The tenanted premises are part of building constructed on the land leased to the original lessee by Delhi Improvement Trust. The DDA succeeded the said Trust. The perpetual lease, inter alia, provides that the lessee will not use the land and building that may be erected thereon during the terms of the lease for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential house without the consent in writing of the lessor. Admittedly the premises are being used by the appellants for commercial purposes.
Dr. K. Madan v. Krishnawati (Smt.) [AIR 1997SC 579] any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or Municipal Corporation of Delhi, then the landlord will be entitled to recovery of possession under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act and that Sub-section (11) of Section 14 of the Act enables the Controller to give another opportunity to the tenant to avoid an order of eviction. The first opportunity to the tenant is given when the notice is served on him by the landlord and the second opportunity is given when a conditional order under Section 14(11) of the Act is passed directing the tenant to pay the amount by way of compensation for regularisation of user up to the date of stopping the misuser and further directing stoppage of unauthorised user.
DDA is insisting on stoppage of misuser. The misuser is contrary to the terms of lease. The DDA cannot be directed to permit continued misuser contrary to the terms of the lease on the ground that zonal development plan of the area has not been framed.
Showing posts with label rent sec 14. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rent sec 14. Show all posts
Feb 23, 2010
FAQIR CHAND v. SHRI RAM RATTAN BHANOT AIR 1973 SC 921
The respondents are landlords of two houses in the Karol Bagh area of Delhi. The houses are built on lands given on long lease by the Delhi Improvement Trust to the rights, liabilities and assets of which the Delhi Development Authority has since succeeded. 3. Under the terms of the lease, subject to revision of rent, the lessees were to put up residential buildings on the leased lands and the lessees undertook: (vi) not to use the said land and buildings that may be erected thereon during the said term for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential house without the consent in writing of the said lessor; provided that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose other than that for which the lease is granted not being a purpose subsequently approved by the lessor ….
Buildings had been put to commercial use even before 1957 when the Delhi Development Authority Act of 1957 came into force.
Question that arises for decision in these cases is this: Are the landlords estopped or otherwise prohibited from getting possession of the property from the tenants because they themselves had let it out for commercial purposes.
The only situation in which it can take effect is where the lease is for a commercial purpose agreed upon by both the landlord and the tenant but that is contrary to the terms of the lease of the land in favour of the landlord. This clause does not come into operation where there is no provision in the lease of the land in favour of the landlord, prohibiting its use for a commercial purpose.
Legislature seems to be to put an end to unauthorised use of the leased lands rather than merely to enable the authorities to get back possession of the leased lands. This conclusion is further fortified by a reference to sub-section (11) of Section 14. The lease is not forfeited merely because the building put upon the leased land is put to an unauthorised use. The tenant is given an opportunity to comply with the conditions.
We are also of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in leaving to the Controller no option but to pass an order for eviction. That would make the alternative provided in sub-section (11) of Section 14 useless.
Buildings had been put to commercial use even before 1957 when the Delhi Development Authority Act of 1957 came into force.
Question that arises for decision in these cases is this: Are the landlords estopped or otherwise prohibited from getting possession of the property from the tenants because they themselves had let it out for commercial purposes.
The only situation in which it can take effect is where the lease is for a commercial purpose agreed upon by both the landlord and the tenant but that is contrary to the terms of the lease of the land in favour of the landlord. This clause does not come into operation where there is no provision in the lease of the land in favour of the landlord, prohibiting its use for a commercial purpose.
Legislature seems to be to put an end to unauthorised use of the leased lands rather than merely to enable the authorities to get back possession of the leased lands. This conclusion is further fortified by a reference to sub-section (11) of Section 14. The lease is not forfeited merely because the building put upon the leased land is put to an unauthorised use. The tenant is given an opportunity to comply with the conditions.
We are also of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in leaving to the Controller no option but to pass an order for eviction. That would make the alternative provided in sub-section (11) of Section 14 useless.
Feb 18, 2010
SATYAWATI SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA 2008 (6) SCALE 325
In terms of Clause 4(c) of the lease deed, the lessee was prohibited from using the land and building (to be constructed over it) for any purpose other than residence, with a stipulation that in case of breach of this condition, the lease shall become void. After constructing the building, the lessee inducted Shri Jai Narain Sharma and Dr. Ms. Tara Motihar, as tenants in two portions of the building, who started using the rented premises for running watch shop and clinic respectively. Smt. Satyawati Sharma (appellant herein), who is now represented by her LRs, purchased property i.e. house bearing No.3395-3397, Ward No.XVI, Block R, Gali No.1, Reghar Pura, New Delhi from legal heirs of the lessee. After purchasing the property, the appellant filed Petition Nos.184 of 1980 and 187 of 1980 for eviction of the tenants by claiming that she needed the house for her own bona fide need and also for the use and occupation of the family members’ dependant upon her. The appellant further pleaded that she wanted to demolish the building and reconstruct the same. She also alleged that tenants have been using the premises in violation of the conditions of lease.
We shall now deal with the core question whether Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act can be treated as violative of equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it differentiates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord and restricts.
The Act, therefore, initially provided conforming to its objects and reasons, bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord, whether residential or non-residential, as a ground of eviction of the tenant. The classification created by the amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. To vacate a premises for the bona fide requirement of the landlord would not cause any hardships to the tenant. Statutory protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such an extent that the landlord is precluded from evicting the tenant for the rest of his life even when he bona fide requires the premises for his personal use and occupation. It is not the tenants but the landlords who are suffering great hardships.
Full Bench upheld the validity of Section 14(1) (e) mainly by relying upon Corporation of India, and of this Court in Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin (supra). and by observing that legislature has the right to classify persons, things, and goods into different groups and that the Court will not sit over the judgment of the legislature. It is significant to note that the Full Bench did not, at all, advert to the question whether the reason/cause which supplied rational to the classification continued to subsist even after lapse of 44 years and whether the tenants of premises let for non-residential purposes should continue to avail the benefit of implicit exemption from eviction in the case of bona fide requirement of the landlord despite sea saw change in the housing scenario in Delhi and substantial increase in the availability of buildings and premises which could be let for non-residential or commercial purposes.
In our considered view, the discrimination which was latent in Section 14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of 1958 Act has, with the passage of time (almost 50 years), become so pronounced that the impugned provision cannot be treated intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by applying any rational criteria.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.
However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety.
We shall now deal with the core question whether Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act can be treated as violative of equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it differentiates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord and restricts.
The Act, therefore, initially provided conforming to its objects and reasons, bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord, whether residential or non-residential, as a ground of eviction of the tenant. The classification created by the amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. To vacate a premises for the bona fide requirement of the landlord would not cause any hardships to the tenant. Statutory protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such an extent that the landlord is precluded from evicting the tenant for the rest of his life even when he bona fide requires the premises for his personal use and occupation. It is not the tenants but the landlords who are suffering great hardships.
Full Bench upheld the validity of Section 14(1) (e) mainly by relying upon Corporation of India, and of this Court in Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin (supra). and by observing that legislature has the right to classify persons, things, and goods into different groups and that the Court will not sit over the judgment of the legislature. It is significant to note that the Full Bench did not, at all, advert to the question whether the reason/cause which supplied rational to the classification continued to subsist even after lapse of 44 years and whether the tenants of premises let for non-residential purposes should continue to avail the benefit of implicit exemption from eviction in the case of bona fide requirement of the landlord despite sea saw change in the housing scenario in Delhi and substantial increase in the availability of buildings and premises which could be let for non-residential or commercial purposes.
In our considered view, the discrimination which was latent in Section 14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of 1958 Act has, with the passage of time (almost 50 years), become so pronounced that the impugned provision cannot be treated intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by applying any rational criteria.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.
However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety.
Feb 17, 2010
RAVI DUTT SHARMA v. RATAN LAL BHARGAVA AIR 1984 SC 967
Admittedly the houses for which eviction has been asked for in these two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the Slum Act. It was contended on behalf of the tenants that the suits for eviction by the landlords were not competent in view of want of permission from the Competent Authority under the Slum Act.
This argument was countered by the respondent on the ground that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976 (referred to as the 'Amending Act' for short), new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenants - one of which was covered by Section 14(1)(e) and the other by Section 14-A. In the instant case we are mainly concerned with eviction applications covered by Section 14(1) (e) and the special procedure provided in Chapter III-A introduced by the Amending Act. It was contended by the respondent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special protection was given to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Rent Act (personal necessity).
Once it is recognised that the newly added sections are in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Slum Act stands withdrawn to that extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesaid sections - 14(1) (e) and 14-A - would not be governed or controlled by Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Act.
This argument was countered by the respondent on the ground that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976 (referred to as the 'Amending Act' for short), new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenants - one of which was covered by Section 14(1)(e) and the other by Section 14-A. In the instant case we are mainly concerned with eviction applications covered by Section 14(1) (e) and the special procedure provided in Chapter III-A introduced by the Amending Act. It was contended by the respondent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special protection was given to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Rent Act (personal necessity).
Once it is recognised that the newly added sections are in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Slum Act stands withdrawn to that extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesaid sections - 14(1) (e) and 14-A - would not be governed or controlled by Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Act.
Feb 15, 2010
PRECISION STEEL & ENGINEERING WORKS v. PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAYAL AIR 1982 SC 1518
the premises were let out for residential purpose and are now required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself and the members of his family dependent on him and that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. Landlord further alleged that he now requires the premises for himself and the members of his family consisting of himself, his wife and two school-going children. He admitted that he has been employed in India since 1965 but was posted at Bombay in 1970 and returned to Delhi in 1972. He went to Saudi Arabia and has now returned to India. It was alleged that on May 1, 1974, he called upon the tenant to vacate.
it was contended that the petitioner is not entitled to file a petition under Section 14(1)(e) because the purpose of letting was not residential alone but combined purpose of residence-cum-business. It was denied that the tenant entered the premises as a licensee and subsequently the contract of lease was entered into and it was submitted that the tenant entered the premises as tenant effective from September 13, 1971, and the lease was for residential-cum-commercial purpose.
In a catena of decisions it has been decided that in order to succeed the landlord should show that the premises have been let out as a residence or for residential purposes; that the landlord needs to occupy the premises which may imply that either he has got no other accommodation in the city or town in which the premises in question are situated or the one in his possession does not provide him a suitable residence and he is required to shift to the premises in question; that his need is genuine and that it is not merely a fanciful desire of an affluent landlord who for the fancy of changing the premises would like to shift to the one from which the tenant is sought to be evicted; that he is acting bona fide in approaching the court for recovery of possession; and that his demand is reasonable.
While examining the question whether leave to defend ought or ought not to be granted the limited jurisdiction which the Controller enjoys is prescribed within the well-defined limits and he cannot get into a sort of a trial by affidavits preferring one set to the other and thus concluding the trial without holding the trial itself.
Let it be made clear that the statute is not cast in a negative form by enacting that the Controller shall refuse to give to the tenant leave to contest the application unless..
The provision indicates a positive approach and not a negative inhibition. When the language of a statute is plain, the principle that legislature speaks its mind in the plainest language has to be given full effect. No canon of construction permits in the name of illusory intendment defeating the plain, unambiguous language expressed to convey the legislative mind. And the legislature had before it Order 37, an analogous phraseology of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, 'substantial defence' and 'vexatious and frivolous defence', the legislature used the plainest language, 'facts disclosed in the affidavit of the tenant'.
Upon a true construction of proviso (e) to Section 14(1) it would unmistakably appear that the burden is on the landlord to satisfy the Controller that the premises of which possession is sought is (i) let for residential purposes; and (ii) possession of the premises is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, etc.; and (iii) that the landlord or the person for whose benefit possession is sought has not other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. This burden, landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gets jurisdiction to make an order for eviction. This necessarily transpires from the language of Section 14(1) which precludes the Controller from making any order or decree for recovery of possession unless the landlord proves to his satisfaction the conditions in the enabling provision enacted as proviso under which possession is sought. Initial burden is thus on the landlord.
The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under sub-section (4) and the reply, if any. On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed by landlord the Controller has to pose to himself the only question: Does the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1). The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions of facts or his preference of one set of affidavit against other set of affidavits.
If Section 37(1) were to govern all proceedings including the application for leave to contest the proceedings, subsection (7) and sub-section (10) would both be rendered redundant. On the contrary the very fact that sub-section (7) provides that while considering the affidavit of the tenant seeking permission to contest the proceedings the practice and procedure of the Small Causes Court will have to be followed itself indicates the legislative intention of treating Chapter III-A and especially Section 25-B as self-contained code.
What follows then? The Controller has to confine himself indisputably to the condition prescribed for exercise of jurisdiction in sub-section (5) of Section 25-B. In other words, he must confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant. If the affidavit discloses such facts - no proof is needed at the stage.
it was contended that the petitioner is not entitled to file a petition under Section 14(1)(e) because the purpose of letting was not residential alone but combined purpose of residence-cum-business. It was denied that the tenant entered the premises as a licensee and subsequently the contract of lease was entered into and it was submitted that the tenant entered the premises as tenant effective from September 13, 1971, and the lease was for residential-cum-commercial purpose.
In a catena of decisions it has been decided that in order to succeed the landlord should show that the premises have been let out as a residence or for residential purposes; that the landlord needs to occupy the premises which may imply that either he has got no other accommodation in the city or town in which the premises in question are situated or the one in his possession does not provide him a suitable residence and he is required to shift to the premises in question; that his need is genuine and that it is not merely a fanciful desire of an affluent landlord who for the fancy of changing the premises would like to shift to the one from which the tenant is sought to be evicted; that he is acting bona fide in approaching the court for recovery of possession; and that his demand is reasonable.
While examining the question whether leave to defend ought or ought not to be granted the limited jurisdiction which the Controller enjoys is prescribed within the well-defined limits and he cannot get into a sort of a trial by affidavits preferring one set to the other and thus concluding the trial without holding the trial itself.
Let it be made clear that the statute is not cast in a negative form by enacting that the Controller shall refuse to give to the tenant leave to contest the application unless..
The provision indicates a positive approach and not a negative inhibition. When the language of a statute is plain, the principle that legislature speaks its mind in the plainest language has to be given full effect. No canon of construction permits in the name of illusory intendment defeating the plain, unambiguous language expressed to convey the legislative mind. And the legislature had before it Order 37, an analogous phraseology of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, 'substantial defence' and 'vexatious and frivolous defence', the legislature used the plainest language, 'facts disclosed in the affidavit of the tenant'.
Upon a true construction of proviso (e) to Section 14(1) it would unmistakably appear that the burden is on the landlord to satisfy the Controller that the premises of which possession is sought is (i) let for residential purposes; and (ii) possession of the premises is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, etc.; and (iii) that the landlord or the person for whose benefit possession is sought has not other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. This burden, landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gets jurisdiction to make an order for eviction. This necessarily transpires from the language of Section 14(1) which precludes the Controller from making any order or decree for recovery of possession unless the landlord proves to his satisfaction the conditions in the enabling provision enacted as proviso under which possession is sought. Initial burden is thus on the landlord.
The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under sub-section (4) and the reply, if any. On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed by landlord the Controller has to pose to himself the only question: Does the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1). The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions of facts or his preference of one set of affidavit against other set of affidavits.
If Section 37(1) were to govern all proceedings including the application for leave to contest the proceedings, subsection (7) and sub-section (10) would both be rendered redundant. On the contrary the very fact that sub-section (7) provides that while considering the affidavit of the tenant seeking permission to contest the proceedings the practice and procedure of the Small Causes Court will have to be followed itself indicates the legislative intention of treating Chapter III-A and especially Section 25-B as self-contained code.
What follows then? The Controller has to confine himself indisputably to the condition prescribed for exercise of jurisdiction in sub-section (5) of Section 25-B. In other words, he must confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant. If the affidavit discloses such facts - no proof is needed at the stage.
Feb 8, 2010
JAGAN NATH v. RAM KISHAN DASS AIR 1985 SC 265
Controller, Delhi refused to pass an order under Section 15(1) of the Act on the ground that such a benefit was given to the appellant in the first eviction petition and that, by reason of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, the appellant could not claim that benefit once again. In that view of the matter, the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction against the appellant.
The passing of an order under Section 15 is not a benefit which accrues to the tenant under Section 14(2). It is obligatory upon the Controller to pass an order under Section 15(1) in every proceeding for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14(1)(a), that is, on the ground that the tenant has committed default in the payment of rent.
If the earlier proceeding was withdrawn by the landlord, it cannot be said that the tenant obtained the benefit of not having had an order of possession passed against him.
The passing of an order under Section 15 is not a benefit which accrues to the tenant under Section 14(2). It is obligatory upon the Controller to pass an order under Section 15(1) in every proceeding for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14(1)(a), that is, on the ground that the tenant has committed default in the payment of rent.
If the earlier proceeding was withdrawn by the landlord, it cannot be said that the tenant obtained the benefit of not having had an order of possession passed against him.
Jan 26, 2010
G.K. BHATNAGAR v. ABDUL ALIM (2002) 9 SCC 516
On 28/5/1979 proceedings for eviction were initiated by the landlord by filing a petition before the Rent Controller on the ground under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 alleging that the tenant had, without the permission of the landlord, sub-let the premises and parted with possession of the whole of the premises in favour of one Jagdish Chander. According to the tenant-respondent, there was no sub-letting: Jagdish Chander was taken into partnership by him in his pre-existing business run in the suit shop under 'deed of partnership' dated 13/10/1978.
After 9th June, 1952, subletting, assigning or otherwise parting with the possession of the whole or any part of the tenancy premises, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord, is not permitted and if done, the same provides a ground for eviction of the tenant by the landlord. However, inducting a partner in his business or profession by the tenant is permitted so long as such partnership may ostensibly be to carry on the business or profession in partnership, but the real purpose be sub-letting of the premises to such other person who is inducted ostensibly as a partner, then the same shall be deemed to be an act of sub-letting attracting the applicability of clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 14 of the Act.
There is no material available to hold the partnership a sham or nominal one and to hold that the partnership was brought into existence for disguising a sub-letting in reality.
After 9th June, 1952, subletting, assigning or otherwise parting with the possession of the whole or any part of the tenancy premises, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord, is not permitted and if done, the same provides a ground for eviction of the tenant by the landlord. However, inducting a partner in his business or profession by the tenant is permitted so long as such partnership may ostensibly be to carry on the business or profession in partnership, but the real purpose be sub-letting of the premises to such other person who is inducted ostensibly as a partner, then the same shall be deemed to be an act of sub-letting attracting the applicability of clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 14 of the Act.
There is no material available to hold the partnership a sham or nominal one and to hold that the partnership was brought into existence for disguising a sub-letting in reality.
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