Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam Vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 28 July, 2000

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as "What is the culpable negligence on the part of the bus driver in the above accident? A passenger might fall down from a moving vehicle due to one of the following causes: It could be accidental; it could be due to the negligence of the passenger himself; it could be due to the negligent taking off of the bus by the driver. However, to fasten the liability with the
driver for negligent driving in such a situation there should be the evidence that he moved the bus suddenly before the passenger could get into the vehicle or that the driver़़़
It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident negligence of the driver should be presumed़़़़़
Merely because a passenger fell down from the bus while boarding the bus no presumption of negligence can be drawn against the driver of the bus. The principle of res ipsa loquitor is only a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. The said principle has application only when the nature of the accident and the attending circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that in the absence of negligence the accident would not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrong doer. A rash act is primarily an over hasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular"

V N Shrikhande Vs Anita Sena Fernandes decided on on 20.10.10

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under "District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission are not bound to admit each and every complaint. Under Section 12(3), the District Forum is empowered to decide the issue of admissibility of the complaint. The District Forum can either allow the complaint to be proceeded with, which implies that the complaint is admitted or reject the same. Similar power is vested with the State Commission under Section 18 and the National Commission under Section 22...

In cases of medical negligence, no straitjacket formula can be applied for determining as to when the cause of action has accrued to the consumer. Each case is to be decided on its own facts. If the effect of negligence on the doctor's part or any person associated with him is patent, the cause of action will be deemed to have arisen on the date when the act of negligence was done. If, on the other hand, the effect of negligence is latent, then the cause of action will arise on the date when the patient or his representative-complainant discovers the harm/injury caused due to such act or the date when the patient or his representative-complainant could have, by exercise of reasonable diligence discovered the act constituting negligence....

In Pennsylvania, the Discovery Rule was adopted in Ayers v. Morgan 397 Pa.282, 154A.2d 788. In that case a surgeon had left a sponge in the patient's body when he performed an operation. It was held that the statute of limitation did not begin to run until years later when the presence of the sponge in the patient's body was discovered...

Ms. Ins. Malhotra Vs A. Kriplani & Ors. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1386 OF 2001 A three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab and Another [(2005) 6 SSC 1] had the occasion to deal with and decide the liability of doctors in a death case arising due to criminal medical negligence for an offence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In the case of professional negligence, it was observed that in the law of negligence, professionals such as lawyers, doctors, architects and others are included in the category of persons professing some special skill or as skilled persons generally. Any task which is required to be performed with a special skill would generally be admitted or undertaken to be performed only if the person possesses the requisite skill for performing that task. Any reasonable man entering into a profession which requires a particular level of learning to be called a professional of that branch, impliedly assures the person dealing with him that the skill which he professes to possess shall be exercised with reasonable degree of care and caution. He does not assure his client of the result. A physician would not assure the patient of full recovery in every case. A surgeon cannot and does not guarantee that the result of surgery would invariably be beneficial, much less to the extent of 100% for the person operated on. The only assurance which such a professional can give or can be understood to have given by implication is that he is possessed of the requisite skill in that branch of profession which he is practising and while undertaking the performance of the task entrusted to him he would be exercising his skill with reasonable competence. This is all what the person approaching the professional can expect. Judged by this standard, the professional may be held liable for negligence on one of two findings: either he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or, he did not exercise, with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he did possess. The standard to be applied for judging, whether the person charged has been negligent or not, would be that of an ordinary competent person exercising ordinary skill in that profession. It is not possible for every professional to possess the highest level of expertise or skills in that branch which he practices. A highly skilled professional may be possessed of better qualities, but That cannot be made the basis or the yardstick for judging the performance of the professional proceeded against on indictment of negligence. [Paras 18 and 48(3)] In the case of medical negligence, it has been held that the subject of negligence in the context of medical profession necessarily calls for treatment with a difference. There is a marked tendency to look for a human actor to blame for an untoward event, a tendency which is closely linked with the desire to punish. Things have gone wrong and, therefore, somebody must be found to answer for it. An empirical study would reveal that the background to a mishap is frequently far more complex than may generally be assumed. It can be demonstrated that actual blame for the outcome has to be attributed with great caution. For a medical accident or failure, the responsibility may lie with the medical practitioner, and equally it may not. The inadequacies of the system, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature of human psychology itself and sheer chance may have combined to produce a result in which the doctor's contribution is either relatively or completely blameless. The human body and its working is nothing less than a highly complex machine. Coupled with the complexities of medical science, the scope for misimpressions, misgivings and misplaced allegations against the operator, i.e. the doctor, cannot be ruled out. One may have notions of best or ideal practice which are different from the reality of how medical practice is carried on or how the doctor functions in real life. The factors of pressing need and limited resources cannot be ruled out from consideration. Dealing with a case of medical negligence needs a deeper understanding of the practical side of medicine. The purpose of holding a professional liable for his act or omission, if negligent, is to make life safer and to eliminate the possibility of recurrence of negligence in future. The human body and medical science, both are too complex to be easily understood. To hold in favour of existence of negligence, associated with the action or inaction of a medical professional, requires an in-depth understanding of the working of a professional as also the nature of the job and of errors committed by chance, which do not necessarily involve the element of culpability. Negligence in the context of the medical profession necessarily calls for a treatment with a difference. To infer rashness or negligence on the part of a professional, in particular a doctor, additional considerations apply. A case of occupational negligence is different from one of professional negligence. A simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident, is not proof of negligence on the part of a medical professional. So long as a doctor follows a practice acceptable to the medical profession of that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative course or method of treatment was also available or simply because a more skilled doctor would not have chosen to follow or resort to that practice or procedure which the accused followed. The classical statement of law in Bolam's case, (1957) 2 AII ER 118, at p. 121 D-F [set out in para 19 herein] has been widely accepted as decisive of the standard of care required both of professional men generally and medical practitioners in particular, and holds good in its applicability in India. In tort, it is enough for the defendant to show that the standard of care and the skill attained was that of the ordinary competent medical practitioner exercising an ordinary degree of professional skill. The fact that a defendant charged with negligence acted in accord with the general and approved practice is enough to clear him of the charge. It is not necessary for every professional to possess the highest level of expertise in that branch which he practices. Three things are pertinent to be noted. Firstly, the standard of care, when assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of knowledge available at the time (of the incident), and not at the date of trial. Secondly, when the charge of negligence arises out of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was not generally available at that point of time (that is, the time of the incident) on which it is suggested as should have been used. Thirdly, when it comes to the failure of taking precautions, what has to be seen is whether those precautions were taken which the ordinary experience of men has found to be sufficient; a failure to use special or extraordinary precautions which might have prevented the particular happening cannot be the standard for judging the alleged negligence. [Paras 48 (2), 48 (4), 19 and 24] Again, it has been held that indiscriminate prosecution of medical professionals for criminal medical negligence is counter-productive and does no service or good to the society. A medical practitioner faced with an emergency ordinarily tries his best to redeem the patient out of his suffering. He does not gain anything by acting with negligence or by omitting to do an act. Obviously, therefore, it will be for the complainant to clearly make out a case of negligence before a medical practitioner is charged with or proceeded against criminally. A surgeon with shaky hands under fear of legal action cannot perform a successful operation and a quivering physician cannot administer the end-dose of medicine to his patient. If the hands be trembling with the dangling fear of facing a criminal prosecution in the event of failure for whatever reason--whether attributable to himself or not, neither can a surgeon successfully wield his life-saving scalpel to perform an essential surgery, nor can a physician successfully administer the life-saving dose of medicine. Discretion being better part of valour, a medical professional would feel better advised to leave a terminal patient to his own fate in the case of emergency where the chance of success may be 10% (or so), rather than taking the risk of making a last ditch effort towards saving the subject and facing a criminal prosecution if his effort fails. Such timidity forced upon a doctor would be a disservice to the society. [See paras 28, 29 and 47] In the case of State of Punjab v. Shiv Ram and Others [2005] 7 SCC 1, a three Judge Bench of this Court while dealing with the case of medical negligence by the doctor in conducting sterilisation operations, reiterated and reaffirmed that unless negligence of doctor is established, the primary liability cannot be fastened on the medical practitioner. In paragraph 6 of the judgment it is said: "Very recently, this Court has dealt with the issues of medical negligence and laid down principles on which the liability of a medical professional is determined generally and in the field of criminal law in particular. Reference may be had to Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1. The Court has approved the test as laid down in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582: (1957) 2 AII ER 118 (QBD) popularly known as Bolam's test, in its applicability to India".

Martin F. D'Souza v. Mohd. Ishfaq decided on 17.02.2009. "We, therefore, direct that whenever a complaint is received against a doctor or hospital by the Consumer Forum (whether District, State or National) or by the Criminal Court then before issuing notice to the doctor or hospital against whom the complaint was made the Consumer Forum or Criminal Court should first refer the matter to a competent doctor or committee of doctors, specialized in the field relating to which the medical negligence is attributed, and only after that doctor or committee reports that there is a prima facie case of medical negligence should notice be then issued to the concerned doctor/hospital. This is necessary to avoid harassment to doctors who may not be ultimately found to be negligent. We further warn the police officials not to arrest or harass doctors unless the facts clearly come within the parameters laid down in Jacob Mathew's case otherwise the policemen will themselves have to face legal action."

CrPC- Sec 313 State of Maharastra Vs Alester Pereria(Bom.High Court, Cr. Appeal 430 of 2007) It is thus well established in law that admission or confession of accused in the statement under section 313 of the Code recorded in the course of trial can be acted upon and the Court can rely on these confessions to proceed to convict him. `Knowledge' is again distinguishable from `reason to believe'. The term 'knowledge' contains higher degree while the term 'reason to believe' is a matter of lesser degree. In the first, the person has direct appeal to his sense, while in the latter, there is sufficient cause to believe. While determining knowledge in relation to an event, the conduct of the person prior to and at the time of the event is of relevant consideration. Actus reus requires that to constitute a crime there must be a result brought about by human conduct, to physical event, which law prohibits. When an individual pursues or follows a line of conduct, he is expected to produce certain results. Final events or results may be the outcome of different events or it may be the result of a single act. If the end result is prohibited in law and if knowledge would have to be construed in the events of that case in relation to the evidence on record, the onus obviously is on the prosecution to prove the chain of acts even to attribute knowledge to the accused. The concept of `knowledge' has to be understood and applied to the facts of a given case in complete contra-distinction to the words `information' or `reasons to believe'. There may be difference of degree but that difference has to be kept in mind, as that alone is the paramount consideration even at the stage of framing charge whether under sections 300, 302 or 304 and for that matter, 304 (I) or (II) of the IPC.