GIAN DEVI ANAND v. JEEVAN KUMAR AIR 1985 SC 796

The question is whether the heirs of a deceased tenant whose contractual tenancy in respect of commercial premises has been determined, are entitled to the same protection against eviction afforded by the Act to the tenant.
He came into possession as tenant on and from 1.9.1959. In April, 1970 the respondent landlord determined the tenancy by serving a notice to quit on the tenant Wasti Ram, since deceased. In September, 1970, the respondent landlord filed a petition under section 14 of the Act for the eviction of the tenant Wasti Ram from the said shop on the following grounds: (1) non-payment of rent; (2) bona fide requirement; (3) change of user from residential to commercial; (4) substantial damage to property; and (5) sub-letting.
During the pendency of the appeal, the tenant Wasti Ram died and on 5.9.1977 the present appellant Smt. Gian Devi Anand, the widow of deceased Wasti Ram, was substituted in place of Wasti Ram on the application of the landlord.
It appears from the judgment of Shah, J. that ‘the Bombay Act merely grants conditional protection to a statutory tenant and does not invest him with the right to enforce the benefit of any of the terms and conditions of the original tenancy.’
The tenant may be carrying on a business in which the member of his family residing with him may not have any interest at all and yet on the construction adopted by the High Court, such member of the family would become a tenant in respect of the business premises. The principle behind section 5(11)(c) seems to be that when a tenant is in occupation of premises, the tenancy is taken by him not only for his own benefit, but also for the benefit of the members of the family residing with him and, therefore, when the tenant dies, protection should be extended to the members of the family who were participants in the benefit of the tenancy and for whose needs inter alia the tenancy was originally taken by the tenant.
But in case of business premises, a member of the family of the tenant residing with him at the time of his death may not be in possession of the business premises; he may be in service or he may be earning on any other business.
Though provisions of all the Rent Control Acts are not uniform, the common feature of all the Rent Control Legislation is that a contractual tenant on the termination of the contractual tenancy is by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Acts not liable to be evicted as a matter of course under the ordinary law of the land and he is entitled to remain in possession even after determination of the contractual tenancy.
The provisions of the Act, therefore, make it abundantly clear that the Act does not make any distinction between a ‘so called statutory tenant’ and a contractual tenant and the Act proceeds to treat both alike and to preserve and protect the status and rights of a tenant after determination of the contractual tenancy in the same way as the status and rights of a contractual tenant are protected and preserved.
The Legislature could never have possibly intended that with the death of a tenant of the commercial premises, the business carried on by the tenant, however flourishing it may be and even if the same constituted the source of livelihood of the members of the family, must necessarily come to an end on the death of the tenant, only because the tenant died after the contractual tenancy had been terminated.
Commercial premises are let out not only to individuals but also to Companies, Corporations and other statutory bodies having a juristic personality.
It can hardly be conceived that the Legislature would intend to deny to one class of tenants, namely, individuals, the protection which will be enjoyed by the other class, namely, the Corporations and Companies and other bodies with juristic personality under the Act.
if the Rent Act in question defines a tenant in substance to mean a tenant who continues to remain in possession even after the termination of the contractual tenancy till a decree for eviction against him is passed’, the tenant even after the determination of the tenancy continues to have an estate or interest in the tenanted premises and the tenancy rights both in respect of residential premises and commercial premises are heritable. The heirs of the deceased tenant in the absence of any provision in the Rent Act to the contrary will step into the position of the deceased tenant.

ANAND NIVAS (PRIVATE) LTD. v. ANANDJI KALYANJI PEDHI 1964 (4) SCR 892

In execution of the decree the trustees obtained possession of the first floor but were obstructed as to the rest by a private limited company called--"Anand Nivas Private Ltd."--and two others, who claimed to be sub-lessees from Maneklal and thereby to have acquired rights of tenancy of the ground floor upon the determination of the tenancy of Maneklal.
Company sets up its claim to protect its possession on the plea that it had acquired the rights of a tenant by virtue of s. 14 of the Act. This plea is supported on two grounds: that the contract of tenancy in favour of the tenant expressly authorised him to sublet, and the tenant having lawfully sublet the premises the Company acquired on the determination of the interest of the tenant the rights of a tenant under the landlord; and in any event, on the determination of the statutory tenancy of the tenant by virtue of Ordinance III of 1959 issued by the Governor of Bombay, retrospectively amending s. 15 of the Act, the Company acquired the rights of a tenant under the landlord.
Court held that before the date of the institution of the suit, Manekal as a statutory tenant had no right to sublet the premises and the Company acquired no right of a tenant on the determination of the tenant's right by virtue of s. 14 of the Act.

V. DHANAPAL CHETTIAR v. YESODAI AMMAL AIR 1979 SC 1745

Whether in order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act it is necessary to give a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Until and unless the lease is determined, the lessee is entitled to continue in possession. Once it is determined it becomes open to the lessor to enforce his right of recovery of possession of the property against him. In such a situation it was plain and clear that if the lease of the immovable property did not stand determined under any of the clauses (a) to (g) of Section 111, a notice to determine it under Section 106 was necessary. But when under the various State Rent Acts, either in one language or the other, it has been provided that a tenant can be evicted on the grounds mentioned in certain sections of the said Acts, then how does the question of determination of a tenancy by notice arise? If the State Rent Act requires the giving of a particular type of notice in order to get a particular kind of relief, such a notice will have to be given.
Without detaining ourselves on this aspect of the matter by any elaborate discussion, in our opinion it will suffice to say that the various State Rent Control Acts make a serious encroachment in the field of freedom of contract.
This was necessary under the Transfer of Property Act as mere termination of the lease entitled the landlord to recover possession. But under the Rent Control Acts it becomes an unnecessary technicality to insist that the landlord must determine the contractual tenancy. It is of no practical use after so many restrictions on his right to evict the tenant have been put.
No notice to quit was necessary under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in order to enable the landlady-respondent to get an order of eviction against the tenant-appellant

C.M. BEENA v. P.N. RAMCHANDRA RAO AIR 2004 SC 2103

The suit property is a shop situated on the ground floor of a building known as 'Woodlands Building' on the M.G. Road, Ernakulam. The respondent filed a civil suit seeking issuance of mandatory injunction directing the appellants to hand over vacant possession over the shop to the respondent on the ground that the license to occupy the suit premises was terminated.
According to the respondent the premises in occupation of the appellant is a car parking place. As between the parties there exists a document dated April 1, 1981 executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent which is styled as a deed of licence. The document begins with a recital -- "Whereas licensee is desirous of having the use of the premises for conducting stationery shop in room ............in Woodlands building, intended as car parking space for lodgers at the time of construction". The next Para states -- "And whereas the licensor is willing to grant licence to the licensee in respect of the aforesaid room for the purpose of carrying on business in stationery goods as licensee of the premises".
Evans & Smith state in The Law of Landlord and Tenant (Fourth Edition) - " A lease, because it confers an estate in land, is much more than a mere personal or contractual agreement for the occupation of a freeholder's land by a tenant, A lease, whether fixed-term or periodic, confers a right in property, enabling the tenant to exclude all third parties, including the landlord, from possession, for the duration of the lease, in return for which a rent or periodical payment is reserved out of the land. A contractual licence confers no more than a permission on the occupier to do some act on the owner's land which would otherwise constitute a trespass.
If the effect of the instrument is to give the holder the exclusive right of occupation of the land, though subject to certain reservations, or to a restriction of the purposes for which it may be used, it is prima facie a lease; if the contract is merely for the use of the property in a certain way and on certain terms, while it remains in the possession and under the control of the owner, it is a licence.
It is thus clear that the present one is not a case where the possession or control of the premises was retained by the respondent while the appellant was only permitted to make such use of the premises as would have been unlawful but for the permission given.
The lessors gave notice purporting to terminate the tenancy by the end of the September 1959. They stated in the notice that the lessees had sub-let the premises and that the lessors required the plot for purpose of putting up construction on it.
Before the High Court, the main contention of the appellants was that, since a fresh tenancy by holding over was created by the acceptance of rent by the lessors after the determination of the lease by efflux of time, the appellants were entitled to six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy, as the lease originally granted was for a manufacturing purpose, and therefore, the lease created by the holding over was also for same purpose.
The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy of any kind. If a tenant remains in possession after the determination of the lease, the common law rule is that he is a tenant at sufferance. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without his consent. The former is a tenant holding over or a tenant at will and the latter is a tenant at sufferance in English Law.
If the tenant has the statutory right to remain in possession, and if he pays the rent, that will not normally be referable to an offer for his continuing in possession which can be converted into a contract by acceptance thereof by the landlord. We do not say that the operation of Section 116 is always excluded whatever might be the circumstances under which the tenant pays the rent and the landlord accepts it.
We have already held the whole basis of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is that, in case of normal tenancy, a landlord is entitled, where he does not accept the rent after the notice to quit, to file a suit in ejectment and obtain a decree for possession, and so his acceptance of rent is an unequivocal act referable only to his desire to assent to the tenant continuing in possession. That is not so where Rent Act exists; and if the tenant says that landlord accepted the rent not as statutory tenant but only as legal rent indicating his assent to the tenant's continuing in possession, it is for the tenant to establish it.
If he tenders the rent as the rent payable under the statutory tenancy, the landlord cannot, by accepting it as rent, create a tenancy by holding over. In such a case the parties would not be ad idem and there will be no consensus.

M. N. CLUBWALA v. FIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB (1964) 6 SCR 642, 651

The main point which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs respondents are the lessees of the appellants. The appellants are the owners of a private market situate in Madras known as Zam Bazar Market. Defendants 1 to 3 to the suit were the contractors appointed by the appellants for collecting rent at the time of the institution of the suit. Though the building in which the market is located is owned by the appellants it cannot be used as a market for the purpose of sale of meat or any other article of human consumption without the permission of the Municipal Council.
Mere necessity of giving a notice to a licensee requiring him to vacate the licenced premises would not indicate that the transaction was a lease.
Whether an agreement creates between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant or merely that of licensor and licensee the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties. This intention has to be ascertained on a consideration of all the relevant provisions in the agreement. In the absence, however, of a formal document the intention of the parties must be inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties.
While it is true that each stallholder is entitled to the exclusive use of his stall from day to day it is clear that he has no right to use it as and when he chooses to do so or to sleep in the stall during the night after closure of the market or enter the stall during the night after 11.00 p.m. at his pleasure.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the intention of the parties was to bring into existence merely a licence and not a lease and the word “rent” was used loosely for “fee”.

G.K. BHATNAGAR v. ABDUL ALIM (2002) 9 SCC 516

On 28/5/1979 proceedings for eviction were initiated by the landlord by filing a petition before the Rent Controller on the ground under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 alleging that the tenant had, without the permission of the landlord, sub-let the premises and parted with possession of the whole of the premises in favour of one Jagdish Chander. According to the tenant-respondent, there was no sub-letting: Jagdish Chander was taken into partnership by him in his pre-existing business run in the suit shop under 'deed of partnership' dated 13/10/1978.
After 9th June, 1952, subletting, assigning or otherwise parting with the possession of the whole or any part of the tenancy premises, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord, is not permitted and if done, the same provides a ground for eviction of the tenant by the landlord. However, inducting a partner in his business or profession by the tenant is permitted so long as such partnership may ostensibly be to carry on the business or profession in partnership, but the real purpose be sub-letting of the premises to such other person who is inducted ostensibly as a partner, then the same shall be deemed to be an act of sub-letting attracting the applicability of clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 14 of the Act.
There is no material available to hold the partnership a sham or nominal one and to hold that the partnership was brought into existence for disguising a sub-letting in reality.

Morrison v. Jacobs (1945) 1 KB 577

Scott, L.J., said: "The sole question before the court is whether after the expiration of the contractual tenancy the mere fact of the landlord receiving rent for the dwelling house from the tenant affords any evidence that the landlord had entered on a new contractual tenancy to take the place of the tenancy which had expired. In my opinion, it does not. The true view is that the landlord takes the rent, knowing that the tenant is granted a statutory tenancy by the Rent Restrictions Acts and that his right to gain possession of his dwelling house depends entirely on his establishing that he brings himself within the conditions laid down by the Acts."

ASSOCIATED HOTELS OF INDIA LTD. v. R. N. KAPOOR AIR 1959 SC 1262

The respondent, R. N. Kapoor, since deceased, was in occupation of two rooms described as ladies' and gentlemen's cloak rooms, and carried on his business as a hairdresser.
The document no doubt uses phraseology appropriate to a licence. But it is the substance of the agreement that matters and not the form, for otherwise clever drafting can camouflage the real intention of the parties.
There is a marked distinction between a lease and a licence. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease of immovable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration for a price paid or promised. Under sec 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A lease is therefore a transfer of an interest in land.
The lessee gets that right to the exclusion of the lessor. Whereas S. 52 of the Indian Easements Act defines a licence thus: ‘Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do or continue to do in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence.’
The following propositions may, therefore, be taken as well-established: (1) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form; (2) the real test is the intention of the parties - whether they intended to create a lease or a licence; (3) if the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease; but, if it only permits another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a licence; and (4) if under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he is considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be established which negative the intention to create a lease.
The solitary circumstance that the rooms let out in the present case are situated in a building wherein a hotel is run cannot make any difference in the character of the holding. The intention of the parties is clearly manifest, and the clever phraseology used or the ingenuity of the document writer hardly conceals the real intent. I, therefore, hold that under the document there was transfer of a right to enjoy the two rooms, and, therefore, it created a tenancy in favour of the respondent.

Nakul Kohli Vs State of GNCT, Delhi High Court on 09.07.2010

Charge can be framed on the basis of fhotocopy of a forged document...
Photocopying a document, which is not genuine and with the kind of technology that is available now, wherein exactly similar copies of the original can be made, would fall within the ambit of making a false document. With the advent of technology, scanners and computerized colour photocopiers produce identical copies which are exactly similar to the original. Excluding photocopying/printing from the ambit of a “false document” would be giving too narrow a reading to the word `makes‟ as used in Section 464 First (a)becouse said word is not limited by the subsequent words signs, seals or executes. If the word `makes‟ was to confine to signing or executing, then there was no need of introducing this word in the said Section. It is settled law that the words used in an enactment are not superfluous.
Hon'ble Delhi high court further observed,"The contention of the learned counsel that he should be discharged at this stage for offences under Section 471 and 474 IPC as the document is a photocopy and thus a secondary evidence, is also untenable, because in a given case where a photocopy is used as the primary offending article, the same would be the primary evidence for the purpose of trial of the said case. Moreover, as to how a document is to be proved, whether by way of primary or secondary evidence is not required to be considered at the stage of framing of charge."