Aravinthan case, III (2002) ACC 738

If property in the goods passes to the consignee, only consignee can sue the carrier.

Biman Chatterjee Vs Sanchita Chatterjee, AIR 2004 SC 1699

the High Court was not justified in cancelling the bail on the ground that the appellant had violated the terms of the compromise…. The grant of bail under the Criminal Procedure Code is governed by the provision of Chapter XXXII of the Code and the provision therein does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the basis of an assurance of a compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise. What the Court has to bear in mind while granting bail is what is provided for in Section 437 of the said Code.

State of Gujarat Vs Patel Ashwinkumar Ranchodbhai, 2008 CriLJ 3662

All the witnesses ie PW 1 to PW 5 did not support the prosecution case and turned hostile - We found that this is a case of failure of justice in which the criminal trial is taken very lightly by all concerned.
Crimes in society are real and concrete incident actually occurs. Crimes are not fancy or imagination, which Courts are called upon to decide. Therefore, greater responsibilities are to be shouldered by Courts while dispensation of justice. Prosecuting agency and investigation agency are also important factor in criminal justice system. Each component must do justice to its role in doing justice to aggrieved persons. The crimes are not affecting the individual, but influences the society as a whole and, therefore, the grave crimes are not against individual but against the society. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. This could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law.
We are at pain to observe that neither the learned Trial Judge nor the learned APP endeavoured to find out the truth by probing further the case. Instead, as soon as the witnesses, who were eye-witnesses, turned hostile, the Trial Court as well as the learned APP shut the doors towards their pious and prime duty to search for the truth and the trial was closed in extreme hurry. We find that the Investigating Officer, who is named in the charge-sheet, could not be examined by the learned APP nor such vigilance could be shown by the Trial Court to reach at the truth. It is not the law that when eye-witness turns hostile, the Courts should abandon the search for the truth and learned APP should become oblivious to put forward the whole prosecution case and instead of adducing further evidence for search of truth, simply giving purshis in the case to lack the whole case in a cupboard so as to ignore completely the heinous crime like murder committed under the nose of the society. The Investigating Officer could have been examined to throw light on the circumstances of the case and could have proved the case beyond reasonable doubt despite eyewitnesses turned hostile.
True that criminal justice deals with complex human problems and diverse human beings. On account of relations, witnesses may turn hostile and witnesses may resile when search for the truth is vigorously undertaken through instrumentality of criminal law. In trials, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Judge presiding over a criminal trial, to appreciate the evidence from all corners, and if the evidence is not produced, though available, then, the same could be produced. The Courts exist for doing justice to the persons who are affected.
This is a fact that most of the witnesses coming in the Courts despite taking oath, make false statement to suit the interest of the parties. Effective and stern action is required to be taken on such a stand, which may be taken upon the witnesses. The mere existence of penal provisions to deal with perjury would be a cruel joke with the society unless the Courts stop to take evasive recourse despite proof of the commission of the offence.
It is known and cardinal principle of evidence that even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, the conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the Court to separate grain from chaff in coming to the conclusion of truth. It also becomes the duty of the Court to take into consideration of relevant evidence available and Courts are empowered to produce on record such evidence if the prosecution failed in their duties to produce such evidence. The conclusion of a criminal trial must be the outcome of cool deliberations and the scanning of the material by the informed mind of the Judge that leads to determination.
A witness may not stand the test of cross-examination which may be sometime because he is a bucolic person and is not able to understand the question put to him by the skillful cross-examiner and at times under the stress of cross-examination, certain answers are snatched from him. When a rustic or illiterate witness faces an astute lawyer, there is bound to be imbalance and, therefore, minor discrepancies have to be ignored. These days it is not difficult to gain over a witness by money power or giving him any other allurance or giving out threats to his life and/or property at the instance of persons, in/or close to powers arid muscle men or their associates. Such instances are also not uncommon where a witness is not inclined to depose because in the prevailing social structure he wants to remain indifferent. It is most unfortunate that expert witnesses and the investigating agencies and other agencies which have an important role to play are also not immune from decline of values in public life. Their evidence sometimes becomes doubtful because they do not act sincerely, take everything in casual manner and are not able to devote proper attention and time.
Thus, in a criminal trial a prosecutor is faced with so many odds. The Court while appreciating the evidence should not lose sight of these realities of life and cannot afford to take an unrealistic approach by sitting in ivory tower. I find that in recent times the tendency to acquit an accused easily is galloping fast. It is very easy to pass an order of acquittal on the basis of minor points raised in the case by a short judgment so as to achieve the yardstick of disposal. Some discrepancy is bound to be there in each and every case which should not weigh with the Court so long it does not materially affect the prosecution case.
Now the maxim "let hundred guilty persons be acquitted, but not a single innocent be convicted" is, in practice, changing world over and Courts have been compelled to accept that "society suffers by wrong convictions and it equally, suffers by wrong acquittals".
K. Lack of 'robust judging' has stated in Criminal Courts need of the hour is "robust judging'. The trial Judge is the linchpin in every case, and he has also its eyes and ears. He is not merely a recorder of facts but a purveyor of all evidence, oral and circumstantial. It is said by him that a good trial Judge needs to have a 'third ear' i.e. hear and comprehend what is not said.

Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia Vs Addl Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786,

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, " To answer the question raised it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain who are necessary or proper parties in a proceeding. The law on the subject is well settled: it is enough if we state the principle. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.”

Shiv Shakti Co-op Housing Society, Nagpur Vs Swaraj Developers (2003) 6 SCC 659,

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "It is a well-settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse.) The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner Courts cannot aid the legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. [See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.] Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of a doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.”

RS Nayak Vs AR Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684,

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "...If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self defeating.”

D Velusamy Vs D Patchaiammal, CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2028-2029 OF 2010

we may point out that the expression `domestic relationship' includes not only the relationship of marriage but also a relationship `in the nature of marriage'. The question, therefore, arises as to what is the meaning of the expression `a relationship in the nature of marriage'. Unfortunately this expression has not been defined in the Act. Since there is no direct decision of this Court on the interpretation of this expression we think it necessary to interpret it because a large number of cases will be coming up before the Courts in our country on this point, and hence an authoritative decision is required…..
In our opinion a `relationship in the nature of marriage' is akin to a common law marriage. Common law marriages require that although not being formally married :-
(a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.
(b) They must be of legal age to marry.
(c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried.
(d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.(see `Common Law Marriage' in Wikipedia on Google)
In our opinion a `relationship in the nature of marriage' under the 2005 Act must also fulfill the above requirements, and in addition the parties must have lived together in a `shared household' as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. Merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a `domestic relationship'….
In our opinion not all live in relationships will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriag8e to get the benefit of the Act of 2005.To get such benefit the conditions mentioned by us above must be satisfied, No doubt the view we are taking would exclude many women who have had a live in relationship from the benefit of the 2005 Act, but then it is not for this Court to legislate or amend the law. Parliament has used the expression `relationship in the nature of marriage' and not `live in relationship'. The Court in the grab of interpretation cannot change the language of the statute.
Read full Judgment at http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis3.aspx

Vimala (K) Vs Veeraswamy (K) (1991) 2 SCC 375

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed about sect 125 CrPC "the object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. When an attempt is made by the husband to negative the claim of the neglected wife depicting her as a kept-mistress on the specious plea that he was already married, the court would insist on strict proof of the earlier marriage. The term `wife' in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, includes a woman who has been divorced by a husband or who has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried. The woman not having the legal status of a wife is thus brought within the inclusive definition of the term `wife' consistent with the objective. However, under the law a second wife whose marriage is void on account of the survival of the first marriage is not a legally wedded wife, and is, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under this provision."

The Jumma Masjid, Mercara Vs Kodimaniandra Deviah AIR 1962 SC 847

Transfer of Property Act - Sections 6, 43 and 44
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The sole point for determination in this appeal is, whether a transfer of property for consideration made by a person who represents that he has a present and transferable interest therein, while he possesses, in fact, only a spes successionis, is within the protection of s. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. If it is, then on the facts found by the courts below, the title of the respondents under Ex. III and Ex. IV must prevail over that of the appellant under Ex. A. If it is not, then the appellant succeeds on the basis of Ex. A.…
whenever a person transfers property to which he has no title on a representation that he has a present and transferable interest therein, and acting on that representation, the transferee takes a transfer for consideration. When these conditions are satisfied, the section enacts that if the transferor subsequently acquires the property, the transferee becomes entitled to it, if the transfer has not meantime been thrown up or cancelled and is subsisting. There is an exception in favour of transferees for consideration in good faith and without notice of the rights under the prior transfer. But apart from that, the section is absolute and unqualified in its operation. It applies to all transfers which fulfil the conditions prescribed therein, and it makes no difference in its application, whether the defect of title in the transferor arises by reason of his having no interest whatsoever in the property, or of his interest therein being that of an expectant heir….
Section 43 deals with representations as to title made by a transferor who had no title at the time of transfer, and provides that the transfer shall fasten itself on the title which the transferor subsequently acquires. Section 6(a) enacts a rule of substantive law, while s. 43 enacts a rule of estoppel which is one of evidence. The two provisions operate on different fields, and under different conditions, and we see no ground for reading a conflict between them or for cutting down the ambit of the one by reference to the other. In out opinion, both of them can be given full effect on their own terms, in their respective spheres. To hold that transfers by persons who have only a spes successionis at the date of transfer are not within the protection afforded by s. 43 would destroy its utility to a large extent….
when a person transfers property representing that he has a present interest therein, whereas he has, in fact, only a spes successionis, the transferee is entitled to the benefit of s. 43, if he has taken the transfer on the faith of that representation and for consideration. In the present case, Santhappa, the vendor in Ex. III, represented that he was entitled to the property in praesenti, and it has been found that the purchaser entered into the transaction acting on that representation. He therefor acquired title to the properties under s. 44 of the Transfer of Property Act.”

Quadrat Ullah Vs Municipal Board Bareilly, AIR 1974 SC 396

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “There is no simple litmus test to distinguish a lease as defined in Section 105 Transfer of Property Act from a licence as defined in Section 52, Easements Act, but the character of the transaction turns on the operative intent of the parties. To put it pithily, if an interest in immovable property, entitling the transferees to enjoyment, is created, it is a lease; if permission to use land without right to exclusive possession is alone granted, a licence is the legal result. Marginal variations to this broad statement are possible and Ex. '1' and '4' fall in the grey area of unclear recitals. The law on the point has been stated by this Court in the Associated Hotels' case….
In determining whether an agreement creates between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant or merely that of licenser and licensee the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties. The parties to an agreement cannot, however, turn a lease into a licence merely by stating that the document is to be deemed a licence or describing it as such; the relationship of the parties is determined by law on a consideration of all relevant provisions of the agreement; nor will the employment of words appropriate to a lease prevent the agreement from conferring a licence only if from the whole document it appears that it was intended merely to confer a licence. In the absence of any formal document the intention of the parties must be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the parties….
The fact that the agreement grants a right of exclusive possession is not in itself conclusive evidence of the existence of a tenancy, but it is a consideration of the first importance….
A licence is normally created where a person is granted the right to use premises without becoming entitled to exclusive possession thereof, or the circumstances and conduct of the parties show that all that was intended was that the grantee should be granted a personal privilege with no interest in the land. If the agreement is merely for the use of the property in a certain way and on certain terms while the property remains in the possession and control of the owner, the agreement will operate as a licence, even though the agreement may employ words appropriate to a lease….”

Rambaran Prosad Vs Ram Mohit Hazra and Ors, AIR1967 SC 744

learned Counsel put forward the argument that the covenant for pre-emption was merely a personal covenant between the contracting parties and was not binding against successors-in-interest or the assignees of the original parties to the contract. We are unable to accept this submission as correct. It is true that the pre-emption clause does not expressly state that it is binding upon the assignees or successors-in-interest, but, having regard to the context and the circumstances in which the award was made, it is manifest that the pre-emption clause must be construed as binding upon the assignees or successors-in-interest of the original contracting parties.

Pandit Chunchun Jha Vs Sheikh Ebadat Ali and Anr

Transfer of Property Act - Section 58- The question whether a given transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale outright with a condition of repurchase is a vexed one which invariably gives rise to trouble and litigation….
first is that the intention of the parties is the determining factor- The next step is to see whether the document is covered by section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, for, if it is not, then it cannot be a mortgage by conditional sale. The first point there is to see whether there is an "ostensible sale." That means a transaction which takes the outward from of a sale, for the essence of a mortgage by conditional sale is that though in substance it is a mortgage it is couched in the form of a sale with certain conditions attached.

Raja Dhruv Dev Chand Vs Harmohinder Singh and Anr AIR 1968 SC 1024

Lease of a land by Govt before partition. After partition land goes to Pakistan. Whether frustrated and lessee can claim money back.

State of UP Vs Deoman Upadhyaya 1960 CrLJ 1504

Evidence Act 1872 – Sec 27 -accused offered to hand over the gandasa which he said, he had thrown in the village tank after murder, and in the presence of the investigating officer and certain witnesses, he waded into the tank and took out a gandasa, which, on examination by the Serologist, was found to be stained with human blood….
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of a group of sections relating to the relevancy of certain forms of admissions made by persons accused of offences. Sections 24 to 30 of the Act deal with admissibility of confessions, i.e., of statements made by a person stating or suggesting that he has committed a crime. By s. 24, in a criminal proceeding against a person, a confession made by him is inadmissible if it appears to the court to have been caused by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge and proceeding from a person in authority. By s. 25, there is an absolute ban against proof at the trial of a person accused of an offence, of a confession made to a police officer. The ban which is partial under s. 24 and complete under s. 25 applies equally whether or not the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was at the time of making the confession in custody. For the ban to be effective the person need not have been accused of an offence when he made the confession. The expression, "accused person" in s. 24 and the expression "a person accused of any offence" have the same connotation, and describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding….
Section 27 is founded on the principle that even though the evidence relating to confessional or other statements made by a person, whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, is tainted and therefore inadmissible, if the truth of the information given by him is assured by the discovery of a fact, it may be presumed to be untainted and is therefore declared provable in so far as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered. Even though s. 27 is in the form of a proviso to s. 26, the two sections do not necessarily deal with the evidence of the same character. The ban imposed by s. 26 is against the proof of confessional statements. Section 27 is concerned with the proof of information whether it amounts to a confession or not, which leads to discovery of facts. By s. 27, even if a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received, only that much of the information is admissible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered…..
On an analysis of Sections 24 to 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, and s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following material propositions emerge :-
(a) Whether a person is in custody or outside, a confession made by him to a police officer or the making of which is procured by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against him and proceeding from a person in authority, is not provable against him in any proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence.
(b) A confession made by a person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer to a person other than a police officer is not provable in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
(c) That part of the information given by a person whilst in police custody whether the information is confessional or otherwise, which distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered but no more, is provable in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence.
(d) A statement whether it amounts to a confession or not made by a person when he is not in custody, to another person such latter person not being a police officer may be proved if it is otherwise relevant.
(e) A statement made by a person to a police officer in the course of an investigation of an offence under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot except to the extent permitted by s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, be used for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when the statement was made in which he is concerned as a person accused of an offence.”
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India further observed, “"persons in custody" and "persons not in custody" do not stand on the same footing nor require identical protection, is the mere theoretical possibility of some degree of inequality of the protection of the laws relating to the admissibility of evidence between persons in custody and persons not in custody by itself a ground of striking down a salutory provision of the law of evidence ?
the High Court was in error in holding that s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and s. 162, sub-s. (2), of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as 'that section relates to s. 27of the Indian Evidence Act' are void as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution….
The High Court was of the view that the mere fetching of the gandasa from its hiding place did not establish that Deoman himself had put it in the tank, and an inference could legitimately be raised that somebody else had placed it in the tank, or that Deoman had seen someone placing that gandasa in the tank or that someone had told him about the gandasa lying in the tank. But for reasons already set out the information given by Deoman is provable in so far as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered : and his statement that he had thrown the gandasa in the tank is information which distinctly relates to the discovery of the gandasa. Discovery from its place of hiding, at the instance of Deoman of the gandasa stained with human blood in the light of the admission by him that he had thrown it in the tank in which it was found therefore acquires significance, and destroys the theories suggested by the High Court. …
The quarrel between Deoman and Sukhdei and the threat uttered by him that he would smash Sukhdei's "mouth" (face) and his absconding immediately after the death of Sukhdei by violence, lend very strong support to the case for the prosecution. The evidence, it is true, is purely circumstantial but the facts proved establish a chain which is consistent only with his guilt and not with his innocence. In our opinion therefore the Sessions Judge was right in his view that Deoman had caused the death of Sukhdei by striking her with the gandasa produced before the court….
When an offence is committed and investigation starts, the police have two objects in view. The first is the collection of information, and the second is the finding of the offender….
Section 27 which is framed as an exception has rightly been held as an exception to Sections 24 to 26 and not only to s. 26.”
Subba Rao was in minority and held section 27 as unconstitutional.

Satyabrata Ghose Vs Mugneeram Bangur & Co and Anr [1954] S.C.R. 310

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed "The doctrine of frustration is really an aspect or part of the law of discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be done and hence comes within the purview of section 56 of the Indian Contract Act. It would be incorrect to say that section 56 of the Contract Act applies only to case of physical impossibility and that where this section is not applicable, recourse can be had to the principles of English law on the subject of frustration. It must be held also that to the extent that the Indian Contract Act deals with a particular subject, it is exhaustive upon the same and it is not permissible to import the principles of English law dehors these statutory provisions."

Prem Shankar Shukla Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1535

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “Handcuffing of accused should not be made in case of non-approval of same by Judicial Officer….
a telegram from one Shukla, prisoner lodged in the Tihar Jail, has prompted the present 'habeas' proceedings…. The petitioner claims that he is a 'better class' prisoner, a fact which is admitted, although one fails to understand how there can be a quasi-caste system among prisoners in the egalitarian context of Article 14. It is a sour fact of life that discriminatory treatment based upon wealth and circumstances dies hard under the Indian Sun. We hope the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Prison Administration will take due note of the survival after legal death of this invidious distinction and put all prisoners on the same footing unless there is a rational classification based upon health, age, academic or occupational needs or like legitimate ground and not irrelevant factors like wealth, political importance, social status and other criteria which are a hang-over of the hierarchical social structure hostile to the constitutional ethos….
In Sunil Butra's case (supra) it has been laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court that imprisonment does not, ipso facto mean that fundamental rights desert the detainee….
Handcuffs should not be used in routine. They are to be used only where the person is desperate, rowdy or is involved in non-bailable offence. There should ordinarily be no occasion to handcuff persons occupying a good social position in public life, or professionals like jurists, advocates doctors, writers, educationists’ and well known journalists. This is at best an illustrative list; obviously it cannot be exhaustive. It is the spirit behind these instructions that should be understood. It shall be the duty of supervisory officers at various levels, the SHO primarily, to see that these instructions are strictly complied with. In case of non-observance of these instructions severe action should be taken against the defaulter….
The duty officers of the police station must also ensure that an accused when brought at the police station or dispatched, the facts where he was handcuffed or otherwise should be clearly mentioned along with the reasons for handcuffing in the relevant daily diary report. The SHO of the police station and ACP of the Sub-Division will occasionally check up the relevant daily diary to see that these instructions are being complied’ with by the police station staff….
Handcuffing is prima facie inhuman and, therefore, unreasonable, is over-harsh and at the first flush, arbitrary. Absent fair procedure and objective monitoring, to inflict 'irons' is to resort to zoological strategies repugnant to Article 21….
Once we make it a constitutional mandate that no prisoner shall be handcuffed or fettered routinely or merely for the convenience of the custodian or escort--and we declare that to be the law--the distinction between classes of prisoners becomes constitutionally obsolete. Apart from the fact that economic and social importance cannot be the basis for classifying prisoners for purposes of handcuffs or otherwise, how can we assume that a rich criminal or under-trial is any different from a poor or pariah convict or under-trial in the matter of security risk ? An affluent in custody may be as dangerous or desperate as an indigent, if not more…..

Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621

The ambit of personal liberty protected by Article 21 is wide and comprehensive. It embraces both substantive rights to personal liberty and the procedure provided for their deprivation.

Porstor Miemoller said

When they arrested my neighbour I did not protest. When they arrested the men and women in the opposite house I did not protest. And when they finally came for me, there was nobody left to protest.

Prem Chand Vijay Kumar Vs Yashpal Singh and Anr, (2005) 4 SCC 417

If dishonour of a cheque has once snowballed into a cause of action it is not permissible for a payee to create another cause of action with the same cheque. Limitation started with first notice of demand and second notice made no difference.

Nazar Singh and others Vs Jagjit Kaur and others, AIR 1996 SC 855

Question was whether a land received by widow as compromise in lieu of her maintenance would become absolute property u/s14 Hindu Succession Act or not. Court held yes.

Mst. Karmi Vs Amru and Ors, AIR 1971 SC 745

The life estate given to a lady under a will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act.

S Jagannath Vs UOI, AIR 1997 SC 811

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "we direct all the respondent-States not to permit the setting up of any industry or the construction of any type on the area at least up to 500 metres from the sea water at the maximum High Tide. The abovesaid area i.e. from the High Tide Level up to 500 metres shall be kept free from all construction of any type.”

UOI Vs Kamath Holiday Resorts (P) Ltd, AIR 1996 SC 1040

The Collector of the Union Territory, Daman, as a step towards promoting tourism leased out a site in the reserved forest area to the respondent for putting up a snack bar and a restaurant to cater to the needs of tourists visiting the forest….Not allowed

Burrabazar Fireworks Dealers Association Vs Commissioner of police, Calcutta, AIR 1998 Cal 121

Court held that, “Art 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India does not guarantee the fundamental right to carry on trade or business which creates pollution or which takes away that community’s safety, health and peace. A citizen or people cannot be made a captive listener to hear the tremendous sounds caused by bursting out from noisy fireworks.”

prosecution witness can not be examined as defence witness

Decided On: 31.03.2006

 State of Madhya Pradesh
Vs.  Badri Yadav and Anr.

JUDGMENT

H.K. Sema, J.

1. This appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh is against the judgment and order of the High Court dated 12.5.2000 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 699 of 1996, whereby the High Court recorded acquittal of respondents-accused herein, by reversing the judgment of the Trial Court convicting the respondent and others under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced them RI for life and a fine of Rs. 200/- and in default to undergo RI for a period of one month.

2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:-

On 16.9.1989, the respondents herein were loitering around 'kothi building' where the courts are situated in order to find out the deceased Lal Mohd. They were all sitting in an auto rickshaw which was hired by them. Finally, they succeeded in locating the deceased Lal Mohd. who was sitting in a tempo. While the tempo stopped for permitting a lady to alight from it and proceeded ahead, the accused-respondents obstructed the said tempo and they pulled out the deceased Lal Mohd. from the said tempo and assaulted him with swords and knives causing number of injuries, which resulted in his death. The matter was investigated and after a prima facie case being established the charge was laid before the Additional Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge after threadbare discussion of the evidence of prosecution witnesses including the two eye witnesses PW-8 Mohd.Amin and PW-9 Zakir Ali who later juxtaposed as DW-1 and DW-2, came to the conclusion that an offence punishable under Section 302 read with 34 was found well established against the accused and convicted as aforesaid.

3. Before the Trial Court four accused had faced the trial namely accused Badri Yadav, Raju, Mahesh Bhat and Mohan Jayaswal. Accused Mohan Jayaswal died during the trial. Accused Mahesh Bhat was acquitted by the Trial Court on benefit of doubt. Accused Raju died during the pendency of this appeal and, therefore, appeal qua him stands abated. Now only the respondent-accused Badri Yadav is before us. The High Court by the impugned order relied upon the testimony of DW-1 Mohd. Amin and DW-2 Zakir Ali who were examined as eye witnesses as PW-8 and PW-9 and acquitted the respondents by reversing the well merited judgment of the Trial Court convicting the respondents.

4. The facts of this case illustrate a disquieting feature as to how the High Court has committed a grave miscarriage of justice in recording the acquittal of the respondents. Few dates would suffice. PW-8 Mohd.Amin and P.W.9 Zakir Ali's statements were recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate on 21.9.1989. On 18.12.1990 their statements on oath were recorded before the Trial Court as prosecution witnesses.

5. It appears that PW-8 and PW-9 filed an affidavit on 16.8.1994 that the statements made before the Magistrate by them were under pressure, tutored by police of Madhav Nagar and due to their pressure the statements were recorded. It was further stated that the policemen threatened them that if they did not make statements as tutored by the police they would implicate PW-8 and PW-9 in this case and when the statements were recorded before the Magistrate the policemen were standing outside and therefore the statements were made as tutored by the police and due to threat and coercion. By this affidavit they have completely resiled from their previous statements recorded before the court as prosecution witnesses. They further stated that they did not see any marpeet and who had inflicted injuries. They further denied that they did not see any incident at all nor any person. Though the affidavit appeared to be dated 16.8.1994, it was actually signed by both on 17.8.1994.

6. In the affidavit of Zakir Ali PW-9 dated 17.8.1994 it is also stated that his statement was recorded on 18.12.1990 before the Sessions Judge. The affidavit further stated that the statement recorded on 18.12.1990 was made due to threat and under the pressure of police. It is further stated that the applicant was going for Haj and according to the religious rites, he wanted to bid good-bye to all the sins he had committed. It is further stated that the statements he made before the court of Magistrate and before the Sessions Judge were false. It is unfortunate that the said application was allowed by the Sessions Judge on 9.2.1995 and they were allowed to be examined as defence witnesses juxtaposed as DW-1 and DW-2. The Sessions Judge, however, on examining the credibility of PW-8 and PW-9 juxtaposed as DW-1 and DW- 2 rejected it as not trustworthy, in our view rightly.

7. The Sessions Judge came to a finding that the statements of DW-1 and DW-2 were recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate on 21.9.1989 as PW-8 and PW-9. Thereafter, their statements were recorded before the Sessions Judge on 18.12.1990 and after four years on 17.7.1995 they gave a different version resiling from their previous statements on grounds of threat, coercion and being tutored by the police. It will be noticed that in between 18.12.1990 the day on which their statements were recorded before the Sessions Judge as PWs and their statements as defence witnesses which were recorded on 17.7.1995 as DWs, no complaint whatsoever was made by DW-1 and DW-2 to any Court or to any authority that they gave statements on 18.12.1990 due to coercion, threat or being tutored by the police. This itself could have been a sufficient circumstance to disbelieve the subsequent statements as DW-1 and DW-2 as held by the Sessions Judge, in our view, rightly.

8. The High Court, while reversing the order of conviction recorded by the Sessions Judge gave the following reasons in support of the reversal in paragraph 16 as under: -

This case has focused a very strange phenomenon before us. The witnesses were examined initially as prosecution witnesses. The trial was not completed within short span of time. It lingered on for about five years. After lapse of five years these witnesses stated in favour of the accused and against the prosecution. The question arises whether the prosecutor in charge of the prosecution was vigilant enough to see that all prosecution witnesses are examined within reasonable time span, so as to see that the case is completed within that time span. The question arises whether the court was vigilant enough to see that the trial is conducted day by day system. The both answers would be negative.

Unfortunately, the Sessions Trial was not conducted day by day. The prosecution witnesses were not produced by making them to remain present for day by day trial. The adjournments were sought by defence and they were also granted liberally. All this resulted in strange situation where those two witnesses stated something as prosecution witnesses and after lapse of sufficient time, they appeared before the court and gave the evidence as defence as witnesses and stated against the prosecution.

9. In our view, the reasoning recorded by the High Court, itself would have been sufficient to reject the testimony of DW-1 and DW-2. However, having said so the High Court reversed the order of conviction and recorded the order of acquittal, which is perverse. In this case the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling PW-8 and PW-9 and re-examining them was rejected by the Court on 2.9.1994. Therefore, the question with regard to recalling PW-8 and PW-9 and re- examining them stood closed. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure that by filing affidavit the witnesses examined as PWs (PW-8 and PW-9 in this case) could be juxtaposed as DW-1 and DW2- and be examined as defence witnesses on behalf of the accused.

10. Mr. A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, learned senior counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the accused is entitled to enter upon defence and adduce evidence in support of his case as provided under Section 233 Cr.P.C. particularly Sub-Section (3) of Section 233. Sub-Section (3) of Section 233 reads: -

(3) If the accused applies for the issue of any process for compelling the attendance of any witness or the production of any document or thing, the Judge shall issue such process unless he considers, for reasons to be recorded, that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice.

11. Section 233 itself deals with entering upon defence by the accused. The application for recalling and re-examining persons already examined, as provided under Section 311 Cr.P.C., was already rejected. The power to summon any person as a witness or recall and re-examine any person already examined is the discretionary power of the Court in case such evidence appears to it to be essential for a just decision of the case. Under Section 233 Cr.P.C. the accused can enter upon defence and he can apply for the issue of any process for compelling the attendance of any witness in his defence. The provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 233 cannot be understood as compelling the attendance of any prosecution witness examined, cross-examined and discharged to be juxtaposed as DWs. In the present case PW-8 and PW-9 were juxtaposed as DW-1 and DW-2. This situation is not one what was contemplated by Sub-section 3 of Section 233 Cr.P.C.

12. When such frivolous and vexatious petitions are filed, a Judge is not powerless. He should have used his discretionary power and should have refused relief on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. In the present case, the witnesses were examined by the prosecution as eyewitnesses on 18.12.1990, cross-examined and discharged. Thereafter, an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. was rejected. They were recalled purportedly in exercise of power under Sub-section (3) of Section 233 Cr.P.C. and examined as DW-1 and DW-2 on behalf of the accused on 17.7.1995. This was clearly for the purpose of defeating the ends of justice, which is not permissible under the law.

13. In the case of Yakub Ismail Bhai Patel v. Gujrat in which one of us Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J. was the author of the judgment, in somewhat similar case to the facts of the present case it was held that once a witness is examined as a prosecution witness he cannot be allowed to perjure himself by resiling from the testimony given in court on oath by filing affidavit stating that whatever he had deposed before court as PW was not true and was done so at the instance of the police. In that case the evidence of PW-1 was relied upon by the Trial Court and also by the High Court. He was examined by the prosecution as an eyewitness. He also identified the appellants and the co- accused in the Court. After a long lapse of time he filed an affidavit stating that whatever he had stated before the Court was not true and had done so at the instance of the police. In those facts and circumstances this Court in paragraphs 38 and 39 at SCC pp.240-241 held as under: -

38. Significantly this witness, later on filed an affidavit, wherein he had sworn to the fact that whatever he had deposed before Court as PW 1 was not true and it was so done at the instance of the police.

39. The averments in the affidavit are rightly rejected by the High Court and also the Sessions Court. Once the witness is examined as a prosecution witness, he cannot be allowed to perjure himself by resiling from the testimony given in Court on oath. It is pertinent to note that during the intervening period between giving of evidence as PW 1 and filing of affidavit in court later, he was in jail in a narcotic case and that the accused persons were also fellow inmates there.

14. In the present case, both PW-8 and PW-9 are related to the deceased. PW-8 is the elder brother of the deceased and PW-9 is the friend of the deceased. Being the close relative and friend of the deceased there is no rhyme and reason to depose falsely against the accused and allowing the real culprit to escape unpunished. On 21.9.1989, their statements were recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate. On 18.12.1990, their depositions were recorded before the Sessions Judge. In both the statements they have stated that they were eyewitnesses and witnessed the occurrence. Both of them have stated that they saw the accused assaulting the deceased with knives and swords. They were subjected to lengthy cross-examination but nothing could be elicited to discredit the statement-in-chief. Their examination as defence witnesses was recorded on 17.7.1995 when they resiled completely from the previous statements as prosecution witnesses. It, therefore, clearly appears that the subsequent statements as defence witnesses were concocted well an after thought. They were either won over or were under threat or intimidation from the accused. No reasonable person, properly instructed in law, would have acted upon such statements.

15. Another contention of counsel for the respondent is being noted only to be rejected. It is contended that accused Mahesh who suffered disclosure statement was acquitted by the Trial Court on benefit of doubt and, therefore, the same yardstick should have been applied to the case of the respondent herein. The Trial Court acquitted the accused Mahesh by giving him the benefit of doubt because his name does not figure in the F.I.R. One Gopal Yadav was mentioned in the F.I.R. as an accused. Whether the Gopal Yadav mentioned in the F.I.R. was the same Mahesh was not explained by the prosecution and this was the reason for the acquittal of Mahesh. The name of the respondent herein was named in the F.I.R. as one of the assailants and he was also identified by PW-8 and PW-9.

16. Prima facie PW-8 Mohd. Amin and PW-9 Zakir Ali in their subsequent affidavits made a false statement which they believed to be false or did not believe to be true. Hence, they are liable for perjury for giving false evidence punishable under Section 193 IPC. We direct the Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh, to file a complaint under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and initiate proceedings against Mohd.Amin PW-8 and Zakir Ali PW-9 juxtaposed as DW-1 and DW-2 and pass necessary orders in accordance with law.

17. In the facts and circumstances aforesaid, the High Court was not justified in reversing the conviction recorded by the Trial Court. The order of the High Court dated 12.5.2000 is accordingly set aside and the order of the Trial Court convicting the respondent under Section 302/34IPC is restored. The appeal is allowed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bond and surety stands cancelled. He is directed to be taken back into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining part of the sentence. Compliance report within one month

M/S Abhilash Textiles Vs The Rajkot Municipal Corp, AIR 1988 Guj 57

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "Is there any right to carry on business or trade in unregulated manner and cause nuisance to the public and also become a health hazard to the society at large? If no, can the petitioners claim any right to be heard before they are asked to discontinue or prevent the nuisance?....
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution confers right upon every citizen to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. But this fundamental right is subject to reasonable restrictions which may be placed in the interest of the general public as provided for in sub-clause (6) of Art. 19 itself. No one has a right to carry on business so as to cause nuisance to the society….
The petitioners cannot assert their right, much less fundamental right, to carry on business without any regard to the fundamental duty. In a complex society, in which we live today, no one can claim absolute freedom without incurring any obligation whatsoever for the general well being.”

Forum Prevention of Environment & Sound Pollution Vs UOI, AIR 2005 SC 3136

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "Anyone who wishes to live in peace, comfort and quiet within his house has a right to prevent the noise as pollutant reaching him. No one can claim a right to create noise even in his own premises… Any noise which has the effect of materially interfering with the ordinary comforts of life judged by the standard of a reasonable man is nuisance….
Those who make noise often take shelter behind Article 19(1)A pleading freedom of speech and right to expression. Undoubtedly, the freedom of speech and right to expression are fundamental rights but the rights are not absolute….
While one has a right to speech, others have a right to listen or decline to listen….
Civil law can be divided under two heads (i) The Law of Torts (ii) The General Civil Law. The cases regarding noise have not come before the law courts in large quantity. The reason behind this is that many people in India did not consider noise as a sort of pollution and they are not very much conscious about the evil consequences of noise pollution.”
Court issue direction for fireworks to reduce noise pollution.

Cooverjee B Bharucha Vs Excise Commr, Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 220

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, " The right of every citizen to pursue any lawful trade or business is obviously subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, order and morals of the community. Some occupations by the noise made in their pursuit, some by the odours they engender, and some by the dangers accompanying them, require regulations as to the locality in which they may be conducted.”

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Vs C Kenchappa, AIR 2006 SC 2038

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "In consonance with the principle of 'Sustainable Development', a serious endeavour has been made in the impugned judgment to strike a golden balance between the industrial development and ecological preservation. …

Mrs Susetha Vs State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2006 SC 2893

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "The Appellant herein claims herself to be a member of the Okkiam Thoraipakkam ly was lying in disuse. It was in fact an abandoned one. The Panchayat took a decision of constructing a shopping complex for the purpose of user thereof for resettlement of those persons who were displaced due to expansion of a highway project….
Maintenance of wetlands was highlighted by the Calcutta High Court in People united for better living in Calcutta - Public and Anr Vs State of West Bengal, AIR 1993 Cal 215, observing that the wetland acts as a benefactor to the society.”

T B Ibrahim Vs The Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1953 SC 79

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "There is no fundamental right in a citizen to carry on business wherever he chooses and his right must be subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by the executive authority in the interest of public convenience.”

Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra Vs State of U P (1985) 2 SCC 431

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "conflict between development and conservation and serves to emphasise the need for reconciling the two in the larger interest of the country.”

Sachidanand Pandey Vs State of west Bengal, AIR 1987 SC 1109

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "On a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the Government of West Bengal acted perfectly bona fide in granting the lease of Begumbari land to the Taj Group of Hotels for the construction of a Five Star hotel in Calcutta.”

Orissa State (Prevention & Control of Pollution Board Vs M/S Orient Paper Mills, AIR 2003 SC 1966

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, " The Constitution could not have intended that all administration in the autonomous districts should come to a stop till the Governor made regulations under paragraph 19(1)(b) or till district Council passed laws under para 3(1)(g) … Doubtless when regulations are made….. The administrative authorities would be bound to follow the regulations so made or the laws so passed….
Non-framing of Rules does not curtail the power of the State Government to declare any area as air pollution control area by means of a notification published in the official gazette.”

State of M P Vs Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd, AIR 2003 SC 3236

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, " SDM of the area concerned served orders in terms of Section 133 of the Code directing the respondents who owned industrial units to close their industries on the allegation that serious pollution was created by discharge of effluent from their respective factories and thereby a public nuisance was caused. The preliminary issues and the proceedings initiated by the SDM were questioned by the respondents….
The object and purpose behind Section 133 of the Code is essentially to prevent public nuisance and involves a sense of urgency in the sense that if the Magistrate fails to take recourse immediately irreparable damage would be done to the public….
some times there is a confusion between Section 133 and Section 144 of the Code. While the latter is more general provision the former is more specific. While the order under the former is conditional, the order under the latter is absolute. The proceedings are more in the nature of civil proceedings than criminal proceedings. One significant factor to be noticed is that person against whom action is taken is not an accused within the meaning of Section 133 of the Code. He can give evidence on his own behalf and may be examined on oath. Proceedings are not the proceedings in respect of offences….
Right to live with human dignity becomes illusory in the absence of humane and healthy environment….
There is presumption against a repeal by implication; and the reason of this rule is based on the theory that the Legislature while enacting a law has a complete knowledge of the existing laws on the same subject matter, and therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provision, the intention is clearly not to repeal the existing legislation. When the new Act contains a repealing section mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, the presumption against implied repeal of other laws is further strengthened on the principle expressio unius (persone vel rei) est exclusio alterius. (The express intention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another)….
The necessary questions to be asked are:
(1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions.
(2) Whether the Legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the earlier law;
(3) Whether the two laws occupy the same field. The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the theory that the Legislature, which is presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions and, therefore, when the court applies the doctrine, it does nothing more than giving effect to the intention of the Legislature by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and by a comparison of their provisions….
The Court leans against implying a repeal, “unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time”

Pollution Murli S Deora Vs UOI, AIR 2002 SC 40

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, “why should a non-smoker be afflicted by various diseases, including lung cancer or of heart, only because he is required to go to public places? Is it not indirectly depriving of his life without any process of law? The answer is obviously — “yes”….
Realising the gravity of the situation and considering the adverse effect of smoking on smokers and passive smokers, we direct and prohibit smoking in public places.”

Municipal Council, Ratlam Vs Vardichand, (1980) 4 SCC 162

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "The key question we have to answer is whether by affirmative action a court can compel a statutory body to carry out its duty to the community by constructing sanitation facilities ….
Had the municipal council and its executive officers spent half of this litigative zeal on cleaning up the street and constructing the drains by rousing the people’s sramdan resources and laying out the city’s limited financial resources, the people’s needs might have been largely met long ago….
So the guns of Section 133 go into action wherever there is public nuisance. The public power of the magistrate under the Code is a public duty to the members of the public who are victims of the nuisance, and so he shall exercise it when the jurisdictional facts are present as here. “All power is a trust - that we are accountable for its exercise - that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist.” Discretion becomes a duty when the beneficiary brings home the circumstances for its benign exercise….
plea is not that the facts are wrong but that the law is not right because the municipal funds being insufficient it cannot carry out the duties under Section 123 of the Act….
under Part III of the Constitution have to be respected by the State regardless of budgetary provision. Likewise, Section 123 of the Act has no saving clause when the municipal council is penniless….
Public nuisance, because of pollutants being discharged by big factories to the detriment of the poorer sections, is a challenge to the social justice component of the rule of law. Likewise, the grievous failure of local authorities to provide the basic amenity of public conveniences drives the miserable slum-dwellers to ease in the streets, on the sly for a time, and openly thereafter, because under Nature’s pressure bashfulness becomes a luxury and dignity a difficult art. A responsible municipal council constituted for the precise purpose of preserving public health and providing better finances cannot run away from its principal duty by pleading financial inability. Decency and dignity are non-negotiable facets of human rights….
providing drainage systems- not pompous and attractive, but in working condition and sufficient to meet the needs of the people - cannot be evaded if the municipality is to justify its existence….
the court, armed with the provisions of the two Codes and justified by the obligation under Section 123 of the Act, must adventure into positive directions as it has done in the present case. Section 133 CrPC authorise the prescription of a time-limit for carrying out the order….
Magistrate only expected the Municipal Council and the Town. Improvement Trust to evolve a plan and to start planning about it within six months; the learned Magistrate has rightly not fixed the time-limit within which that plan will be completed….
Before us the major endeavour of the Municipal Council was to persuade us to be pragmatic and not to force impracticable orders on it since it had no wherewithal to execute the order. Of course, we agree that law is realistic and not idealistic and what cannot be performed under given circumstances cannot be prescribed as a norm to be carried out. From that angle it may well be that while upholding the order of the magistrate, we may be inclined to tailor the direction to make it workable. But first things first and we cannot consent to a value judgment where people’s health is a low priority. Nevertheless, we are willing to revise the order into a workable formula the implementation of which would be watch-dogged by the court….
We have no hesitation in holding that if these directions are not complied with the subDivisional Magistrate will prosecute the officers responsible. Indeed, this Court will also consider action to punish for contempt in case of report by the sub-Divisional Magistrate of wilful breach by any officer.”

Forum Prevention of Environment & Sound Pollution Vs UOI, AIR 2006 SC 348

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "Restrictions on the use of loud speakers…. No religion ever says to force the unwilling to listen to expressions of religious beliefs. In the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna says to Arjuna: This secret gospel of the Gita should never be imparted to a man who lacks penance, nor to him who is wanting in devotion, nor even to him who lends not a willing ear; and in no case to him who finds fault with Me... He who, offering the highest love to Me, preaches the most profound gospel of the Gita among My devotees, shall come to Me alone; there is no doubt about it….
Before parting, we would like to clarify further that we may not be understood as diluting in any manner our holding in Noise Pollution. We are also not granting any exemption or relaxation in favour of anyone by our verdict.”

Goa Foundation, Goa Vs Diksha Holdings Pvt Ltd, AIR 2001 SC 184

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “It was also contended before the High Court that there exist large number of sand dunes and permitting the respondent to have the hotel complex on the plot of land will ultimately lead to irreversible ecological damage of the coastal area, and, therefore, the Court should prevent such construction.”

Narmda Bachao Andolan Vs UOI AIR 2000 SC 3751

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The “precautionary principle” and the corresponding burden of proof on the person who wants to change the status quo will ordinarily apply in a case of polluting or other project or industry where the extent of damage likely to be inflicted is not known….
Water is one element without which life cannot sustain. Therefore, it is to be regarded as one of the primary duties of the Government to ensure availability of water to the people….
The courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision….
Just because a petition is termed as a PIL does not mean that ordinary principles applicable to litigation will not apply. Laches is one of them…
Public interest litigation should not be allowed to degenerate to becoming publicity interest litigation or private inquisitiveness litigation….
If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will not be in public interest to require the court to go into and investigate those areas which are the function of the executive….
A hard decision need not necessarily be a bad decision….
Environmental concern has not only to be of the area which is going to be submerged but also its surrounding area. The impact on environment should be seen in relation to the project as a whole. While an area of land will submerge but the construction of the dam will result in multifold improvement in the environment of the areas where the canal waters will reach.”

Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum Vs UOI, AIR 1996 SC 2715

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “the tanneries are discharging untreated effluent into agricultural fields, roadsides, waterways and open lands….The traditional concept that development and ecology are opposed to each other is no longer acceptable. “Sustainable Development” is the answer….
We are, however, of the view that “The Precautionary Principle” and “The Polluter Pays Principle” are essential features of “Sustainable Development”. The “Precautionary Principle” - in the context of the municipal law - means:
(i) Environmental measures - by the State Government and the statutory authorities - must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation.
(ii) Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.
(iii) The “onus of proof” is on the actor or the developer/industrialist to show that his action is environmentally benign….
“Polluter Pays Principle” as interpreted by this Court means that the absolute liability for harm to the environment extends not only to compensate the victims of pollution but also the cost of restoring the environmental degradation…
Even otherwise once these principles are accepted as part of the Customary International Law there would be no difficulty in accepting them as part of the domestic law. It is almost an accepted proposition of law that the rules of Customary International Law there would be no difficulty in accepting them as part of the domestic law. It is almost an accepted proposition of law that the rules of Customary International Law which are not contrary to the municipal law shall be deemed to have been incorporated in the domestic law and shall be followed by the courts of law.”

no need for prosecution to apply for process to the witnesses

State v. K. A. Shariff
1971 CRI. L. J. 226
MYSORE HIGH COURT  AIR 1971 MYSORE 60 (V 58 C 16)
Judgement
SANTHOSH, J. :- This appeal filed by the State is directed against the order of acquittal of the two respondents passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Second Court, Bijapur, in C. C. No. 1344 of 968. Charges under Sections 392 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code were framed against the respondents by the learned Magistrate and the case was posted for evidence. On 27-5-1969 as there were no witnesses present in the court on behalf of the prosecution, the learned Magistrate acquitted the respondents under Section 251-A(11) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it is this order of acquittal that is challenged by the State in this appeal.
2. The learned State Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant, has contended that the said order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate is illegal. On 27-5-1969 as the Assistant Public Prosecutor was not well, and adjournment was asked on behalf of the prosecution which was not unreasonable and that the learned Magistrate was not justified in acquitting the respondents merely on the ground that no prosecution witnesses were present in Court. The learned Magistrate had no power to acquit the respondents under Section 251-A(11) of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless he records a finding that the respondents accused who were charged with the serious offence of robbery, were not guilty of the charge. He therefore argues that the impugned order of acquittal is not in accordance with law and deserves to be set aside.
3. The order-sheet in the case shows that on 24-2-1969 charges were framed against the respondents-accused and the case was posted for evidence to 11-3-1969. On 11-3-69 as no witnesses were present, the case was again posted for evidence to 10-4-69. On 10-4-1969 as the Magistrate was on leave the case was posted to 23-4-1969; that on 23-4-1969 as the counsel for the accused were absent and no witnesses were present, the case was posted to 27-5-1969. On 27-5-1969 the Head Constable represented that the Assistant Public Prosecutor was not well and the witnesses were not present and the learned Magistrate passed the following order :
"In this case, I do not see any reason to adjourn the case any more as a punishment to the accused for the laches on the part of the prosecution. Hence, I take the prosecution has no evidence to adduce and close the case. The accused are acquitted u/s. 251-A(11), Cr. P.C. and their bail bonds are cancelled."
4. In State of Mysore v. Narasimhegowda, (1964) 2 Mys LJ 241 : (AIR 1965 Mys 167) on which strong reliance is placed by the learned State Public Prosecutor in support of his contention that the learned Magistrate had no power to acquit the respondents without recording evidence under Section 251-A(11) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Tukol and Chandrashekhar, JJ. held that in a case where the magistrate had framed charges and the case was adjourned for production of the prosecution witnesses and the summons issued to the witnesses had not been returned, the Magistrate could not have passed an order of acquittal under Section 251-A(11), Cr. P.C. without recording evidence and finding the accused to be not guilty. Having issued summons to the witnesses the Magistrate should have taken steps by issuing warrants if necessary to secure the presence of witnesses. Their Lordships observed in para 4 at p. 243 (of Mys LJ) : (Para 4 at p. 169 of AIR) as follows :-
"Sub-Sec. (11) lays down that 'if, in any case under this section in which a charge has been framed, the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal.' The word 'finds' seems to have been used in the sense of 'decides', 'concludes' or 'holds' implying that the finding to be arrived at shall be after consideration of all the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the plea of the accused and the evidence adduced on his behalf if any. This Section occurs in Chapter XXI of the Code which also provides for the procedure for trial of warrant cases 'instituted otherwise than on a police report' and embodies in Section 258(1) provisions identical with those of Sub-Section (11). The Code does not provide for or contemplate on order of acquittal being recorded merely on the ground that the prosecution or the complainant had failed to produce evidence on the date fixed by the Magistrate. We do not desire to express any opinion in the present case on the question whether the Magistrate cannot at all record an order of acquittal under any circumstance where the prosecution or the complainant persistently and unreasonably fails in his obligation to keep the witnesses present or secure their attendance."
In para 5  their Lordships also observed as follows :
"In warrant cases where the law requires the State to undertake the burden of prosecuting the offenders in public interest to ensure law and order, the Court also has its responsibility to see that justice is done by a fair and speedy trial. Passing orders of discharge or acquittal without just and sufficient grounds would be contrary to law and against public interest."
Mr. Swamy the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-accused, has relied on a decision of a single Judge of this Court reported in Basappa v. Kalappa, (1966) 2 Mys LJ 528 in which Honniah, J. held thus :
"Before the amendment Act of 1955 the Magistrate had a duty to ascertain the names of the prosecution witnesses and summon them, but there appears to be no analogous provision in S.251A. Under Sub-Section (7) of Section 251A the Magistrate is to take such evidence as is produced before him in support of the prosecution. If for one reason or the other, the prosecution fails to produce such evidence, the only alternative left to the Magistrate would be to act under Sub-Section (11), to make an order holding that the accused are not guilty as the prosecution has failed to produce any evidence in support of the charge and then record an order of acquittal."
The Bench decision of this Court (1964) 2 Mys LJ 241 : (AIR 1965 Mys 167) referred to earlier, was not brought to His Lordship's notice. Further in the said case the prosecutor had undertaken to produce the witnesses on the adjourned hearing. The acquittal was also not challenged by the State but by the complainant only.
It is contended by Mr. Swamy that in the instant case, no summons to the witnesses had been taken by the prosecution and the prosecution undertook to produce the witnesses. As the prosecution have not produced any witness in support of their case, the learned Magistrate, it is argued, was perfectly justified in acquitting the respondents-accused under Sub-Section (11) of Section 251A.
5. There is no force in the said contention of Mr. Swamy. In the charge-sheet filed by the Police, there was a specific prayer for issue of summons to the witnesses cited in the charge-sheet. In the order sheet of the case, it is nowhere stated that the prosecution undertook to produce the witnesses. In a case like this where the prosecution has not undertaken to produce the witnesses and where they have made a specific prayer in the charge-sheet to issue summons to the witnesses mentioned therein, it is the duty of the Court to issue summons to those witnesses and insist on their attendance. If the witnesses do not come to court in spite, of the summons, it is open to the Court to issue a warrant and see that the witnesses appear before the Court.
We may also point out that under sub-clause (2) of Section 207A of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is the duty of the officer conducting the prosecution to apply to the Magistrate to issue process to compel the attendance of any witness. Section 208(3) of the said Code also lays down that in proceedings instituted otherwise than on police reports, it is the duty of the complainant or the officer conducting the prosecution or the accused to apply to the Magistrate to issue process to compel the attendance of any witness. There is no such obligation cast, under Section 251-A(7) of the Cr. P.C. on the prosecution to apply for process to the witnesses. There is, therefore, no force in the contention advanced by Mr. Swamy that it is the duty of the prosecution to apply for summons to the witnesses they proposed to examine in the case.
6. It is also clear from the wordings of sub-clause (11) of Section 251-A that if in any case under this Section in which a charge has been framed the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal. As has been pointed by Their Lordships in (1964) 2 Mys LJ 241 : (AIR 1965 SC 167) to which we have already referred, the word 'finds' in sub-clause (11) of this Section is used in the sense 'decides' implying that the finding to be arrived at shall be after consideration of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the plea of the accused and the evidence adduced on his behalf if any, and the Code does not provide for or contemplate an order of acquittal being recorded merely on the ground that the prosecution failed to produce the witnesses on the date fixed by the Magistrate.
The words used in sub-clause (11) are 'finds the accused not guilty' and 'record an order of acquittal'. If the legislature wanted merely that the accused should be acquitted, it could have simply used the words 'pass an order of acquittal'. There was no need for the legislature to use the specific words 'finds the accused not guilty'. Finding the accused not guilty implies that the Court has applied its mind to the merits of the case after recording evidence and then only found him not guilty. We may also point out that the policy of law seems to be that in serious cases the accused should not be acquitted merely because of laches on the part of the prosecution. In summons cases instituted on complaint under Section 247 of the Cr. P.C. the Court is competent to acquit the accused merely because of the non-appearance of the complainant. Under Section 249 of the Cr. P.C. in any case instituted otherwise than upon a complaint, the Magistrate may, for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgement either of acquittal or conviction and may thereupon release the accused. Power is given to Court to stop proceedings for good reasons even in a case instituted otherwise than on a complaint.
Some Courts have taken the view that Section 249 applies only to summons cases as it is found in Chapter XX dealing with trial of summons cases. But the words used in the said Section are very wide and it says 'in any case' instituted otherwise than upon a complaint the Court for reasons to be recorded by it may stop the proceedings. It may also be mentioned that the very next Section 250, though it appears in Chapter XX dealing with trial of summons cases, refers to compensation to be awarded for frivolous accusations both in summons and warrant cases.
Referring to this Section 439 Cr. P.C. the learned author Sohoni in his Code of Criminal Procedure, 1966 Edition observes that "The Section though occurring in Chapter XX seems to be applicable to warrant cases also." All that we are interested in pointing out here is, that so far as Police charge-Sheets are concerned, there is no provision in Chapter XXI dealing with trial of warrant cases, for the acquittal of the accused merely on the ground of absence of the prosecutor or non-appearance of his witnesses. Section 259 is the only Section in the said Chapter which states that when the proceedings have been instituted upon complaint and on the day fixed for hearing the complainant is absent and the offence may be lawfully compounded or is not a cognizable offence, the Magistrate may, in his discretion at any time before the charge is framed, discharge the accused. It is needless to point out that Sec. 259 does not apply to cases instituted on police charge-sheets.
7. Apart from the question of law, we are of the opinion even on merits, the learned Magistrate was not justified in passing the impugned order. The order sheet shows that it was represented to him that the Assistant Public Prosecutor was ill on 27-5-69 the day on which he acquitted the accused. The order sheet further discloses that later in the day the Head Constable filed an application for issue of attendance certificates to five witnesses who are stated to have been present. The charge against the respondents was of a serious one viz. robbery. We have already pointed out that the order sheet does not disclose that the prosecution at any time undertook to produce any witnesses. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the learned Magistrate was not justified in passing the impugned order in the instant case. Disposal of cases in this fashion is not desirable.
8. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of acquittal of the respondents passed by the learned Magistrate and we remand the case for a fresh disposal in accordance with law. We direct that the case should be disposed of expeditiously.
Appeal allowed.

State of Maharashtra Vs Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao, AIR 1970 SC 1157

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, " “under the Constitution a proper balance is intended to be maintained between the exercise of the right conferred by Art. 19(1)(f) and (g) and the interests of a citizen in the exercise of his right to acquire, hold or dispose of his property or to carry on occupation, trade or business. In striking that balance the danger which may be inherent in permitting unfettered exercise of right in a commodity must of necessity influence the determination of the restrictions which may be placed upon the right of the citizen ‘to the commodity’.”

T N Godavaraman Thirumulkpad Vs UOI, AIR 2005 SC 4256

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “Natural resources are the assets of entire nation. It is the obligation of all concerned including Union Government and State Governments to conserve and not waste these resources. Article 48A of the Constitution of India requires the State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forest and wild life of the country….
The point in issue is whether before diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes and consequential loss of benefits accruing from the forests should not the user agency of such land be required to compensate for the diversion….
we hold that the natural resources are not ownership of any one State or individual, public at large is its beneficiary and, therefore, the contention of Mr. Venugopal that the amount of NPV shall be made over to the State Government cannot be accepted”

A P Pollution Control Board Vs Prof M V Nayudu, AIR 1999 SC 812

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “In Vellore Citizens’Welfare Forum Vs Union of India (1966) 5 SCC 647, a three-Judge Bench of this Court referred to these changes, to the “precautionary principle” and the new concept of “burden of proof” in environmental matters. We shall next elaborate the new concept of burden of proof referred to in the Vellore case. In that case, Kuldip Singh, J, stated as follows: (iii) The ‘onus of proof’ is on the actor or the developer/ industrialist to show that his action is environmentally benign….
Good governance is an accepted principle of international and domestic laws. It comprises of the rule of law, effective State institutions, transparency and accountability in public affairs, respect for human rights and the meaningful participation of citizens — (including scientists) - in the political processes of their countries and in decisions affecting their lives. It includes the need for the State to take the necessary “legislative, administrative and other actions” to implement the duty of prevention of environmental harm.”

Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs UOI, AIR 1996 SC 1446

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “In M C Mehta case, no compensation was awarded as this Court could not reach the conclusion that Shriram company came within the meaning of ‘State’ in Article 12 so as to be liable to the discipline of Article 21 and to be subjected to a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution….
The Polluter Pays principle demands that the financial costs of preventing or remedying damage caused by pollution should lie with the undertakings which cause the pollution, or produce the goods which cause the pollution….”

M C Mehta Vs UOI, AIR 1987 SC 1086

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, " applications for compensation are for enforcement of the fundamental right to life enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution and while dealing with such applications we cannot adopt a hyper-technical approach which would defeat the ends of justice….
If this Court is prepared to accept a letter complaining of violation of the fundamental right of an individual or a class of individuals who cannot approach the Court for justice, there is no reason why these applications for compensation which have been made for enforcement of the fundamental right of the persons affected by the oleum gas leak under Art. 21 should not be entertained….
It may now be taken as well settled that Art. 32 does not merely confer power on this Court to issue a direction, order or writ for enforcement of the fundamental rights but it also lays a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental rights of the people and for that purpose this Court has all incidental and ancillary powers including the power to forge new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental rights….
If the Court were powerless to issue any direction, order or writ in cases where a fundamental right has already been violated, Art. 32 would be robbed of all its efficacy, because then the situation would be that if a fundamental right is threatened to be violated, the Court can injunct such violation but if the violator is quick enough to take action infringing the fundamental right, he would escape from the net of Art. 32….
The power of the Court to grant such remedial relief may include the power to award compensation in appropriate cases….
Whether Article 21 is available against Shriram which is owned by Delhi Cloth Mills Limited, a public company limited by shares and which is engaged in an industry vital to public interest….
Once an authority is deemed to be ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12, it is State for the purpose of all its activities and functions and the American functional dichotomy by which some functions of an authority….
it is immaterial for the purpose of determining whether a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the State or not whether it is created by a Statute or under a statute, “the inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence….
It is true that Control is not exercised by the Government in relation to the internal management policies of the Company. However, the control is exercised on all such activities of Shriram which can jeopardize public interest….
we find that Shriram also receives sizeable assistance in the shape of loans and overdrafts running into several crores of rupees from the Government….
Why should a private corporation under the functional control of the State engaged in an activity which is hazardous to the health and safety of the community and is imbued with public interest and which the State ultimately proposes to exclusively run under its industrial policy, not be subject to the same limitations….
rule in Rylands Vs Fletcher was evolved in the year 1866 and it provides that a person who for his own purpose brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he fails to do so, is prima facie liable for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. The liability under this rule is strict and it is no defence that the thing escaped without that person’s wilful act, default or neglect or even that he had no knowledge of its existence….
rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and it does not apply to things naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases where there is statutory authority….
We need not feel inhibited by this rule which was evolved in this context of a totally different kind of economy. Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society…. Law cannot afford to remain static….
We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign country….
We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build up our own jurisprudence…
where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity…. such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-à-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands Vs Fletcher.

M C Mehta Vs UOI, AIR 1987 SC 965

This public interest litigation raises some seminal questions concerning the (1) true scope and ambit of Arts. 21 and 32 of the Constitution and (2) principles and norms for determining the liability of large enterprises engaged in manufacture and sale of hazardous products.

M C Mehta Vs Kamal Nath, AIR 2000 SC 1997

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "determination of the quantum of pollution fine….
“POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE” has also been applied by this Court in various decisions. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs UOI, AIR 1996 SC 1446, it was held that once the activity carried on was hazardous or inherently dangerous, the person carrying on that activity was liable to make good the loss caused to any other person by that activity….
Pollution is a civil wrong. By its very nature, it is a tort committed against the community as a whole. A person, therefore, who is guilty of causing pollution has to pay damages (compensation) for restoration of the environment and ecology. He has also to pay damages to those who have suffered loss on account of the act of the offender. The powers of this Court under Article 32 are not restricted and it can award damages in a PIL or a Writ Petition as has been held in a series of decisions. In addition to damages aforesaid, the person guilty of causing pollution can also be held liable to pay exemplary damages so that it may act as a deterrent for others not to cause pollution in any manner.”

M C Mehta Vs Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "This Court took notice of the news item appearing in the Indian Express dated 25.2.1996 under the caption – “Kamal Nath dares the mighty Beas to keep his dreams afloat.”….
To ecologists, the need for preserving sensitive resources does not reflect value choices but rather is the necessary result of objective observations of the laws of nature. In sum, ecologists view the environmental sciences as providing us with certain laws of nature….
Under the English common law, however, the Sovereign could own these resources but the ownership was limited in nature, the Crown could not grant these properties to private owners if the effect was to interfere with the public interests in navigation or fishing. Resources that were suitable for these uses were deemed to be held in trust by the Crown for the benefit of the public….
large area of the bank of River Beas which is part of protected forest has been given on a lease purely for commercial purposes to the Motels. We have no hesitation in holding that the Himachal Pradesh Government committed patent breach of public trust by leasing the ecologically fragile land to the Motel management….
The public trust doctrine, as discussed by us in this judgment is a part of the law of the land.”

M C Mehta Vs Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The issues presented in this case illustrate the classic struggle between those members of the public who would preserve our rivers, forests, parks and open lands in their pristine purity and those charged with administrative responsibilities who, under the pressures of the changing needs of an increasingly complex society, find it necessary to encroach to some extent upon open lands heretofore considered inviolate to change. The resolution of this conflict in any given case is for the legislature and not the courts.”

M C Mehta Vs UOI, AIR 2002 SC 1696

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “Articles 39(e), 47 and 48-A by themselves and collectively cast a duty on the State to secure the health of the people, improve public health and protect and improve the environment…
The two essential features of sustainable development are (a) the precautionary principle, and (b) the polluter pays principle….
The ‘precautionary principle’ was elucidated by this Court in Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum Vs UoI (1996) 5 SCC 647.”

M C Mehta Vs Union of India AIR 1987 SC 965

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “We would also suggest to the Government of India that since cases involving issues of environmental pollution, ecological destruction and conflicts over national resources are increasingly coming up for adjudication and these cases involve assessment and evolution of scientific and technical data, it might be desirable to set up environment courts on the regional basis with one professional Judge and two experts drawn from the Ecological Sciences Research Group keeping in view the nature of the case and the expertise required for its adjudication. There would of course be a right of appeal to this Court from the decision of the environment court.”

Oleum Gas Leak case, AIR 1987 SC 1086

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, Enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-à-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands Vs Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330.

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Miss Mohini Jain Vs State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1992 SC 1858

The Karnataka State Legislature, with the object of eliminating the practice of collecting capitation fee for admitting students into educational institutions, enacted the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 (the Act)…. Under the notification the candidates admitted against "Government seats" are to pay Rs. 2,000/- per year as tuition fee. The Karnataka students (other than those admitted against "Government seats") are to be charged tuition fee not exceeding Rs. 25,000/- per annum. The third category is of "Indian students from outside Karnataka", from whom tuition fee not exceeding Rs. 60,000/- per annum is permitted to be charged….
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The directive principles which are fundamental in the governance of the country cannot be isolated from the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III. These principles have to be read into the fundamental rights. Both are supplementary to each other. The State is under a constitutional mandate to create conditions in which the fundamental rights guaranteed to the individuals under Part III could be enjoyed by all. Without making "right to education" under Article 41 of the Constitution a reality the fundamental rights under Chapter III shall remain beyond the reach of large majority which is illiterate….
The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education. The State Government is under an obligation to make endeavour to provide educational facilities at all levels to its citizens….”