Appellant had not raised objections prior to the first arbitration hearing

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.& Anr. vs Motorola India Pvt.Ltd. on 15 ... - Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as  "17.The provision under clause 16.2 that quantification of the Liquidated Damages shall be final and cannot be challenged by the supplier Motorolla is clearly in restraint of legal proceedings under section 28 of the Indian Contracts Act. So the provision to this effect has to be held bad.

18.Pursuant to section 4 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a party who knows that a requirement under the arbitration agreement has not been complied with and still proceeds with the arbitration without raising an objection, as soon as possible, waives their right to object. The High Court had appointed an arbitrator in response to the petition filed by the appellant. At this point, the matter was closed unless further objections were to be raised. If further objections were to be made after this order, they should have been made prior to the first arbitration hearing. But the appellant had not raised any such objections. The appellant therefore had clearly failed to meet the stated requirement to object to arbitration without delay. As such their right to object is deemed to be waived."

Hinsa Virodhak Sangh Vs Mirzapur Motikuresh Jamat & Ors

Decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on 14.03.08
Validity of closure of Slaughter house on jain festival - constitution of India- art 19- right of trade-
had the closure of the slaughter houses been ordered for a considerable period of time, we would have declared it to be unconstitutional on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) as well as 21 of the Constitution. However, in the present case, the closure is only for a few days and has been done out of respect for the sentiments of the Jain community which has a large population in Gujarat. Moreover such closure during Paryushan has been consistently observed in Ahmedabad for a very long time, at least from 1993 and probably for a longer period.

Swaran Singh & Ors Vs State thr Standing Counsel & Anr (2008) 12 SCR 132

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as -sc/st act

In our opinion, the so-called upper castes and OBCs should not use the word `Chamar' when addressing a member of the Scheduled Caste, even if that person in fact belongs to the `Chamar' caste, because use of such a word will hurt his feelings

Divine Retreat Centre Vs State of Kerala

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed on 11.03.08 as---- Neither the accused nor the complainant or informant are entitled to choose their own investigating agency to investigate a crime in which they may be interested.
No judicial order can ever be passed by any court without providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person likely to be affected by such order and particularly when such order results in drastic consequences of affecting ones own reputation. In our view, the impugned order of the High Court directing enquiry and investigation into allegations in respect of which not even any complaint/information has been lodged with the police is violative of principles of natural justice.
the Public Interest Litigant must disclose his identity so as to enable the court to decide that the informant is not a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern.
It is clear from the record that the learned Judge was not dealing with any public interest litigation cases as on the date of entertaining anonymous petition. It is beyond pale of any doubt and controversy that the administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice of the High Court alone and it is his prerogative to distribute business of the High Court both judicial and administrative; that the Chief justice is the master of the roster. He alone has the prerogative to constitute benches of the court and allocate cases to the benches so constituted; and the puisne judges can only do that work as is allotted to them by the Chief Justice or under his directions; that the puisne judges cannot pick and chooseany case pending in the High Court and assign the same to himself or themselves for disposal without appropriate orders of the Chief Justice

Kusuma Ankama Rao Vs State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2008 SC 2819

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under

"Extra-judicial confessions are generally those that are made by a party to or before a private individual which includes even a judicial officer in his private capacity. It also includes a Magistrate who is not especially empowered to record confessions under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or a Magistrate so empowered but receiving the confession at a stage when Section 164 does not apply. As to extra-judicial confessions, two questions arise : (i) were they made voluntarily ? and (ii) are they true ? As the section enacts, a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in criminal proceedings, if the making of the confession appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, (1) having reference to the charge against the accused person, (2) proceeding from a person in authority, and (3) sufficient, in the opinion of the court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.."

Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate & Ors Vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 1460

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under

"The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and the said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make-believe. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness."

Dr. P.G. Najpandey Vs. State of M.P. and Others, AIR 2008 MP 55

Hon'ble High Court of MP observed
"It should be borne in mind that in the name of demonstration or protestation, the life in a civilized society cannot be paralyzed, in the name of legitimate exercise of ones right to protest the fundamental right of others cannot be scuttled. In a democratic polity the fundamental right of each citizen is sacrosanct. The collective cannot destroy the same. No one, however big he may be should foster a misgiving that he can create a tremor in the fundamental rights of others and tremble the spine of the members of the society at large by forming a group or a political party. The splendor of right to move the glory to live with dignity by carrying out a lawful profession or calling cannot be abridged in the name of mass protest or mass demonstration. The collective protest cannot be allowed to take the shape of collective passion to project a fractured mind thereby creating a dent in the concept of 'Rule of law' and bringing in a concavity in the constitutional philosophy which sings the song of highly cherished fundamental rights of millions of people. Be it noted the rights of others cannot be crucified at the fanciful pedestal of a group or a party and by no stretch of imagination it can be guillotined in a cavalier fashion from any pupil. The law of this country does not so countenance.
The great society gets further nurtured and fostered by the high ideals of Rule of Law'. The essentiality of' Rule of Law' cannot be allowed to be sent to the sky in a huge balloon to burst. The serenity of body polity cannot be permitted to be destroyed in the name of political pulse making a citizen 'A traveler betwixt the life and death'. The law should be allowed to reign supreme with the splendid vision, in its glorious resplendence."

Brajendra Singh Vs State of MP (2008) 13 SCC 161

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under -"A married woman cannot adopt at all during the subsistence of the marriage except when the husband has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. If the husband is not under such disqualification, the wife cannot adopt even with the consent of the husband whereas the husband can adopt with the consent of the wife. This is clear from Section 7 of the Act. Proviso thereof makes it clear that a male Hindu cannot adopt except with the consent of the wife, unless the wife has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. It is relevant to note that in the case of a male Hindu the consent of the wife is necessary unless the other contingency exists. Though Section 8 is almost identical, the consent of the husband is not provided for. The proviso to Section 7 imposes a restriction in the right of male Hindu to take in adoption. In this respect the Act radically departs from the old law where no such bar was laid down to the exercise of the right of a male Hindu to adopt oneself, unless he dispossesses the requisite capacity. As per the proviso to Section 7 the wife's consent must be obtained prior to adoption and cannot be subsequent to the act of adoption. The proviso lays down consent as a condition precedent to an adoption which is mandatory and adoption without wife's consent would be void. Both proviso to Sections 7 and 8(c) refer to certain circumstances which have effect on the capacity to make an adoption"

Venture Global Engineering vs. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. and another (2008) 4 SCC 190

foreign award could be challenged under Section 34 of Arbitration act

Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450

In this case Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed on power in appeal
1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial courts conclusion with respect to both facts and law.
2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial courts acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent.
3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial courts decision. This is especially true when a witness credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong.
Sent from my iPod

Himanshu Singh Sabharwal Vs State of M P, AIR 2008 SC 1943

Hon'ble Supreme Court observed, "The Courts have to take a participatory role in a trial. They are not expected to be tape recorders to record whatever is being stated by the witnesses. Section 311 of the Code and Section 165 of the Evidence Act confer vast and wide powers on Presiding Officers of Court to elicit all necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence collecting process. They have to monitor the proceedings in aid of justice in a manner that something, which is not relevant, is not unnecessarily brought into record. Even if the prosecutor is remiss in some ways, it can control the proceedings effectively so that ultimate objective i.e. truth is arrived at. This becomes more necessary where the Court has reasons to believe that the prosecuting agency or the prosecutor is not acting in the requisite manner. The Court cannot afford to be wishfully or pretend to be blissfully ignorant or oblivious to such serious pitfalls or dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecuting agency.”

State of Gujarat Vs Patel Ashwinkumar Ranchodbhai, 2008 CriLJ 3662

All the witnesses ie PW 1 to PW 5 did not support the prosecution case and turned hostile - We found that this is a case of failure of justice in which the criminal trial is taken very lightly by all concerned.
Crimes in society are real and concrete incident actually occurs. Crimes are not fancy or imagination, which Courts are called upon to decide. Therefore, greater responsibilities are to be shouldered by Courts while dispensation of justice. Prosecuting agency and investigation agency are also important factor in criminal justice system. Each component must do justice to its role in doing justice to aggrieved persons. The crimes are not affecting the individual, but influences the society as a whole and, therefore, the grave crimes are not against individual but against the society. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. This could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law.
We are at pain to observe that neither the learned Trial Judge nor the learned APP endeavoured to find out the truth by probing further the case. Instead, as soon as the witnesses, who were eye-witnesses, turned hostile, the Trial Court as well as the learned APP shut the doors towards their pious and prime duty to search for the truth and the trial was closed in extreme hurry. We find that the Investigating Officer, who is named in the charge-sheet, could not be examined by the learned APP nor such vigilance could be shown by the Trial Court to reach at the truth. It is not the law that when eye-witness turns hostile, the Courts should abandon the search for the truth and learned APP should become oblivious to put forward the whole prosecution case and instead of adducing further evidence for search of truth, simply giving purshis in the case to lack the whole case in a cupboard so as to ignore completely the heinous crime like murder committed under the nose of the society. The Investigating Officer could have been examined to throw light on the circumstances of the case and could have proved the case beyond reasonable doubt despite eyewitnesses turned hostile.
True that criminal justice deals with complex human problems and diverse human beings. On account of relations, witnesses may turn hostile and witnesses may resile when search for the truth is vigorously undertaken through instrumentality of criminal law. In trials, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Judge presiding over a criminal trial, to appreciate the evidence from all corners, and if the evidence is not produced, though available, then, the same could be produced. The Courts exist for doing justice to the persons who are affected.
This is a fact that most of the witnesses coming in the Courts despite taking oath, make false statement to suit the interest of the parties. Effective and stern action is required to be taken on such a stand, which may be taken upon the witnesses. The mere existence of penal provisions to deal with perjury would be a cruel joke with the society unless the Courts stop to take evasive recourse despite proof of the commission of the offence.
It is known and cardinal principle of evidence that even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, the conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the Court to separate grain from chaff in coming to the conclusion of truth. It also becomes the duty of the Court to take into consideration of relevant evidence available and Courts are empowered to produce on record such evidence if the prosecution failed in their duties to produce such evidence. The conclusion of a criminal trial must be the outcome of cool deliberations and the scanning of the material by the informed mind of the Judge that leads to determination.
A witness may not stand the test of cross-examination which may be sometime because he is a bucolic person and is not able to understand the question put to him by the skillful cross-examiner and at times under the stress of cross-examination, certain answers are snatched from him. When a rustic or illiterate witness faces an astute lawyer, there is bound to be imbalance and, therefore, minor discrepancies have to be ignored. These days it is not difficult to gain over a witness by money power or giving him any other allurance or giving out threats to his life and/or property at the instance of persons, in/or close to powers arid muscle men or their associates. Such instances are also not uncommon where a witness is not inclined to depose because in the prevailing social structure he wants to remain indifferent. It is most unfortunate that expert witnesses and the investigating agencies and other agencies which have an important role to play are also not immune from decline of values in public life. Their evidence sometimes becomes doubtful because they do not act sincerely, take everything in casual manner and are not able to devote proper attention and time.
Thus, in a criminal trial a prosecutor is faced with so many odds. The Court while appreciating the evidence should not lose sight of these realities of life and cannot afford to take an unrealistic approach by sitting in ivory tower. I find that in recent times the tendency to acquit an accused easily is galloping fast. It is very easy to pass an order of acquittal on the basis of minor points raised in the case by a short judgment so as to achieve the yardstick of disposal. Some discrepancy is bound to be there in each and every case which should not weigh with the Court so long it does not materially affect the prosecution case.
Now the maxim "let hundred guilty persons be acquitted, but not a single innocent be convicted" is, in practice, changing world over and Courts have been compelled to accept that "society suffers by wrong convictions and it equally, suffers by wrong acquittals".
K. Lack of 'robust judging' has stated in Criminal Courts need of the hour is "robust judging'. The trial Judge is the linchpin in every case, and he has also its eyes and ears. He is not merely a recorder of facts but a purveyor of all evidence, oral and circumstantial. It is said by him that a good trial Judge needs to have a 'third ear' i.e. hear and comprehend what is not said.

State of UP Vs Kishanpal & Ors (2008) 16 SCC 73

Hon'ble Supreme Cort of India held that, "The motive may be considered as a circumstance which is relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence is clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove the guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the motive is not a very strong one. It is also settled law that the motive loses all its importance in a case where direct evidence of eyewitnesses is available, because even if there may be a very strong motive for the accused persons to crime, they cannot evidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing."

SATYAWATI SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA 2008 (6) SCALE 325

In terms of Clause 4(c) of the lease deed, the lessee was prohibited from using the land and building (to be constructed over it) for any purpose other than residence, with a stipulation that in case of breach of this condition, the lease shall become void. After constructing the building, the lessee inducted Shri Jai Narain Sharma and Dr. Ms. Tara Motihar, as tenants in two portions of the building, who started using the rented premises for running watch shop and clinic respectively. Smt. Satyawati Sharma (appellant herein), who is now represented by her LRs, purchased property i.e. house bearing No.3395-3397, Ward No.XVI, Block R, Gali No.1, Reghar Pura, New Delhi from legal heirs of the lessee. After purchasing the property, the appellant filed Petition Nos.184 of 1980 and 187 of 1980 for eviction of the tenants by claiming that she needed the house for her own bona fide need and also for the use and occupation of the family members’ dependant upon her. The appellant further pleaded that she wanted to demolish the building and reconstruct the same. She also alleged that tenants have been using the premises in violation of the conditions of lease.
We shall now deal with the core question whether Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act can be treated as violative of equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it differentiates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord and restricts.
The Act, therefore, initially provided conforming to its objects and reasons, bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord, whether residential or non-residential, as a ground of eviction of the tenant. The classification created by the amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. To vacate a premises for the bona fide requirement of the landlord would not cause any hardships to the tenant. Statutory protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such an extent that the landlord is precluded from evicting the tenant for the rest of his life even when he bona fide requires the premises for his personal use and occupation. It is not the tenants but the landlords who are suffering great hardships.
Full Bench upheld the validity of Section 14(1) (e) mainly by relying upon Corporation of India, and of this Court in Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin (supra). and by observing that legislature has the right to classify persons, things, and goods into different groups and that the Court will not sit over the judgment of the legislature. It is significant to note that the Full Bench did not, at all, advert to the question whether the reason/cause which supplied rational to the classification continued to subsist even after lapse of 44 years and whether the tenants of premises let for non-residential purposes should continue to avail the benefit of implicit exemption from eviction in the case of bona fide requirement of the landlord despite sea saw change in the housing scenario in Delhi and substantial increase in the availability of buildings and premises which could be let for non-residential or commercial purposes.
In our considered view, the discrimination which was latent in Section 14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of 1958 Act has, with the passage of time (almost 50 years), become so pronounced that the impugned provision cannot be treated intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by applying any rational criteria.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.
However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety.

Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450

1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law.
2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent.
3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong.

K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan (2008) 1 SCC 258

It is now trite that if two views are possible, the appellate court shall not reverse a judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible to be taken. The appellate court's jurisdiction to interfere is limited.

Mandali Ranganna and Ors. v. T. Ramachandra (2008) 11 SCC 1

an additional principle was sought to be enunciated relating to grant of injunction by way of an equitable relief.

Government of Karnataka and Ors. v. Gowramma and Ors. AIR 2008 SC 863

Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which thecase is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides.

CPC- Sec 34 C.K. Sasankan Vs The Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd SLP (C) No. 30832 of 2008 According to the provisions of Section 34 of the Code interest is to be awarded at a reasonable rate and on the principal amount. It is needless to point out that although the amount of interest from the date of filing of the suit till the date of the decree and thereafter till realisation is in the discretion of the court as is confirmed by the use of the word `may' but such discretion has to be exercised by the court properly, reasonably and on sound legal principles and not arbitrarily and while doing so the court is also to consider the parameter, scope and ambit of Section 34 of Code. we find that the rate of interest as awarded for pendente lite and future interest is exorbitant and thus we direct that pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 9% shall be paid which is found to be just, proper and reasonable.

HAMA- Sec8 Brijendra Singh v. State of M.P. 2008(2) RCR (Civil) 277 (SC) Section 8 speaks of what is described as `capacity'. Section 11 which lays down the condition for a valid adoption requires that in case of adoption of a son, the mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a Hindu son or son's son or grand son by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption living at the time of adoption. It follows from the language of Section 8 read with Clauses (i) & (ii) of Section 11 that the female Hindu has the capacity and right to have both adopted son and adopted daughter provided there is compliance of the requirements and conditions of such adoption laid down in the Act. Any adoption made by a female Hindu who does not have requisite capacity to take in adoption or the right to take in adoption is null and void. It is clear that only a female Hindu who is married and whose marriage has been dissolved i.e. who is a divorcee has the capacity to adopt. Admittedly in the instant case there is no dissolution of the marriage. Prior to the enactment of the Act also adoption of a son during the lifetime of a male issue was prohibited and the position continues to be so after the enactment of the Act. A married woman cannot adopt at all during the subsistence of the marriage except when the husband has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. If the husband is not under such disqualification, the wife cannot adopt even with the consent of the husband whereas the husband can adopt with the consent of the wife.