Showing posts with label envirmental law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label envirmental law. Show all posts
Oct 27, 2010
S Jagannath Vs UOI, AIR 1997 SC 811
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "we direct all the respondent-States not to permit the setting up of any industry or the construction of any type on the area at least up to 500 metres from the sea water at the maximum High Tide. The abovesaid area i.e. from the High Tide Level up to 500 metres shall be kept free from all construction of any type.”
Oct 26, 2010
UOI Vs Kamath Holiday Resorts (P) Ltd, AIR 1996 SC 1040
The Collector of the Union Territory, Daman, as a step towards promoting tourism leased out a site in the reserved forest area to the respondent for putting up a snack bar and a restaurant to cater to the needs of tourists visiting the forest….Not allowed
Oct 21, 2010
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Vs C Kenchappa, AIR 2006 SC 2038
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "In consonance with the principle of 'Sustainable Development', a serious endeavour has been made in the impugned judgment to strike a golden balance between the industrial development and ecological preservation. …
Oct 18, 2010
Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra Vs State of U P (1985) 2 SCC 431
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "conflict between development and conservation and serves to emphasise the need for reconciling the two in the larger interest of the country.”
Oct 11, 2010
Goa Foundation, Goa Vs Diksha Holdings Pvt Ltd, AIR 2001 SC 184
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “It was also contended before the High Court that there exist large number of sand dunes and permitting the respondent to have the hotel complex on the plot of land will ultimately lead to irreversible ecological damage of the coastal area, and, therefore, the Court should prevent such construction.”
Oct 7, 2010
M C Mehta Vs UOI, AIR 1987 SC 1086
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, " applications for compensation are for enforcement of the fundamental right to life enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution and while dealing with such applications we cannot adopt a hyper-technical approach which would defeat the ends of justice….
If this Court is prepared to accept a letter complaining of violation of the fundamental right of an individual or a class of individuals who cannot approach the Court for justice, there is no reason why these applications for compensation which have been made for enforcement of the fundamental right of the persons affected by the oleum gas leak under Art. 21 should not be entertained….
It may now be taken as well settled that Art. 32 does not merely confer power on this Court to issue a direction, order or writ for enforcement of the fundamental rights but it also lays a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental rights of the people and for that purpose this Court has all incidental and ancillary powers including the power to forge new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental rights….
If the Court were powerless to issue any direction, order or writ in cases where a fundamental right has already been violated, Art. 32 would be robbed of all its efficacy, because then the situation would be that if a fundamental right is threatened to be violated, the Court can injunct such violation but if the violator is quick enough to take action infringing the fundamental right, he would escape from the net of Art. 32….
The power of the Court to grant such remedial relief may include the power to award compensation in appropriate cases….
Whether Article 21 is available against Shriram which is owned by Delhi Cloth Mills Limited, a public company limited by shares and which is engaged in an industry vital to public interest….
Once an authority is deemed to be ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12, it is State for the purpose of all its activities and functions and the American functional dichotomy by which some functions of an authority….
it is immaterial for the purpose of determining whether a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the State or not whether it is created by a Statute or under a statute, “the inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence….
It is true that Control is not exercised by the Government in relation to the internal management policies of the Company. However, the control is exercised on all such activities of Shriram which can jeopardize public interest….
we find that Shriram also receives sizeable assistance in the shape of loans and overdrafts running into several crores of rupees from the Government….
Why should a private corporation under the functional control of the State engaged in an activity which is hazardous to the health and safety of the community and is imbued with public interest and which the State ultimately proposes to exclusively run under its industrial policy, not be subject to the same limitations….
rule in Rylands Vs Fletcher was evolved in the year 1866 and it provides that a person who for his own purpose brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he fails to do so, is prima facie liable for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. The liability under this rule is strict and it is no defence that the thing escaped without that person’s wilful act, default or neglect or even that he had no knowledge of its existence….
rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and it does not apply to things naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases where there is statutory authority….
We need not feel inhibited by this rule which was evolved in this context of a totally different kind of economy. Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society…. Law cannot afford to remain static….
We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign country….
We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build up our own jurisprudence…
where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity…. such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-à-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands Vs Fletcher.
If this Court is prepared to accept a letter complaining of violation of the fundamental right of an individual or a class of individuals who cannot approach the Court for justice, there is no reason why these applications for compensation which have been made for enforcement of the fundamental right of the persons affected by the oleum gas leak under Art. 21 should not be entertained….
It may now be taken as well settled that Art. 32 does not merely confer power on this Court to issue a direction, order or writ for enforcement of the fundamental rights but it also lays a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental rights of the people and for that purpose this Court has all incidental and ancillary powers including the power to forge new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental rights….
If the Court were powerless to issue any direction, order or writ in cases where a fundamental right has already been violated, Art. 32 would be robbed of all its efficacy, because then the situation would be that if a fundamental right is threatened to be violated, the Court can injunct such violation but if the violator is quick enough to take action infringing the fundamental right, he would escape from the net of Art. 32….
The power of the Court to grant such remedial relief may include the power to award compensation in appropriate cases….
Whether Article 21 is available against Shriram which is owned by Delhi Cloth Mills Limited, a public company limited by shares and which is engaged in an industry vital to public interest….
Once an authority is deemed to be ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12, it is State for the purpose of all its activities and functions and the American functional dichotomy by which some functions of an authority….
it is immaterial for the purpose of determining whether a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the State or not whether it is created by a Statute or under a statute, “the inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence….
It is true that Control is not exercised by the Government in relation to the internal management policies of the Company. However, the control is exercised on all such activities of Shriram which can jeopardize public interest….
we find that Shriram also receives sizeable assistance in the shape of loans and overdrafts running into several crores of rupees from the Government….
Why should a private corporation under the functional control of the State engaged in an activity which is hazardous to the health and safety of the community and is imbued with public interest and which the State ultimately proposes to exclusively run under its industrial policy, not be subject to the same limitations….
rule in Rylands Vs Fletcher was evolved in the year 1866 and it provides that a person who for his own purpose brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he fails to do so, is prima facie liable for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. The liability under this rule is strict and it is no defence that the thing escaped without that person’s wilful act, default or neglect or even that he had no knowledge of its existence….
rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and it does not apply to things naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases where there is statutory authority….
We need not feel inhibited by this rule which was evolved in this context of a totally different kind of economy. Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society…. Law cannot afford to remain static….
We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign country….
We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build up our own jurisprudence…
where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity…. such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-à-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands Vs Fletcher.
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