TPA-Sec 106 Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 (SC) 1262 expression `room in a hotel' must take colour from the context or the collocation of words in which it has been used; in other words, its meaning should be determined noscitur a sociis. The reason why I think so may be explained by an illustration. Suppose there is a big room inside a hotel; in a physical sense it is a room in a hotel, but let us suppose that it is let out, to take an extreme example, as a timber godown. Will it still be a room in a hotel, though in a physical sense it is a room of the building which is used as a hotel ? I think it would be doing violence to the context if the expression `room in a hotel' is interpreted in a strictly literal sense. On the view which I take a room in a hotel must fulfil two conditions : (1) it must be part of a hotel in the physical sense and (2) its user must be connected with the general purpose of the hotel of which it is a part. In the case under our consideration the spaces were let out for carrying on the business of a hair dresser. Such a business I consider to be one of the amenities which a modern hotel provides. The circumstance that people not resident in the hotel might also be served by the hair dresser does not alter the position; it is still an amenity for the residents in the hotel to have a hair dressing saloon within the hotel itself. All these amenities are connected with the hotel business and a barber's shop within the hotel premises is no exception. These are my reasons for holding that the rooms in question were rooms in a hotel within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Rent Control Act, 1947, and the respondent was not entitled to ask for fixation of fair or standard rent for the same. [(Subarao J, in minority)There is a marked distinction between a lease and a licence. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease of immoveable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration for a price paid or promised. Under Section 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A lease is therefore a transfer of an interest in land. The interest transferred is called the leasehold interest. The lessor parts with his right to enjoy the property during the term of the lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that right to the exclusion of the lessor. Whereas Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act defines a licence thus : "Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do or continue to do, in or upon the immoveable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence." Under the aforesaid section, if a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a licence. The legal possession, therefore, continues to be with the owner of the property, but the licensee is permitted to make use of the premises for a particular purpose. But for the permission, his occupation would be unlawful. It does not create in his favour any estate or interest in the property. There is, therefore, clear distinction between the two concepts. The dividing line is clear though sometimes it becomes very thin or even blurred. At one time it was thought that the test of exclusive possession was infallible and if a person was given exclusive possession of a premises, it would conclusively establish that he was a lessee. But there was a change and the recent trend of judicial opinion is reflected in Errington v. Errington, 1952-1 All ER 149, wherein Lord Denning reviewing the case law on the subject summarizes the result of his discussion thus at p. 155 : "The result of all these cases is that, although a person who is let into exclusive possession is, `prima facie', to he considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy." The Court of Appeal again in Cobb v. Lane, 1952-1 All ER 1199, considered the legal position and laid down that the intention of the parties was the real test for ascertaining the character of a document. At p. 1201, Somervell L.J., stated : ". . . . . . . the solution that would seem to have been found is, as one would expect, that it must depend on the intention of the parties." Denning L.J. said much to the same effect at p. 1202 : "The question in all these cases is one of intention : Did the circumstances and the conduct of the parties show that all that was intended was that the occupier should have a personal privilege with no interest in the land ?" The following propositions may, therefore, be taken as well-established : (1) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form; (2) the real test is the intention of the parties - whether they intended to create a lease or a licence; (3) if the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease; but, if it only permits another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a licence; and (4) if under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, `prima facie', he is considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be established which negative the intention to create a lease.]