Shiv Shakti Co-op Housing Society, Nagpur Vs Swaraj Developers (2003) 6 SCC 659,

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "It is a well-settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse.) The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner Courts cannot aid the legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. [See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.] Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of a doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.”

M/s R.N. Jadi & Brothers v. Subhashchandra, 2007(6) SCC 420 Maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit - an act of court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia - the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its administration is understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in the consideration of particular cases. I am conscious that I was a party to the decision in Kailash v. Nankhu and others (2005(4) SCC 480) which held that the provision was directory and not mandatory But there could be situations where even a procedural provision could be construed as mandatory, no doubt retaining a power in the court, in an appropriate case, to exercise a jurisdiction to take out the rigor of that provision or to mitigate genuine hardship. It was in that context that in Kailash v. Nankhu and others. (supra) it was stated that the extension of time beyond 90 days was not automatic and that the court, for reasons to be recorded, had to be satisfied that there was sufficient justification for departing from the time limit fixed by the Code and the power inhering in the court in terms of Section 148 of the Code. Kailash is no authority for receiving written statements, after the expiry of the period permitted by law, in a routine manner. It is, therefore, necessary to emphasize that the grant of extension of time beyond 30 days is not automatic, that it should be exercised with caution and for adequate reasons and that an extension of time beyond 90 days of the service of summons must be granted only based on a clear satisfaction of the justification for granting such extension, the court being conscious of the fact that even the power of the court for extension inhering in Section 148 of the Code, has also been restricted by the legislature. It would be proper to encourage the belief in litigants that the imperative of Order VIII Rule 1 must be adhered to and that only in rare and exceptional cases, the breach thereof will be condoned.

Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, 2005(3) RCR (Civil) 530 As regards Order VIII Rule 1 Committee's report is as follows: "The question is whether the Court has any power or jurisdiction to extend the period beyond 90 days. The maximum period of 90 days to file written statement has been provided but the consequences on failure to file written statement within the said period have not been provided for in Order VIII Rule 1. The point for consideration is whether the provision providing for maximum period of ninety days is mandatory and, therefore, the Court is altogether powerless to extend the time even in an exceptionally hard case. It has been common practice for the parties to take long adjournments for filing written statements. The legislature with a view to curb this practice and to avoid unnecessary delay and adjournments has provided for the maximum period within which the written statement is required to be filed. The mandatory or directory nature of Order VIII Rule 1 shall have to be determined by having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the amendment. It is, thus, necessary to find out the intention of the legislature. The consequences which may follow and whether the same were intended by the legislature have also to be kept in view.

CPC- Order VI R 17 Ajendraprasadji N. Pande v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N., AIR 2007 (SC) 806 In the written statement there is a denial that defendant No. 1 wanted to handover his seat or office to defendant No. 2, his son. The insertion proposed in draft amendments is that defendant No. 2 was appointed in 1984 as the successor of defendant No. 1. The two read together mean that though defendant No. 1 had in 1984 appointed defendant No. 2 as his successor, defendant No. 1 had no intention at present to handover the seat/office to defendant No. 2. In B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai and Another, (2000) 1 SCC 712 wherein this Court held that delay on its own, untouched by fraud is not a ground for rejecting the application for amendment opposite party to be compensated by costs. . No facts are pleaded nor any grounds are raised in the amendment application to even remotely contend that despite exercise of due diligence these matters could not be raised by the appellants.

CPC- Order VIII R 1 M/s R.N. Jadi & Brothers v. Subhashchandra, AIR 2007 (SC) 2571 The maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit - an act of court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia - the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its administration is understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in the consideration of particular cases. A dispensation that makes Order VIII Rule 1 directory, leaving it to the courts to extend the time indiscriminately would tend to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the amendments to the Code. It is, therefore, necessary to emphasize that the grant of extension of time beyond 30 days is not automatic, that it should be exercised with caution and for adequate reasons and that an extension of time beyond 90 days of the service of summons must be granted only based on a clear satisfaction of the justification for granting such extension, the court being conscious of the fact that even the power of the court for extension inhering in Section 148 of the Code, has also been restricted by the legislature. It would be proper to encourage the belief in litigants that the imperative of Order VIII Rule 1 must be adhered to and that only in rare and exceptional cases, the breach thereof will be condoned.

CPC- Order VIII R 1 Kailash v. Nanhku, AIR 2005 (SC) 2441 Whether the time limit of 90 days as prescribed by the Proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII of the CPC is mandatory or directory in nature ? Directory. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the Statute, the provisions of the CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice.