Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
" It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring."It is a site to share short notes on law for judicial exam in india. you can comment on any post, ask for judgment on any topic and free to ask any question related to judicial exam.
Apr 30, 2011
Apr 29, 2011
Childline India Foundation & Anr Vs Alan John Waters & Ors
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed on 18.03.11 as under
Children are the greatest gift to humanity. The sexual abuse of children is one of the most heinous crimes. It is an appalling violation of their trust, an ugly breach of our commitment to protect the innocent. There are special safeguards in the Constitution that apply specifically to children. The Constitution has envisaged a happy and healthy childhood for children which is free from abuse and exploitation. Article 15(3) of the Constitution has provided the State with the power to make special provisions for women and children. Article 21A of the Constitution mandates that every child in India shall be entitled to free and compulsory education upto the age of 14 years. The word "life" in the context of article 21 of the Constitution has been found to include "education" and accordingly this Court has implied that "right to education" is in fact a fundamental right.
Article 23 of the Constitution prohibits traffic in human beings, beggars and other similar forms of forced labour and exploitation. Although this article does not specifically speak of children, yet it is applied to them and is more relevant in their context because children are the most vulnerable section of the society. It is a known fact that many children are exploited because of their poverty. They are deprived of education, made to do all sorts of work injurious to their health and personality. Article 24 expressly provides that no child below the age of 14 years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any hazardous employment. This Court has issued elaborate guidelines on this issue.
The Directive Principles of State Policy embodied in the Constitution of India provides policy of protection of children with a self- imposing direction towards securing the health and strength of workers, particularly, to see that the children of tender age is not abused, nor they are forced by economic necessity to enter into avocations unsuited to their strength.
Article 45 has provided that the State shall endeavor to provide early childhood care and education for all the children until they complete the age of fourteen years. This Directive Principle signifies that it is not only confined to primary education, but extends to free education whatever it may be upto the age of 14 years. Article 45 is supplementary to Article 24 on the ground that when the child is not to be employed before the age of 14 years, he is to be kept occupied in some educational institutions. It is suggested that Article 24 in turn supplements the clause (e) and (f) of Article 39, thus ensuring distributive justice to children in the matter of education. Virtually, Article 45 recognizes the importance of dignity and personality of the child and directs the State to provide free and compulsory education for the children upto the age of 14 years.
The Juvenile Justice Act was enacted to provide for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent juveniles and for the adjudication of such matters relating to disposition of delinquent juveniles. This is being ensured by establishing observation homes, juvenile houses, juvenile homes or neglected juveniles and special homes for delinquent or neglected juveniles.
Apr 28, 2011
Union of India & Others Vs S K Kapoor
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed on 16.03.11 as under
There may be a case where the report of the Union Public Service Commission is not relied upon by the disciplinary authority and in that case it is certainly not necessary to supply a copy of the same to the concerned employee. However, if it is relied upon, then a copy of the same must be supplied in advance to the concerned employee, otherwise, there will be violation of the principles of natural justice. It is well settled that if a subsequent co-ordinate bench of equal strength wants to take a different view, it can only refer the matter to a larger bench, otherwise the prior decision of a co-ordinate bench is binding on the subsequent bench of equal strength.
Apr 27, 2011
Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit Vs State of Maharashtra AIR 2001 SC 1980
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
"It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning."Apr 26, 2011
State of M P Vs Ramesh & Anr
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed on 28.03.11 on the point of child witness as under and summerized the law
'In Rameshwar S/o Kalyan Singh Vs The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54, this Court examined the provisions of Section 5 of Indian Oaths Act, 1873 and Section 118 of Evidence Act, 1872 and held that every witness is competent to depose unless the court considers that he is prevented from understanding the question put to him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender age, extreme old age, disease whether of body or mind or any other cause of the same kind. There is always competency in fact unless the Court considers otherwise.
In Mangoo & Anr Vs State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1995 SC 959, this Court while dealing with the evidence of a child witness observed that there was always scope to tutor the child, however, it cannot alone be a ground to come to the conclusion that the child witness must have been tutored. The Court must determine as to whether the child has been tutored or not. It can be ascertained by examining the evidence and from the contents thereof as to whether there are any traces of tutoring.
In Panchhi & Ors Vs State of UP AIR 1998 SC 2726, this Court while placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments observed that the testimony of a child witness must find adequate corroboration before it is relied on. However, it is more a rule of practical wisdom than of law.The evidence of a child must reveal that he was able to discern between right and wrong and the court may find out from the cross-examination whether the defence lawyer could bring anything to indicate that the child could not differentiate between right and wrong. The court may ascertain his suitability as a witness by putting questions to him and even if no such questions had been put, it may be gathered from his evidence as to whether he fully understood the implications of what he was saying and whether he stood discredited in facing a stiff cross-examination. A child witness must be able to understand the sanctity of giving evidence on a oath and the import of the questions that were being put to him. (Vide: Himmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh & Ors Vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 2009 SC 2292).
In State of UP Vs Krishna Master & Ors AIR 2010 SC 3071, this Court held that there is no principle of law that it is inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to recapitulate the facts in his memory. A child is always receptive to abnormal events which take place in his life and would never forget 9those events for the rest of his life. The child may be able to recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked about the same in the future. In case the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, and the same inspire confidence of the Court, his deposition does not require any corroboration whatsoever. The child at a tender age is incapable of having any malice or ill will against any person. Therefore, there must be something on record to satisfy the Court that something had gone wrong between the date of incident and recording evidence of the child witness due to which the witness wanted to implicate the accused falsely in a case of a serious nature.
Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored, can be relied upon, if the tutored part can be separated from untutored part, in case such remaining untutored part inspires confidence. In such an eventuality the untutored part can be believed or at least taken into consideration for the purpose of corroboration as in the case of a hostile witness. (Vide: Gagan Kanojia & Anr Vs State of Punjab, (2006) SCC 516).
In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that the deposition of a child witness may require corroboration, but in case his deposition inspires the confidence of the court and there is no embellishment or improvement therein, the court may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully with greater circumspection because he is susceptible to tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to show that a child has been tutored, the Court can reject his statement partly or fully. However, an inference as to whether child has been tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his deposition.
The cumulative effect of reading the provisions of Article 20(3) of the Constitution with Sections 161(2); 313(3); and proviso (b) to Section 315 Cr.P.C. remains that in India, law provides for the rule against adverse inference from silence of the accused. Statement of the accused made under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be taken into consideration to appreciate the truthfulness or otherwise of the prosecution case. However, as such a statement is not recorded after administration of oath and the accused cannot be cross-examined, his statement so recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can not be treated to be evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 315 Cr.P.C. enables an accused to give evidence on his own behalf to disprove the charges made against him. However, for such a course, the accused has to offer in writing to give his evidence in defence. Thus, the accused becomes ready to enter into the witness box, to take oath and to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution and/or of the accomplice, if it is so required.'
Apr 25, 2011
Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate & Ors Vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 1460
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
"The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and the said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make-believe. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness."Apr 24, 2011
Tgn Kumar Vs State Of Kerala & Ors, on 14 Jan 2011
Supreme Court of India set aside the direction of Kerla High Court to all magistrate Court u/s 482 CrPC for personal exemption of accused in N I Act
Retired judge alleges torture by govt, moves court - Hindustan Times
Retired judge alleges torture by govt, moves court - Hindustan Times: "“The police, at the instance [sic] of state machinery, let loose terrorism and have become a law unto themselves,” the retired judge’s petition filed through advocate Vishwajit Sawant said. “The respondents [the state and the police] are behaving as if there is undeclared emergency in the state suspending relevant provisions of the Constitution of India postulating rights of citizens.”"
Apr 23, 2011
Krishna Swami Vs Union of India (1992) 4 SCC 605
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
"investigation connotes discovery and collection of evidence before charge-sheet is filed and based thereon definite charges are framed. Inquiry by a Magistrate is stopped when the trial begins. The trial is a culminating process to convict or acquit an accused. In Service Jurisprudence, departmental inquiry against a delinquent "Apr 22, 2011
Raj Restaurant and Anr Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1982) 3 SCC 338
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
“ Where, in order to carry on business a licence is required, obviously refusal to give licence or cancellation or revocation of licence would be visited with both civil and pecuniary consequences and as the business cannot be carried on without the licence it would also affect the livelihood of the person. In such a situation before either refusing to renew the licence or cancelling or revoking the same, the minimum principle of natural justice of notice and opportunity to represent one's case is a must."Apr 21, 2011
Appointment of Judges
Present position of appointment of Judge as decided by Supreme Court of India -(214 report of Law Commission recommend a review of same)-
The expression “consultation with the Chief Justice of India” in Articles 217(1) and 222(1) of the Constitution of India required consultation with a plurality of judges in the formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India. The sole individual opinion of the Chief Justice of India does not constitute consultation” within the meaning of the said articles.
2. The transfer of puisne Judges is judicially reviewable only to this extent that the recommendation that has been made by the Chief Justice of India in this behalf has not been made in consultation with the four seniormost Judges of the Supreme Court and/or that the views of the Chief Justice of High Court from which the transfer is to be effected and of the Chief Justice of High Court to which the transfer is to be effected have not been obtained.
3. The Chief Justice of India must make a recommendation to appoint a Judge of the Supreme Court and to transfer a Chief Justice or puisne Judge of a High Court in consultation with the four seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. Insofar as an appointment to the High Court is concerned, the ecommendation must be made in consultation with the two seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court.
4. The Chief Justice of India is not entitled to act solely in his individual capacity, without consultation with other Judges of the Supreme Court, in respect of materials and information conveyed by the Government of India for non-appointment of a Judge recommended for appointment.
5. The requirement of consultation by the Chief Justice of India with his colleagues who are likely to be ersant with the affairs of the High Court concerned does not refer only to those Judges who have that High Court as a parent High Court. It does not exclude Judges who have occupied the office of a Judge or Chief Justice of that High Court on transfer.
6. “Strong cogent reasons” do not have to be recorded as justification for a departure from the order of seniority in respect of each senior Judge who has been passed over. What has to be recorded is the positive reason for the recommendation.
7. The views of the other Judges consulted should be in writing and should be conveyed to the Government of India by the Chief Justice of India along with his views to the extent set out in the body of his opinion.
8. The Chief Justice of India is obliged to comply with the norms and the requirement of the consultation process, as aforestated, in making his recommendations to the Government of India.
9. Recommendations made by the Chief Justice of India without complying with the norms and requirements of the consultation process, as aforestated, are not binding upon the Government of India.
The expression “consultation with the Chief Justice of India” in Articles 217(1) and 222(1) of the Constitution of India required consultation with a plurality of judges in the formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India. The sole individual opinion of the Chief Justice of India does not constitute consultation” within the meaning of the said articles.
2. The transfer of puisne Judges is judicially reviewable only to this extent that the recommendation that has been made by the Chief Justice of India in this behalf has not been made in consultation with the four seniormost Judges of the Supreme Court and/or that the views of the Chief Justice of High Court from which the transfer is to be effected and of the Chief Justice of High Court to which the transfer is to be effected have not been obtained.
3. The Chief Justice of India must make a recommendation to appoint a Judge of the Supreme Court and to transfer a Chief Justice or puisne Judge of a High Court in consultation with the four seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. Insofar as an appointment to the High Court is concerned, the ecommendation must be made in consultation with the two seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court.
4. The Chief Justice of India is not entitled to act solely in his individual capacity, without consultation with other Judges of the Supreme Court, in respect of materials and information conveyed by the Government of India for non-appointment of a Judge recommended for appointment.
5. The requirement of consultation by the Chief Justice of India with his colleagues who are likely to be ersant with the affairs of the High Court concerned does not refer only to those Judges who have that High Court as a parent High Court. It does not exclude Judges who have occupied the office of a Judge or Chief Justice of that High Court on transfer.
6. “Strong cogent reasons” do not have to be recorded as justification for a departure from the order of seniority in respect of each senior Judge who has been passed over. What has to be recorded is the positive reason for the recommendation.
7. The views of the other Judges consulted should be in writing and should be conveyed to the Government of India by the Chief Justice of India along with his views to the extent set out in the body of his opinion.
8. The Chief Justice of India is obliged to comply with the norms and the requirement of the consultation process, as aforestated, in making his recommendations to the Government of India.
9. Recommendations made by the Chief Justice of India without complying with the norms and requirements of the consultation process, as aforestated, are not binding upon the Government of India.
JURIST - Paper Chase: Supreme Court rules prisoners may not seek monetary damages for violation of rights
JURIST - Paper Chase: Supreme Court rules prisoners may not seek monetary damages for violation of rights: "Applying ordinary contract principles here would also make little sense because contracts with a sovereign are unique: They do not traditionally confer a right of action for damages to enforce compliance. More fundamentally, Sossamon's implied-contract remedy cannot be squared with the rule that a sovereign immunity waiver must be expressly and unequivocally stated in the relevant statute's text."
Apr 20, 2011
Maria Cristina De Souza Sadder Vs Amria Zurana Pereira Pinto (1979) 1 SCC 92
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
“…It is no doubt well-settled that the right of appeal is a substantive right and it gets vested in a litigant no sooner the lis is commenced in the Court of the first instance, and such right or any remedy in respect thereof will not be affected by any repeal of the enactment conferring such right unless the repealing enactment either expressly or by necessary implication takes away such right or remedy in respect thereof."Apr 19, 2011
In re the Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979) 1 SCC 380
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
Article 14 include
"(2) The State, in the exercise of its governmental power, has of necessity to make laws operating differently on different groups or classes of persons within its territory to attain particular ends in giving effect to its policies, and it must possess for that purpose large powers of distinguishing and classifying persons or things to be subjected to such laws.(3) The constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary.
(4) The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same.
(5) By the process of classification, the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. This power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. Classification thus means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily.
(6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.
(7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act."
Apr 18, 2011
Union of India Vs Y P Madan - high court of Delhi on 24.01.2011
A Govt. servant who makes an application for correction of date of birth beyond the time so fixed, therefore, cannot claim as a matter of right, the alteration of his date of birth even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous, has to be carried out.
The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigor and the Courts or Tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire.
The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigor and the Courts or Tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire.
Supreme Court for fixed time frame for granting sanction against babus in corruption cases - India - DNA
Supreme Court for fixed time frame for granting sanction against babus in corruption cases - India - DNA: "The Supreme Court today favoured a fixed time frame for governments to grant sanction to prosecute its officials in corruption cases"
Quote of the Day: A Call for Reform « Above the Law: A Legal Tabloid - News and Colorful Commentary on Law Firms and the Legal Profession
Quote of the Day: A Call for Reform « Above the Law: A Legal Tabloid - News and Colorful Commentary on Law Firms and the Legal Profession: "[T]he never-ending stream of futile petitions suggests that habeas corpus is a wasteful nuisance. By almost any measure, the use, and abuse, of habeas by convicted state prisoners is a failure, one that could corrode one of the most revered pillars of our legal system."
Apr 17, 2011
Apr 16, 2011
Yedla Srinivasa Rao Vs State of A P
IPC 376- rape- consent of women- on the promise of marriage no consent- the intention of the accused right from the beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of the accused completely being misled by the accused who held out the promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to fulfil the promise and persuaded the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under total misconception, cannot be treated to be a consent- If it is fully grown up girl who gave the consent then it is different case but a girl whose age is very tender and she is giving a consent after persuasion of three months on the promise that the accused will marry her which he never intended to fulfil right from the beginning which is apparent from the conduct of the accused- If the attending circumstances lead to the conclusion that it was not only the accused but prosecutor was also equally keen, then in that case the offence is condoned. But in case a poor girl placed in a peculiar circumstance where her father has died and she does not understand what the consequences may result for indulging into such acts and when the accused promised to marry but he never intended to marry right from the beginning then the consent of the girl is of no consequence and falls in the second category as enumerated in Section 375 -"without her consent". A consent obtained by misconception while playing a fraud is not a consent.
Apr 15, 2011
Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar Vs Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi (2002) 1 SCC 308
HMA-section 13- desertion- clause lays down the rule that desertion to amount to a matrimonial offence must be for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately proceeding the presentation of the petition. This clause has to be read with the Explanation. The Explanation has widened the definition of desertion to include 'willful neglect' of the petitioning spouse by the respondent. It status that to amount to a matrimonial offence desertion must be without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of the petitioner. From the Explanation it is abundantly clear that the legislature intended to give to the expression a wide import which includes willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage.
Quote of the Day: Sure, go ahead, he’s only the most powerful judge in America…. « Above the Law: A Legal Tabloid - News and Colorful Commentary on Law Firms and the Legal Profession
Quote of the Day: Sure, go ahead, he’s only the most powerful judge in America…. « Above the Law: A Legal Tabloid - News and Colorful Commentary on Law Firms and the Legal Profession:
"It’s always been a dream of mine to interrupt a Supreme Court justice."
Apr 14, 2011
Savitri Pandey Va Prem Chandra Pandey (2002) 2 SCC 73
HMA- section -13 -"Desertion", for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. In other words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations, ie.., not permitting of allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties.
Apr 13, 2011
Bipin Chander Vs Prabhawati AIR 1957 SC 176
HMA-section 13- divorce- ground of desertion - For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively....
Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If, in fact, there has been a separation the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus deserendi coincide in point of time..
Apr 12, 2011
J & K National Panthers Party Vs The Union of India and others decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on 09.11.10
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under "we must have a clear perception of what the Basic Structure is. It is hazardous to define what is the Basic Structure of the Constitution as what is basic does not remain static for all time to come. However, the basic features have been culled out from various pronouncements of this Court. In the 14th Edition of Shorter Constitution of India by D.D. Basu, these features have been noted as under:-
Supremacy of the Constitution.a. Rule of law.
b. The principle of Separation of Powers.
c. The principles behind fundamental rights.
d. The objectives specified in the Preamble to the Constitution.
e. Judicial review; Art.32.; Arts.226/227.
f. Federalism
g. Secularism.
h. The sovereign, democratic, republican structure.
i. Freedom and dignity of the individual.
j. Unity and integrity of the Nation.
k. The principle of equality; not every feature of equality, but the quintessence of equal justice
l. The rule of equality in public employment.
m. The `essence' of other Fundamental Rights in Part III.
n. The concept of social and economic justice-to build a welfare State; part IV in to. 21
o. The balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.
p. The Parliamentary system of government.
q. The principle of free and fair elections.
r. Limitations upon the amending power conferred by Art. 368.
s. Independence of the judiciary; but within the four corners of the Constitution and not beyond that.
t. Independent and efficient judicial system.
u. Powers of the Supreme Court under Arts. 32, 136, 141, 142.
v. Effective access to justice."
Of these features `free and fair election' in Clause (r) comes closest with the question discussed in this case.
This Court has already held relying on the Constitution Bench judgment in Poudyal that ensuring uniformity in the value of votes is not a constitutionally mandated imperative of free and fair election under our constitutional dispensation. Therefore, the argument on the question of Basic Structure is also without substance and is rejected."
Apr 11, 2011
Esher Singh Vs State of AP (2004) 11 SCC 585
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under "Crucial words in the provision are "charged and tried". The use of the expression "charged and tried" imposes cumulative conditions. Firstly, the two persons who are the accused and the co- accused in the sense used by the legislature under Section 15, must be charged in the same trial, and secondly, they must be tried together. Kalpnath Rai case has been overruled in Nalini case making the position clear that the confession of a co- accused is substantive evidence."
Public prosecutors in J&K must meet physical eligibilty conditions: SC | NetIndian | India News | Latest News from India | Breaking News from India | Latest Headlines
Public prosecutors in J&K must meet physical eligibilty conditions: SC | NetIndian | India News | Latest News from India | Breaking News from India | Latest Headlines: "Jammu and Kashmir government in its advertisement dated March 24, 2000 and March 5, 2003 while inviting applications for the post of prosecuting officers in Jammu and Kashmir police had prescribed that the candidate must have minimum height of five feet six inches and width of unexpanded chest should be 32 and a half inches and that of the expanded chest should be 33 and a half inches."
Apr 10, 2011
Radha Mohan Singh Vs State of UP, 2006 Cri LJ 1121 (SC) Court has observed
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under "It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution choose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof."
Prosecutors, defense attorneys at odds over funding | JournalNow.com
Prosecutors, defense attorneys at odds over funding | JournalNow.com: "
In fiscal year 2009-10, the total budget for the 44 elected district attorneys was $92 million, while the budget for indigent defense services was $132 million. Prosecutors said they were 'outspent and outgunned' every time they went into a courtroom."
Apr 9, 2011
Manjit Singh @ Mange Vs CBI decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on 25.01.2011
TADA- Section 12 of the TADA Act speaks of the power of the Designated Courts with respect to other offences. By virtue of this Section, the Designated Court may also try any other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence. Sub-section (2) further empowers the Designated Court that in the course of the trial under the TADA Act of any offence, if it is found that the accused person has committed any other offence under the TADA Act or any rule made thereunder or under any other law, the Designated Court may convict such person of such other offence and pass any sentence authorized under this Act or such rule or such other law for the punishment thereof. A Designated Court constituted under Section 9 of the TADA Act or a transferee Designated under Section 11 of the TADA Act is vested with the jurisdiction to try all the offences punishable under the provisions of the TADA Act. While trying such offence, if the accused is charged for offence punishable under the provisions of any other law connected with such offence, the Designated Court has power to try the accused in such offence also during trial, if it is found that the accused has also committed other offence punishable under any other law, the Designated Court can convict the accused for such offence also. The Designated Court can pass any sentence, on conviction of the accused, as authorized in the respective statute for punishment of such offence. (17) Section 15 of the TADA Act commences with a non obstinate clause by stating that notwithstanding anything contained in the IPC or the Evidence Act, the confession made by a person before a police officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police and recorded by such Police Officer in writing etc., shall be admissible in the trial of such person, co-accused, abettor or conspirator for an offence under the TADA Act or rules made thereunder. The proviso appended to the Section carves out an exception to the main Section. It says that the confession made by a person accused of an offence under the Act or the rules framed thereunder can be used against co- accused, abettor or conspirator, provided he is charged for any offence under the Act or the rules framed thereunder and tried in the same case together with the accused...
After the amendment of 1993, the addition of the words `co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged or tried together with the accused' clearly shows that the confession could be considered by the Court only when the co-accused, who makes the confession, is charged and tried along with the other accused....
The Code does not define what a charge is. It is the precise formulation of the specific accusation made against a person who is entitled to know its nature at the earliest stage. A charge is not an accusation made or information given in the abstract, but an accusation made against a person in respect of an act committed or omitted in violation of penal law forbidding or commanding it. In other words, it is an accusation made against a person in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him. A charge is formulated after inquiry as distinguished from the popular meaning of the word as implying inculpation of a person for an alleged offence as used in Section 224 IPC....
After the amendment of 1993, the addition of the words `co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged or tried together with the accused' clearly shows that the confession could be considered by the Court only when the co-accused, who makes the confession, is charged and tried along with the other accused....
The Code does not define what a charge is. It is the precise formulation of the specific accusation made against a person who is entitled to know its nature at the earliest stage. A charge is not an accusation made or information given in the abstract, but an accusation made against a person in respect of an act committed or omitted in violation of penal law forbidding or commanding it. In other words, it is an accusation made against a person in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him. A charge is formulated after inquiry as distinguished from the popular meaning of the word as implying inculpation of a person for an alleged offence as used in Section 224 IPC....
Coulee Region prosecutors shocked by state ultimatum over furloughs
Coulee Region prosecutors shocked by state ultimatum over furloughs:
"'If public safety is that important to this administration to that point where police officers are exempt from proposals, it's demoralizing that they don't see that prosecutors are partners with law enforcement,' Skemp said."
Apr 8, 2011
Arrest” and its scope in contemporary Indian criminal justice system - Criminal Law Articles - Law, Lawyers, Advocates, Law Firms,Legal Help, Legal Experts,Judgements,Law Help, Indian Lawyers
Arrest” and its scope in contemporary Indian criminal justice system - Criminal Law Articles - Law, Lawyers, Advocates, Law Firms,Legal Help, Legal Experts,Judgements,Law Help, Indian Lawyers: "
K.MAHESWARI,
Asst. Public Prosecutor,
JAMMALAMADUGU (A.P)"
Asst. Public Prosecutor,
JAMMALAMADUGU (A.P)"
Jagpal Singh & Ors Vs State Of Punjab & Ors
Decided by Supreme Court of India on 28.01.11
In many states Government orders have been issued by the State Government permitting allotment of Gram Sabha land to private persons and commercial enterprises on payment of some money. In our opinion all such Government orders are illegal, and should be ignored....
In Uttar Pradesh the U P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 was widely misused to usurp Gram Sabha lands either with connivance of the Consolidation Authorities, or by forging orders purported to have been passed by Consolidation Officers in the long past so that they may not be compared with the original revenue record showing the land as Gram Sabha land, as these revenue records had been weeded out. Similar may have been the practice in other States. The time has now come to review all these orders by which the common village land has been grabbed by such fraudulent practices....
Before parting with this case we give directions to all the State Governments in the country that they should prepare schemes for eviction of illegal/unauthorized occupants of Gram Sabha/Gram Panchayat/Poramboke/Shamlat land and these must be restored to the Gram Sabha/Gram Panchayat for the common use of villagers of the village. For this purpose the Chief Secretaries of all State Governments/Union Territories in India are directed to do the needful, taking the help of other senior officers of the Governments. The said scheme should provide for the speedy eviction of such illegal occupant, after giving him a show cause notice and a brief hearing. Long duration of such illegal occupation or huge expenditure in making constructions thereon or political connections must not be treated as a justification for condoning this illegal act or for regularizing the illegal possession. Regularization should only be permitted in exceptional cases e.g. where lease has been granted under some Government notification to landless labourers or members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, or where there is already a school, dispensary or other public utility on the land.
In many states Government orders have been issued by the State Government permitting allotment of Gram Sabha land to private persons and commercial enterprises on payment of some money. In our opinion all such Government orders are illegal, and should be ignored....
In Uttar Pradesh the U P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 was widely misused to usurp Gram Sabha lands either with connivance of the Consolidation Authorities, or by forging orders purported to have been passed by Consolidation Officers in the long past so that they may not be compared with the original revenue record showing the land as Gram Sabha land, as these revenue records had been weeded out. Similar may have been the practice in other States. The time has now come to review all these orders by which the common village land has been grabbed by such fraudulent practices....
Before parting with this case we give directions to all the State Governments in the country that they should prepare schemes for eviction of illegal/unauthorized occupants of Gram Sabha/Gram Panchayat/Poramboke/Shamlat land and these must be restored to the Gram Sabha/Gram Panchayat for the common use of villagers of the village. For this purpose the Chief Secretaries of all State Governments/Union Territories in India are directed to do the needful, taking the help of other senior officers of the Governments. The said scheme should provide for the speedy eviction of such illegal occupant, after giving him a show cause notice and a brief hearing. Long duration of such illegal occupation or huge expenditure in making constructions thereon or political connections must not be treated as a justification for condoning this illegal act or for regularizing the illegal possession. Regularization should only be permitted in exceptional cases e.g. where lease has been granted under some Government notification to landless labourers or members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, or where there is already a school, dispensary or other public utility on the land.
Apr 7, 2011
R C Bansal Vs Cbi & Ors decided by High Court of Delhi on 2.02.11
Hon’ble High Court observed as under "Order summoning accused persons is liable to be quashed for the reason that that order was passed at a time when the case had already been fixed for arguments on charge and the stage of summoning additional persons as accused had gone by and the stage of Section 319 Cr.P.C. had not yet reached. Consequently, even the direction given for registration of a case against the investigating officer has also to be set aside."
Apr 6, 2011
Ajit Singh & Ors Vs Rani
Decided by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi on 1.02.2011
Here, respondent had agreed for quashing of criminal case in order to reconcile and give a fresh chance to the marriage so that she could happily live in matrimonial home. Since the atmosphere in the matrimonial home continued to be same and she could not live there, I consider that she cannot be forced to withdraw the criminal complaint lodged by her on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties.
Apr 5, 2011
T N Lakshmaiah Vs State of Karnataka (2002) 1 SCC 219
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under "Under the Evidence Act, the onus of proving any of the exceptions mentioned in the Chapter lies on the accused though the requisite standard of proof is not the same as expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient if an accused is able to bring his case within the ambit of any of the general exceptions by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, as a result of which he may succeed not because that he proves his case to the hilt but because the version given by him casts a doubt on the prosecution case.
In State of M P Vs Ahmadull AIR 1961 SC 998, this Court held that the burden of proof that the mental condition of the accused was, at the crucial point of time, such as is described by the section, lies on the accused who claims the benefit of this exemption vide Section 105 of the Evidence Act [Illustration (a)]. The settled position of law is that every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. Mere ipse dixit of the accused is not enough for availing of the benefit of the exceptions under Chapter IV.In a case where the exception under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is claimed, the court has to consider whether, at the time of commission of the offence, the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The entire conduct of the accused, from the time of the commission of the offence up to the time the sessions proceedings commenced, is relevant for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether plea raised was genuine, bona fide or an afterthought."
Apr 4, 2011
Ram Chandra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand, 2011
It is a case on section 493 IPC. In this case two judges of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India differs on the applicability of the section on the facts of the case. Hon'ble Markandey Katju base his opinion on an agreement between parties to merry that this agreement itself shows that lady were not under beilef that she is marreied wife of accused. On the other hand Hon'ble Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra placed reliance on living together for 9 years and application for registration of marriage. Hon'ble Justice Katju also made several observation with regard to the distinction of law from morality and tried to held that it may be immoral to live with a woman without marries for 9 years but not an offense. Matter was referred to larger bench. With due respect it is submitted that Justice Katju wrongly divert his discussion on the morality and law. Though he rightly concluded that "It is true that the appellant has not behaved like a gentleman. He lived with the complainant for nine years and had two children by her, and hence as a decent person he should have married her which he did not do." but failed to understand that if it is immoral to live with a lady without marries then living with a men for 9 years without marries also come under the same preview. It was not the duty of the court that which of the party is gentlemen and which is not. Court has only one duty to see whether ingredients section 493 is attracted or not.
Apr 3, 2011
Competition Commission of India Vs Steel Authority of India Ltd & Anr
The main objective of competition law is to promote economic efficiency using competition as one of the means of assisting the creation of market responsive to consumer preferences.
1) In terms of Section 53A(1)(a) of the Act appeal shall lie only against such directions, decisions or orders passed by the Commission before the Tribunal which have been specifically stated under the provisions of Section 53A(1)(a). The orders, which have not been specifically made appealable, cannot be treated appealable by implication. For example taking a prima facie view and issuing a direction to the Director General for investigation would not be an order appealable under Section 53A.
2) Neither any statutory duty is cast on the Commission to issue notice or grant hearing, nor any party can claim, as a matter of right, notice and/or hearing at the stage of formation of opinion by the Commission...However, the Commission, being a statutory body exercising, inter alia, regulatory jurisdiction, even at that stage, in its discretion and in appropriate cases may call upon the concerned party(s) to render required assistance or produce requisite information, as per its directive. The Commission is expected to form such prima facie view without entering upon any adjudicatory or determinative process....
3) The Commission, in cases where the inquiry has been initiated by the Commission suo moto, shall be a necessary party and in all other cases the Commission shall be a proper party in the proceedings before the Competition Tribunal...
4) During an inquiry and where the Commission is satisfied that the act is in contravention of the provisions stated in Section 33 of the Act, it may issue an order temporarily restraining the party from carrying on such act, until the conclusion of such inquiry or until further orders without giving notice to such party, where it deems it necessary. This power has to be exercised by the Commission sparingly and under compelling and exceptional circumstances.
5) In consonance with the settled principles of administrative jurisprudence, the Commission is expected to record at least some reason even while forming a prima facie view. Right of appeal is neither a natural nor inherent right vested in a party. It is substantive statutory right regulated by the statute creating it. In absence of any specific provision creating a right in a party to file an appeal, such right can neither be assumed nor inferred in favour of the party. Expressum facit cessare tacitum – Express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of other.
Apr 2, 2011
Uday Vs State of Karnataka 2003 CriLJ 1539
IPC -376- rape- consent - for determining whether consent given by the prosecutor was voluntary or under a misconception of fact, no straitjacket formula can be laid down but following factors stand out;
(i) where a girl was of 19 years of age and had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to;
(ii) she was conscious of the fact that her marriage was difficult on account of caste considerations;
(iii) it was difficult to impute to the appellant knowledge the prosecutor had consented in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his promise, and
(iv) there was no evidence to prove conclusively that the appellant never intended to marry the prosecutor.
Apr 1, 2011
State Of Orissa & Anr Vs Mamata Mohanty decided by Supreme Court of India on 09.02.11
It is a settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. If any appointment is made by merely inviting names from the Employment Exchange or putting a note on the Notice Board etc. that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such a course violates the mandates of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it deprives the candidates who are eligible for the post, from being considered. A person employed in violation of these provisions is not entitled to any relief including salary.
if an order is bad in its inception, it does not get sanctified at a later stage. A subsequent action/development cannot validate an action which was not lawful at its inception, for the reason that the illegality strikes at the root of the order.
the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a settled legal proposition that "as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted." Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties....
Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief....
Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should not only be fair, legitimate and above-board but should be without any affection or aversion. It should neither be suggestive of discrimination nor even give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. Procedural fairness is an implied mandatory requirement to protect against arbitrary action where Statute confers wide power coupled with wide discretion on an authority. If the procedure adopted by an authority offends the fundamental fairness or established ethos or shocks the conscience, the order stands vitiated.
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