Moti Ram Vs State of M P (1978) 4 SCC 47

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as “14. The consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Defendants presumed innocent arc subjected to the psychological and physical deprivations of jail life, usually under more onerous conditions than are imposed on convicted defendants. The jailed defendant loses his job if he has one and is prevented from contributing to the preparation of his defence. Equally important, the burden of his detention frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.”

In re the Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979) 1 SCC 380

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under

Article 14 include

"(2) The State, in the exercise of its governmental power, has of necessity to make laws operating differently on different groups or classes of persons within its territory to attain particular ends in giving effect to its policies, and it must possess for that purpose large powers of distinguishing and classifying persons or things to be subjected to such laws.
(3) The constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary.
(4) The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same.
(5) By the process of classification, the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. This power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. Classification thus means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily.
(6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.
(7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act."

Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621

The ambit of personal liberty protected by Article 21 is wide and comprehensive. It embraces both substantive rights to personal liberty and the procedure provided for their deprivation.

Nandini Satpathy vs P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed, “Any giving of evidence, any furnishing of information, if likely to have an incriminating impact, answers the description of being a witness against oneself. Not being limited to the forensic stage by express words in Article 20(3), we have to construe the expression to apply to every stage where furnishing of information and collection of materials takes place. That is to say, even the investigation at the police level is embraced by Article 20(3).This is precisely what Section 161(2) means.”

Code of Civil Procedure- Section 2(12) Mesne profits Nathuni Prasad Singh and others v. Bishwanath Singh Sharma and others, AIR 1978 SC 30 has held that the very foundation of the cause of action for mesne profits is wrongful possession of the defendant. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Hukum Singh Nadir Singh v. Hakumat Rai Nihal Chand, AIR 1968 P&H 110 has held that it is only a person who is entitled to actual possession that can claim mesne profits.

CrPC-Sec439 Gurcharan Singh and others v. State (Delhi Adminsitration), 1978(2) SCR 358 " Section 439(1) Cr. P.C. of the new Code, on the other hand, confers special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session in respect of bail. Unlike under Section 437(1) there is no ban imposed under Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. against granting of bail by the High Court or the Court of Session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is, however, legitimate to suppose that the High Court or the Court of Session will be approached by an accused only after he has failed before the Magistrate and after the investigation has progressed throwing light on the evidence and circumstances implicating the accused. Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session will have to exercise its judicial discretion in considering the question of granting of bail under Section 439(1) Cr.P.C. of the new Code. The overriding considerations in granting bail to which we adverted to earlier and which are common both in the case of Section 437(1) and Section 439(1) Cr.P.C. of the new Code are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood, of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many valuable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out. The question of cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. of the new Code is certainly different from admission to bail under Section 439(1) Cr.P.C. The decisions of the various High Courts cited before us are mainly with regard to the admission to bail by the High Court under Section 498 Cr.P.C. (old). Power of the High Court or of the Sessions Judge to admit persons to bail under Section 498 Cr. P.C. (old) was always held to be wide without any express limitations in law. In considering the question of b ail justice to both sides governs the judicious exercise of the Court's judicial discretion."