determination of the case would be the 'ratio decidendi' . However, the opinion of the tribunal on the question, which was not necessary to decide the case would be only an 'obiter dictum'.

(c) ‘Obiter dictum’ is made as argument or illustration, as pertinent to other cases as to the one on hand, and which may enlighten or convince, but which in no sense are a part of the judgment in[…]”

Selvi J Jayalalithaa & Ors Vs State of Karnataka & Ors

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.154 of 2013 decided on 30.9.2013 as
“Fair trial is the main object of criminal procedure and such fairness should not be hampered or threatened in any manner. Fair trial entails the interests of the accused, the victim and of the society. Thus, fair trial must be accorded to every accused in the spirit of right to life and personal liberty and the accused must get a free and fair, just and reasonable trial on the charge imputed in a criminal case. Any breach or violation of public rights and duties adversely affects the community as a whole and it becomes harmful to the society in general.”

Read Full Judgement Here

Can a lady be prosecuted for gang rape?

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed in Priya Patel vs State Of M.P. & And on 12 July, 2006 as  “A bare reading of Section 375 makes the position clear that rape can be committed only by a man. The section itself provides as to when a man can be said to have committed rape. Section 376(2) makes certain categories of serious cases of rape as enumerated therein attract more severe punishment. One of them relates to "gang rape". The language of sub-section(2)(g) provides that "whoever commits 'gang rape" shall be punished etc.

The Explanation only clarifies that when a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention each such person shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within this sub-section (2). That cannot make a woman guilty of committing rape. This is conceptually inconceivable. The Explanation only indicates that when one or more persons act in furtherance of their common intention to rape a woman, each person of the group shall be deemed to have committed gang rape.

By operation of the deeming provision, a person who has not actually committed rape is deemed to have committed rape even if only one of the group in furtherance of the common intention”

“A woman cannot be said to have an intention to commit rape. Therefore, the counsel for the appellant is right in her submission that the appellant cannot be prosecuted for alleged commission of the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g).

The residual question is whether she can be charged for abetment. This is an aspect which has not been dealt with by the Trial Court or the High Court. If in law, it is permissible and the facts warrant such a course to be adopted, it is for the concerned court to act in accordance with law. We express no opinion in that regard.”

Thus a lady cannot be prosecuted for rape even with the help of sec 34 (common intention) but whether she can be prosecuted for abetment left undecided.

Read Full Judgement Here

Dr Rajesh Talwar & Anr Vs CB

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India while dismissing an application of accused u/s 233 CrPC to call certain witnesses observed on 08.10.2013 as “We might note that criminal courts are not obliged to accede to the request made by any party to entertain and allow application for additional evidence and in fact, are bound in terms of Section 233(3) Cr.PC. to refuse such request if it appears that they are made in order to vex the proceedings or delay the same”

Read Full Judgment Here

meager sentences.. counter productive in the long run

Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed and Anr Vs State of Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as 

“99.….The object of awarding appropriate sentence should be to protect the society and to deter the criminal from achieving the avowed object to law by imposing appropriate sentence. It is expected that the courts would operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence, which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be.

Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counter productive in the long run and against the interest of society which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.

100. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime and the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is “not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which both the criminal and the victim belong”

Just punishment is the collective cry of the society

Gopal Singh Vs State of Uttarakhand JT 2013 (3) SC 444 Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as 

“18. Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence”

A team whose goal is justice

Ram Chander Vs State Of Haryana AIR 1991 SC 1036 

Evidence Act- sec 165- power of court to ask question- role of court in evidence

"“If a Criminal Court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the presiding judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine. He must become a participant in the trial by evincing intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth. The Court has wide powers and must actively participate in the trial to elicit the truth and to protect the weak and the innocent. It is the duty of a judge to discover the truth and for that purpose he may "ask any question, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact, relevant or irrelevant". But this he must do, without unduly trespassing upon the functions of the public prosecutor and the defence counsel, without any hint of partisanship and without appearing to frighten, coerce, confuse, intimidate or bully witnesses. He must take the prosecution and the defence with him. The Court. the prosecution and the defence must work as a team whose goal is justice, a team whose captain is the judge. The judge, like the conductor of a choir, must, by force of personality personality, induce his team to work in harmony; subdue the raucous, encourage the timid, conspire with the young, flatter and old”

sentence should reflect the crime

Hazara Singh vs Raj Kumar Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed on 18.04.13 as

“The cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that the sentence imposed on an offender should reflect the crime he has committed and it should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence.”

“If acquittal of some co-accused casts a cloud of doubt over the entire prosecution case, the whole case may be rejected. But we fail to understand how acquittal of some of the accused can have any relevance to the question of sentence awarded to those who are convicted.”

“Mr Jain said that the High Court has enhanced the fine and compensated the injured and, therefore, we should not enhance the sentence. Accepting such a submission would mean that if your pockets can afford, commit serious crime, offer to pay heavy fine and escape entacles of law. Power of wealth need not extend to overawe court processes.”

Disposal of case property- how to prove

AIR 2003 SC 638 Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai and C M Mudaliar Vs State of Gujarat Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as 

“In our view, the powers under Section 451 Cr.P.C. should be exercised expeditiously and judiciously. It would serve various purposes, namely:--

1. Owner of the article would not suffer because of its remaining unused or by its misappropriation;

2. Court or the police would not be required to keep the article in safe custody;

3. If the proper panchnama before handing over possession of article is prepared, that can be used in evidence instead of its production before the Court during the trial. If necessary, evidence could also be recorded describing the nature of the property in detail; and

4. This jurisdiction of the Court to record evidence should be exercised promptly so that there may not be further chance of tampering with the articles."

“For this purpose, if material on record indicates that such articles belong to the complainant at whose house theft, robbery or dacoity has taken place, then seized articles be handed over to the complainant after:--

(1) preparing detailed proper panchnama of such articles;

(2) taking photographs of such articles and a bond that such articles would be produced if required at the time of trial; and  (3) after taking proper security.

13. For this purpose, the Court may fol ow the procedure of recording such evidence, as it thinks necessary, as provided under Section 451 Cr.P.C. The bond and security should be taken so as to prevent the evidence being lost, altered or destroyed. The Court should see that photographs of such articles are attested or countersigned by the complainant, accused as well as by the person to whom the custody is handed over. Still however, it would be the function of the Court under Section 451 Cr.P.C. to impose any other appropriate condition.”

“In any case, such articles should be produced before the Magistrate within a week of their seizure. If required, the Court may direct that such articles be handed over back to the Investigating Officer for further investigation and identification. However, in no set of circumstances, the Investigating Officer should keep such articles in custody for a longer period for the purpose of investigation and identification. For currency notes, similar procedure can be followed”

“For articles such as seized liquor also, prompt action should be taken in disposing it of after preparing necessary panchnama. If sample is required to be taken, sample may kept properly after sending it to the chemical analyser, if required. But in no case, large quantity of liquor should be stored at the police station. No purpose is served by such storing.

20. Similarly for the Narcotic drugs also....”

“In our view, no further directions are required to be given in these matters.

However, it is made clear that in case where accused disputes that he is not involved in the alleged incident and no article was found from him then such endorsement be taken on the photograph. Further with regard to the vehicle also, it is made clear that there may not be any necessity of producing the vehicle before the Court and the seizure Report may be sufficient”

Delay in lodging the FIR

In State of H P Vs Gian Chand (2001) 6 SCC 71 Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as,

“Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the court on its guard to search if any explanation has been offered “for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution case”

Sunil Mehta & Anr Vs State of Gujarat & Anr

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed on 20.02.13
CrPC 1973 - Chapter XV & Part B of Chapter XIX - Whether depositions of the complainant and his witnesses recorded before cognizance is taken by the Magistrate would constitute evidence for the Magistrate to frame charges against the accused? - No

OMA @ Omprakash & Anr Vs State of Tamil Nadu

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India -on 18.12.12- in this case Session Court had observed, “In this case, the accused came from a state about
2000 k.m. from our state and they did not think that
the victims were also human like them but they thought only about the well being of their family and
their own life and committed the fear of death amongst the common public of our state by committing robbery and murder for about 11 years.
Therefore, this court is of the opinion that the death sentence that would be imposed on them would create a fear amongst the criminals who commit such crime and further this case is a rarest of rare
case that calls for the imposition of death sentence.” -
The ‘special reasons’ weighed with the trial judge to say the least, was only one’s predilection or
inclination to award death sentence, purely judge-centric.
Learned judge has not discussed the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances of this case, the approach was purely ‘crimecentric’.... We are really surprised to note the “special reasons” stated by the trial judge in para 36(b) of the judgment. We fail to see why we import the criminal jurisprudence of America or the Arab
countries to our system. Learned trial judge speaks of sentence like “lynching” and described that it has attained legal form in America. Lynching means kill someone for an alleged offence
without a legal trial, especially by hanging....
We are also not concerned with the question whether the
criminals have come from 20 km away or 2000 km away.
Learned judge says that they have come to “our state”, forgetting the fact that there is nothing like ‘our state’ or ‘your state’. Such parochial attitude shall not influence or sway a judicial mind.
Learned judge has further stated, since the accused persons had come from a far away state, about 2000 km to “our state” for
committing robbery and murder, death sentence would be
imposed on them. Learned judge has adopted a very strange
reasoning, needs fine tuning and proper training....
Learned trial judge has also opined that the imposition of death sentence under Section 396 of the IPC is the only weapon in the hands of judiciary under the prevailing law to help to eliminate the crime. Judiciary has neither any weapon in its hands nor uses it to eliminate crimes. Duty of the judge is to decide cases which come before him in accordance with the constitution and laws, following the settled judicial precedents. A
Judge is also part of the society where he lives and also conscious of what is going on in the society. Judge has no weapon or sword. Judge’s greatest strength is the trust and confidence of the people, whom he serves. We may point out that clear reasoning and analysis are the basic requirements in a judicial decision.
Judicial decision is being perceived by the parties and by the society in general as being the result of a correct application of the legal rules, proper evaluation of facts based on settled judicial
precedents and judge shall not do anything which will undermine the faith of the people.

Bhajju alias Karan Singh Vs State of Madhya Pradesh -(2012) 4 SCC 327

A two-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as
“Normally, when a witness deposes
contrary to the stand of the prosecution
and his own statement recorded under
Section 161 CrPC, the prosecutor, with
the permission of the court, can pray to
the court for declaring that witness
hostile and for granting leave to crossexamine the said witness. If such a
permission is granted by the court then
the witness is subjected to crossexamination by the prosecutor as well as an opportunity is provided to the
defence to cross-examine such
witnesses, if he so desires. In other
words, there is a limited examination-inchief, cross-examination by the
prosecutor and cross-examination by
the counsel for the accused. It is
admissible to use the examination-inchief
as well as the cross-examination of the said witness insofar as it supports
the case of the prosecution.”

Court on its own motion (LAJJA DEVI) through: NEMO Vs State

Hon'ble High Court of delhi observed as on 27.07.12

1) Whether a marriage contracted by a boy with a female of less than 18 years and a male of less than 21 year could
be said to be valid marriage and the custody of the said girl be given to the husband (if he is not in custody)?
2) Whether a minor can be said to have reached the age of discretion and thereby walk away from the lawful guardianship of her parents and refuse to go in their
custody?
3) If yes, can she be kept in the protective custody of the State?
4) Whether the FIR under Section 363 IPC or even 376 IPC can be quashed on the basis of the statement of such a minor that she has contracted the marriage of her own?
5) Whether there may be other presumptions also which may arise?”

In such circumstances, allowing the husband to consummate a marriage may
not be appropriate more so when the purpose and rationale behind the PCM
Act, 2006 is that there should be a marriage of a child at a tender age as he
or she is not psychologically or medically fit to get married. There is another important aspect which is to be borne in mind. Such a marriage, after all, is voidable and the girl child still has right to approach the Court seeking to exercise her option to get the marriage declared as void till she attains the age of 20 years.
Answers to question-

1- voidable and PCM override HMA
2&3- yes but not for long period and free if above 20 - and it's on case to case basis
4&5- no

Rajendra Shrivastava Vs State of Maharashtra, (2010) 112 BomLR 762

Whether sc & st act may be add with sec 498a- Hon'ble High Court of Bombay observed as
“When a woman born in a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe marries to a person belonging to a forward caste, her caste by birth does not change by virtue of the marriage. A person born as a member of a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe has to suffer from disadvantages, disabilities and indignities only by virtue of belonging to the particular caste which he or she acquires involuntarily on birth. The suffering of such a person by virtue of caste is not wiped out by a marriage with the person belonging to a forward caste. The label attached to a person born into a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe continues notwithstanding the marriage. No material has been placed before us by the applicant so as to point out that the caste of a person can be changed either by custom, usage, religious sanction or provision of law.”

Simon & Ors. v. State of Karnataka -2004 (2) SCC 694

“14…………mere identification of an accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. Courts generally look for corroboration of the sole testimony of the witnesses in court so as to fix the identity of the accused who are strangers to them in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. It has also to be borne in mind that the aspect of identification parade belongs to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim a test identification parade. Mere failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. What weight is to be attached to such identification is a matter for the courts of fact to examine. In appropriate cases, it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration……….”

Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs State of West Bengal 2012 STPL(Web) 584 SC

JJ Act - determination of age- we say a word about the argument raised on behalf of the State of Bihar that claim of juvenility cannot be raised before this Court after disposal of the case. The argument is so hopeless that it deserves no discussion. The expression, ‘any court’ in Section 7A is too wide and comprehensive; it includes this Court. Supreme Court Rules surely do not limit the operation of Section 7A to the courts other than this Court where the plea of juvenility is raised for the first time after disposal of the case. 36. Now, we summarise the position which is as under: (i) A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage even after final disposal of the case. It may be raised for the first time before this Court as well after final disposal of the case. The delay in raising the claim of juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of such claim. The claim of juvenility can be raised in appeal even if not pressed before the trial court and can be raised for the first time before this Court though not pressed before the trial court and in appeal court. (ii) For making a claim with regard to juvenility after conviction, the claimant must produce some material which may prima facie satisfy the court that an inquiry into the claim of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has to be discharged by the person who claims juvenility. (iii) As to what materials would prima facie satisfy the court and/or are sufficient for discharging the initial burden cannot be catalogued nor can it be laid down as to what weight should be given to a specific piece of evidence which may be sufficient to raise presumption of juvenility but the documents referred to in Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall definitely be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court about the age of the delinquent necessitating further enquiry under Rule 12. The statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code is too tentative and may not by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject the claim of juvenility. The credibility and/or acceptability of the documents like the school leaving certificate or the voters’ list, etc. obtained after conviction would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be prescribed that they must be prima facie accepted or rejected. In Akbar Sheikh2 and Pawan8 these documents were not found prima facie credible while in Jitendra Singh10 the documents viz., school leaving certificate, marksheet and the medical report were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry and verification of the appellant’s age. If such documents prima facie inspire confidence of the court, the court may act upon such documents for the purposes of Section 7A and order an enquiry for determination of the age of the delinquent. (iv) An affidavit of the claimant or any of the parents or a sibling or a relative in support of the claim of juvenility raised for the first time in appeal or revision or before this Court during the pendency of the matter or after disposal of the case shall not be sufficient justifying an enquiry to determine the age of such person unless the circumstances of the case are so glaring that satisfy the judicial conscience of the court to order an enquiry into determination of age of the delinquent. (v) The court where the plea of juvenility is raised for the first time should always be guided by the objectives of the 2000 Act and be alive to the position that the beneficent and salutary provisions contained in 2000 Act are not defeated by hyper-technical approach and the persons who are entitled to get benefits of 2000 Act get such benefits. The courts should not be unnecessarily influenced by any general impression that in schools the parents/guardians understate the age of their wards by one or two years for future benefits or that age determination by medical examination is not very precise. The matter should be considered prima facie on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. (vi) Claim of juvenility lacking in credibility or frivolous claim of juvenility or patently absurd or inherently improbable claim of juvenility must be rejected by the court at threshold whenever raised.....
Suffice it to say that while affidavits may not be generally accepted as a good enough basis for directing an enquiry, that they are not so accepted is not a rule of law but a rule of prudence. The Court would, therefore, in each case weigh the relevant factors, insist upon filing of better affidavits if the need so arises, and even direct, any additional information considered relevant including information regarding the age of the parents, the age of siblings and the like, to be furnished before it decides on a case to case basis whether or not an enquiry under Section 7A ought to be conducted. It will eventually depend on how the court evaluates such material for a prima facie conclusion that the Court may or may not direct an enquiry.

Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs State of West Bengal 2012 STPL(Web) 584 SC

JJ Act - determination of age- we say a word about the argument raised on behalf of the State of Bihar that claim of juvenility cannot be raised before this Court after disposal of the case. The argument is so hopeless that it deserves no discussion. The expression, ‘any court’ in Section 7A is too wide and comprehensive; it includes this Court. Supreme Court Rules surely do not limit the operation of Section 7A to the courts other than this Court where the plea of juvenility is raised for the first time after disposal of the case. 36. Now, we summarise the position which is as under: (i) A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage even after final disposal of the case. It may be raised for the first time before this Court as well after final disposal of the case. The delay in raising the claim of juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of such claim. The claim of juvenility can be raised in appeal even if not pressed before the trial court and can be raised for the first time before this Court though not pressed before the trial court and in appeal court. (ii) For making a claim with regard to juvenility after conviction, the claimant must produce some material which may prima facie satisfy the court that an inquiry into the claim of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has to be discharged by the person who claims juvenility. (iii) As to what materials would prima facie satisfy the court and/or are sufficient for discharging the initial burden cannot be catalogued nor can it be laid down as to what weight should be given to a specific piece of evidence which may be sufficient to raise presumption of juvenility but the documents referred to in Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall definitely be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court about the age of the delinquent necessitating further enquiry under Rule 12. The statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code is too tentative and may not by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject the claim of juvenility. The credibility and/or acceptability of the documents like the school leaving certificate or the voters’ list, etc. obtained after conviction would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be prescribed that they must be prima facie accepted or rejected. In Akbar Sheikh2 and Pawan8 these documents were not found prima facie credible while in Jitendra Singh10 the documents viz., school leaving certificate, marksheet and the medical report were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry and verification of the appellant’s age. If such documents prima facie inspire confidence of the court, the court may act upon such documents for the purposes of Section 7A and order an enquiry for determination of the age of the delinquent. (iv) An affidavit of the claimant or any of the parents or a sibling or a relative in support of the claim of juvenility raised for the first time in appeal or revision or before this Court during the pendency of the matter or after disposal of the case shall not be sufficient justifying an enquiry to determine the age of such person unless the circumstances of the case are so glaring that satisfy the judicial conscience of the court to order an enquiry into determination of age of the delinquent. (v) The court where the plea of juvenility is raised for the first time should always be guided by the objectives of the 2000 Act and be alive to the position that the beneficent and salutary provisions contained in 2000 Act are not defeated by hyper-technical approach and the persons who are entitled to get benefits of 2000 Act get such benefits. The courts should not be unnecessarily influenced by any general impression that in schools the parents/guardians understate the age of their wards by one or two years for future benefits or that age determination by medical examination is not very precise. The matter should be considered prima facie on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. (vi) Claim of juvenility lacking in credibility or frivolous claim of juvenility or patently absurd or inherently improbable claim of juvenility must be rejected by the court at threshold whenever raised.....
Suffice it to say that while affidavits may not be generally accepted as a good enough basis for directing an enquiry, that they are not so accepted is not a rule of law but a rule of prudence. The Court would, therefore, in each case weigh the relevant factors, insist upon filing of better affidavits if the need so arises, and even direct, any additional information considered relevant including information regarding the age of the parents, the age of siblings and the like, to be furnished before it decides on a case to case basis whether or not an enquiry under Section 7A ought to be conducted. It will eventually depend on how the court evaluates such material for a prima facie conclusion that the Court may or may not direct an enquiry.

Accused are entitled for legal aid at each stage of proceedings

in Rajoo @ Ramakant vs State Of MP on 9 August, 2012 Hon'ble Madan B Lakur, Judge Supreme court of India
"we are of the opinion that neither the Constitution nor the Legal Services Authorities Act makes any distinction between a trial and an appeal for the purposes of providing free legal aid to an accused or a person in custody. We are also of the view that the High Court was under an obligation to enquire from Rajoo whether he required legal assistance and if he did, it should have been provided to him at State expense. However, since the record of the case does not indicate any such endeavour having been made by the High Court, this case ought to be re- heard by the High Court after providing Rajoo an opportunity of obtaining legal representation."

State of U P Vs Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as
“18. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail [see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)]. While a vague allegation that the accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused. We may also refer to the following principles relating to grant or refusal of bail stated in 22. While a detailed examination of the evidence is to be avoided while considering the question of bail, to ensure that there is no prejudging and no prejudice, a brief examination to be satisfied about the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case is necessary.”