KAMLA DEVI v. VASDEV AIR 1995 SC 985

It has been contended on her behalf that in view of the fact that the respondent neither took any step to deposit arrears of rent nor for the extension of time within one month of the order of the Rent Controller under Section 15(1) of the Act, the Rent Controller did not have any discretionary power to condone the delay under Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
If the Rent Controller is of the view that in the facts of a particular case the time to make payment or deposit pursuant to an order passed under sub section (1) of Section 15 should be extended, he may do so by passing a suitable order.
Similarly, if he is not satisfied about the case made out by the tenant, he may order the defence against eviction to be struck out. But, the power to strike out the defence against eviction is discretionary and must not be mechanically exercised without any application of mind to the facts of the case.

JAGAN NATH v. RAM KISHAN DASS AIR 1985 SC 265

Controller, Delhi refused to pass an order under Section 15(1) of the Act on the ground that such a benefit was given to the appellant in the first eviction petition and that, by reason of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, the appellant could not claim that benefit once again. In that view of the matter, the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction against the appellant.
The passing of an order under Section 15 is not a benefit which accrues to the tenant under Section 14(2). It is obligatory upon the Controller to pass an order under Section 15(1) in every proceeding for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14(1)(a), that is, on the ground that the tenant has committed default in the payment of rent.
If the earlier proceeding was withdrawn by the landlord, it cannot be said that the tenant obtained the benefit of not having had an order of possession passed against him.

Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash AIR 1980 SC 1644

it was pointed out that the provision contained in Section 15 (7) was a penal provision and in terms by the use of the word 'may' gave to the Controller a discretionary power in the matter of striking out of the defence and that, in appropriate cases, the Controller may refuse to visit upon the tenant the penalty of eviction for failure to pay or deposit the future rent.