Padam Sen v. State of UP AIR 1961 SC 218

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in S.151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature.”

Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120

(1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) `substantial and compelling reasons', (ii) `good and sufficiently cogent reasons', and (iii) `strong reasons' are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.

Limitation Act Section 19, 20 Gori Lal v. Ramjee Lal, AIR 1961 MP 346, "If one bears in mind that the word "payment" has been used in two different senses, it would be clear that the moment the negotiable instrument is handed over and accepted by the creditor and is in the debtor's handwriting, there has been a payment for the purposes of Section 20, Limitation Act and a fresh period of limitation has already started. If the negotiable instrument is dishonoured subsequently the creditor, no doubt, can fall back on his original claim. But the new term of limitation (sic) of the subsequent happening. To link S. 20 with the subsequent honouring of the negotiable instrument would indeed lead to absurd results. The debtor has intended and at all events represented to the creditor that the negotiable instrument is good, and thereby the creditor has for his part, been given a feeling of security with a fresh term of limitation. If it turns out that the debtor's negotiable instrument is dishonoured (or as for that matter the currency notes that he has given turn out to be counterfeit) this fresh term of limitation cannot be blocked. Again, if one looks to the equity side of it, a payment which the debtor means as a sheer pretence, but the creditor accepts as genuine, cannot certainly deprive the latter of what S. 20 has already given him. Thus I would hold that the passing of the cheque is payment for the purpose of S. 20 and if the other conditions were fulfilled, a fresh term of limitation started from that date, whether or not it is subsequently honoured. That way the suit of the plaintiff was not time-barred."

Tort Oversees Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Docks and Engineering Co. Ltd., (1961) AC 388. Viscount Simonds, "It is, no doubt, proper when considering tortious liability for negligence to analyse its elements and to say that the plaintiff must prove a duty owed to him by the defendant, a breach of that duty by the defendant, and consequent damage. But there could be no liability until the damage has been done. It is not the act but the consequences on which tortious liability is founded for tort.