PUKHRAJ JAIN v. PADMA KASHYAP AIR 1990 SC 77

Tenant inducted in 1979, for three years, by the landlord under a written agreement, in C-4/33, Safdarjang Development Area, New Delhi, with permission of Controller under Section 21 of Delhi Rent Control Act (for brevity the 'Act') seeks leave of this Court on limited question of law if proceedings for recovery of possession under Section 21 of the Act could be initiated and continued by legal representatives of the landlord who had obtained permission but who died before expiry of period of tenancy. Answer of it shall depend, primarily, on construction of word 'landlord' used in Section 21.
Is there any justification for construing the word "landlord" in a narrow sense so as to restrict it, only, to the person who made the application and obtained permission. "Landlord" has been defined in Section 2(e). Expression, "for the time being" makes it clear, that landlord has to be understood in praesenti. That is anyone entitled to receive rent is the landlord. It does not visualise past or future landlord. Therefore, the word "landlord", on plain reading of Section 21 does not warrant construction of the word in any other manner. Basis for submission, however, that landlord in second part of Section 21 entitling him to claim vacant possession should be confined to the person who obtained permission was founded on use of expression, "who does not require the whole or any part of the premises for a particular period". Attempt was made to personalise eviction proceedings by linking it with the person.
Vacation is not linked with landlord but with time. Expiry of it obliges tenant to vacate. If he does not then the landlord may approach Controller for putting him in vacant possession. Which landlord? Obviously whosoever is the landlord at affected.
Even otherwise an action for eviction abates only if the cause of action does not survive. What is the cause of action for an application for vacant possession in Section 21 : death of landlord or expiry of time for which tenancy was created. Obviously the latter, the failure of tenant to honour his commitment to vacate the premises after expiry of time for which he was inducted with permission of Controller.

Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 79

it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:
(1) The circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
(2) Those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and
(4) The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.

S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594,

Constitution Bench held that recording of reasons: (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision making.

Abdul Khader Rowther v. P.K. Sara Bai and others, AIR 1990 SC 682, The apex Court, while dealing with Article 133 of the Constitution of India, held that a plea which was not taken in the trial Court cannot be taken in appeal for the first time.