Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

"A landlord of a premises governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is entitled to have increase(s) in rent only in accordance with Section 6A and 8 thereof and not otherwise; such a landlord cannot approach the civil vourt contending that the rent stands increased or should be increased in accordance with the inflation or cost price index," the bench observed.
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Nagjee Purushotham and Co Ltd. Vs Vimalabai Prabhulal and Ors (2005) 8 SCC 252

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under "It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business."

PUNNU RAM v. CHIRANJI LAL GUPTA (DEAD) BY LRS. AIR 1999 SC 1094

the only question involved is whether the factors laid down in Section 19(4) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act') are to be read as cumulatively or alternatively.
High Court was right in holding that the factors which are mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 19 are to be taken into account as alternative factors.

LAL CHAND v. RADHA KRISHAN AIR 1977 SC 789

The fact that Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot apply on its terms, the earlier proceedings before the competent authority not being a suit, is no answer to the extension of the principle underlying that section to the instant case. Section 11, it is long since settled, is not exhaustive and the principle which motivates that section can be extended to cases which do not fall strictly within the letter of the law. The issues involved in the two proceedings are identical, those issues arise as between the same parties and thirdly, the issue now sought to be raised was decided finally by a competent quasi-judicial tribunal. The principle of res judicata is conceived in the larger public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end. The principle is also founded on equity, justice and good conscience which require that a party which has once succeeded on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by a multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same issue. Were it permissible to bring suits of the present nature, the beneficial jurisdiction conferred on the competent authority by the Slum Clearance Act would become illusory and meaningless for, whether the competent authority grants or refuses permission to execute a decree for eviction, it would always be open to the landlord to enforce the ejectment decree by filing a substantive suit for possession. Verily, the respondent is executing the eviction decree by instalments, now under the garb of a suit. Apart from the fact that the suit is barred on account of principles analogous to res judicata, it is plainly in violation of the injunction contained in Section 19(1)(b) of the Slum Clearance Act, if regard is to be had to the substance and not to the form of the proceedings. 19.

C.R. ABROL v. ADMINISTRATOR UNDER THE SLUM AREAS (1970) R.C.J 899

The twin objects of the Act as spelt out in its long title is “the improvement and clearance of slum areas, and the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction.” While the rest of the Act is concerned with the improvement and clearance of the slum areas, Chapter VI thereof is concerned with the protection of tenants in slum areas from eviction.
The protection given by Section 19 is available only to tenants. The Act does not define either “landlord” or “tenant”. It is clear, therefore, that the relationship of landlord and tenant has to be determined according to the general law.
In our view, therefore, Section 19 applies only to proceedings between the landlord and tenant.
Section 19 has given jurisdiction to the Competent Authority to decide a certain question. Jurisdiction would be made largely infructuous if a mere denial of the relationship by the alleged tenants could put the Competent Authority out of action and unable to proceed further. Therefore the second course which is the only possible one in the circumstances, and which must be adopted by the Competent Authority, is to determine whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties.

PUKHRAJ JAIN v. PADMA KASHYAP AIR 1990 SC 77

Tenant inducted in 1979, for three years, by the landlord under a written agreement, in C-4/33, Safdarjang Development Area, New Delhi, with permission of Controller under Section 21 of Delhi Rent Control Act (for brevity the 'Act') seeks leave of this Court on limited question of law if proceedings for recovery of possession under Section 21 of the Act could be initiated and continued by legal representatives of the landlord who had obtained permission but who died before expiry of period of tenancy. Answer of it shall depend, primarily, on construction of word 'landlord' used in Section 21.
Is there any justification for construing the word "landlord" in a narrow sense so as to restrict it, only, to the person who made the application and obtained permission. "Landlord" has been defined in Section 2(e). Expression, "for the time being" makes it clear, that landlord has to be understood in praesenti. That is anyone entitled to receive rent is the landlord. It does not visualise past or future landlord. Therefore, the word "landlord", on plain reading of Section 21 does not warrant construction of the word in any other manner. Basis for submission, however, that landlord in second part of Section 21 entitling him to claim vacant possession should be confined to the person who obtained permission was founded on use of expression, "who does not require the whole or any part of the premises for a particular period". Attempt was made to personalise eviction proceedings by linking it with the person.
Vacation is not linked with landlord but with time. Expiry of it obliges tenant to vacate. If he does not then the landlord may approach Controller for putting him in vacant possession. Which landlord? Obviously whosoever is the landlord at affected.
Even otherwise an action for eviction abates only if the cause of action does not survive. What is the cause of action for an application for vacant possession in Section 21 : death of landlord or expiry of time for which tenancy was created. Obviously the latter, the failure of tenant to honour his commitment to vacate the premises after expiry of time for which he was inducted with permission of Controller.

Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam AIR 1974 SC 471

The question was whether a compromise decree for eviction could be passed because the Rent Act enjoined the eviction only on the satisfaction of the court. The respondent landlord in that case instituted a suit under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 for possession against the tenant on two grounds, namely, arrears in payment of rent and bona fide requirement of the premises for personal use and occupation. A compromise decree was passed. When the appellant applied for execution of the decree the tenant contended that the compromise decree had been passed by the Rent Court without satisfying itself as to the existence of grounds of eviction under the Act and hence being a nullity was not executable. It was held by this Court that the public policy permeating this Act was the protection of tenants against unreasonable eviction. Construing the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 28 of the Act in the light of the said policy, it should be held that the Rent Court under the Act was not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground which was de hors the Act or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the statutory grounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13 was a sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court. Parties by their consent could not confer jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which, according to the legislative mandate, it could not do.

Vijay Kumar Bajaj v. Inder Sain Minocha AIR 1982 Del. 260

In that decision, in the light of Section 21, the following questions were posed: (1) Whether the permission under Section 21 of the Act is invalid in view of Supreme Court judgment in S.B. Noronah case if reasons for not requiring the premises by the landlord for a particular period are not disclosed in his application or his statement before the Controller? (2) Whether before or after permission execution of any agreement in writing to let the premises for the fixed period is necessary, if so, whether such a document requires registration? (3) Whether the proposed agreement of tenancy in writing submitted along with the application under Section 21 of the Act, in this appeal required registration?” The questions were answered by the High Court as follows: (1) Not necessarily. The landlord or the tenant may be able to show that cogent reasons did exist or were within the knowledge of the parties as to why the landlord did not require the whole or a part of his premises for a specified period. (2) No registration is necessary. The agreement in writing may be entered into either before or after grant of permission. (3) An agreement in writing submitted along with the application under Section 21 of the Act is really a proposed agreement. It comes into effect only after the grant of permission under Section 21 of the Act. It does not require registration.

INDER MOHAN LAL v. RAMESH KHANNA AIR 1987 SC 1986

The Rent Controller after recording the statements of the appellant and the respondent made an order permitting creation of limited tenancy only for a period of two years to residential purposes to which the respondent had agreed upon. It may be material to refer to the fact that the appellant in his application under Section 21 of the Rent Act had stated as follows: “I do not require the premises for a period of two years from July 15, 1976. The purpose of letting shall be residential only and the premises are shown in the site plan Ex. A-1. The proposed agreement is Ex. A-2. Limited tenancy under Section 21 of the Act may be allowed to be created for the said period.”
question, therefore, that arises for consideration of this Court is whether in view of the requirements of Section 21 of the Rent Act, was the permission invalid?
Section 21 of the Rent Act reads as follows: “ Where a landlord does not require the whole or any part of any premises for a particular period, and the landlord, after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner, lets the whole of the premises or part thereof as a residence for such period as may be agreed to in writing between the landlord and the tenant and the tenant does not, on the expiry of the said period, vacate such premises, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the landlord within such time as may be prescribed, place the landlord in vacant possession of the premises or part thereof by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation of such premises. 12. An analysis of this section makes it clear that in order to attract Section 21; the first condition is that the landlord does not require the whole or part of any premises for a particular period. If that condition is fulfilled then the said landlord after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner lets the whole of the premises or part thereof as a residence for such period as may be agreed to in writing between the landlord and the tenant does not on the expiry of the said period, vacate such premises, then notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the landlord within such time as may be prescribed, order the eviction of the tenant. Therefore the first condition must be that the landlord must not require the premises either in whole or part of any premises for a particular period. Secondly, the landlord must obtain the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner. Thirdly, letting of the whole or part of the premises must be for residence. Fourthly, such letting out must be for such period as may be agreed in writing.
The sanction granted under Section 21, if it has been procured by fraud and collusion cannot withstand invalidity because, otherwise, high public policy will be given as hostage to successful collusion. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked to render valid a proceeding which the legislature has on grounds of public policy subjected to mandatory conditions which are shown to be absent. As between unequals the law steps in and as against statutes there is no estoppel, especially where collusion and fraud are made out and high purpose is involved.
There must not be any fraud or collusion. There is a presumption of regularity. But it is open in particular facts and circumstances of the case to prove to the satisfaction of the executing court that there was no (sic) collusion or conspiracy between the landlord and the tenant and the landlord did not mean what he said or that it was a fraud or that the tenant agreed because the tenant was wholly unequal to the landlord. In the instant case none of these conditions were fulfilled. There is no evidence in this case that when the landlord stated that he did not require the premises in question for a particular period, he did not mean what he stated or that he made a false statement.
It is not necessary to state under Section 21 the reasons why the landlord did not require the premises in question for any particular period. Nor is there any presumption that in all cases the tenants are the weaker sections. the permission was valid and the order permitting limited tenancy was not a mindless order but one passed after application of the mind taking the two relevant facts under Section 21 of the Act into consideration, it is not necessary to discuss these decisions any further. In view of the fact that Section 21 is a code by itself, no question of any further agreement in writing which has to be registered arises.

SHRI MUNSHI RAM v. UNION OF INDIA AIR 2000 SC 2623

The tenanted premises are part of building constructed on the land leased to the original lessee by Delhi Improvement Trust. The DDA succeeded the said Trust. The perpetual lease, inter alia, provides that the lessee will not use the land and building that may be erected thereon during the terms of the lease for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential house without the consent in writing of the lessor. Admittedly the premises are being used by the appellants for commercial purposes.
Dr. K. Madan v. Krishnawati (Smt.) [AIR 1997SC 579] any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or Municipal Corporation of Delhi, then the landlord will be entitled to recovery of possession under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act and that Sub-section (11) of Section 14 of the Act enables the Controller to give another opportunity to the tenant to avoid an order of eviction. The first opportunity to the tenant is given when the notice is served on him by the landlord and the second opportunity is given when a conditional order under Section 14(11) of the Act is passed directing the tenant to pay the amount by way of compensation for regularisation of user up to the date of stopping the misuser and further directing stoppage of unauthorised user.
DDA is insisting on stoppage of misuser. The misuser is contrary to the terms of lease. The DDA cannot be directed to permit continued misuser contrary to the terms of the lease on the ground that zonal development plan of the area has not been framed.

FAQIR CHAND v. SHRI RAM RATTAN BHANOT AIR 1973 SC 921

The respondents are landlords of two houses in the Karol Bagh area of Delhi. The houses are built on lands given on long lease by the Delhi Improvement Trust to the rights, liabilities and assets of which the Delhi Development Authority has since succeeded. 3. Under the terms of the lease, subject to revision of rent, the lessees were to put up residential buildings on the leased lands and the lessees undertook: (vi) not to use the said land and buildings that may be erected thereon during the said term for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential house without the consent in writing of the said lessor; provided that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose other than that for which the lease is granted not being a purpose subsequently approved by the lessor ….
Buildings had been put to commercial use even before 1957 when the Delhi Development Authority Act of 1957 came into force.
Question that arises for decision in these cases is this: Are the landlords estopped or otherwise prohibited from getting possession of the property from the tenants because they themselves had let it out for commercial purposes.
The only situation in which it can take effect is where the lease is for a commercial purpose agreed upon by both the landlord and the tenant but that is contrary to the terms of the lease of the land in favour of the landlord. This clause does not come into operation where there is no provision in the lease of the land in favour of the landlord, prohibiting its use for a commercial purpose.
Legislature seems to be to put an end to unauthorised use of the leased lands rather than merely to enable the authorities to get back possession of the leased lands. This conclusion is further fortified by a reference to sub-section (11) of Section 14. The lease is not forfeited merely because the building put upon the leased land is put to an unauthorised use. The tenant is given an opportunity to comply with the conditions.
We are also of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in leaving to the Controller no option but to pass an order for eviction. That would make the alternative provided in sub-section (11) of Section 14 useless.

DR K. MADAN v. KRISHNAWATI (SMT) AIR 1997 SC 579

the premises in question were residential and according to the terms of the lease given by the Government the said premises could not be used for any other purposes. A doctor was allowed to use the premises up to 500 square feet as his clinic provided the doctor resided in the said premises. Inasmuch as the appellant had shifted from the Lajpat Nagar house to her own house in East of Kailash, therefore, the submission was that her continued user of the premises in question only as a clinic was against the terms of the lease.
In any case there can be no estoppel against the statute. We are of the view that the appellant is liable to be evicted unless he has already stopped or stops immediately the misuser of the premises and pays the misuse charges for the period of misuse. Continued wrongful user cannot be permitted by levying penalty but if the authorities do not require the stoppage of misuser, but merely ask for payment of penalty or compensation, then in such a case, an order of eviction or for stoppage of premises need not be passed and it will be sufficient if compensation is required to be paid.

S.P. ARORA v. AJIT SINGH 1970 RCR 628

One of the terms of the lease was that the lessee should erect upon the said land within one year from the date of the lease and thereafter at all times during the terms of the lease maintain on the land a good and substantial residential house. Another term was that the lessee should not use the said land and the building thereon during the term of the lease for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential use without the consent in writing of the Lesser, and it was stipulated that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose other than the purpose for which the lease was granted for being a purpose subsequently approved by the Lesser.
by leasing out the premises for a purpose which is contrary to the condition in the lease deed for the land, the landlord is only committing a breach of a contractual term. So far as clause (k) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is concerned, it does not expressly prohibit the landlord from entering into such a transaction. It only enables the landlord to seek for the eviction of his tenant in a case in which the tenant uses the premises in a manner contrary to the condition in the lease deed for the land on which the premises are situate. There is no express prohibition in clause (k) against the landlord contracting out of it and waiving the advantage conferred upon him by the clause. In so waiving the advantage, the landlord cannot be said to be infringing any public right or public policy. Once he so agrees and waives the right given to him under clause (k), he would be stopped from enforcing that right.
The two clauses (c) and (k) provide for two different situations. Clause (c) applies to all cases of user by the tenant other than the one for which the premises are let out to him by the landlord, while clause (k) applies to the specific case where the land on which the premises are situate has been granted to the landlord subject to certain condition regarding the user thereof, and the tenant use the premises in a manner contrary to the said condition. Clause (c)is thus a general provision, while clause (k) is a special provision applicable to the specific kind of premises and user thereof mentioned in the clause. The provisions in the two clauses are not identical. There is a clear distinction between the provisions in the two clauses.

Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan AIR 1979 SC 272

where it was held that the expression 'reasonable requirement' in Section 11(h) of the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, undoubtedly postulates that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish.

Niader Mal v. Ugar Sain Jain AIR 1966 Punj 509

the court had to construe, inter alia, Section 13(1) (h) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. There under Section 13(1)(h) of the said Act in order to be liable for eviction, the tenant must have built a suitable residence. The court was of the opinion that merely because the tenant had built a house, would not be a ground for ejectment within the meaning of Section 13(1)(h). The words 'suitable residence' must be read with all the terms namely 'built', 'acquired vacant possession of' or 'been allotted'.

GANPAT RAM SHARMA v. GAYATRI DEVI AIR 1987 SC 2016

In appeal before us, it was submitted on behalf of the appellants that in none of the three judgements, there was any finding as to the suitability of the residence that is built, allotted or of which the tenant has acquired vacant possession of. None of the courts has reexamined the size of the space.
The words 'has built' or 'has acquired' or 'has been allotted' clearly mean that the tenant has already built, acquired or been allotted the residence to which he can move and that on the date of the application for his eviction his right to reside therein exists. It was therefore held that the words as they stood associated with each other in clause (h) lead to the only conclusion that as on the date of the application the tenant must be possessing a clear right to reside in some other premises than the tenancy premises as a matter of his own rightful choice either because he may have built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or the same may have been allotted to him.
It is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not, and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts.

SATYAWATI SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA 2008 (6) SCALE 325

In terms of Clause 4(c) of the lease deed, the lessee was prohibited from using the land and building (to be constructed over it) for any purpose other than residence, with a stipulation that in case of breach of this condition, the lease shall become void. After constructing the building, the lessee inducted Shri Jai Narain Sharma and Dr. Ms. Tara Motihar, as tenants in two portions of the building, who started using the rented premises for running watch shop and clinic respectively. Smt. Satyawati Sharma (appellant herein), who is now represented by her LRs, purchased property i.e. house bearing No.3395-3397, Ward No.XVI, Block R, Gali No.1, Reghar Pura, New Delhi from legal heirs of the lessee. After purchasing the property, the appellant filed Petition Nos.184 of 1980 and 187 of 1980 for eviction of the tenants by claiming that she needed the house for her own bona fide need and also for the use and occupation of the family members’ dependant upon her. The appellant further pleaded that she wanted to demolish the building and reconstruct the same. She also alleged that tenants have been using the premises in violation of the conditions of lease.
We shall now deal with the core question whether Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act can be treated as violative of equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it differentiates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord and restricts.
The Act, therefore, initially provided conforming to its objects and reasons, bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord, whether residential or non-residential, as a ground of eviction of the tenant. The classification created by the amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. To vacate a premises for the bona fide requirement of the landlord would not cause any hardships to the tenant. Statutory protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such an extent that the landlord is precluded from evicting the tenant for the rest of his life even when he bona fide requires the premises for his personal use and occupation. It is not the tenants but the landlords who are suffering great hardships.
Full Bench upheld the validity of Section 14(1) (e) mainly by relying upon Corporation of India, and of this Court in Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin (supra). and by observing that legislature has the right to classify persons, things, and goods into different groups and that the Court will not sit over the judgment of the legislature. It is significant to note that the Full Bench did not, at all, advert to the question whether the reason/cause which supplied rational to the classification continued to subsist even after lapse of 44 years and whether the tenants of premises let for non-residential purposes should continue to avail the benefit of implicit exemption from eviction in the case of bona fide requirement of the landlord despite sea saw change in the housing scenario in Delhi and substantial increase in the availability of buildings and premises which could be let for non-residential or commercial purposes.
In our considered view, the discrimination which was latent in Section 14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of 1958 Act has, with the passage of time (almost 50 years), become so pronounced that the impugned provision cannot be treated intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by applying any rational criteria.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.
However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety.

RAVI DUTT SHARMA v. RATAN LAL BHARGAVA AIR 1984 SC 967

Admittedly the houses for which eviction has been asked for in these two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the Slum Act. It was contended on behalf of the tenants that the suits for eviction by the landlords were not competent in view of want of permission from the Competent Authority under the Slum Act.
This argument was countered by the respondent on the ground that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976 (referred to as the 'Amending Act' for short), new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenants - one of which was covered by Section 14(1)(e) and the other by Section 14-A. In the instant case we are mainly concerned with eviction applications covered by Section 14(1) (e) and the special procedure provided in Chapter III-A introduced by the Amending Act. It was contended by the respondent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special protection was given to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Rent Act (personal necessity).
Once it is recognised that the newly added sections are in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Slum Act stands withdrawn to that extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesaid sections - 14(1) (e) and 14-A - would not be governed or controlled by Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Act.

V.S. TALWAR v. PREM CHANDRA SHARMA AIR 1984 SC 664

The respondent was admitted into tenancy of the premises in question under a lease deed dated January 5, 1968. Clause 12 thereof provided: That the lessee shall use the premises for the purpose of Residential/Personal office only and not for commercial purposes.
There was no description of any existing office room and available for such use to the tenant, nor was space earmarked for any personal office out of this accommodation. As indicated above it was in the discretion of the lessee to use any part as a personal office.

PRECISION STEEL & ENGINEERING WORKS v. PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAYAL AIR 1982 SC 1518

the premises were let out for residential purpose and are now required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself and the members of his family dependent on him and that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. Landlord further alleged that he now requires the premises for himself and the members of his family consisting of himself, his wife and two school-going children. He admitted that he has been employed in India since 1965 but was posted at Bombay in 1970 and returned to Delhi in 1972. He went to Saudi Arabia and has now returned to India. It was alleged that on May 1, 1974, he called upon the tenant to vacate.
it was contended that the petitioner is not entitled to file a petition under Section 14(1)(e) because the purpose of letting was not residential alone but combined purpose of residence-cum-business. It was denied that the tenant entered the premises as a licensee and subsequently the contract of lease was entered into and it was submitted that the tenant entered the premises as tenant effective from September 13, 1971, and the lease was for residential-cum-commercial purpose.
In a catena of decisions it has been decided that in order to succeed the landlord should show that the premises have been let out as a residence or for residential purposes; that the landlord needs to occupy the premises which may imply that either he has got no other accommodation in the city or town in which the premises in question are situated or the one in his possession does not provide him a suitable residence and he is required to shift to the premises in question; that his need is genuine and that it is not merely a fanciful desire of an affluent landlord who for the fancy of changing the premises would like to shift to the one from which the tenant is sought to be evicted; that he is acting bona fide in approaching the court for recovery of possession; and that his demand is reasonable.
While examining the question whether leave to defend ought or ought not to be granted the limited jurisdiction which the Controller enjoys is prescribed within the well-defined limits and he cannot get into a sort of a trial by affidavits preferring one set to the other and thus concluding the trial without holding the trial itself.
Let it be made clear that the statute is not cast in a negative form by enacting that the Controller shall refuse to give to the tenant leave to contest the application unless..
The provision indicates a positive approach and not a negative inhibition. When the language of a statute is plain, the principle that legislature speaks its mind in the plainest language has to be given full effect. No canon of construction permits in the name of illusory intendment defeating the plain, unambiguous language expressed to convey the legislative mind. And the legislature had before it Order 37, an analogous phraseology of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, 'substantial defence' and 'vexatious and frivolous defence', the legislature used the plainest language, 'facts disclosed in the affidavit of the tenant'.
Upon a true construction of proviso (e) to Section 14(1) it would unmistakably appear that the burden is on the landlord to satisfy the Controller that the premises of which possession is sought is (i) let for residential purposes; and (ii) possession of the premises is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, etc.; and (iii) that the landlord or the person for whose benefit possession is sought has not other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. This burden, landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gets jurisdiction to make an order for eviction. This necessarily transpires from the language of Section 14(1) which precludes the Controller from making any order or decree for recovery of possession unless the landlord proves to his satisfaction the conditions in the enabling provision enacted as proviso under which possession is sought. Initial burden is thus on the landlord.
The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under sub-section (4) and the reply, if any. On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed by landlord the Controller has to pose to himself the only question: Does the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1). The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions of facts or his preference of one set of affidavit against other set of affidavits.
If Section 37(1) were to govern all proceedings including the application for leave to contest the proceedings, subsection (7) and sub-section (10) would both be rendered redundant. On the contrary the very fact that sub-section (7) provides that while considering the affidavit of the tenant seeking permission to contest the proceedings the practice and procedure of the Small Causes Court will have to be followed itself indicates the legislative intention of treating Chapter III-A and especially Section 25-B as self-contained code.
What follows then? The Controller has to confine himself indisputably to the condition prescribed for exercise of jurisdiction in sub-section (5) of Section 25-B. In other words, he must confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant. If the affidavit discloses such facts - no proof is needed at the stage.