Divine Retreat Centre Vs State of Kerala

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed on 11.03.08 as---- Neither the accused nor the complainant or informant are entitled to choose their own investigating agency to investigate a crime in which they may be interested.
No judicial order can ever be passed by any court without providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person likely to be affected by such order and particularly when such order results in drastic consequences of affecting ones own reputation. In our view, the impugned order of the High Court directing enquiry and investigation into allegations in respect of which not even any complaint/information has been lodged with the police is violative of principles of natural justice.
the Public Interest Litigant must disclose his identity so as to enable the court to decide that the informant is not a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern.
It is clear from the record that the learned Judge was not dealing with any public interest litigation cases as on the date of entertaining anonymous petition. It is beyond pale of any doubt and controversy that the administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice of the High Court alone and it is his prerogative to distribute business of the High Court both judicial and administrative; that the Chief justice is the master of the roster. He alone has the prerogative to constitute benches of the court and allocate cases to the benches so constituted; and the puisne judges can only do that work as is allotted to them by the Chief Justice or under his directions; that the puisne judges cannot pick and chooseany case pending in the High Court and assign the same to himself or themselves for disposal without appropriate orders of the Chief Justice

Popular Muthiah Vs State represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as "The High Court cannot issue directions to investigate the case from a particular angle or by a particular agency." (i) Power can be exercised suo motu in
the interest of justice. If such a power is not conceded, it may even lead to
injustice to an accused.
(ii) Such a power can be exercised
concurrently with the appellate or
revisional jurisdiction and no formal
application is required to be filed therefor.
(iii) However, the power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is not unlimited

Manohar Lal Chopra Vs Raj Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal AIR 1962 SC 527

Hon'ble Court observed "The Code of Civil Procedure is undoubtedly not exhaustive: it does not lay down rules for guidance in respect of all situations nor does it seek to provide rules for decision of all conceivable cases which may arise. The civil courts are authorized" to pass such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of court, but where an express provision is made to meet a particular situation the Code must be observed, and departure therefrom is not permissible."

KK Velusamy Vs N Palanisamy, SC 30.03.11

section 151 of CPC can be used for re-opening evidence or for recalling witnesses but not routinely invoked for reopening evidence or recalling witnesses....

"We may summarize as follows: 

(a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognizes the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is `right' and undo what is `wrong', that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. 

(b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, section 151 recognizes and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is co-extensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. 

(c) A Court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. 

(d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the Legislature. 

(e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the court, and the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. 

(f) The power under section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court.

11. The Code earlier had a specific provision in Order 18 Rule 17A for production of evidence not previously known or the evidence which could not be produced despite due diligence. It enabled the court to permit a party to produce any evidence even at a late stage, after the conclusion of his evidence if he satisfied the court that even after the exercise of due diligence, the evidence was not within his knowledge and could not be produced by him when he was leading the evidence. That provision was deleted with effect from 1.7.2002. The deletion of the said provision does not mean that no evidence can be received at all, after a party closes his evidence. It only means that the amended structure of the Code found no need for such a provision, as the amended Code contemplated little or no time gap between completion of evidence and commencement and conclusion of arguments. Another reason for its deletion was the misuse thereof by the parties to prolong the proceedings under the pretext of discovery of new evidence.

12. The amended provisions of the Code contemplate and expect a trial court to hear the arguments immediately after the completion of evidence and then proceed to judgment. Therefore, it was unnecessary to have an express provision for re-opening the evidence to examine a fresh witness or for recalling any witness for further examination. But if there is a time gap between the completion of evidence and hearing of the arguments, for whatsoever reason, and if in that interregnum, a party comes across some evidence which he could not lay his hands earlier, or some evidence in regard to the conduct or action of the other party comes into existence, the court may in exercise of its inherent power under section 151 of the Code, permit the production of such evidence if it is relevant and necessary in the interest of justice, subject to such terms as the court may deem fit to impose.

13. The learned counsel for respondent contended that once arguments are commenced, there could be no re-opening of evidence or recalling of any witness. This contention is raised by extending the convention that once arguments are concluded and the case is reserved for judgment, the court will not entertain any interlocutory application for any kind of relief. The need for the court to act in a manner to achieve the ends of justice (subject to the need to comply with the law) does not end when arguments are heard and judgment is reserved. If there is abuse of the process of the court, or if interests of justice require the court to do something or take note of something, the discretion to do those things does not disappear merely because the arguments are heard, either fully or partly. The convention that no application should be entertained once the trial or hearing is concluded and the case is reserved for judgment is a sound rule, but not a straitjacket formula. There can always be exceptions in exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances, to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court, subject to the limitation recognized with reference to exercise of power under section 151 of the Code. Be that as it may. In this case, the applications were made before the conclusion of the arguments....

We may add a word of caution. The power under section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used routinely, merely for the asking. If so used, it will defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials. But where the application is found to be bonafide and where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence. But if it does so, it should ensure that the process does not become a protracting tactic. The court should firstly award appropriate costs to the other party to compensate for the delay. Secondly the court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly if the application is found to be mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs. If the application is allowed and the evidence is permitted and ultimately the court finds that evidence was not genuine or relevant and did not warrant the reopening of the case recalling the witnesses, it can be made a ground for awarding exemplary costs apart from ordering prosecution if it involves fabrication of evidence. If the party had an opportunity to produce such evidence earlier but did not do so or if the evidence already led is clear and unambiguous, or if it comes to the conclusion that the object of the application is merely to protract the proceedings, the court should reject the application. If the evidence sought to be produced is an electronic record, the court may also listen to the recording before granting or rejecting the application..."

Kalyani Vs Janak C Mehta and Ors (2009) 1 SCC 516

(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.

State of Haryana & Others Vs Bhajan Lal & Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Preeti Gupta & Another Vs State of Jharkhand & Another, Decided by Delhi High Court on 13.08.10

In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254, Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.
The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution but court’s failing to use the power for advancement of justice can also lead to grave injustice. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.
The allegations of harassment of husband’s close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband’s relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.
Before parting with this case, we would like to observe that a serious relook of the entire provision is warranted by the legislation. It is also a matter of common knowledge that exaggerated versions of the incident are reflected in a large number of complaints.

R P Kapur Vs State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed about use of inherent power to quash the proceedings "(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge."

Madhu Limaye Vs The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “In case the impugned order clearly brings out a situation which is an abuse of the process of the court, or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. Such cases would necessarily be few and far between. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. The present case would undoubtedly fall for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, that the invoking of the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible.”

Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others Vs Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others (1988) 1 SCC 692

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”

Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd & Others Vs Mohd Sharaful Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC 122

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.”

Nainsingh v. Koonwarjee AIR 1970 SC 997

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed, “Under the inherent power of Courts recognized by Section 151 CPC, a Court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the Court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code”

Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal AIR 1962 SC 527

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed, “the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in S.151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their exercised may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature.”

Padam Sen v. State of UP AIR 1961 SC 218

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in S.151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature.”

R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and Ors. (2009) 1 SCC 516,

(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.

Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hira Lal AIR 1962 SC 527

The civil court has a power to grant interim injunction in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction even if the case does not fall within the ambit of provisions of Order 39 Code of Civil Procedure.

M.N. Ojha and Ors. Vs. Alok Kumar Srivastav and Anr. SLP (Crl.) No. 1875 of 2008 Decided On: 21.08.2009

the saving of inherent power of the High Court in criminal matters is intended to achieve a salutary public purpose "which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. If such power is not conceded, it may even lead to injustice".

Prem Shankar Pandey & Others Vs State Of U.P. & Another, HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 16003 of 2009

The words "Nothing in this Code" used in section 482 is a non obstante clause, and give it overriding effect over other provisions in the Cr.P.C. The words "or otherrwise to secure the ends of justice" in section 482 implies that to secure the interest of justice, sometimes (though only in very rare cases) the High Court can pass an order in violation of a provision in the Cr.P.C. in appropriate cases where the dispute is of a personal nature and the parties have settled the dispute amicably, the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases where the offences are non- compoundable.