K N Govindan Kutty Menon Vs C D Shaji

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on 28.11.11- N I Act - Sec 138- compounding in Lok Adalat- may be enforced by Civil Court as decree even if refer by criminal court

Sunita Gupta Vs Inderjeet Singh & Anr

Decided on 31.01.11 by Delhi High Court as
A compromise is nothing but an agreement. The imprimatur of the Court in accepting the compromise and in passing a decree in terms thereof, confers the said agreement with the status of a lawful contract.

Keshardeo Chamria Vs Radha Kissen Chamria and Ors, AIR 1953 SC 23

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The proceedings that commenced with the decree-holder's application for restoration of the execution and terminated with the order of revival can in no sense be said to relate to the determination of any question concerning the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Such proceedings are in their nature collateral to the execution and are independent of it…. It was not contended and could not be seriously urged, that an order under section 151 simpliciter is appealable….”

Phool Patti and Anr. Vs. Ram Singh, Decided On 31.03.2009

“In Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major 1995(5) SCC 709 in which it is stated that: ...We would think that the exception engrafted is meant to cover that decree or order of a court, including a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which declares the pre-existing right and does not by itself create new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 or upwards....
Prima facie it seems to us that the decision in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) does not lay down the correct law since Section 17(2) (vi) on its plain reading has nothing to do with any pre existing right. All that seems to have been stated therein is that if a decree is passed regarding some immovable property which is not a subject-matter of the suit then it will require registration. As already explained above, if a suit is filed in respect of property A but the decree is in respect of immovable property B, then the decree so far as it relates to immovable property B will require registration.
It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear. Since there is no mention of any pre- existing right in the exception in clause (vi) we have found it difficult to accept the views in Bhoop Singh's case (supra).
Let the papers be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench for interpreting the exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act.”