RS Nayak Vs AR Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684,

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "...If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self defeating.”

Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs Union of India and Ors [1984] 2 SCR 67

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and particularly Clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of workers men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and no State - neither the Central Government nor any State Government - has the right to take any action which will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essential.”

RAVI DUTT SHARMA v. RATAN LAL BHARGAVA AIR 1984 SC 967

Admittedly the houses for which eviction has been asked for in these two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the Slum Act. It was contended on behalf of the tenants that the suits for eviction by the landlords were not competent in view of want of permission from the Competent Authority under the Slum Act.
This argument was countered by the respondent on the ground that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976 (referred to as the 'Amending Act' for short), new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenants - one of which was covered by Section 14(1)(e) and the other by Section 14-A. In the instant case we are mainly concerned with eviction applications covered by Section 14(1) (e) and the special procedure provided in Chapter III-A introduced by the Amending Act. It was contended by the respondent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special protection was given to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Rent Act (personal necessity).
Once it is recognised that the newly added sections are in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Slum Act stands withdrawn to that extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesaid sections - 14(1) (e) and 14-A - would not be governed or controlled by Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Act.

V.S. TALWAR v. PREM CHANDRA SHARMA AIR 1984 SC 664

The respondent was admitted into tenancy of the premises in question under a lease deed dated January 5, 1968. Clause 12 thereof provided: That the lessee shall use the premises for the purpose of Residential/Personal office only and not for commercial purposes.
There was no description of any existing office room and available for such use to the tenant, nor was space earmarked for any personal office out of this accommodation. As indicated above it was in the discretion of the lessee to use any part as a personal office.

RAM MURTI v. BHOLA NATH AIR 1984 SC 71

It was alleged that although the appellant had taken the premises on rent from the Custodian of Evacuee Properties at Rs 18 per month he vacated the premises after respondent 1 acquired the same and there was a new tenancy created in his favour on March 1, 1961 on a monthly rent of Rs. 80. On an application made by respondent 1, the Additional Rent Controller by his order dated February 14, 1969 passed under Section 15 (1) of the Act directed the appellant to deposit rent Rs. 18 per month w. e. f. December 1, 1965 and to deposit the future rent at the same date on the fifteenth day of each succeeding month.
The High Court relying upon the decision of this Court in Hem Chand v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co Ltd. [AIR 1977 SC 1986] held that the Rent Controller had no power to extend the time prescribed by an order under Section 15 (1) which requires the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within one month from the date of the order and future rents by the fifteenth day of the each succeeding month.
From a conspectus of these provisions, it would be seen that the various sub-sections of Sections 14 and 15 form an integrated process seeking to strike a balance between the conflicting rights of the landlord to secure eviction of the tenant on any one or more of the grounds specified in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 and that of the tenant for protection against such eviction except under certain circumstances.
When a tenant can get the benefit of the protection under Section 14 (2) is provided for in Section 15 (1). Section 15 (1) of the Act is in two parts. The first part requires the tenant to pay or deposit within one month of the order of the Rent Controller passed under S. 15 (1) directing him to pay the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which such payment or deposit is to be made. The second part is meant to secure payment of the future rent by a defaulting tenant and casts a duty on such tenant to continue to pay or deposit, month by month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate.
It logically follows that if the Rent Controller has the power not to strike out the defence of the tenant under Section 15 (7) of the Act, he necessarily has by legal implication the power to condone the default on the part of the tenant in making payment or deposit of the future rent.
If the Rent Controller has the discretion under S. 15 (7) not to strike out the defence of the tenant he necessarily has the power to extend the time for payment of future rent under Sec. 15 (1) where the failure of the tenant to make such payment or deposit was due to circumstance beyond his control.
Court reverse the view expressed by the High Court that the Rent Controller has no power to condone the default on the part of the tenant in making payment or deposit of future rent or to extend time for such payment or deposit.