Tenant inducted in 1979, for three years, by the landlord under a written agreement, in C-4/33, Safdarjang Development Area, New Delhi, with permission of Controller under Section 21 of Delhi Rent Control Act (for brevity the 'Act') seeks leave of this Court on limited question of law if proceedings for recovery of possession under Section 21 of the Act could be initiated and continued by legal representatives of the landlord who had obtained permission but who died before expiry of period of tenancy. Answer of it shall depend, primarily, on construction of word 'landlord' used in Section 21.
Is there any justification for construing the word "landlord" in a narrow sense so as to restrict it, only, to the person who made the application and obtained permission. "Landlord" has been defined in Section 2(e). Expression, "for the time being" makes it clear, that landlord has to be understood in praesenti. That is anyone entitled to receive rent is the landlord. It does not visualise past or future landlord. Therefore, the word "landlord", on plain reading of Section 21 does not warrant construction of the word in any other manner. Basis for submission, however, that landlord in second part of Section 21 entitling him to claim vacant possession should be confined to the person who obtained permission was founded on use of expression, "who does not require the whole or any part of the premises for a particular period". Attempt was made to personalise eviction proceedings by linking it with the person.
Vacation is not linked with landlord but with time. Expiry of it obliges tenant to vacate. If he does not then the landlord may approach Controller for putting him in vacant possession. Which landlord? Obviously whosoever is the landlord at affected.
Even otherwise an action for eviction abates only if the cause of action does not survive. What is the cause of action for an application for vacant possession in Section 21 : death of landlord or expiry of time for which tenancy was created. Obviously the latter, the failure of tenant to honour his commitment to vacate the premises after expiry of time for which he was inducted with permission of Controller.
Feb 28, 2010
Feb 27, 2010
Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam AIR 1974 SC 471
The question was whether a compromise decree for eviction could be passed because the Rent Act enjoined the eviction only on the satisfaction of the court. The respondent landlord in that case instituted a suit under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 for possession against the tenant on two grounds, namely, arrears in payment of rent and bona fide requirement of the premises for personal use and occupation. A compromise decree was passed. When the appellant applied for execution of the decree the tenant contended that the compromise decree had been passed by the Rent Court without satisfying itself as to the existence of grounds of eviction under the Act and hence being a nullity was not executable. It was held by this Court that the public policy permeating this Act was the protection of tenants against unreasonable eviction. Construing the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 28 of the Act in the light of the said policy, it should be held that the Rent Court under the Act was not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground which was de hors the Act or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the statutory grounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13 was a sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court. Parties by their consent could not confer jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which, according to the legislative mandate, it could not do.
Feb 26, 2010
Vijay Kumar Bajaj v. Inder Sain Minocha AIR 1982 Del. 260
In that decision, in the light of Section 21, the following questions were posed: (1) Whether the permission under Section 21 of the Act is invalid in view of Supreme Court judgment in S.B. Noronah case if reasons for not requiring the premises by the landlord for a particular period are not disclosed in his application or his statement before the Controller? (2) Whether before or after permission execution of any agreement in writing to let the premises for the fixed period is necessary, if so, whether such a document requires registration? (3) Whether the proposed agreement of tenancy in writing submitted along with the application under Section 21 of the Act, in this appeal required registration?” The questions were answered by the High Court as follows: (1) Not necessarily. The landlord or the tenant may be able to show that cogent reasons did exist or were within the knowledge of the parties as to why the landlord did not require the whole or a part of his premises for a specified period. (2) No registration is necessary. The agreement in writing may be entered into either before or after grant of permission. (3) An agreement in writing submitted along with the application under Section 21 of the Act is really a proposed agreement. It comes into effect only after the grant of permission under Section 21 of the Act. It does not require registration.
Feb 25, 2010
INDER MOHAN LAL v. RAMESH KHANNA AIR 1987 SC 1986
The Rent Controller after recording the statements of the appellant and the respondent made an order permitting creation of limited tenancy only for a period of two years to residential purposes to which the respondent had agreed upon. It may be material to refer to the fact that the appellant in his application under Section 21 of the Rent Act had stated as follows: “I do not require the premises for a period of two years from July 15, 1976. The purpose of letting shall be residential only and the premises are shown in the site plan Ex. A-1. The proposed agreement is Ex. A-2. Limited tenancy under Section 21 of the Act may be allowed to be created for the said period.”
question, therefore, that arises for consideration of this Court is whether in view of the requirements of Section 21 of the Rent Act, was the permission invalid?
Section 21 of the Rent Act reads as follows: “ Where a landlord does not require the whole or any part of any premises for a particular period, and the landlord, after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner, lets the whole of the premises or part thereof as a residence for such period as may be agreed to in writing between the landlord and the tenant and the tenant does not, on the expiry of the said period, vacate such premises, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the landlord within such time as may be prescribed, place the landlord in vacant possession of the premises or part thereof by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation of such premises. 12. An analysis of this section makes it clear that in order to attract Section 21; the first condition is that the landlord does not require the whole or part of any premises for a particular period. If that condition is fulfilled then the said landlord after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner lets the whole of the premises or part thereof as a residence for such period as may be agreed to in writing between the landlord and the tenant does not on the expiry of the said period, vacate such premises, then notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the landlord within such time as may be prescribed, order the eviction of the tenant. Therefore the first condition must be that the landlord must not require the premises either in whole or part of any premises for a particular period. Secondly, the landlord must obtain the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner. Thirdly, letting of the whole or part of the premises must be for residence. Fourthly, such letting out must be for such period as may be agreed in writing.
The sanction granted under Section 21, if it has been procured by fraud and collusion cannot withstand invalidity because, otherwise, high public policy will be given as hostage to successful collusion. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked to render valid a proceeding which the legislature has on grounds of public policy subjected to mandatory conditions which are shown to be absent. As between unequals the law steps in and as against statutes there is no estoppel, especially where collusion and fraud are made out and high purpose is involved.
There must not be any fraud or collusion. There is a presumption of regularity. But it is open in particular facts and circumstances of the case to prove to the satisfaction of the executing court that there was no (sic) collusion or conspiracy between the landlord and the tenant and the landlord did not mean what he said or that it was a fraud or that the tenant agreed because the tenant was wholly unequal to the landlord. In the instant case none of these conditions were fulfilled. There is no evidence in this case that when the landlord stated that he did not require the premises in question for a particular period, he did not mean what he stated or that he made a false statement.
It is not necessary to state under Section 21 the reasons why the landlord did not require the premises in question for any particular period. Nor is there any presumption that in all cases the tenants are the weaker sections. the permission was valid and the order permitting limited tenancy was not a mindless order but one passed after application of the mind taking the two relevant facts under Section 21 of the Act into consideration, it is not necessary to discuss these decisions any further. In view of the fact that Section 21 is a code by itself, no question of any further agreement in writing which has to be registered arises.
question, therefore, that arises for consideration of this Court is whether in view of the requirements of Section 21 of the Rent Act, was the permission invalid?
Section 21 of the Rent Act reads as follows: “ Where a landlord does not require the whole or any part of any premises for a particular period, and the landlord, after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner, lets the whole of the premises or part thereof as a residence for such period as may be agreed to in writing between the landlord and the tenant and the tenant does not, on the expiry of the said period, vacate such premises, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the landlord within such time as may be prescribed, place the landlord in vacant possession of the premises or part thereof by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation of such premises. 12. An analysis of this section makes it clear that in order to attract Section 21; the first condition is that the landlord does not require the whole or part of any premises for a particular period. If that condition is fulfilled then the said landlord after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner lets the whole of the premises or part thereof as a residence for such period as may be agreed to in writing between the landlord and the tenant does not on the expiry of the said period, vacate such premises, then notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the landlord within such time as may be prescribed, order the eviction of the tenant. Therefore the first condition must be that the landlord must not require the premises either in whole or part of any premises for a particular period. Secondly, the landlord must obtain the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner. Thirdly, letting of the whole or part of the premises must be for residence. Fourthly, such letting out must be for such period as may be agreed in writing.
The sanction granted under Section 21, if it has been procured by fraud and collusion cannot withstand invalidity because, otherwise, high public policy will be given as hostage to successful collusion. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked to render valid a proceeding which the legislature has on grounds of public policy subjected to mandatory conditions which are shown to be absent. As between unequals the law steps in and as against statutes there is no estoppel, especially where collusion and fraud are made out and high purpose is involved.
There must not be any fraud or collusion. There is a presumption of regularity. But it is open in particular facts and circumstances of the case to prove to the satisfaction of the executing court that there was no (sic) collusion or conspiracy between the landlord and the tenant and the landlord did not mean what he said or that it was a fraud or that the tenant agreed because the tenant was wholly unequal to the landlord. In the instant case none of these conditions were fulfilled. There is no evidence in this case that when the landlord stated that he did not require the premises in question for a particular period, he did not mean what he stated or that he made a false statement.
It is not necessary to state under Section 21 the reasons why the landlord did not require the premises in question for any particular period. Nor is there any presumption that in all cases the tenants are the weaker sections. the permission was valid and the order permitting limited tenancy was not a mindless order but one passed after application of the mind taking the two relevant facts under Section 21 of the Act into consideration, it is not necessary to discuss these decisions any further. In view of the fact that Section 21 is a code by itself, no question of any further agreement in writing which has to be registered arises.
Feb 24, 2010
SHRI MUNSHI RAM v. UNION OF INDIA AIR 2000 SC 2623
The tenanted premises are part of building constructed on the land leased to the original lessee by Delhi Improvement Trust. The DDA succeeded the said Trust. The perpetual lease, inter alia, provides that the lessee will not use the land and building that may be erected thereon during the terms of the lease for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential house without the consent in writing of the lessor. Admittedly the premises are being used by the appellants for commercial purposes.
Dr. K. Madan v. Krishnawati (Smt.) [AIR 1997SC 579] any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or Municipal Corporation of Delhi, then the landlord will be entitled to recovery of possession under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act and that Sub-section (11) of Section 14 of the Act enables the Controller to give another opportunity to the tenant to avoid an order of eviction. The first opportunity to the tenant is given when the notice is served on him by the landlord and the second opportunity is given when a conditional order under Section 14(11) of the Act is passed directing the tenant to pay the amount by way of compensation for regularisation of user up to the date of stopping the misuser and further directing stoppage of unauthorised user.
DDA is insisting on stoppage of misuser. The misuser is contrary to the terms of lease. The DDA cannot be directed to permit continued misuser contrary to the terms of the lease on the ground that zonal development plan of the area has not been framed.
Dr. K. Madan v. Krishnawati (Smt.) [AIR 1997SC 579] any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or Municipal Corporation of Delhi, then the landlord will be entitled to recovery of possession under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act and that Sub-section (11) of Section 14 of the Act enables the Controller to give another opportunity to the tenant to avoid an order of eviction. The first opportunity to the tenant is given when the notice is served on him by the landlord and the second opportunity is given when a conditional order under Section 14(11) of the Act is passed directing the tenant to pay the amount by way of compensation for regularisation of user up to the date of stopping the misuser and further directing stoppage of unauthorised user.
DDA is insisting on stoppage of misuser. The misuser is contrary to the terms of lease. The DDA cannot be directed to permit continued misuser contrary to the terms of the lease on the ground that zonal development plan of the area has not been framed.
Feb 23, 2010
FAQIR CHAND v. SHRI RAM RATTAN BHANOT AIR 1973 SC 921
The respondents are landlords of two houses in the Karol Bagh area of Delhi. The houses are built on lands given on long lease by the Delhi Improvement Trust to the rights, liabilities and assets of which the Delhi Development Authority has since succeeded. 3. Under the terms of the lease, subject to revision of rent, the lessees were to put up residential buildings on the leased lands and the lessees undertook: (vi) not to use the said land and buildings that may be erected thereon during the said term for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential house without the consent in writing of the said lessor; provided that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose other than that for which the lease is granted not being a purpose subsequently approved by the lessor ….
Buildings had been put to commercial use even before 1957 when the Delhi Development Authority Act of 1957 came into force.
Question that arises for decision in these cases is this: Are the landlords estopped or otherwise prohibited from getting possession of the property from the tenants because they themselves had let it out for commercial purposes.
The only situation in which it can take effect is where the lease is for a commercial purpose agreed upon by both the landlord and the tenant but that is contrary to the terms of the lease of the land in favour of the landlord. This clause does not come into operation where there is no provision in the lease of the land in favour of the landlord, prohibiting its use for a commercial purpose.
Legislature seems to be to put an end to unauthorised use of the leased lands rather than merely to enable the authorities to get back possession of the leased lands. This conclusion is further fortified by a reference to sub-section (11) of Section 14. The lease is not forfeited merely because the building put upon the leased land is put to an unauthorised use. The tenant is given an opportunity to comply with the conditions.
We are also of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in leaving to the Controller no option but to pass an order for eviction. That would make the alternative provided in sub-section (11) of Section 14 useless.
Buildings had been put to commercial use even before 1957 when the Delhi Development Authority Act of 1957 came into force.
Question that arises for decision in these cases is this: Are the landlords estopped or otherwise prohibited from getting possession of the property from the tenants because they themselves had let it out for commercial purposes.
The only situation in which it can take effect is where the lease is for a commercial purpose agreed upon by both the landlord and the tenant but that is contrary to the terms of the lease of the land in favour of the landlord. This clause does not come into operation where there is no provision in the lease of the land in favour of the landlord, prohibiting its use for a commercial purpose.
Legislature seems to be to put an end to unauthorised use of the leased lands rather than merely to enable the authorities to get back possession of the leased lands. This conclusion is further fortified by a reference to sub-section (11) of Section 14. The lease is not forfeited merely because the building put upon the leased land is put to an unauthorised use. The tenant is given an opportunity to comply with the conditions.
We are also of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in leaving to the Controller no option but to pass an order for eviction. That would make the alternative provided in sub-section (11) of Section 14 useless.
Feb 22, 2010
DR K. MADAN v. KRISHNAWATI (SMT) AIR 1997 SC 579
the premises in question were residential and according to the terms of the lease given by the Government the said premises could not be used for any other purposes. A doctor was allowed to use the premises up to 500 square feet as his clinic provided the doctor resided in the said premises. Inasmuch as the appellant had shifted from the Lajpat Nagar house to her own house in East of Kailash, therefore, the submission was that her continued user of the premises in question only as a clinic was against the terms of the lease.
In any case there can be no estoppel against the statute. We are of the view that the appellant is liable to be evicted unless he has already stopped or stops immediately the misuser of the premises and pays the misuse charges for the period of misuse. Continued wrongful user cannot be permitted by levying penalty but if the authorities do not require the stoppage of misuser, but merely ask for payment of penalty or compensation, then in such a case, an order of eviction or for stoppage of premises need not be passed and it will be sufficient if compensation is required to be paid.
In any case there can be no estoppel against the statute. We are of the view that the appellant is liable to be evicted unless he has already stopped or stops immediately the misuser of the premises and pays the misuse charges for the period of misuse. Continued wrongful user cannot be permitted by levying penalty but if the authorities do not require the stoppage of misuser, but merely ask for payment of penalty or compensation, then in such a case, an order of eviction or for stoppage of premises need not be passed and it will be sufficient if compensation is required to be paid.
Feb 21, 2010
S.P. ARORA v. AJIT SINGH 1970 RCR 628
One of the terms of the lease was that the lessee should erect upon the said land within one year from the date of the lease and thereafter at all times during the terms of the lease maintain on the land a good and substantial residential house. Another term was that the lessee should not use the said land and the building thereon during the term of the lease for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential use without the consent in writing of the Lesser, and it was stipulated that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose other than the purpose for which the lease was granted for being a purpose subsequently approved by the Lesser.
by leasing out the premises for a purpose which is contrary to the condition in the lease deed for the land, the landlord is only committing a breach of a contractual term. So far as clause (k) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is concerned, it does not expressly prohibit the landlord from entering into such a transaction. It only enables the landlord to seek for the eviction of his tenant in a case in which the tenant uses the premises in a manner contrary to the condition in the lease deed for the land on which the premises are situate. There is no express prohibition in clause (k) against the landlord contracting out of it and waiving the advantage conferred upon him by the clause. In so waiving the advantage, the landlord cannot be said to be infringing any public right or public policy. Once he so agrees and waives the right given to him under clause (k), he would be stopped from enforcing that right.
The two clauses (c) and (k) provide for two different situations. Clause (c) applies to all cases of user by the tenant other than the one for which the premises are let out to him by the landlord, while clause (k) applies to the specific case where the land on which the premises are situate has been granted to the landlord subject to certain condition regarding the user thereof, and the tenant use the premises in a manner contrary to the said condition. Clause (c)is thus a general provision, while clause (k) is a special provision applicable to the specific kind of premises and user thereof mentioned in the clause. The provisions in the two clauses are not identical. There is a clear distinction between the provisions in the two clauses.
by leasing out the premises for a purpose which is contrary to the condition in the lease deed for the land, the landlord is only committing a breach of a contractual term. So far as clause (k) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is concerned, it does not expressly prohibit the landlord from entering into such a transaction. It only enables the landlord to seek for the eviction of his tenant in a case in which the tenant uses the premises in a manner contrary to the condition in the lease deed for the land on which the premises are situate. There is no express prohibition in clause (k) against the landlord contracting out of it and waiving the advantage conferred upon him by the clause. In so waiving the advantage, the landlord cannot be said to be infringing any public right or public policy. Once he so agrees and waives the right given to him under clause (k), he would be stopped from enforcing that right.
The two clauses (c) and (k) provide for two different situations. Clause (c) applies to all cases of user by the tenant other than the one for which the premises are let out to him by the landlord, while clause (k) applies to the specific case where the land on which the premises are situate has been granted to the landlord subject to certain condition regarding the user thereof, and the tenant use the premises in a manner contrary to the said condition. Clause (c)is thus a general provision, while clause (k) is a special provision applicable to the specific kind of premises and user thereof mentioned in the clause. The provisions in the two clauses are not identical. There is a clear distinction between the provisions in the two clauses.
Feb 20, 2010
Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan AIR 1979 SC 272
where it was held that the expression 'reasonable requirement' in Section 11(h) of the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, undoubtedly postulates that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish.
Feb 19, 2010
Niader Mal v. Ugar Sain Jain AIR 1966 Punj 509
the court had to construe, inter alia, Section 13(1) (h) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. There under Section 13(1)(h) of the said Act in order to be liable for eviction, the tenant must have built a suitable residence. The court was of the opinion that merely because the tenant had built a house, would not be a ground for ejectment within the meaning of Section 13(1)(h). The words 'suitable residence' must be read with all the terms namely 'built', 'acquired vacant possession of' or 'been allotted'.
GANPAT RAM SHARMA v. GAYATRI DEVI AIR 1987 SC 2016
In appeal before us, it was submitted on behalf of the appellants that in none of the three judgements, there was any finding as to the suitability of the residence that is built, allotted or of which the tenant has acquired vacant possession of. None of the courts has reexamined the size of the space.
The words 'has built' or 'has acquired' or 'has been allotted' clearly mean that the tenant has already built, acquired or been allotted the residence to which he can move and that on the date of the application for his eviction his right to reside therein exists. It was therefore held that the words as they stood associated with each other in clause (h) lead to the only conclusion that as on the date of the application the tenant must be possessing a clear right to reside in some other premises than the tenancy premises as a matter of his own rightful choice either because he may have built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or the same may have been allotted to him.
It is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not, and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts.
The words 'has built' or 'has acquired' or 'has been allotted' clearly mean that the tenant has already built, acquired or been allotted the residence to which he can move and that on the date of the application for his eviction his right to reside therein exists. It was therefore held that the words as they stood associated with each other in clause (h) lead to the only conclusion that as on the date of the application the tenant must be possessing a clear right to reside in some other premises than the tenancy premises as a matter of his own rightful choice either because he may have built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or the same may have been allotted to him.
It is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not, and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts.
Feb 18, 2010
SATYAWATI SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA 2008 (6) SCALE 325
In terms of Clause 4(c) of the lease deed, the lessee was prohibited from using the land and building (to be constructed over it) for any purpose other than residence, with a stipulation that in case of breach of this condition, the lease shall become void. After constructing the building, the lessee inducted Shri Jai Narain Sharma and Dr. Ms. Tara Motihar, as tenants in two portions of the building, who started using the rented premises for running watch shop and clinic respectively. Smt. Satyawati Sharma (appellant herein), who is now represented by her LRs, purchased property i.e. house bearing No.3395-3397, Ward No.XVI, Block R, Gali No.1, Reghar Pura, New Delhi from legal heirs of the lessee. After purchasing the property, the appellant filed Petition Nos.184 of 1980 and 187 of 1980 for eviction of the tenants by claiming that she needed the house for her own bona fide need and also for the use and occupation of the family members’ dependant upon her. The appellant further pleaded that she wanted to demolish the building and reconstruct the same. She also alleged that tenants have been using the premises in violation of the conditions of lease.
We shall now deal with the core question whether Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act can be treated as violative of equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it differentiates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord and restricts.
The Act, therefore, initially provided conforming to its objects and reasons, bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord, whether residential or non-residential, as a ground of eviction of the tenant. The classification created by the amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. To vacate a premises for the bona fide requirement of the landlord would not cause any hardships to the tenant. Statutory protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such an extent that the landlord is precluded from evicting the tenant for the rest of his life even when he bona fide requires the premises for his personal use and occupation. It is not the tenants but the landlords who are suffering great hardships.
Full Bench upheld the validity of Section 14(1) (e) mainly by relying upon Corporation of India, and of this Court in Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin (supra). and by observing that legislature has the right to classify persons, things, and goods into different groups and that the Court will not sit over the judgment of the legislature. It is significant to note that the Full Bench did not, at all, advert to the question whether the reason/cause which supplied rational to the classification continued to subsist even after lapse of 44 years and whether the tenants of premises let for non-residential purposes should continue to avail the benefit of implicit exemption from eviction in the case of bona fide requirement of the landlord despite sea saw change in the housing scenario in Delhi and substantial increase in the availability of buildings and premises which could be let for non-residential or commercial purposes.
In our considered view, the discrimination which was latent in Section 14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of 1958 Act has, with the passage of time (almost 50 years), become so pronounced that the impugned provision cannot be treated intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by applying any rational criteria.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.
However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety.
We shall now deal with the core question whether Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act can be treated as violative of equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it differentiates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord and restricts.
The Act, therefore, initially provided conforming to its objects and reasons, bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord, whether residential or non-residential, as a ground of eviction of the tenant. The classification created by the amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. To vacate a premises for the bona fide requirement of the landlord would not cause any hardships to the tenant. Statutory protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such an extent that the landlord is precluded from evicting the tenant for the rest of his life even when he bona fide requires the premises for his personal use and occupation. It is not the tenants but the landlords who are suffering great hardships.
Full Bench upheld the validity of Section 14(1) (e) mainly by relying upon Corporation of India, and of this Court in Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin (supra). and by observing that legislature has the right to classify persons, things, and goods into different groups and that the Court will not sit over the judgment of the legislature. It is significant to note that the Full Bench did not, at all, advert to the question whether the reason/cause which supplied rational to the classification continued to subsist even after lapse of 44 years and whether the tenants of premises let for non-residential purposes should continue to avail the benefit of implicit exemption from eviction in the case of bona fide requirement of the landlord despite sea saw change in the housing scenario in Delhi and substantial increase in the availability of buildings and premises which could be let for non-residential or commercial purposes.
In our considered view, the discrimination which was latent in Section 14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of 1958 Act has, with the passage of time (almost 50 years), become so pronounced that the impugned provision cannot be treated intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by applying any rational criteria.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.
However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety.
Feb 17, 2010
RAVI DUTT SHARMA v. RATAN LAL BHARGAVA AIR 1984 SC 967
Admittedly the houses for which eviction has been asked for in these two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the Slum Act. It was contended on behalf of the tenants that the suits for eviction by the landlords were not competent in view of want of permission from the Competent Authority under the Slum Act.
This argument was countered by the respondent on the ground that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976 (referred to as the 'Amending Act' for short), new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenants - one of which was covered by Section 14(1)(e) and the other by Section 14-A. In the instant case we are mainly concerned with eviction applications covered by Section 14(1) (e) and the special procedure provided in Chapter III-A introduced by the Amending Act. It was contended by the respondent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special protection was given to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Rent Act (personal necessity).
Once it is recognised that the newly added sections are in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Slum Act stands withdrawn to that extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesaid sections - 14(1) (e) and 14-A - would not be governed or controlled by Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Act.
This argument was countered by the respondent on the ground that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976 (referred to as the 'Amending Act' for short), new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenants - one of which was covered by Section 14(1)(e) and the other by Section 14-A. In the instant case we are mainly concerned with eviction applications covered by Section 14(1) (e) and the special procedure provided in Chapter III-A introduced by the Amending Act. It was contended by the respondent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special protection was given to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Rent Act (personal necessity).
Once it is recognised that the newly added sections are in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Slum Act stands withdrawn to that extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesaid sections - 14(1) (e) and 14-A - would not be governed or controlled by Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Act.
Feb 16, 2010
V.S. TALWAR v. PREM CHANDRA SHARMA AIR 1984 SC 664
The respondent was admitted into tenancy of the premises in question under a lease deed dated January 5, 1968. Clause 12 thereof provided: That the lessee shall use the premises for the purpose of Residential/Personal office only and not for commercial purposes.
There was no description of any existing office room and available for such use to the tenant, nor was space earmarked for any personal office out of this accommodation. As indicated above it was in the discretion of the lessee to use any part as a personal office.
There was no description of any existing office room and available for such use to the tenant, nor was space earmarked for any personal office out of this accommodation. As indicated above it was in the discretion of the lessee to use any part as a personal office.
Feb 15, 2010
PRECISION STEEL & ENGINEERING WORKS v. PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAYAL AIR 1982 SC 1518
the premises were let out for residential purpose and are now required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself and the members of his family dependent on him and that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. Landlord further alleged that he now requires the premises for himself and the members of his family consisting of himself, his wife and two school-going children. He admitted that he has been employed in India since 1965 but was posted at Bombay in 1970 and returned to Delhi in 1972. He went to Saudi Arabia and has now returned to India. It was alleged that on May 1, 1974, he called upon the tenant to vacate.
it was contended that the petitioner is not entitled to file a petition under Section 14(1)(e) because the purpose of letting was not residential alone but combined purpose of residence-cum-business. It was denied that the tenant entered the premises as a licensee and subsequently the contract of lease was entered into and it was submitted that the tenant entered the premises as tenant effective from September 13, 1971, and the lease was for residential-cum-commercial purpose.
In a catena of decisions it has been decided that in order to succeed the landlord should show that the premises have been let out as a residence or for residential purposes; that the landlord needs to occupy the premises which may imply that either he has got no other accommodation in the city or town in which the premises in question are situated or the one in his possession does not provide him a suitable residence and he is required to shift to the premises in question; that his need is genuine and that it is not merely a fanciful desire of an affluent landlord who for the fancy of changing the premises would like to shift to the one from which the tenant is sought to be evicted; that he is acting bona fide in approaching the court for recovery of possession; and that his demand is reasonable.
While examining the question whether leave to defend ought or ought not to be granted the limited jurisdiction which the Controller enjoys is prescribed within the well-defined limits and he cannot get into a sort of a trial by affidavits preferring one set to the other and thus concluding the trial without holding the trial itself.
Let it be made clear that the statute is not cast in a negative form by enacting that the Controller shall refuse to give to the tenant leave to contest the application unless..
The provision indicates a positive approach and not a negative inhibition. When the language of a statute is plain, the principle that legislature speaks its mind in the plainest language has to be given full effect. No canon of construction permits in the name of illusory intendment defeating the plain, unambiguous language expressed to convey the legislative mind. And the legislature had before it Order 37, an analogous phraseology of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, 'substantial defence' and 'vexatious and frivolous defence', the legislature used the plainest language, 'facts disclosed in the affidavit of the tenant'.
Upon a true construction of proviso (e) to Section 14(1) it would unmistakably appear that the burden is on the landlord to satisfy the Controller that the premises of which possession is sought is (i) let for residential purposes; and (ii) possession of the premises is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, etc.; and (iii) that the landlord or the person for whose benefit possession is sought has not other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. This burden, landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gets jurisdiction to make an order for eviction. This necessarily transpires from the language of Section 14(1) which precludes the Controller from making any order or decree for recovery of possession unless the landlord proves to his satisfaction the conditions in the enabling provision enacted as proviso under which possession is sought. Initial burden is thus on the landlord.
The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under sub-section (4) and the reply, if any. On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed by landlord the Controller has to pose to himself the only question: Does the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1). The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions of facts or his preference of one set of affidavit against other set of affidavits.
If Section 37(1) were to govern all proceedings including the application for leave to contest the proceedings, subsection (7) and sub-section (10) would both be rendered redundant. On the contrary the very fact that sub-section (7) provides that while considering the affidavit of the tenant seeking permission to contest the proceedings the practice and procedure of the Small Causes Court will have to be followed itself indicates the legislative intention of treating Chapter III-A and especially Section 25-B as self-contained code.
What follows then? The Controller has to confine himself indisputably to the condition prescribed for exercise of jurisdiction in sub-section (5) of Section 25-B. In other words, he must confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant. If the affidavit discloses such facts - no proof is needed at the stage.
it was contended that the petitioner is not entitled to file a petition under Section 14(1)(e) because the purpose of letting was not residential alone but combined purpose of residence-cum-business. It was denied that the tenant entered the premises as a licensee and subsequently the contract of lease was entered into and it was submitted that the tenant entered the premises as tenant effective from September 13, 1971, and the lease was for residential-cum-commercial purpose.
In a catena of decisions it has been decided that in order to succeed the landlord should show that the premises have been let out as a residence or for residential purposes; that the landlord needs to occupy the premises which may imply that either he has got no other accommodation in the city or town in which the premises in question are situated or the one in his possession does not provide him a suitable residence and he is required to shift to the premises in question; that his need is genuine and that it is not merely a fanciful desire of an affluent landlord who for the fancy of changing the premises would like to shift to the one from which the tenant is sought to be evicted; that he is acting bona fide in approaching the court for recovery of possession; and that his demand is reasonable.
While examining the question whether leave to defend ought or ought not to be granted the limited jurisdiction which the Controller enjoys is prescribed within the well-defined limits and he cannot get into a sort of a trial by affidavits preferring one set to the other and thus concluding the trial without holding the trial itself.
Let it be made clear that the statute is not cast in a negative form by enacting that the Controller shall refuse to give to the tenant leave to contest the application unless..
The provision indicates a positive approach and not a negative inhibition. When the language of a statute is plain, the principle that legislature speaks its mind in the plainest language has to be given full effect. No canon of construction permits in the name of illusory intendment defeating the plain, unambiguous language expressed to convey the legislative mind. And the legislature had before it Order 37, an analogous phraseology of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, 'substantial defence' and 'vexatious and frivolous defence', the legislature used the plainest language, 'facts disclosed in the affidavit of the tenant'.
Upon a true construction of proviso (e) to Section 14(1) it would unmistakably appear that the burden is on the landlord to satisfy the Controller that the premises of which possession is sought is (i) let for residential purposes; and (ii) possession of the premises is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, etc.; and (iii) that the landlord or the person for whose benefit possession is sought has not other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. This burden, landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gets jurisdiction to make an order for eviction. This necessarily transpires from the language of Section 14(1) which precludes the Controller from making any order or decree for recovery of possession unless the landlord proves to his satisfaction the conditions in the enabling provision enacted as proviso under which possession is sought. Initial burden is thus on the landlord.
The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under sub-section (4) and the reply, if any. On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed by landlord the Controller has to pose to himself the only question: Does the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1). The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions of facts or his preference of one set of affidavit against other set of affidavits.
If Section 37(1) were to govern all proceedings including the application for leave to contest the proceedings, subsection (7) and sub-section (10) would both be rendered redundant. On the contrary the very fact that sub-section (7) provides that while considering the affidavit of the tenant seeking permission to contest the proceedings the practice and procedure of the Small Causes Court will have to be followed itself indicates the legislative intention of treating Chapter III-A and especially Section 25-B as self-contained code.
What follows then? The Controller has to confine himself indisputably to the condition prescribed for exercise of jurisdiction in sub-section (5) of Section 25-B. In other words, he must confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant. If the affidavit discloses such facts - no proof is needed at the stage.
Feb 14, 2010
Motilal v. Nanak Chand, (1964)66 Punj LR 179
It was held in that case that in cases governed by the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 if the premises are in well-defined parts and have been let out for residential and commercial purposes together, the rule as to eviction regarding the portion that has been used for residence will govern the residential portion of the same and similarly the rules of eviction regarding the commercial premises will govern the commercial portion of the same as laid down in the Act.
Feb 13, 2010
MISS S. SANYAL v. GIAN CHAND AIR 1968 SC 438
The respondent Gian Chand purchased the house from the owners by a sale deed dated September 19, 1956, and commenced an action in the Court of the Subordinate Judge Ist Class, Delhi against the appellant for a decree in ejectment in respect of the house. Numerous grounds were set up in the plaint in support of the claim for a decree in ejectment, but the ground that the respondent required the house bona fide for his own residence alone need be considered in this appeal. The Trial Court dismissed the suit and the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi dismissed an appeal from that order holding that the house being let for purposes nonresidential as well as residential, a degree in ejectment could not be granted under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The High Court of Punjab (Delhi Bench) in a revision petition filed by the respondent held that on the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court a decree in ejectment limited to that portion of the house which was used for residential purposes by the tenant could be granted, and remanded the case to the Rent Controller "for demarcating those portions which were being used for residence" and to pass a decree in ejectment from those specific portions.
In this case the letting not being solely for residential purposes, in our judgment, the Court had no jurisdiction to pass the order appealed from.
In this case the letting not being solely for residential purposes, in our judgment, the Court had no jurisdiction to pass the order appealed from.
Feb 12, 2010
GOPAL DAS VERMA v. S.K.BHARADWAJ AIR 1963 SC 337
where premises are let for residential purposes and it is shown that they are used by the tenant incidentally for commercial, professional or other purposes with the consent of the landlord the landlord would not be entitled to eject the tenant even if he proves that he needs the premises bona fide for his personal use because the premises have by their user ceased to be premises let for residential purposes alone.
The requirement is that the tenant must have suitable residence. Both words of the requirement are significant; what he has acquired must be a residence and the premises from which ejectment is sought are used not only for residence but also for profession, how could S. 13(1)(h) come into operation? One of the purposes for which the tenancy is acquired is professional use, and that cannot be satisfied by the acquisition of premises which are suitable for residence alone, and it is the suitability for residence alone which is postulated by S. 13(1)(h). Therefore, in our opinion, it would be unreasonable to hold that tenancy which has been created or used both for residence and profession can be successfully terminated merely be showing that the tenant has acquired a suitable residence
The requirement is that the tenant must have suitable residence. Both words of the requirement are significant; what he has acquired must be a residence and the premises from which ejectment is sought are used not only for residence but also for profession, how could S. 13(1)(h) come into operation? One of the purposes for which the tenancy is acquired is professional use, and that cannot be satisfied by the acquisition of premises which are suitable for residence alone, and it is the suitability for residence alone which is postulated by S. 13(1)(h). Therefore, in our opinion, it would be unreasonable to hold that tenancy which has been created or used both for residence and profession can be successfully terminated merely be showing that the tenant has acquired a suitable residence
Feb 11, 2010
BALDEV SAHAI BAGLA v. R.C. BHASIN AIR 1982 SC 1091
In 1971 the tenant went to Canada followed by his wife and children. It is alleged that after having gone to Canada, the husband along with his wife took up some employment there. Admittedly, the tenant did not return to India after 1971. While leaving for Canada the tenant had left his mother and brother in the house who were regularly paying rent to the landlord. There is some controversy as to whether or not the mother and brother, who were left behind, were being supported by the tenant or were living on their own earnings or by the income of the property left by the tenant in India. Such a controversy however, is of no consequence in deciding the question of law which arises for consideration in this case.
On September 27, 1972 the landlord filed an application for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement and non-residence of the tenant
A close analysis of this provision would reveal that before the landlord can succeed, he must prove three essential ingredients— (1) that the premises were let out for use as a residence, (2) that the tenant after having taken the premises has ceased to reside, and (3) that apart from the tenant no member of his family also has been residing for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the application for ejectment.
Surely, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that when the tenant was living with his own mother in the house and after he migrated to Canada, he had severed all his connections with his mother so that she became an absolute stranger to the family.
The legislature has wisely used the term that any member of the family residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the actual presence of the tenant as on the fact that the members of the family actually live and reside in the tenanted premises.
On September 27, 1972 the landlord filed an application for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement and non-residence of the tenant
A close analysis of this provision would reveal that before the landlord can succeed, he must prove three essential ingredients— (1) that the premises were let out for use as a residence, (2) that the tenant after having taken the premises has ceased to reside, and (3) that apart from the tenant no member of his family also has been residing for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the application for ejectment.
Surely, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that when the tenant was living with his own mother in the house and after he migrated to Canada, he had severed all his connections with his mother so that she became an absolute stranger to the family.
The legislature has wisely used the term that any member of the family residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the actual presence of the tenant as on the fact that the members of the family actually live and reside in the tenanted premises.
Feb 10, 2010
SANTRAM v. RAJINDER LAL 1979 SC (1) RCJ 13
Landlord filed a petition for eviction of the appellant-tenant under S.13(2) (ii) (b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as applied to Himachal Pradesh on the ground that the premises were being used for a purpose other than the one for which they were let out.
There is no case of written consent put forward by the tenant. But he contested the landlord's claim by asserting that there was no specific commercial purpose inscribed in the demise and, therefore, it was not possible to postulate a diversion of purpose. Secondly, he urged that, even assuming that the letting was for a commercial purpose, the fact that he had cooked his food or stayed at night in the rear portion of the small shop did not offend against S. 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.
The lease deed, disclosed no purpose; but inferentially it has been held by the High Court that the lease being of a shop the purpose must have been commercial. Possible; not necessarily sure. The actual life situations and urban conditions of India, especially where poor tradesmen like cobblers, candle-stick makers, cycle repairers and Tanduri bakers, take out small spaces on rent, do not warrant an irresistible inference that if the lease is of a shop the purpose of the lease must be commercial.
You struggle to make a small income and work late into the right from early in the morning and, during intervals, rest your bones in the same place, drawing down the shutters of the shop for a while. The primary purpose is to ply a petty trade, the secondary, but necessary incident, is to sleep in the same place since you can hardly afford anything but a pavement. In this view, the appeal is allowed with costs. The tenant shall not be ejected.
There is no case of written consent put forward by the tenant. But he contested the landlord's claim by asserting that there was no specific commercial purpose inscribed in the demise and, therefore, it was not possible to postulate a diversion of purpose. Secondly, he urged that, even assuming that the letting was for a commercial purpose, the fact that he had cooked his food or stayed at night in the rear portion of the small shop did not offend against S. 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.
The lease deed, disclosed no purpose; but inferentially it has been held by the High Court that the lease being of a shop the purpose must have been commercial. Possible; not necessarily sure. The actual life situations and urban conditions of India, especially where poor tradesmen like cobblers, candle-stick makers, cycle repairers and Tanduri bakers, take out small spaces on rent, do not warrant an irresistible inference that if the lease is of a shop the purpose of the lease must be commercial.
You struggle to make a small income and work late into the right from early in the morning and, during intervals, rest your bones in the same place, drawing down the shutters of the shop for a while. The primary purpose is to ply a petty trade, the secondary, but necessary incident, is to sleep in the same place since you can hardly afford anything but a pavement. In this view, the appeal is allowed with costs. The tenant shall not be ejected.
Feb 9, 2010
KAMLA DEVI v. VASDEV AIR 1995 SC 985
It has been contended on her behalf that in view of the fact that the respondent neither took any step to deposit arrears of rent nor for the extension of time within one month of the order of the Rent Controller under Section 15(1) of the Act, the Rent Controller did not have any discretionary power to condone the delay under Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
If the Rent Controller is of the view that in the facts of a particular case the time to make payment or deposit pursuant to an order passed under sub section (1) of Section 15 should be extended, he may do so by passing a suitable order.
Similarly, if he is not satisfied about the case made out by the tenant, he may order the defence against eviction to be struck out. But, the power to strike out the defence against eviction is discretionary and must not be mechanically exercised without any application of mind to the facts of the case.
If the Rent Controller is of the view that in the facts of a particular case the time to make payment or deposit pursuant to an order passed under sub section (1) of Section 15 should be extended, he may do so by passing a suitable order.
Similarly, if he is not satisfied about the case made out by the tenant, he may order the defence against eviction to be struck out. But, the power to strike out the defence against eviction is discretionary and must not be mechanically exercised without any application of mind to the facts of the case.
Feb 8, 2010
JAGAN NATH v. RAM KISHAN DASS AIR 1985 SC 265
Controller, Delhi refused to pass an order under Section 15(1) of the Act on the ground that such a benefit was given to the appellant in the first eviction petition and that, by reason of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, the appellant could not claim that benefit once again. In that view of the matter, the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction against the appellant.
The passing of an order under Section 15 is not a benefit which accrues to the tenant under Section 14(2). It is obligatory upon the Controller to pass an order under Section 15(1) in every proceeding for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14(1)(a), that is, on the ground that the tenant has committed default in the payment of rent.
If the earlier proceeding was withdrawn by the landlord, it cannot be said that the tenant obtained the benefit of not having had an order of possession passed against him.
The passing of an order under Section 15 is not a benefit which accrues to the tenant under Section 14(2). It is obligatory upon the Controller to pass an order under Section 15(1) in every proceeding for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14(1)(a), that is, on the ground that the tenant has committed default in the payment of rent.
If the earlier proceeding was withdrawn by the landlord, it cannot be said that the tenant obtained the benefit of not having had an order of possession passed against him.
Feb 7, 2010
Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash AIR 1980 SC 1644
it was pointed out that the provision contained in Section 15 (7) was a penal provision and in terms by the use of the word 'may' gave to the Controller a discretionary power in the matter of striking out of the defence and that, in appropriate cases, the Controller may refuse to visit upon the tenant the penalty of eviction for failure to pay or deposit the future rent.
Feb 6, 2010
RAM MURTI v. BHOLA NATH AIR 1984 SC 71
It was alleged that although the appellant had taken the premises on rent from the Custodian of Evacuee Properties at Rs 18 per month he vacated the premises after respondent 1 acquired the same and there was a new tenancy created in his favour on March 1, 1961 on a monthly rent of Rs. 80. On an application made by respondent 1, the Additional Rent Controller by his order dated February 14, 1969 passed under Section 15 (1) of the Act directed the appellant to deposit rent Rs. 18 per month w. e. f. December 1, 1965 and to deposit the future rent at the same date on the fifteenth day of each succeeding month.
The High Court relying upon the decision of this Court in Hem Chand v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co Ltd. [AIR 1977 SC 1986] held that the Rent Controller had no power to extend the time prescribed by an order under Section 15 (1) which requires the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within one month from the date of the order and future rents by the fifteenth day of the each succeeding month.
From a conspectus of these provisions, it would be seen that the various sub-sections of Sections 14 and 15 form an integrated process seeking to strike a balance between the conflicting rights of the landlord to secure eviction of the tenant on any one or more of the grounds specified in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 and that of the tenant for protection against such eviction except under certain circumstances.
When a tenant can get the benefit of the protection under Section 14 (2) is provided for in Section 15 (1). Section 15 (1) of the Act is in two parts. The first part requires the tenant to pay or deposit within one month of the order of the Rent Controller passed under S. 15 (1) directing him to pay the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which such payment or deposit is to be made. The second part is meant to secure payment of the future rent by a defaulting tenant and casts a duty on such tenant to continue to pay or deposit, month by month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate.
It logically follows that if the Rent Controller has the power not to strike out the defence of the tenant under Section 15 (7) of the Act, he necessarily has by legal implication the power to condone the default on the part of the tenant in making payment or deposit of the future rent.
If the Rent Controller has the discretion under S. 15 (7) not to strike out the defence of the tenant he necessarily has the power to extend the time for payment of future rent under Sec. 15 (1) where the failure of the tenant to make such payment or deposit was due to circumstance beyond his control.
Court reverse the view expressed by the High Court that the Rent Controller has no power to condone the default on the part of the tenant in making payment or deposit of future rent or to extend time for such payment or deposit.
The High Court relying upon the decision of this Court in Hem Chand v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co Ltd. [AIR 1977 SC 1986] held that the Rent Controller had no power to extend the time prescribed by an order under Section 15 (1) which requires the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within one month from the date of the order and future rents by the fifteenth day of the each succeeding month.
From a conspectus of these provisions, it would be seen that the various sub-sections of Sections 14 and 15 form an integrated process seeking to strike a balance between the conflicting rights of the landlord to secure eviction of the tenant on any one or more of the grounds specified in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 and that of the tenant for protection against such eviction except under certain circumstances.
When a tenant can get the benefit of the protection under Section 14 (2) is provided for in Section 15 (1). Section 15 (1) of the Act is in two parts. The first part requires the tenant to pay or deposit within one month of the order of the Rent Controller passed under S. 15 (1) directing him to pay the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which such payment or deposit is to be made. The second part is meant to secure payment of the future rent by a defaulting tenant and casts a duty on such tenant to continue to pay or deposit, month by month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate.
It logically follows that if the Rent Controller has the power not to strike out the defence of the tenant under Section 15 (7) of the Act, he necessarily has by legal implication the power to condone the default on the part of the tenant in making payment or deposit of the future rent.
If the Rent Controller has the discretion under S. 15 (7) not to strike out the defence of the tenant he necessarily has the power to extend the time for payment of future rent under Sec. 15 (1) where the failure of the tenant to make such payment or deposit was due to circumstance beyond his control.
Court reverse the view expressed by the High Court that the Rent Controller has no power to condone the default on the part of the tenant in making payment or deposit of future rent or to extend time for such payment or deposit.
Feb 5, 2010
RAGHUNANDAN SARAN ASHOK SARAN v. UNION OF INDIA 95 (2002) DLT 508
This is a writ petition whereby the petitioner primarily challenges the provisions of Sections 4,6,9 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 being violative of Article 14, 19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner also seeks a direction to the first respondent to rationalise the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act so that the petitioner is assured of receiving reasonable rent for his properties let out to the tenants.
Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, are held ultra vires the Constitution.
Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, are held ultra vires the Constitution.
Feb 4, 2010
Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das
Court held that where a contractual tenancy, to which rent control legislation applied, had expired by efflux of time or by determination by notice to quit and the tenant continued in possession of the premises, acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord after the expiration or determination of the contractual tenancy will not afford ground for holding that the landlord had assented to a new contractual tenancy. It was further held that acceptance by the land lord from the tenant, after the contractual tenancy had expired, of amounts equivalent to rent, or amounts which were fixed as standard rent, did not amount to acceptance of rent from a lessee within the meaning of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Feb 3, 2010
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545
"commonsense which is a cluster of life's experiences, is often more dependable than the rival facts presented by warring litigants".
Feb 2, 2010
ATMA RAM PROPERTIES (P) LTD v. P.S. JAIN COMPANY LTD. 57 (1995) DLT 131
A strange but interesting situation has propped-up for consideration. Premises have been let out by the landlord to a tenant at a monthly rent not exceeding Rs.3,500/-. The tenant has sub-let the premises exercising the right to sub-let conferred by the terms of tenancy. The monthly rent realised by the tenant from the sub-tenants in respect of the very same premises exceeds Rs.3,500/-.
So also in respect of the same premises in a suit filed by the landlord against the tenant Section 3 (c) would not apply but if a suit was to be filed by the tenant against sub-tenant in respect of the same very premises, Section 3 (c) would apply.
Premises whose rent exceeds Rs.3,500/- whether paid by a tenant to landlord or by a sub-tenant are covered by Section 3 (c) of Delhi Rent Control Act. To begin with, the premises may be leased out for Rs.3,500/- or less a month and may not Premises whose rent exceeds Rs.3,500/- whether paid by a tenant to landlord or by a sub-tenant are covered by Section 3 (c) of Delhi Rent Control Act. To begin with, the premises may be leased out for Rs.3,500/- or less a month and may not
So also in respect of the same premises in a suit filed by the landlord against the tenant Section 3 (c) would not apply but if a suit was to be filed by the tenant against sub-tenant in respect of the same very premises, Section 3 (c) would apply.
Premises whose rent exceeds Rs.3,500/- whether paid by a tenant to landlord or by a sub-tenant are covered by Section 3 (c) of Delhi Rent Control Act. To begin with, the premises may be leased out for Rs.3,500/- or less a month and may not Premises whose rent exceeds Rs.3,500/- whether paid by a tenant to landlord or by a sub-tenant are covered by Section 3 (c) of Delhi Rent Control Act. To begin with, the premises may be leased out for Rs.3,500/- or less a month and may not
ATMA RAM PROPERTIES (P) LTD v. FEDERAL MOTORS (P) LTD. (2005) 1 SCC 705
the learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that once a decree or order for eviction has been passed, the tenant is liable to be evicted and if he files an appeal or revision and opts for retaining use and occupation of the premises, he should be prepared to compensate the landlord by paying such amount as the landlord would have been able to earn in the event of the premises being vacated.
It is well settled that mere preferring of an appeal does not operate as stay on the decree or order appealed against nor on the proceedings in the court below. A prayer for the grant of stay of proceedings or on the execution of decree or order appealed against has to be specifically made to the appellate Court and the appellate Court has discretion to grant an order of stay or to refuse the same.
The power to grant stay is discretionary and flows from the jurisdiction conferred on an appellate Court which is equitable in nature. To secure an order of stay merely by preferring an appeal is not the statutory right conferred on the appellant. So also, an appellate Court is not ordained to grant an order of stay merely because an appeal has been preferred and an application for an order of stay has been made.
The tenant having suffered a decree or order for eviction may continue his fight before the superior forum but, on the termination of the proceedings and the decree or order of eviction first passed having been maintained, the tenancy would stand terminated with effect from the date of the decree passed by the lower forum. In the case of premises governed by rent control legislation, the decree of eviction on being affirmed, would be determinative of the date of termination of tenancy and the decree of affirmation passed by the superior forum at any subsequent stage or date, would not, by reference to the doctrine of merger have the effect of postponing the date of termination of tenancy.
The tenant having suffered an order for eviction must comply and vacate the premises. His right of appeal is statutory but his prayer for grant of stay is dealt with in exercise of equitable discretionary jurisdiction of the appellate Court. While ordering stay the appellate Court has to be alive to the fact that it is depriving the successful landlord of the fruits of the decree and is postponing the execution of the order for eviction.
The tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises and earn rent if the tenant would have vacated the premises.
It is well settled that mere preferring of an appeal does not operate as stay on the decree or order appealed against nor on the proceedings in the court below. A prayer for the grant of stay of proceedings or on the execution of decree or order appealed against has to be specifically made to the appellate Court and the appellate Court has discretion to grant an order of stay or to refuse the same.
The power to grant stay is discretionary and flows from the jurisdiction conferred on an appellate Court which is equitable in nature. To secure an order of stay merely by preferring an appeal is not the statutory right conferred on the appellant. So also, an appellate Court is not ordained to grant an order of stay merely because an appeal has been preferred and an application for an order of stay has been made.
The tenant having suffered a decree or order for eviction may continue his fight before the superior forum but, on the termination of the proceedings and the decree or order of eviction first passed having been maintained, the tenancy would stand terminated with effect from the date of the decree passed by the lower forum. In the case of premises governed by rent control legislation, the decree of eviction on being affirmed, would be determinative of the date of termination of tenancy and the decree of affirmation passed by the superior forum at any subsequent stage or date, would not, by reference to the doctrine of merger have the effect of postponing the date of termination of tenancy.
The tenant having suffered an order for eviction must comply and vacate the premises. His right of appeal is statutory but his prayer for grant of stay is dealt with in exercise of equitable discretionary jurisdiction of the appellate Court. While ordering stay the appellate Court has to be alive to the fact that it is depriving the successful landlord of the fruits of the decree and is postponing the execution of the order for eviction.
The tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises and earn rent if the tenant would have vacated the premises.
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