Shabana Bano Vs Imran Khan S.L.P.(Crl.) No.717 of 2009

B. SUDERSHAN REDDY J & DEEPAK VERMA J held 04.12.09 that,
In our opinion, the point stands settled by judgment of this Court reported in (2001) 7 SCC 740 titled Danial Latifi & Anr. Vs. Union of India pronounced by a Constitution Bench of this Court. Paras 30, 31 and 32 thereof fully establish the said right of the appellant. The said paragraphs are reproduced herein under:
"30. A comparison of these provisions with Section 125 CrPC will make it clear that requirements provided in Section 125 and the purpose, object and scope thereof being to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can do so to support those who are unable to support themselves and who have a normal and legitimate claim to support are satisfied. If that is so, the argument of the petitioners that a different scheme being provided under the Act which is equally or more beneficial on the interpretation placed by us from the one provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure deprive them of their right, loses its significance. The object and scope of Section 125 CrPC is to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who are under an obligation to support those who are unable to support themselves and that object being fulfilled, we find it difficult to accept the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners.
31. Even under the Act, the parties agreed that the provisions of Section 125 CrPC would still be attracted and even otherwise, the Magistrate has been conferred with the power to make appropriate provision for maintenance and, therefore, what could be earlier granted by a Magistrate under Section 125 CrPC would now be granted under the very Act itself. This being the position, the Act cannot be held to be unconstitutional.
32. As on the date the Act came into force the law applicable to Muslim divorced women is as declared by this Court in Shah Bano's case [(1985) 2 SCC 556 Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum & Ors.]. In this case to find out the personal law of Muslims with regard to divorced women's rights, the starting point should be Shah Bano's case and not the original texts or any other material - all the more so when varying versions as to the authenticity of the source are shown to exist. Hence, we have refrained from referring to them in detail. That declaration was made after considering the Holy Quran, and other commentaries or other texts. When a Constitution Bench of this Court analysed Suras 241-242 of Chapter II of the Holy Quran and other relevant textual material, we do not think, it is open for us to re-examine that position and delve into a research to reach another conclusion. We respectfully abide by what has been stated therein. All that needs to be considered is whether in the Act specific deviation has been made from the personal laws as declared by this Court in Shah Bano's case without mutilating its underlying ratio. We have carefully analysed the same and come to the conclusion that the Act actually and in reality codifies what was stated in Shah Bano's case. The learned Solicitor General contended that what has been stated in the Objects and Reasons in Bill leading to the Act is a fact and that we should presume to be correct. We have analysed the facts and the law in Shah Bano's case and proceeded to find out the impact of the same on the Act. If the language of the Act is as we have stated, the mere fact that the Legislature took note of certain facts in enacting the law will not be of much materiality."
The appellant's petition under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as appellant does not remarry. The amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be restricted for the iddat period only.

Iqbal Bano Vs. State of U.P.& Anr. (2007) 6 SCC 785

Court held that, Proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are civil in nature. Even if the Court noticed that there was a divorced woman in the case in question, it was open to it to treat it as a petition under the Act considering the beneficial nature of the legislation. Proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and claims made under the Act are tried by the same court. In Vijay Kumar Prasad Vs State of Bihar (2004) 5 SCC 196 it was held that proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are civil in nature. It was noted as follows: “14. The basic distinction between Section 488 of the old Code and Section 126 of the Code is that Section 126 has essentially enlarged the venue of proceedings for maintenance so as to move the place where the wife may be residing on the date of application. The change was thought necessary because of certain observations by the Law Commission, taking note of the fact that often deserted wives are compelled to live with their relatives far away from the place where the husband and wife last resided together. As noted by this Court in several cases, proceedings under Section 125 of the Code are of civil nature. Unlike clauses (b) and (c) of Section 126 (1) an application by the father or the mother claiming maintenance has to be filed where the person from whom maintenance is claimed lives."

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248

P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship then was) held that the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and give additional protection under Article 19. Any law interfering with personal liberty of a person must satisfy a triple test: (i) it must prescribe a procedure; (ii) the procedure must withstand a test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation; and (iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14. As the test propounded by Article 14 pervades Article 21 as well, the law and procedure authorising interference with the personal liberty must also be right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. If the procedure prescribed does not satisfy the requirement of Article 14, it would be no procedure at all within the meaning of Article 21. The Court thus expanded the scope and ambit of the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 and sowed the seed for future development of the law.

Law v. Canada (Ministry of Employment and Immigration) 1999 1 S.C.R. 497

Attempts to capture the concept of dignity in these words: “Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits.

Lohana Vasantlal Devchand v. State, AIR 1968 Guj 252

The issue was whether oral sex amounted to an offence under Section 377 IPC. It was held that the “orifice of the mouth is not, according to nature, meant for sexual or carnal intercourse.”

Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others (1981) 1 SCC 608

Justice P.N. Bhagwati “... We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. ......... Every act which offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights.”

R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632

The right to privacy to be implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 21. “It is the right to be left alone”.

Gobind v. State of M.P., (1975) 2 SCC 148

Mathew, J. “There can be no doubt that the makers of our Constitution wanted to ensure conditions favourable to the pursuit of happiness. They certainly realized as Brandeis, J. said in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438, 471 the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect and that only a part of the pain, pleasure, satisfaction of life can be found in material things and therefore they must be deemed to have conferred upon the individual as against the Government a sphere where he should be let alone.”

John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611

“The constitutionality of a provision, it is trite, will have to be judged keeping in view the interpretative changes of the statute affected by passage of time.......the law although may be constitutional when enacted but with passage of time the same may be held to be unconstitutional in view of the changed situation.”

Naz Foundation vs Government of NCT of Delhi and Others, decided by Delhi High Court on 02.07.09

JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR, AJIT PRAKASH SHAH, CHIEF JUSTICE:
The marginal note refers to the acts proscribed as “unnatural offences”. This expression, however, is not used in the text of Section 377 IPC. The expression “carnal intercourse” is used in Section 377 IPC as distinct from the expression “sexual intercourse”, which appears in Sections 375 and 497 IPC. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary (ninth edition, 1995), the term “carnal” means “of the body or flesh; worldly” and “sensual, sexual”. Consent is no defence to an offence under Section 377 IPC and no distinction regarding age is made in the section.
The English law was reformed in Britain by the Sexual Offences Act, 1967, which de-criminalised homosexuality and acts of sodomy between consenting adults (above age of 21) pursuant to the report of Wolfenden Committee.
Union of India argues that Indian society is yet to demonstrate readiness or willingness to show greater tolerance to practices of homosexuality.
From the above summary of submissions of the Union of India through the MHA it is clear that the thrust of the resistance to the claim in the petition is founded on the argument of public morality.
Learned ASG submits that there is no fundamental right to engage in the same sex activities. In our country, homosexuality is abhorrent and can be criminalised by imposing proportional limits on the citizens’ right to privacy and equality. Learned ASG submits that right to privacy is not absolute and can be restricted for compelling state interest.
According to him, in the western societies the morality standards are not as high as in India. Learned ASG further submits that Section 377 IPC is not discriminatory as it is gender neutral.
Dignity as observed by L’Heureux-Dube, J is a difficult concept to capture in precise terms [Egan v. Canada, (1995) 29 CRR (2nd) 79 at 106]. At its least, it is clear that the constitutional protection of dignity requires us to acknowledge the value and worth of all individuals as members of our society. It recognises a person as a free being who develops his or her body and mind as he or she sees fit.
The expression “dignity of the individual” finds specific mention in the Preamble to the Constitution of India. V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. observed that the guarantee of human dignity forms part of our constitutional culture [Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admn.].
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) refers to privacy and it states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
In India, our Constitution does not contain a specific provision as to privacy but the right to privacy has, as we shall presently show, been spelt out by our Supreme Court from the provisions of Article 19(1) (a) dealing with freedom of speech and expression, Article 19(1) (d) dealing with right to freedom of movement and from Article 21, which deals with right to life and liberty.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438 (1928), was a case of wire-tapping or electronic surveillance and where there was no actual physical invasion, the majority held that the action was not subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions. But, in his dissent, Justice Brandeis, stated that the amendment protected the right to privacy which meant “the right to be let alone”, and its purpose was “to secure conditions favourable to the pursuit of happiness”, while recognising “the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and intellect: the right sought “to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations”
Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332, the U.P. Regulations regarding domiciliary visits were in question and the majority referred to Munn v. Illinois, 94 US 113 (1877), and held that though our Constitution did not refer to the right to privacy expressly, still it can be traced from the right to “life” in Article 21. The majority did not go into the question whether these visits violated the “right to privacy”. But, Subba Rao, J. while concurring that the fundamental right to privacy was part of the right to liberty in Article 21, part of the right to freedom of speech and expression in Article 19(1) (a), and also of the right of movement in Article 19(1) (d), held that the Regulations permitting surveillance violated the fundamental right to privacy.
The right to privacy thus has been held to protect a “private space in which man may become and remain himself”. The ability to do so is exercised in accordance with individual autonomy.
Bowers v. Hardwick (supra) Blackmun, J. cited the following passage from Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, [413 US 49 (1973), page 63] : “Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality. The way in which we give expression to our sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy. If, in expressing our sexuality, we act consensually and without harming one another, invasion of that precinct will be a breach of our privacy.”
The sphere of privacy allows persons to develop human relations without interference from the outside community or from the State. The exercise of autonomy enables an individual to attain fulfillment, grow in self-esteem, build relationships of his or her choice and fulfill all legitimate goals that he or she may set. In the Indian Constitution, the right to live with dignity and the right of privacy both are recognised as dimensions of Article 21. Section 377 IPC denies a person’s dignity and criminalises his or her core identity solely on account of his or her sexuality and thus violates Article 21 of the Constitution.
These fundamental rights had their roots deep in the struggle for independence and, as pointed out by Granville Austin in “The Indian Constitution – Cornerstone of A Nation”, “they were included in the Constitution in the hope and expectation that one day the tree of true liberty would bloom in India”.
However persons, having carnal intercourse with any animal, were to be left to their just deserts. Though the Law Commission report would not expressly say so, it is implicit in the suggested amendments that elements of “will” and “consent” will become relevant to determine if the sexual contact (homosexual for the purpose at hand) constitute an offence or not.
In fact, the admitted case of Union of India that Section 377 IPC has generally been used in cases of sexual abuse or child abuse, and conversely that it has hardly ever been used in cases of consenting adults, shows that criminalisation of adult same-sex conduct does not serve any public interest. The compelling state interest rather demands that public health measures are strengthened by de-criminalisation of such activity, so that they can be identified and better focused upon.
The decisions lay down that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the objective sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The other important facet of Article 14 which was stressed in Maneka Gandhi is that it eschews arbitrariness in any form.
It is clear that Section 377 IPC, whatever its present pragmatic application, was not enacted keeping in mind instances of child sexual abuse or to fill the lacuna in a rape law. It was based on a conception of sexual morality specific to Victorian era drawing on notions of carnality and sinfulness. In any way, the legislative object of protecting women and children has no bearing in regard to consensual sexual acts between adults in private.
The Court further held that legislations with pronounced “protective discrimination” aims, such as Section 30, potentially serve as double edged swords. Strict scrutiny should be employed while assessing the implications of this variety of legislations. Legislation should not be only assessed on its proposed aims but rather on the implications and the effects.
We declare that Section 377 IPC, insofar it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private, is violative of Articles 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The provisions of Section 377 IPC will continue to govern non-consensual penile non-vaginal sex and penile non-vaginal sex involving minors.

Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka 2007 (4) SCC 415

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.

Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. (2002) 6 SCC 470

Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible.

Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120

(1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) `substantial and compelling reasons', (ii) `good and sufficiently cogent reasons', and (iii) `strong reasons' are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.

State of Rajasthan Vs. Mohan Lal, Decided by SC on 16.04.2009

Bare reading of Section 378 of the present Code quoted above, makes it clear that no restrictions have been imposed by the legislature on the powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at large, the material on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact and of law are open to determination by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal.
It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
Referring to the interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, a learned author says [see "The Mathematics of Proof II": Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340 (342)]: The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other.

Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955) 2 SCR 1285

“It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong.”

Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294

“It is not possible for this Court to give any directions for amending the Act or statutory Rules. It is for Parliament to amend the Act and the Rules. It is also established law that no direction can be given, which would be contrary to the Act and the Rules. However, it is equally settled that in case when the Act or Rules are silent on a particular subject and the authority implementing the same has constitutional or statutory power to implement it, the court can necessarily issue directions or orders on the said subject to fill the vacuum or void till the suitable law is enacted."

D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416

Police is, no doubt, under a legal duty and has legitimate right to arrest a criminal and to interrogate him during the investigation of an offence but it must be remembered that the law does not permit use of third-degree methods or torture of accused in custody during interrogation and investigation with a view to solve the crime. End cannot justify the means. The interrogation and investigation into a crime should be in true sense purposeful to make the investigation effective. By torturing a person and using third-degree methods, the police would be accomplishing behind the closed doors what the demands of our legal order forbid. No society can permit it.
State terrorism is no answer to combat terrorism. State terrorism would only provide legitimacy to "terrorism".
It is now an accepted rule of judicial construction that regard must be had to international conventions and norms for construing domestic law when there is no inconsistency between them and there is a void in the domestic law.

In Re: Destruction of Public and Private Properties, Decided by SC on 16.04.2009

Taking a serious note of various instances where there was large scale destruction of public and private properties in the name of agitations, bandhs, hartals and the like, suo motu proceedings were initiated by a Bench of this Court on 5.6.2007.
In many such cases, the leaders would really be the main offenders being the abettors of the crime. If they are not caught in the dragnet and allowed to be immune from prosecution proceedings, such direct actions would continue unabated, if not further escalated, and will remain a constant or recurring affair.
Of course, it is normally difficult to prove abetment of the offence with the help of direct evidence. This flaw can be remedied to a great extent by making an additional provision in PDPP Act to the effect that specified categories of leaders of the organization which make the call for direct actions resulting in damage to public property, shall be deemed to be guilty of abetment of the offence.
However, the accused in such case shall not be liable to conviction if he proves that (i) he was in no way connected with the action called by his political party or that (ii) he has taken all reasonable measures to prevent causing damage to public property in the direct action called by his organisation.
We felt that one of the areas to be tapped is evidence through videography in addition to contemporaneous material that may be available through the media.
There is a connection between tort and crime - the purpose of the criminal law is to protect the public interest and punish wrongdoers, the purpose of tort-law is to vindicate the rights of the individual and compensate the victim for loss, injury or damage suffered by him: however - the distinction in purpose between criminal law and the law of tort is not entirely crystal-clear, and it has been developed from case-to-case. The availability of exemplary damages in certain torts (for instance) suggest an overtly punitive function - but one thing is clear: tort and criminal law have always shared a deterrent function in relation to wrongdoing.
The entire history of the development of the tort law shows a continuous tendency, which is naturally not uniform in all common law countries, to recognise as worthy of legal protection, interests which were previously not protected at all or were infrequently protected and it is unlikely that this tendency has ceased or is going to cease in future. There are dicta both ancient and modern that categories of tort are not closed and that novelty of a claim is no defence. But generally, the judicial process leading to recognition of new tort situations is slow.
Where persons, whether jointly or otherwise, are part of a protest which turns violent, results in damage to private or public property, the persons who have caused the damage, or were part of the protest or who have organized will be deemed to be strictly liable for the damage so caused, which may be assessed by the ordinary courts or by any special procedure created to enforce the right.
Damages in the law of torts in India include (a) damages based on the concept of restituto in interregnum to enable total recompense; and (b) exemplary damages"
The basic principles as suggested by Nariman Committee are as follows which we find to be appropriate: (1) The basic principle for measure of damages in torts (i.e. wrongs) in property is that there should be `restituto in interregnum' which conveys the idea of "making whole". (2) Where any injury to property is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be given for reparation by way of damages the Court should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation. (3) In this branch of the law, the principle of restitution in interregnum has been described as the "dominant" rule of law. Subsidiary rules can only be justified if they give effect to that rule.
Aggravated damages are designed to compensate the plaintiff for his wounded feelings-they must be distinguished from exemplary damages which are punitive in nature and which (under English Law) may be awarded in a limited category of cases.
"Exemplary damages" has been a controversial topic for many years. Such damages are not compensatory but are awarded to punish the defendant and to deter him and others from similar behaviour in the future. The law in England (as restated in Rookes v. Barnard affirmed in Cassell v. Broome) is that such damages are not generally allowed. In England they can only be awarded in three classes of cases (i) where there is oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the Government; (ii) where the defendants conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the claimant; and (iii) where such damages are provided by statute.
In the absence of legislation the following guidelines are to be adopted to assess damages:
(I) Wherever a mass destruction to property takes place due to protests or thereof, the High Court may issue suo motu action and set up a machinery to investigate the damage caused and to award compensation related thereto.
(II) Where there is more than one state involved, such action may be taken by the Supreme Court.
(III) In each case, the High Court or Supreme Court, as the case may be, appoint a sitting or retired High Court judge or a sitting or retired District judge as a Claims Commissioner to estimate the damages and investigate liability.
(IV) An Assessor may be appointed to assist the Claims Commissioner.
(V) The Claims Commissioner and the Assessor may seek instructions from the High Court or Supreme Court as the case may be, to summon the existing video or other recordings from private and public sources to pinpoint the damage and establish nexus with the perpetrators of the damage.
(VI) The principles of absolute liability shall apply once the nexus with the event that precipitated the damage is established.
(VII) The liability will be borne by the actual perpetrators of the crime as well as organisers of the event giving rise to the liability - to be shared, as finally determined by the High Court or Supreme Court as the case may be.
(VIII) Exemplary damages may be awarded to an extent not greater than twice the amount of the damages liable to be paid.
(IX) Damages shall be assessed for: (a) damages to public property; (b) damages to private property; (c) damages causing injury or death to a person or persons; (d) Cost of the actions by the authorities and police to take preventive and other actions
(X) The Claims Commissioner will make a report to the High Court or Supreme Court which will determine the liability after hearing the parties.

The situation in which a positive mandamus to do a particular act in a particular way, may be broadly classified in the following manner. First are the broad mandamus cases where this Court has held that the court may issue a positive mandamus to enforce the law. Thus in Vineet Narain's case (supra) detailed orders were passed for the investigation of the Hawala transaction cases. It is laid down that positive directions can be issued where there is a power coupled with a duty. The situations under which this can happen are numerous.
How do we check the abuse of police power? Transparency of action and accountability perhaps are two possible safeguards which this Court must insist upon.
if we lay too much of emphasis on protection of their fundamental rights and human rights, such criminals may go Scot free without exposing any element or iota of criminality with the result, the crime would go unpunished and in the ultimate analysis the society would suffer. The concern is genuine and the problem is real. To deal with such a situation, a balanced approach is needed to meet the ends of justice.
In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746, a provision in the ICCPR was referred to support the view taken that 'an enforceable right to compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of a guaranteed right', as a public law remedy under Article 32, distinct from the private law remedy in torts. There is no reason why these international conventions and norms cannot, therefore, be used for construing the fundamental rights expressly guaranteed in the Constitution of India which embody the basic concept of gender equality in all spheres of human activity.
As pointed out in Vishaka it is the duty of the executive to fill the vacuum by executive orders because its field is coterminous with that of the legislature, and where there is inaction even by the executive, for whatever reason, the judiciary must step in, in exercise of its constitutional obligations under the aforesaid provisions to provide a solution till such time as the legislature acts to perform its role by enacting proper legislation to cover the field.
Mr. F.S. Nariman Committee has suggested certain modalities which are essentially as follows: a) The Trusteeship Principle - Professional journalists operate as trustees of public and their mission should be to seek the truth and to report it with integrity and independence. b) The Self Regulation Principles - A model of self-regulation should be based upon the principles of impartiality and objectivity in reporting; ensuring neutrality; responsible reporting of sensitive issues, especially crime, reporting women violence, agitations and children and and protests; sensitivity in matters relating to national security; respect for privacy. c) Content Regulations - In principle, content regulation except under very exceptional circumstances, is not to be encouraged beyond vetting of cinema and advertising through the existing statues. It should be incumbent on the media to classify its work through warning systems as in cinema so that children and those who are challenged adhere to time, place and manner restraints. The media must also evolve codes and complaint systems. But prior content control (while accepting the importance of codes for self restraint) goes to the root of censorship and is unsuited to the role of media in democracy. d) Complaints Principle - There should be an effective mechanism to address complaints in a fair and just manner. e) Balance Principle - A balance has to be maintained which is censorial on the basis of the principles of proportionality and least invasiveness, but which effectively ensures democratic governance and self restraint from news publications that the other point of view is properly accepted and accommodated.
Regulation of the media is not an end in itself; and allocative regulation is necessary because the 'air waves' are public property and cannot technically be free for all but have to be distributed in a fair manner.

Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202

it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses

Bhupendra Singh and Ors. Vs. State of U.P., Decided by SC on 16.04.2009

Merely because the eye-witnesses are family members their evidence cannot per se be discarded. When there is allegation of interestedness, the same has to be established. Mere statement that being relatives of the deceased they are likely to falsely implicate the accused cannot be a ground to discard the evidence which is otherwise cogent and credible.
Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person.
The emphasis in Section 149 IPC is on the common object and not on common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149.
The word "object" means the purpose or design and, in order to make it "common", it must be shared by all. In other words, the object should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur with it. A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage.
The expression "in prosecution of common object" as appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly construed as equivalent to "in order to attain the common object". It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must be community of object and the object may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly may have community of object up to a certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects and their knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object which may vary not only according to the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149 IPC may be different on different members of the same assembly.
"Common object" is different from a "common intention" as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to achieve that object.
Section 149 IPC consists of two parts. The first part of the section means that the offence to be committed in prosecution of the common object must be one which is committed with a view to accomplish the common object. In order that the offence may fall within the first part, the offence must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was a member. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section 141, if it can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed and this is what is required in the second part of the section. The purpose for which the members of the unlawful assembly set out or desired to achieve is the object. If the object desired by all the members is the same, the knowledge that is the object which is being pursued is shared by all the members and they are in general agreement as to how it is to be achieved and that is now the common object of the assembly.
The word "knew" used in the second branch of the section implies something more than a possibility and it cannot be made to bear the sense of "might have been known". Positive knowledge is necessary.

Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya v. Union of India and Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 436

Once the documents are referred to in the grounds of detention it becomes the bounden duty of the detaining authority to supply the same to the detenu as part of the grounds or pari passu the grounds of detention.

Golam alias Golam Mallick v. State of West Bengal (1975) 2 SCC 4

No doubt, Clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution and Section 8 of the Act do not, in terms, speak of 'particulars' or 'facts', but only of 'grounds' to be communicated to the detenu. But this requirement is to be read in conjunction with and subservient to the primary mandate: "and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order", in the aforesaid Clause (5). Thus construed, it is clear that in the context, 'grounds' does not merely mean a recital or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of the authority in the language of Section 3 of the Act; nor is its connotation restricted to a bare statement of conclusions of fact. It means something more.
That 'something' is the factual constituent of the 'grounds' on which the subjective satisfaction of the authority is based. All the basic facts and material particulars, therefore, which have influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention, will be covered by "grounds" within the contemplation of Article 22(5) and Section 8, and are required to be communicated to the detenu unless their disclosure is considered by the authority to be against public interest.

Ganga Ramchand Bharvani v. Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra and Ors. (1980) 4 SCC 624

The mere fact that the grounds of detention served on the detenu are elaborate, does not absolve the detaining authority from its constitutional responsibility to supply all the basic facts and materials relied upon in the grounds to the detenu. In the instant case, the grounds contain only the substance of the statements, while the detenu had asked for copies of the full text of those statements.

Thahira Haris etc. Vs. Government of Karnataka and Ors., Decided by SC on 15.04.2009

The right which the detenu enjoys under Article 22(5) is of immense importance. This Article of the Constitution can be broadly classified into two categories: (i) the grounds on which the detention order is passed must be communicated to the detenu as expeditiously as possible and (ii) proper opportunity of making representation against the detention order be provided.
Our Constitution provides adequate safeguards under clauses (5) and (6) of Article 22 to the detenu who has been detained in pursuance of the order made under any law providing for preventive detention. He has right to be supplied copies of all documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention without any delay. The predominant object of communicating the grounds of detention is to enable the detenu at the earliest opportunity to make effective and meaningful representation against his detention.

Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi and Ors. 1953 SCR 708

Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meager safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court.
We are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under clause (6) of Article 22.

Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450

1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law.
2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent.
3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong.

K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan (2008) 1 SCC 258

It is now trite that if two views are possible, the appellate court shall not reverse a judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible to be taken. The appellate court's jurisdiction to interfere is limited.

Ludhiana Improvement Trust, Ludhiana and Anr. Vs. Shakti Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., Decided by SC on: 13.04.2009

"unfair trade practice" are: (i) it must be a trade practice; (ii) the trade practice must be employed for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or for the provision of any service; and (iii) the trade practice adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice including any of the practices enumerated in clauses (1) to (6) of Section 2(r) of the Act.
It is true that the Consumer Protection Act being a benevolent piece of legislation intended to protect the consumers from exploitation, the provisions thereof should receive a liberal construction; technicalities should be eschewed and grievances of the consumers deserve to be redressed expeditiously.
The averments in the complaint by the consumer cannot be taken as a Gospel truth. To support a finding of "unfair trade practice", there has to be some cogent material before the Commission and any inferential finding is not sufficient to attract Section 2(r) of the Act.

State of M.P. v. Mansingh 2003 (10) SCC 414

It is extremely difficult to believe that the injured witnesses who themselves got injured and whose close relatives lost their lives would shield the real culprits and name somebody else only due to some enmity.

Surender Singh v. State of Haryana 2006 (9) SCC 247

The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy. The fact that the witness was injured at the time and in the same occurrence lends support to the testimony that the witness was present during occurrence and he saw the happening with his own eyes.

Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Anr. (2006) 1 SCC 75

Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice.

Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi (2004) 1 SCC 438

A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal court. An order passed by the Executive Magistrate in proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code is an order by a criminal court and that too based on a summary enquiry. The order is entitled to respect and wait before the competent court at the interlocutory stage. At the stage of final adjudication of rights, which would be on the evidence adduced before the court, the order of the Magistrate is only one out of several pieces of evidence.

Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 480

All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation.

Lakshmi and Anr. Vs. Chinnammal @ Rayyammal and Ors., Decided by SC on 08.04.2009

If bringing on record a document is essential for proving the case by a party, ordinarily the same should not be refused; the Court's duty being to find out the truth. The procedural mechanics necessary to arrive at a just decision must be encouraged. We are not unmindful of the fact that the court in the said process would not encourage any fishing enquiry. It would also not assist a party in procuring a document which he should have himself filed.
There cannot furthermore be any doubt that by calling for such documents, the Court shall not bring about a situation whereby a criminal proceeding would remain stayed as it is a well settled principle of law that where a Civil proceeding as also a Criminal proceeding is pending, the latter shall get primacy.

Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy and Anr. (2003) 1 SCC 734

It is settled law that there is no statutory bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts. In a case where a previous complaint is reasons, the Magistrate under cognizance of an offence and issue process if there is sufficient ground for proceeding. As held in Pramatha Nath Talukdar case second complaint could be dismissed after a decision has been given against the complainant in previous matter upon a full consideration of his case. Further, second complaint on the same facts could be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, namely, where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced.

R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and Ors. (2009) 1 SCC 516,

(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.

Kishorsinh Ratansinh Jadeja Vs. Maruti Corp. and Ors., Decided by SC on: 06.04.2009

It is well established, that while passing an interim order of injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the Court is required to consider three basic principles, namely, (i) prima facie case; (ii) balance of convenience and inconvenience; and (iii) irreparable loss and injury.

Mandali Ranganna and Ors. v. T. Ramachandra (2008) 11 SCC 1

an additional principle was sought to be enunciated relating to grant of injunction by way of an equitable relief.

Rama Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar, Decided by SC on: 02.04.2009

A mere reading of the above provision makes it clear that irrespective of report under Sub-section (2) forwarded to the Magistrate, if the officer in-charge of the police station obtains further evidence, it is incumbent on his part to forward the same to the Magistrate with a further report with regard to such evidence in the form prescribed.
The above said provision also makes it clear that further investigation is permissible, however, reinvestigation is prohibited. The law does not mandate taking of prior permission from the Magistrate for further investigation. Carrying out a further investigation even after filing of the charge-sheet is a statutory right of the police. Reinvestigation without prior permission is prohibited.
The meaning of "Further" is additional; more; or supplemental. "Further" investigation, therefore, is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation altogether.
The investigating agency has to forward to the Magistrate a "further" report and not fresh report regarding the "further" evidence obtained during such investigation.
The material collected in further investigation cannot be rejected only because it has been filed at the stage of trial.

Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills' Circumstantial Evidence"

Lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence:
(1) The facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum;
(2) The burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability;
(3) In all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits;
(4) In order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt,
(5) If there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled of the right to be acquitted.

State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava 1992 Crl.LJ 1104,

It was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences; the one in favour of the accused must be accepted.

Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 79

it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:
(1) The circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
(2) Those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and
(4) The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.

C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC 193

In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence....

Chaman Lal and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab and Anr, Decided On 31.03.2009

“The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be: (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object, (c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is framed.
Agreement may be proved by necessary implication. The offence of criminal conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to commit an offence.
No doubt in the case of conspiracy there cannot be any direct evidence.
The agreement may be express or implied, or in part express and in part implied.
The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal conduct, not the execution of it.
It is not enough that two or more persons pursued the same unlawful object at the same time or in the same place; it is necessary to show a meeting of minds, a consensus to effect an unlawful purpose.
It is not, however, necessary that each conspirator should have been in communication with every other."

Phool Patti and Anr. Vs. Ram Singh, Decided On 31.03.2009

“In Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major 1995(5) SCC 709 in which it is stated that: ...We would think that the exception engrafted is meant to cover that decree or order of a court, including a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which declares the pre-existing right and does not by itself create new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 or upwards....
Prima facie it seems to us that the decision in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) does not lay down the correct law since Section 17(2) (vi) on its plain reading has nothing to do with any pre existing right. All that seems to have been stated therein is that if a decree is passed regarding some immovable property which is not a subject-matter of the suit then it will require registration. As already explained above, if a suit is filed in respect of property A but the decree is in respect of immovable property B, then the decree so far as it relates to immovable property B will require registration.
It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear. Since there is no mention of any pre- existing right in the exception in clause (vi) we have found it difficult to accept the views in Bhoop Singh's case (supra).
Let the papers be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench for interpreting the exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act.”

Ramchandra Dagdu Sonavane Vs. Vithu Hira Mahar Decided by SC on 09.10.09

As regards whether there is valid adoption or not, that question pertains to the status and legal character of an individual, which falls within the purview of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and a suit for declaration before a civil court is maintainable.
Res-judicata and Code of Civil Procedure: It is well known that the doctrine of res-judicata is codified in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11 generally comes into play in relation to civil suits. But apart from the codified law, the doctrine of res-judicata or the principle of the res-judicata has been applied since long in various other kinds of proceedings and situations by courts in England, India and other countries. The rule of constructive resjudicata is engrafted in Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in many other situations also Principles not only of direct res-judicata but of constructive res-judicata are also applied, if by any judgment or order any matter in issue has been directly and explicitly decided, the decision operates as res-judicata and bars the trial of an identical issue in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties. The Principle of res-judicata comes into play when by judgment and order a decision of a particular issue is implicit in it, that is, it must be deemed to have been necessarily decided by implications even then the Principle of res-judicata on that issue is directly applicable. When any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceeding but was not so made, then such a matter in the eye of law, to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to bring about finality in it, is deemed to have been constructively in issue and, therefore, is taken as decided.
When the material issue has been tried and determined between the same parties in a proper suit by a competent court as to the status of one of them in relation to the other, it cannot be again tried in another suit between them. It is a settled law that in a suit for injunction when title is in issue, for the purpose of granting injunction the issue directly and substantially arises in that suit between the parties. When the same is put in issue in a later suit based on title between the same parties or their privies in a subsequent suit, the decree in injunction suit equally operates as a res judicata.
It is true that if an earlier judgment has to operate as res-judicata in the subsequent proceedings, then all the necessary facts including pleadings of the earlier litigation must be placed on record in the subsequent proceedings.

Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair (1994) 2 SCC

The decision in earlier case on the issue between the same parties or persons under whom they claim title or litigating under the same title, it operates as a res-judicata. A plea decided even in a suit for injunction touching title between the same parties, would operate as res-judicata.

Isher Singh v. Sarwan Singh AIR 1965 SC 948

We thus reach the position that in the former suit the heirship of the respondents to Jati deceased (a) was in terms raised by the pleadings, (b) that an issue was framed in regard to it by the trial Judge, (c) that evidence was led by the parties on that point directed towards this issue, (d) a finding was recorded on it by the appellate court, and (e) that on the proper construction of the pleadings it would have been necessary to decide the issue in order to properly and completely decide all the points arising in the case to grant relief to the plaintiff. We thus find that every one of the conditions necessary to satisfy the test as to the applicability of Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code is satisfied.

Swamy Atmandanda v. Sri Ramakrishna, Tapovanam (2005) 10 SCC 51

The object and purport of the principle of res judicata as contended in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to uphold the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, as to the points decided earlier of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, in every subsequent suit between the same parties.

Tirupur Dyeing Factory Owners Association Vs. Noyyal River Ayacutdars Protection Association and Ors., Supreme Court on 06.10.2009

In case in spite of stringent conditions, degradation of environment continues and reaches a stage of no return, the court may consider the closure of industrial activities in areas where there is such a risk. Undoubtedly, there has been unabated pollution by the members of the appellant Association. They cannot escape the responsibility to meet out the expenses of reversing the ecology. They are bound to meet the expenses of removing the sludge of the river and also for cleaning the dam. The principles of "polluters-pay" and "precautionary principle" have to be read with the doctrine of "sustainable development". It becomes the responsibility of the members of the appellant Association that they have to carry out their industrial activities without polluting the water.

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2004)12 SCC 118

Court explained the scope of "precautionary principle" observing that it requires anticipatory action to be taken to prevent harm. The harm can be prevented even on a reasonable suspicion. It is not always necessary that there should be direct evidence of harm to the environment. The concept of "sustainable development" has been explained that it covers the development that meets the needs of the person without compromising the ability of the future generation to meet their own needs. It means the development, that can take place and which can be sustained by nature/ecology with or without mitigation. In such eventuality, a balance has to be struck, for the reason that if the activity is allowed to go, there may be irreparable damage to the environment and there may be irreparable damage to the economic interest.

Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2715

Court considered various constitutional provisions including Articles 47, 48-A, 51-A(g) and came to the conclusion that it is the duty of the State to protect and preserve the ecology, as Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees protection of life and personal liberty and every person has a right to pollution free atmosphere. Therefore, the "precautionary principle" and the "polluter-pays" principle have been accepted as a part of the law of the land being the part of environmental law of the country.

Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1996) 3 SCC 212

Court ruled that once the industrial activities carried out are found to be hazardous or inherently dangerous, the person carrying on such activities are liable to make good the loss caused to any other person by his activity irrespective of the fact whether he took reasonable care while carrying out his industrial or commercial activities.

Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2004 (10) SCC 657

For Evidence Act sec 27
(1) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mind that the provisions has nothing to do with the question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescription relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make facts discovered admissible.
(2) The fact must be discovered.
(3)The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accused's own act.
(4) The person giving information must be accused of an offence.
(5) He must be in the custody of a police officer.
(6) The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to.
(7) Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the facts discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible.

State of M.P. V. Dayaram Hemraj AIR 1981 SC 2007

Confessional statement was not accepted by the courts on the ground, the confessional statement recorded by the Magistrate was in the form of question and answer. The record shows that he was virtually cross examined and whatever he said was in answer to leading questions put by the learned Magistrate.

State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358

Court observed that in Nazir Ahmed's case, 63 Inds App 372 :(AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) the Judicial Committee observed that the principle applied in Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) A Ch. D. 426 to a Court, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden, applied to judicial officers making a record under S. 164 and, therefore, held that the magistrate could not give oral evidence of the confession made to him which he had purported to record under S. 164 of the Code. It was said that otherwise all the precautions and safeguards laid down in Ss. 164 and 364, both of which had to be read together, would become of such trifling value as to be almost idle and that "it would be an unnatural construction to hold that any other procedure was permitted than that which is laid down with such minute particularity in the sections themselves.

Mohd Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra 1976 SCC (Crl.) 199

The last but the most important condition is that only ''so much of the information' as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word ''distinctly' means ''directly', ''indubitably', ''strictly', ''unmistakably'. The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase ''distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered' is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered.

Ramanlal Rathi v. the State AIR 1951 Cal 305

If at the end of a criminal prosecution the evidence leaves the Court in doubt as to the guilt of the accused the latter is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. A retrial may be ordered when the original trial has not been satisfactory for particular reasons, for example if evidence had been wrongly rejected which should have been admitted or admitted when it should have been rejected, or the Court had refused to hear certain witness who should have been heard. But retrial cannot be ordered on the ground that the prosecution did not produce the proper evidence and did not know how to prove their case

Babubhai Udesinh Parmar vs. State of Gujarat (2007) 1 SCC (Crl.) 702

Section 164 of CrPC provided for safeguards for an accused. The provisions contained therein are required to be strictly complied with. But, it does not envisage compliance with the statutory provisions in a routine or mechanical.

Mausam Singh Roy v. state of West Bengal 2003 (12) SCC 377

It is also settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious an offence, the stricter decree of proof, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused.

Ukha Kohle v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1531

An order for retrial of a criminal case is made in exceptional cases, and not unless the appellate Court is satisfied that the Court trying the proceeding had no jurisdiction to try it or that the trial was vitiated by serious illegalities or irregularities or on account of misconception of the nature of the proceedings and on that account in substance there had been no real trial or that the prosecutor or an accused was for reasons over which he had no control, prevented from leading or tendering evidence material to the charge and in the interests of justice the appellate Court deems it appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the case, that the accused should be put on his trial again.

Subhash v. State of U.P (1976) 3 SCC 629

Before referring to the evidence in the case, it has to be mentioned that the High Court had before it not only the appeal filed by the accused but also a reference made by the Sessions Court for confirmation of the capital sentence under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Time and again, this Court has pointed out that on a reference for confirmation of the sentence of death, the High Court is under an obligation to precede in accordance with the provisions of sections 375 and 376 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Under these sections, the High Court must not only see whether the order passed by the Sessions Court is correct but it is under an obligation to examine the entire evidence for itself, apart from and independently of the Sessions Court's appraisal and assessment of that evidence.

Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P.AIR 1952 SC 159

The murder was particularly cruel and revolting one and for that reason, it will be necessary to examine the evidence with more than ordinary care lest the shocking nature of the crime induces an insensitive reaction against a dispassionate judicial scrutiny of the facts and law.

Badri Prasad Prajapti vs. State of M.P. 2005 Crl. L.J. 1856

For applicability of sec30 Evidence Act
(i) there must be joint trial for the same offence
(ii) it must be a confessional
(iii) the confession of guilt must affect himself and others, i.e. implicate the maker substantially to the same incident as the other accused;
(iv) The confession of guilt must be proved.

Shashi Kant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh 2002 (v) SCC 738

The intention of the provision here is that wherein the course of any enquiry into or trial of, an offence, it appears to the court from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence, the court may proceed against him for the offence which he appears to have committed. At that stage, the court would consider that such a person could be tried together with the accused who is already before the court facing the trial. The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the proceedings right from the beginning have mandatorily to be commenced afresh and the witnesses reheard. In short, there has to be a de novo trial against him. The provision of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of a person so brought before the court, it would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses for the cross examination of such a person. They have to be examined afresh. Fresh examination-in-chief and not only their presentation for the purpose of the cross examination of the newly added accused is the mandate of section 319 (4). The words "could be tried together with the accused" in section 319 (1) appear to be only directory. "could be" cannot under these circumstances be held to be "must be". The provision cannot be interpreted to mean that since the trial in respect of a person who was before the court has concluded with the result that the newly added person can not be tried together with the accused who was before the court when order under section 319 (1) was passed, the order would become ineffective and inoperative, nullifying the opinion earlier formed by the court on the basis of the evidence before it that the newly added person appears to have committed the offence resulting in an order for his being brought before the court.

Rama Shanker Singh v. state of West Bengal , 1962, SC 1239

The sentence of death passed by the Court of Sessions in a reference under Section 374 of the Code cannot be executed unless it be confirmed by the High Court. Under section 376 Cr.P.C. The High Court dealing with a case submitted to it under section 374 (1) may confirm the sentence or pass any other sentence warranted by law, or (b) may annul the conviction, and convict the accused of any offence of which the Sessions Court might have convicted him, or order a new trial on the same or an amended charge, or may acquit the accused person.

Sarwan Singh V. The State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 637

Prima facie whether or not the confession is voluntary would be a question of fact and we would be reluctant to interfere with a finding of such question of fact unless we are satisfied that the impugned finding has been reached without applying the true and relevant legal test in the matter.

Tanvi Ben Pankaj Kumar Divetia v. state of Gujarat, AIR 1997 SC 2193

This Court has clearly sounded a note of caution that in case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always danger that conjectures and surmises may take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of innocence of the accused.

Sunil Kumar v. State of Rajasthan 2005 SCC (Crl.) 654

Additionally, no question was asked of the Investigating officer as to the reason for the alleged delayed dispatch of the F.I.R. Had this been done, the investigating officer could have explained the circumstances. That having not been done, no adverse inference can be drawn.

Dhanajaya Reddy V. State of KarnataKa 2001 (4) SCC 9

Omission to comply with the mandatory provisions, one of such being as incorporated in subsection (4) of Section 164 is likely to render the confessional statement inadmissible. The words "shall be signed by the person making the confession” are mandatory in nature and the Magistrate recording the confession has no option.

Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab (1995) 3 SCC 367

Section 138 envisages that a witness would first be examined-in-chief and then subjected to cross-examination and for seeking any clarification, the witness may be re-examined by the prosecution. There is, in our opinion, no meaning in tendering a witness for cross examination. Tendering of a witness for cross examination, as a matter of fact, amounts to giving up of the witness by the prosecution as it does not choose to examine him in-chief.

Bigan Singh v. King Emperor AIR 1928 Patna 143

The provisions of S. 353 (Section 273 in New Code) require that with certain exceptions the evidence should be taken in the presence of the accused or when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader.

Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 119

Now, a confession may consist of several parts and may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity, the provocation, the weapons used, the intention, the concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct of the accused. If the confession is tainted, the taint attaches to each part of it. It is not permissible in law to separate one part and to admit it in evidence as a non-confessional statement. Each part discloses some incriminating fact, i.e., some fact which by itself or along with other admitted or proved facts suggests the inference that the accused committed the crime, and though each part taken singly may not amount to a confession, each of them being part of a confessional statement partakes of the character of a confession. If a statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that admission but also, every other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the statement is part of the confession. 14. If proof of the confession is excluded by any provision of law such as S. 24, S. 25 and S. 26 of the Evidence Act, the entire confessional statement in all its parts including the admissions of minor incriminating facts must also be excluded, unless proof of it is permitted by some other section such as S. 27 of the Evidence Act. Little substance and content would be left in Ss. 24, 25 and 26 if proof of admissions of incriminating facts in a confessional statement is permitted.

U.P. v. Babu Ram (2000) 4 SCC 515

Depositions of witnesses, whether they are examined on the prosecution side or defence side or as court witnesses, are oral evidence in the case and hence, the scrutiny thereof shall be without any predilection or bias. No witness is entitled to get better treatment merely because he was examined as a prosecution witness or even as a court witness. It is judicial scrutiny which is warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for which different yardstick cannot be prescribed as for those different categories of witnesses.

Queen Empress v. Abdullah, I.L.R 7 All. 3385 (F.B.) 1885

If a person was found making such statement without any question first being asked his statement might be regarded as a part of his conduct. But where the statement is made merely in response to some question or suggestion it shows a state of things introduced not by the fact in issue, but by the interposition of some thing else. For these reasons, I think that the signs made by the accused cannot be admitted by way of "conduct" under section 8 of the Evidence Act.

Nathu V. State of U.P., 1956 SC 56

It appears to us that the prolonged custody immediately preceding the making of confession is sufficient, unless it is properly explained, to stamp Exhibit P-15, as involuntary. P.W. 33 made no attempt to explain this unusual circumstance. It is true that with reference to this matter the appellant made various suggestions in the cross examination of P.W. 33, such as that he was given 'bhang and liquor, or shown pictures or promised to be made an approver, as they have been rejected and rightly as unfounded. But that does not relieve the prosecution from its duty of positively establishing that the confession was voluntary, and for that purpose, it was necessary to prove the circumstances under which this unusual step was taken.

Maninder Singh Pandher Vs State decided by Allahabad High Court on 11.09.09

Where the evidence is of circumstantial nature, the facts and circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be deduced and drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established and the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The circumstances should be of conclusive nature and they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. In other words, there must be chain of evidence so complete as to leave any reasonable ground for conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused.
The confessions made to a police officer and a confession made by any person while he or she is in police custody cannot be proved against that person accused of an offence. Of course, a confession made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate can be proved against him. The last clause makes it clear that it is not the confessional part that is admissible but it is only such information or part of it, which relates distinctly to the fact discovered by means of the information furnished. If the police officer chooses not to take the informant accused to the spot, it will have no bearing on the point of admissibility under Section 27, though it may be one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that particular piece of evidence.
The reason behind this partially lifting of the ban against confessions and statement made to the police is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused it affords some guarantee of truth of that part and that part only, of information which was the clear immediate and proximate cause of the discovery.
The Sessions Judge has relied upon the testimonies of P.W. 8 Manish Kummath and P.W. 10 Dr. Sanjeev Lalwani in support of this circumstance. These witnesses deposed that a Committee was constituted and he was also one of the members of the said Committee. He further deposed that dead body of one unknown person was shown to Surendra Koli and a piece of Chalk was also given to him so that he could demonstrate the manner in which he used to cut the bodies into pieces and in their presence accused marked the portion of dead body. The Committee thereupon examined recovered bones and found that marking done by Surendra Koli tallied with the marks on the recovered bones. In our opinion report of this committee is not admissible in evidence. It would transpire from the testimony of P.W. 8, Manish Kummath that when Surendra Koli was brought before the committee, he was in police custody. He also deposed that Surendra Koli was asked to demonstrate how he used to cut dead bodies into pieces and thereafter, he marked the portion of dead bodies with chalk. This circumstances amounts to his confession. In this connection, section 26 of the Evidence Act may be noticed and it envisages that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.
Learned A.G.A canvassed that the deposition of P.WS. 10 and P.W. 8 are admissible because sections 24-30 limit the admissibility of statement and the demonstration of cutting of body by A-2 is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. In the instant case the demonstration of A-2 was in response to a question as to how he used to cut the dead body is not admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act.
The act of recording confessions under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a very solemn act and, in discharging his duties under the said section, the Magistrate must take care to see that the requirement of sub-section (3) of Section 164 Cr.P.C. are fully satisfied. It would of course be necessary in every case to put the questions and the questions intended to be put under sub-section (3) of Section 164 Cr.P.C. should not be allowed to become a matter of a mere mechanical enquiry. No element of casualness should be allowed to creep in and the Magistrate should be fully satisfied that the confessional statement which the accused wants to make is in fact and in substance voluntary. The whole object of putting questions to an accused person who offers to confess is to obtain an assurance of the fact that the confession is not caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person as mentioned in section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. There can be no doubt that when an accused person is produced before the Magistrate by the Investigating Officer, it is of utmost importance that the mind of the accused person should be completely freed from any possible influence of the police and the effective way of securing such freedom from fear to the accused person is to send him to Jail custody and given him adequate time to consider whether he should make a confession at all. Before proceeding to record the confessional statement, a searching enquiry must be made from the accused as to the custody from which was produced and the treatment he had been receiving in such custody in order to ensure that there is no scope for doubt of any sort of influence proceeding from a source interested in the prosecution still lurking in the mind of the accused. In case the Magistrate discovers on such an enquiry that there is ground for such supposition he should give the accused sufficient time for reflection before he is asked to make his statement and should assure himself that during the time of reflection he is completely out of police influence. An accused should particularly be asked the reason why he wants to make a statement which would surely go against his self interest, of course of trial, even if contrive subsequently to retract the confession. Beside administering the caution, warning specifically provided for in the first part of sub-section (2) of Section 164 Cr.P.C., namely, that the accused is not bound to make a statement and that if he makes one it may be used against him as evidence in relation to his complicity in the offence at the trial, that is to follow. He should also, in plain language, be assured of protection from any sort of apprehended torture or pressure or such extraneous agent like police, in case he declines to make the statement and he give the assurance that even he declines to make the confession he shall not be remanded to police custody. The Magistrate who is entrusted with the duty of recording confession of an accused coming from police custody or jail custody must appreciate his function in that behalf as one of a judicial officer and he must apply his judicial mind to ascertain and satisfy his conscience that the statement the accused makes, is not born out of any extraneous influence exerted on him. That indeed is the essence of a "voluntary statement within the meaning of the provisions of Section 164 Cr.P.C.". Moreover, the Magistrate must not only be satisfied as to the voluntary character of the statement, he should also make and leave such on the record, proof of compliance that the imperative requirement of the statutory provision, as would satisfy the court that sits in judgement in the case that the confessional statement was made by the accused voluntary and the statutory provisions were strictly complied with. Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a salutary provision which lays down certain precautionary rule to be followed by the Magistrate regarding a confession so as to ensure the voluntariness of the confession and the accused be placed in a situation free from threat or influence of the police. Section 164 Cr.P.C. provides for safeguards for an accused. The provisions contained therein are required to be strictly complied with.
The next ground urged for assailing the confessional statement is that there is no provision for videography of the confessional statement and further the same is not admissible in evidence. The submission of learned counsel is not loaded with any substance and confession is admissible.
The confession has been retracted by Surendra Koli when he was examined under section 313 Cr.P.C. It is well settled that a confession, and truthfulness, is an efficacious proof of guilt. The court should carefully examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the probabilities of the case. Whatever be the terminology one rule is almost certain that no judgement of conviction shall be passed on an uncorroborated retracted confession.
The Apex Court in Shashi Kant Singh has held that fresh examination-in-chief and not only their presentation for the purpose of cross examination of the newly added accused is the mandate of section 319 (4) of the Cr.P.C.
Having considered the above decisions and regard being had to the facts on record, after the appraisal of entire evidence, we do not propose to direct for retrial inasmuch as we have converged to the firm opinion that there is no admissible evidence against A-1 (Maninder Singh Pendher) in this case. The courts below committed a serious error in proceeding on the basis that for proving the defence, the accused is required to step into the witness box and unless he does so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an approach on the part of the court is not a correctly oriented approach.
The object of the section 313 Cr.P.C is to give an accused an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances being cited against him.
Suspicion however great it may be, cannot take the place of legal proof. A moral conviction, however, strong or genuine cannot amount to a legal conviction supportable in law.

Ex aequo et bono

the power of the arbitrators to dispense with consideration of the law and consider solely what they consider to be fair and equitable in the case at hand

Union of India v. M/s. Popular Construction Co., AIR 2001 SC 4010

As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the Award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result. Thus sec 5 of limitation Act is not apllicable to arbitration Act.

Union of India Vs Manager Jain and associates 2001 (3) SCC 277

The result is - before pronouncing judgment, the Court has to apply its mind to arrive at the conclusion whether there is any cause to modify or remit the award. Further the phrase `pronounce judgment' would itself indicate judicial determination by reasoned order for arriving at the conclusion that decree in terms of award be passed. One of the meaning given to the word "Judgment" in Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary [International Edition, Vol. 1 (1984)] reads thus : "the result of judging; the decision or conclusion reached, as after consideration or deliberation". Further, Order XX Rule 4(2) C.P.C. in terms provides that `Judgment' shall contain a concise statement of case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for.

Chief Engineer of B.P.D.P./R.E.O. v. M/s. Scoot Wilson Kirpatrick India Pvt. Ltd., 2006(11) SCC 622

There can be no quarrel with the proposition that Section 5 of the Limitation Act providing for condonation of delay is excluded by Section 34(3) of the Act. But the question in the instant case is not about the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and question really is whether the appeal was maintainable. The High Court did not consider this aspect. The appeal is clearly maintainable.

Datar Switchgears Ltd. Vs Tata Finance Ltd & Anr 2001(1) RCR (Civil) 267

So far as cases falling under Section 11(6) are concerned - such as the one before us - no time limit has been prescribed under the Act, whereas a period of 30 days has been prescribed under Section 11(4) and Section 11(5) of the Act. In our view, therefore, so far as Section 11(6) is concerned, if one party demands the opposite party to appoint an arbitrator and the opposite party does not make an appointment within 30 days of the demand, the right to appointment does not get automatically forfeited after expiry of 30 days. If the opposite party makes an appointment even after 30 days of the demand, but before the first party has moved the court under Section 11, that would be sufficient. In other words, in cases arising under Section 11(6), if the opposite party has not made an appointment within 30 days of demand, the right to make appointment is not forfeited but continues, but an appointment has to be made before the former files application under Section 11 seeking appointment of an arbitrator. Only then the right of the opposite party ceases. We do not, therefore, agree with the observation in the above judgments that if the appointment is not made within 30 days of demand, the right to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) is forfeited.

Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S. A., AIR 2002 SC 1432

The Appellant entered into a contract with the 1st Respondent on 9th May, 1997. This contract contained an arbitration clause which provided that arbitration was to be as per the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (for short ICC). On 23rd October, 1997 the 1st Respondent filed a request for arbitration with ICC. Parties agreed that the arbitration be held in Paris, France. ICC has appointed a sole arbitrator.
1st Respondent filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter called the said Act) before the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Indore, M. P. against the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent. One of the interim reliefs sought was an order of injunction restraining these parties from alienating, transferring and/or creating third party right, disposing of, dealing with and/or selling their business assets and properties. The Appellant raised the plea of maintainability of such an application.
The said Act nowhere provides that its provisions are not to apply to international commercial arbitrations which take place in a non-convention country. Admittedly Part II only applies to arbitrations which take place in a convention country.
Thus the Legislature has not provided that Part I is not to apply to arbitrations which take place outside India. The use of the language is significant and important. The Legislature is emphasising that the provisions of Part I would apply to arbitrations which take place in India, but not providing that the provisions of Part I will not apply to arbitrations which take place out of India. The wording of sub-section (2) of Section 2 suggests that the intention of the Legislature was to make provisions of Part I compulsorily applicable to an arbitration, including an international commercial arbitration, which takes place in India. Parties cannot, by agreement, override or exclude the non-derogable provisions of Part I in such arbitrations. By omitting to provide that Part I will not apply to international commercial arbitrations which take place outside India the affect would be that Part I would also apply to international commercial arbitrations held out of India. But by not specifically providing that the provisions of Part I apply to international commercial arbitrations held out of India, the intention of the Legislature appears to be to ally parties to provide by agreement that Part I or any provision therein will not apply.
Section 5 provides that a judicial authority shall not intervene except where so provided in Part I. Section 8 of the said Act permits a judicial authority before whom an action is brought in a matter to refer parties to arbitration. If the matters were to be taken before a judicial authority in India it would be a Court as defined in Section 2(e). Thus if Part I was to only apply to arbitrations which take place in India the term "Court" would have been used in Sections 5 and 8 of the said Act. The Legislature was aware that, in international commercial arbitrations, a matter may be taken before a judicial authority outside India. As Part I was also to apply to international commercial arbitrations held outside India the term "judicial authority" has been used in Sections 5 and 8.
An award passed in an arbitration which takes place in India would be a "domestic award". There would thus be no need to define an award as a "domestic award" unless the intention was to cover awards which would otherwise not be covered by this definition.

In the matter of adoption of Payal @ Sharinee Vinay Pathak, Bom HC on 16.09.09

The issue which arises before the Court is as to whether a Hindu couple governed by the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956, with a child of their own can adopt a child of the same gender under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000. Adoption is a facet of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. The right to live that is asserted is, on the one hand, the right of parents and of individuals ­ women and men ­ who seek to adopt a child to give meaning and content to their lives. Equally significant, in the context of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, the right to life that is specially protected is the right of children who are in need of special care and protection. The Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 is a special enactment dealing with children in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection. While enacting the Juvenile Justice Act 2000 the legislature has taken care to ensure that its provisions are secular in character and that the benefit of adoption is not restricted to any religious or social group. even if there were to be a conflict between the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000, it is the latter Act which would prevail. If the two pieces of legislation, both of which are enacted by Parliament are harmoniously construed, there is no conflict of interpretation. Alternatively This is on the well settled principle that when there are two special Acts dealing with the same subject matter, the legislation which has been enacted subsequently should prevail. There is abundant material before the Court for the Court to conclude that it is manifestly in the interest and welfare of the child that the petition for adoption should be allowed.

Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hira Lal AIR 1962 SC 527

The civil court has a power to grant interim injunction in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction even if the case does not fall within the ambit of provisions of Order 39 Code of Civil Procedure.

IPC for Nokia 5800

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Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors. AIR 1993 SC 276,

the Supreme Court explained the scope of aforesaid material circumstances, but observed as under: The phrases `prima facie case', `balance of convenience' and ` irreparable loss' are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by man's ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The facts rest eloquent and speak for themselves. It is well nigh impossible to find from facts prima facie case and balance of convenience

Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 3105

Other considerations which ought to weigh with the Court hearing the application or petition for the grant of injunctions are as below: (i) Extent of damages being an adequate remedy; (ii) Protect the plaintiff's interest for violation of his rights though however having regard to the injury that may be suffered by the defendants by reason therefor ; (iii) The court while dealing with the matter ought not to ignore the factum of strength of one party's case being stronger than the others; (iv) No fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the matter of grant of injunction but on the facts and circumstances of each case- the relief being kept flexible; (v) The issue is to be looked from the point of view as to whether on refusal of the injunction the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury keeping in view the strength of the parties' case; (vi) Balance of convenience or inconvenience ought to be considered as an important requirement even if there is a serious question or prima facie case in support of the grant; (vii) Whether the grant or refusal of injunction will adversely affect the interest of general public which can or cannot be compensated otherwise.

Zenit Mataplast P. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., SC on 11.09.2009

In a case like this, when the applicant approaches the Court complaining against the Statutory Authority alleging arbitrariness, bias or favouritism, the court, being custodian of law, must examine the averments made in the application to form a tentative opinion as to whether there is any substance in those allegations. Such a course is also required to be followed while deciding the application for interim relief. Grant of temporary injunction is governed by three basic principles, i.e. prima facie case; balance of convenience; and irreparable injury, which are required to be considered in a proper perspective in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. But it may not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction.

I.R. Coelho (dead) by LRs v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 861,

The State is to deny no one equality before the law.... Economic growth and social equity are the two pillars of our Constitution which are linked to the right of an individual (right to equal opportunity), rather than in the abstract.... Equality, rule of law, judicial review and separation of powers form parts of the basic structure of the Constitution. Each of these concepts are intimately connected. There can be no rule of law, if there is no equality before the law. These would be meaningless if the violation was not subject to the judicial review.

S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594,

Constitution Bench held that recording of reasons: (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision making.

Som Datt Builders Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala, SC on 17.09.2009

The requirement of reasons in support of the award under Section 31(3) is not an empty formality. It guarantees fair and legitimate consideration of the controversy by the arbitral tribunal. It is true that arbitral tribunal is not expected to write judgment like a court nor it is expected to give elaborate and detailed reasons in support of its finding/s but mere noticing the submissions of the parties or reference to documents is no substitute for reasons which the arbitral tribunal is obliged to give. Howsoever brief these may be, reasons must be indicated in the award.

Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Woolcombers Workers Union and Anr. AIR 1973 SC 2758,

The giving of reasons in support of their conclusions by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities when exercising initial jurisdiction is essential for various reasons. First, it is calculated to prevent unconscious unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching the conclusions. The very search for reasons will put the authority on the alert and minimise the chances of unconscious infiltration of personal bias or unfairness in the conclusion. The authority will adduce reasons which will be regarded as fair and legitimate by a reasonable man and will discard irrelevant or extraneous considerations....