Motilal v. Nanak Chand, (1964)66 Punj LR 179

It was held in that case that in cases governed by the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 if the premises are in well-defined parts and have been let out for residential and commercial purposes together, the rule as to eviction regarding the portion that has been used for residence will govern the residential portion of the same and similarly the rules of eviction regarding the commercial premises will govern the commercial portion of the same as laid down in the Act.

ANAND NIVAS (PRIVATE) LTD. v. ANANDJI KALYANJI PEDHI 1964 (4) SCR 892

In execution of the decree the trustees obtained possession of the first floor but were obstructed as to the rest by a private limited company called--"Anand Nivas Private Ltd."--and two others, who claimed to be sub-lessees from Maneklal and thereby to have acquired rights of tenancy of the ground floor upon the determination of the tenancy of Maneklal.
Company sets up its claim to protect its possession on the plea that it had acquired the rights of a tenant by virtue of s. 14 of the Act. This plea is supported on two grounds: that the contract of tenancy in favour of the tenant expressly authorised him to sublet, and the tenant having lawfully sublet the premises the Company acquired on the determination of the interest of the tenant the rights of a tenant under the landlord; and in any event, on the determination of the statutory tenancy of the tenant by virtue of Ordinance III of 1959 issued by the Governor of Bombay, retrospectively amending s. 15 of the Act, the Company acquired the rights of a tenant under the landlord.
Court held that before the date of the institution of the suit, Manekal as a statutory tenant had no right to sublet the premises and the Company acquired no right of a tenant on the determination of the tenant's right by virtue of s. 14 of the Act.

M. N. CLUBWALA v. FIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB (1964) 6 SCR 642, 651

The main point which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs respondents are the lessees of the appellants. The appellants are the owners of a private market situate in Madras known as Zam Bazar Market. Defendants 1 to 3 to the suit were the contractors appointed by the appellants for collecting rent at the time of the institution of the suit. Though the building in which the market is located is owned by the appellants it cannot be used as a market for the purpose of sale of meat or any other article of human consumption without the permission of the Municipal Council.
Mere necessity of giving a notice to a licensee requiring him to vacate the licenced premises would not indicate that the transaction was a lease.
Whether an agreement creates between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant or merely that of licensor and licensee the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties. This intention has to be ascertained on a consideration of all the relevant provisions in the agreement. In the absence, however, of a formal document the intention of the parties must be inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties.
While it is true that each stallholder is entitled to the exclusive use of his stall from day to day it is clear that he has no right to use it as and when he chooses to do so or to sleep in the stall during the night after closure of the market or enter the stall during the night after 11.00 p.m. at his pleasure.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the intention of the parties was to bring into existence merely a licence and not a lease and the word “rent” was used loosely for “fee”.

State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358

Court observed that in Nazir Ahmed's case, 63 Inds App 372 :(AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) the Judicial Committee observed that the principle applied in Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) A Ch. D. 426 to a Court, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden, applied to judicial officers making a record under S. 164 and, therefore, held that the magistrate could not give oral evidence of the confession made to him which he had purported to record under S. 164 of the Code. It was said that otherwise all the precautions and safeguards laid down in Ss. 164 and 364, both of which had to be read together, would become of such trifling value as to be almost idle and that "it would be an unnatural construction to hold that any other procedure was permitted than that which is laid down with such minute particularity in the sections themselves.

Raghavamma & Anr. v. Chenchamma & Anr., AIR 1964 SC 136, there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof : burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shifts. Onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff's title.

HSA-Sec14 Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad 387, 'only to remove the disability of women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of which a women's right was restricted"