Rambaran Prosad Vs Ram Mohit Hazra and Ors, AIR1967 SC 744

learned Counsel put forward the argument that the covenant for pre-emption was merely a personal covenant between the contracting parties and was not binding against successors-in-interest or the assignees of the original parties to the contract. We are unable to accept this submission as correct. It is true that the pre-emption clause does not expressly state that it is binding upon the assignees or successors-in-interest, but, having regard to the context and the circumstances in which the award was made, it is manifest that the pre-emption clause must be construed as binding upon the assignees or successors-in-interest of the original contracting parties.

Partnership Commissioner of Income Tax. West Bengal, Calcutta. v. Juggilal Kamalapat, AIR 1967 (SC) 401 The Deed of Relinquishment, in this case, was in respect of the individual interest of the three Singhania Brothers in the assets of the partnership firm in favour of the Kamala Town Trust, and consequently, did not require registration, even though the assets of the partnership firm included immovable property, and was valid without registration. As a result of this deed, all the assets of the partnership vested in the new partners of the firm. In the alternative, we think that, even if it had been accepted that this deed of relinquishment required registration, that would not lead to the conclusion that the partnership seeking registration was not valid and had not come into existence in law. The deed of relinquishment could, at best. be held to he invalid insofar as it affected the immovable properties included in the assets of the firm; but to the extent that it purported to transfer movable assets of the firm, the document would remain valid. The deed could clearly be divided into two separate parts, one relating to immovable properties, and the other to movable assets; and the part of the deed dealing with movable assets could not be held invalid for want of registration. A deed of relinquishment is in the nature of a deed of gift, where the various properties dealt with are always separable, and the invalidity of the deed of gift in respect of one item cannot affect its validity in respect of another. This view was expressed by the Madras High Court in Perumal Ammal v. Perumal Naicker, ILR 44 Mad 196. A deed of relinquishment, or a deed of gift, differs from a deed of partition in which it is not possible to hold that the partition is valid in respect of some properties and not in respect of others, because rights of persons being partitioned are adjusted with reference to the properties subject to partition as a whole.

Limitation Act- Section 20 Jiwan Lal Acharya v. Rameshwar Lal Aggarwala, AIR 1967 SC 1118 "Where therefore the payment is by cheque and is conditional, the mere delivery of the cheque on a particular date does not mean that the payment was made on that date unless the cheque was accepted as unconditional payment. Where the cheque is not accepted as an unconditional payment, it can only be treated as a conditional payment. In such a case the payment for purposes of S. 20 would be the date on which the cheque would be actually payable at the earliest assuming that it will be honoured".

CrPC- Sec 200 Abhinandan Jha and Ors. Dinesh Mishra [1967] 3 S.C.R. 668 while a Magistrate can order the police to investigate the complaint it has no power to compel the police to submit a charge-sheet on a final report being submitted by the police. In such cases a Magistrate can either order re-investigation or dispose of the complaint according to law.