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Dec 31, 2011

Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam Vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 28 July, 2000

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as "What is the culpable negligence on the part of the bus driver in the above accident? A passenger might fall down from a moving vehicle due to one of the following causes: It could be accidental; it could be due to the negligence of the passenger himself; it could be due to the negligent taking off of the bus by the driver. However, to fasten the liability with the
driver for negligent driving in such a situation there should be the evidence that he moved the bus suddenly before the passenger could get into the vehicle or that the driver़़़
It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident negligence of the driver should be presumed़़़़़
Merely because a passenger fell down from the bus while boarding the bus no presumption of negligence can be drawn against the driver of the bus. The principle of res ipsa loquitor is only a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. The said principle has application only when the nature of the accident and the attending circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that in the absence of negligence the accident would not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrong doer. A rash act is primarily an over hasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular"

Mancini Vs Director of Public Prosecutions

Viscount Simon, L. C "It is not all provocation that will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter. Provocation, to have that result, must be such as temporarily deprives the person provoked of the power of self-control as the result of which he commits the unlawful act which causes death......... The test to be applied is that of the effect of the provocation on a reasonable man, as was laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Lesbini, so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary person to act as he did. In applying the text, it is of particular importance to (a) consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a reasonable man time to cool, and (b) to take into account the instrument with which the homicide was effected, for to retort, in the heat of passion induced by provocation, by a simple blow, is a very different thing from making use of a deadly instrument like a concealed dagger. In short, the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation if the offence is to be reduced to manslaughter"

Woolmington Vs The Director of Public Prosecutions

while the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner, there is no such burden laid on the prisoner to prove his innocence and it is sufficient for him to raise a doubt as to his guilt; he is not bound to satisfy the jury of his innocence......
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt

K M Nanavati Vs State Of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605

The alleged conflict between the general burden which lies on the prosecution and the special burden imposed on the accused under s. 105 of the Evidence Act is more imaginary than real. Indeed, there is no conflict at all. There may arise three different situations: (1) A statute may throw the burden of proof of all or some of the ingredients of an offence on the accused: (see ss. 4 and 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act).
(2) The special burden may not touch the ingredients of the offence, but only the protection given on the assumption of the proof of the said ingredients: (see ss. 77,78,79,81 and 88 of the Indian Penal Code). (3) It may relate to an exception, some of the many circumstances required to attract the exception if proved affecting the proof of all or some of the ingredients of the offence: (see s. 80 of the Indian Penal Code). In the first case the burden of proving the ingredients or some of the ingredients of the offence, as the case may be, lies on the accused. In the second case, the burden of bringing the case under the exception lies on the accused. In the third case, though the burden lies on the accused to bring his case within the exception, the facts proved may not discharge the said burden, but may affect the proof of the ingredients of the offence. An illustration may bring out the meaning. The prosecution has to prove that the accused shot dead the deceased intentionally and thereby committed the offence of murder within the meaning of s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code; the prosecution has to prove the ingredients of murder, and one of the ingredients of that offence is that the accused intentionally shot the deceased; the accused pleads that he shot at the deceased by accident without any intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means with proper care and caution; the accused against whom a presumption is drawn under s. 105 of the Evidence Act that the shooting was not by accident in the circumstances mentioned in s. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, may adduce evidence to rebut that presumption. That evidence may not be sufficient to prove all the ingredients of s. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, but may prove that the shooting was by accident or inadvertence, i.e., it was done without any intention or requisite state of mind, which is the essence of the offence, within the meaning of s. 300, Indian Penal Code, or at any rate may throw a reasonable doubt on the essential ingredients of the offence of murder. In that event though the accused failed to bring his case within the terms of s. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court may hold that the ingredients of the offence have not been established or that the prosecution has not made out the case against the accused. In this view it might be said that the general burden to prove the ingredients of the offence, unless there is a specific statute to the contrary, is always on the prosecution, but the burden to prove the circumstances coming under the exceptions lies upon the accused. The failure on the part of the accused to establish all the circumstances bringing his case under the exception does not absolve the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offence...
Statement of one witness to police can not be used to contradict other witness ...
Homicide is the killing of a human being by another. Under this exception, culpable homicide is not murder if the following conditions are complied with : (1) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused. (2) The provocation must be grave. (3) The provocation must be sudden. (4) The offender, by reason of the said provocation, shall have been deprived of his power of self-control. (5) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control. (6) The offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident....
It is a sudden and temporary loss of self-control....
Indian courts have not maintained the distinction between words and acts in the application of the doctrine of provocation in a given case. The Indian law on the subject may be considered from two aspects, namely, (1) whether words or gestures unaccompanied by acts can amount to provocation and (2) what is the effect of the time lag between the act of provocation and the commission of the offence....
Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of "grave and sudden" provocation ? No abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision : it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the relevant circumstances.....
The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus (1) The test of "grave and sudden" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.
(2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code.
(3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence.
(4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1596139/

Ghapoo Yadav & Ors Vs State of MP (2003) 3 SCC 528

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as "The Fourth Exception of Section 300, IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception
There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC is not defined in the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'."

Dec 30, 2011

Gyarsibai W/O Jagannath Vs The State 1953 CriLJ 588

In this case a woman have some fighting with sister in law- husband also take side of sister in law- she said that she will jump in the well with children - children died -she was convicted for offence u/s 302& 309 IPC - as per court case is different from mst Dhirajia case as here there is no question of any panic or fright of the appellant as it was in that case
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/109424/

Gudar Dusadh Vs State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 952

H.R.Khanna, J observed as "The fact that the appellant gave only one blow on the head would not mitigate the offence of the appellant and make him guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The blow on the head of Ramlal with lathi was plainly given with some force and resulted in a 3" long fracture of the left parietal bone. Ramlal deceased died instantaneously and as such, there arose no occasion for giving a second blow to him. As the injury on the head was deliberate and not accidental and as the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the case against the appellant would fall squarely within the ambit of clause "3rdly" of Section 300, Indian Penal Code"
Thus one lathi blow on head is sufficient

Emperor Vs Mt Dhirajia AIR 1940 All 486

Woman of 20 years age tried for sec 302 and 309- want to go parental home - husband gave beating to her- she left matrimonial house in the night- her Mt. Dhirajia turned round in a panic, ran a little distance with the baby girl in her arms and then either jumped or fell into an open well which was at some little distance from the path. It is important to observe that obviously she did this in panic because we have the clearest possible evidence that she looked behind her and was evidently running away from her husband. The result was, to put it briefly, that the little child died while the woman was eventually rescued and suffered little or no injury- -Some degree of knowledge must, we think, be attributed to every sane person. Obviously, the degree of knowledge which any particular person can be assumed to possess must vary. For instance, we cannot attribute the same degree of knowledge to an uneducated as to an educated person. But we think that to some extent knowledge must be attributed to everyone who is sane. -
however primitive a man or woman may be, and however frightened he or she may be, knowledge of the likely consequence of so imminently dangerous an act must be supposed to have remained with him or her-
hat is the fourth case in which culpable homicide is murder. We have already found that Mt. Dhirajia must be taken to have known that what she did must in all probability cause the death of her baby. But this is qualified by the further requirement that "such act" must be "without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death...." The construction of this particular passage of Section 300 is well settled. It is well settled that it is not murder merely to cause death by doing an act with the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. In order that an act done with such knowledge should constitute murder it is necessary that it should be committed without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing the death or bodily injury. An act done with the knowledge of its consequences is not prima facie murder. It becomes murder only if it can be positively affirmed that there was no excuse. The requirements of the section are not satisfied by the act of homicide being one of extreme recklessness. It must in addition be wholly inexcusable. When a risk is incurred-even a risk of the gravest possible character which must normally result in death-the taking of that risk is not murder unless it was inexcusable to take it. That, as we understand it, in terms of this case, is the meaning of this passage of Section 300, I.P.C. Now looking at the facts of this case which we need not repeat again, we think that it is not possible to say that Mt. Dhirajia in jumping into this well did so without excuse--
Difference from Supadi Lukadu v. Emperor (25) 12 AIR 1925 Bom 310 is that in that case child was on back of lady and court reached to the conclusion that she was not aware of child-
She did so in an effort to escape from her husband. The taking of her own life was not, we think, for one moment present to her mind. For that reason we think that Mt. Dhirajia was rightly acquitted under Section 309, I.P.C--
Punish only for 6 month u/s 304 IPC

Dec 29, 2011

Kapur Singh Vs State Of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 654

About a year before the date of the occurrence, Bachan Singh son of the deceased caused a severe injury on the leg of Pritam Singh, son of the appellant resulting in the amputation of his leg. The appellant harboured a grudge against the father and the son since that time and he was trying to take revenge...
Chand Singh held the deceased by the head and the appellant inflicted as many as 18 injuries on the arms and legs of the deceased with a gandasa. It is significant that out of all the injuries which were thus inflicted none was inflicted on a vital part of the body....
The fact that no injury was inflicted on any vital part of the body of the deceased goes to show in the circumstances of this case that the intention of the appellant was not to kill the deceased outright. He inflicted the injuries not with the intention of murdering the deceased, but caused such bodily injuries as, he must have known, would likely cause death having regard to the number and nature of the injuries...
Conviction altered to 304(1) from 302 IPC

Rawalpenta Venkalu Vs State of Hyderabad AIR 1956 SUPREME COURT 171

A person who put fire on a cottage and made sure that nobody came to help the person inside is liable u/s 302/34 even if charge was not framed.

Dec 26, 2011

Emperor Vs Mushnooru Suryanarayana (1912) 22 MLJ 333

Benson J. -accused, with the intentipn of killing Appala Narasimhulu, (on whose life he had effected large insurances without Appala Narasimhulu's knowledge, and in order to obtain the sums for which he was insured), gave him some sweetmeat (halva) in which a poison containing arsenic and mercury in soluble form had been mixed. Appala Narasimhulu ate a portion of the sweetmeat, and threw the rest away. This occured at the house of the accused's brother-in-law where the accused had asked Appala Narasimhulu to meet him. Rajalakshmi, who was aged 8 or 9 years, and who was niece of the accused, being ,the daughter of accused's brother-in-law, took some of the sweetmeat and ate it .
language of the section and the illustration seem to me to show that neither the contributory action of Appala Narasimhulu in throwing away part of the sweetmeat, nor the contributory action of the girl in picking it up and eating it prevent our holding that it was the accused who caused the girl's death.
Indian Law Commissioners in their report (1846) on the Indian Penal Code call attention to the unqualified use of the words "to cause death " in the definition of culpable homicide, and rightly point out that there is a great difference between acts which cause death immediately, and acts which cause death remotely, and they point out that the difference is a matter to be considered by the courts when estimating the effect of the evidence in each case. Almost all, perhaps all, results are caused by a combination of causes, yet we ordinarily speak of a result as caused by the most conspicuous or efficient cause, without specifying all the contributory causes. In Webster's Dictionary " cause " is defined as " that which produces or effects a result; that from which anything proceeds and without which it would not exist " and again " the general idea of cause is that without which another thing, called the effect, cannot be; and it is divided by Aristotle into lour kinds known by the name of the material, the formal, the efficient and the final cause. The efficient cause is the agent that is prominent or conspicuous in producing a change or result.
The mens rea which is essential to criminal responsibility existed with reference to the act done by the accused in attempting to kill Apala Narasimhulu, though not in regard to the girl whose death he, in fact, caused, and that is all that the section requires. It does not say " whoever voluntarily causes death," or require that the death actually caused should have been voluntarily caused. It is sufficient if death is actually, even though involuntarily, caused to one person by an act intended to cause the death of another. It is the criminality of the intention with regard to the latter that makes the act done and the consequence which follows from it an offence.
Sundara Aiyar J.- He urges that the sections of the Penal Code practically reproduce the English Law according to which the causing of death with malice aforethought, though the malice may not be directed against a particular individual whose death ensues, would amount to murder.
The accused would be guilty of the murder of one and all of the persons who might take the poison, though it might' have been impossible for him to imagine that it would change hands in the manner that it did. The contention practically amounts to saying that the intervention of other agencies, and of any number of them, before death results, would make no difference in the guilt of the accused, that causing death does not mean being the proximate cause of death, but merely being a link in the chain ot the cause or events lea-ding to the death and that further any knowledge on the part of the accused that such a chain of events might result from his act is quite immaterial. It is, prima facie, difficult to uphold such an argument. Now is there anything in the sections of the Penal Code to support it? Section 39 provides that " a person is said to cause an effect' voluntarily ' when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it." The illustration to the section is that if a person sets fire by night to an inhabited house in a large town for the purpose of facilitating robbery, and thus causes the death of a person, he would be taken to have caused the death voluntarily if he knew that he was likely to cause it even though he may not have intended to cause death and may even be sorry that death had been caused by his act. The section and the illustration both show that causation with respect to any event involves that the person should have knowledge that the event was likely to result from his act.
Section 301, Indian Penal Code. That section apparently applies to a cause where the death of the person whose death was intended or known to be likely to occur by the person doing the act, does not, as a fact, occur but the death of some one else occurs as the result of the act done by him. It evidently does not apply where the death both of the person whose death was in contemplation and of another person or persons, had occurred. Can it be said that, in such a case, the doer of the act is guilty of homicide with reference to those whose death was not intended by him and could not have been foreseen by him as likely to occur ? Are we to hold that a man who knows that his act is likely to cause the death of one person is guilty of the death of all the others who happen to die, but whose death was far beyond his imagination? Such a proposition it is impossible to maintain in criminal law. Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code has reference to a case where a person intending to cause the death of A, say by striking or shooting him, kills B because B is in the place where he imagined A to be, or B rushes in to save A and receives the injury intended for A. The reason for not exculpating the wrong-doer in such cases is that he must take the risk of some other person being in the place where he expected to find A, or, of some one else intervening between him and A. The section is a qualification of the rule laid down in Section 299 and is evidently confined to cases where the death of the person intended or known to be likely to be killed does not result. If the Public Prosecutor's general proposition were right, Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code would seem to be unnecessary, as Section 299 would be quite enough.
Now, can it be said that the accused, in this case, knew it to be likely that the prosecution 1st witness would give a portion of the halva to the girl Rajalakshmi? According to Section 26 of the Indian Penal Code " a person is said to have 'reason to believe' a thing if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise." A trader who sells a basket of poisoned oranges may be said to have sufficient ' reason to believe' that the buyer would give them to various persons to eat; but one who gives a slice of an orange to another to eat on the spot could not be said to have sufficient ' reason to believe' that he would give half of that slice to another person to eat or that he would throw away a portion and that another would eat it. The poison was thrown aside here not by the accused but by the prosecution 1st witness. The girl's death could not have been caused but for the intervention of the prosecution 1st witness's agency. The case, in my opinion, is not one covered by Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code.
law is not identical in both countries. In England an intention to commit any felony will make the act murder if death results. Again " if a child under years of discretion, a madman, or any other person of defective mind, is incited to commit a crime, the inciter is the principal ex necessitate, though absent when the thing was done. In point of law, the act of the innocent agent is as much the act of the procurer as if he were present and did the act himself." See RUSSELL on Crimes, Vol. I, page 104. The Indian law does not make the abettor guilty of the principal offence in such circumstances.
There is also a presumption in the English Law that " all homicide is malicious and murder, until the contrary appears from circumstances of alleviation, excuse, or justification ; and it is incumbent upon the prisoner to make out such circumstances to the satisfaction of the Court and Jury, unless they arise out of the evidence produced against him." See Russell on Crimes, Vol. I, page 657. There is no such presumption here. In Saunder's case as stated in Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, p. 154, the prisoner intending to poison his wife gave her a poisoned apple which she, ignorant of its nature, gave to a child who took it and died. This was held murder in the husband, although being present he endeavoured to dissuade his wife from giving it to the child. In Hale'S Pleas of the Crown, Vol. I, p. 436, it is not stated that the prisoner endeavoured, to dissuade his wife from giving the apple to the child. On the other hand, the author says : '' If A commands or counsels B to kill C and before the fact is dose A repents and comes to B and expressly discharges him from the fact and countermands it, if after this countermand B does it, it is murder in B; but A is not accessory." The decision apparently proceeded on the English rule that the innocence of the intervening agent had the effect of holding the prisoner liable as the principal offender.
As we differ in our opinion as to the guilt of the accused, the case will be laid before another Judge of this court, with our opinions.

Rahim, J-It is also found as a fact, and I agree with the finding, that Rajalakshmi and the other girl ate the halva without the knowledge of the accused, who did not intend to cause their deaths. Upon these facts Benson J. would find the accused guilty of the murder of Rajalakshmi, while Sundara Aiyar J., agreeing with the Sessions Judge, holds a contrary view
The language is perfectly general; all that it requires is that there should be an intention to cause death or a knowledge that death is likely to be the result, and there is nothing in reason which, in my opinion, would warrant us in saying that the homicidal intention or knowledge must be with reference to the life of the person whose death is actually caused. The law affords protection equally to the lives of all persons, and once the criminal intention, that is, an intention to destroy human life, is found, I do not see why it should make any difference whether the act done with such intention causes the death of the person aimed at or of some one else.
Section 301 also supports this construction as it assumes that the accused in such cases would be guilty of culpable homicide.
here the throwing aside of the sweetmeat by Appala Narasimhulu and the picking and the eating of it by Rajalakshmi cannot absolve the accused from responsibility for his act. No doubt the intervening acts or events may sometimes be such as to deprive the earlier act of the character of an efficient cause. Now, suppose, in this case Appala Narasimhulu had discovered that the sweetmeat was poisoned and then gave it to Rajalakshmi to eat, it is to his act that Rajalakshmi's death would be imputed and not to the accused's. Or suppose Appala Narasimhulu, either suspecting that the sweetmeat was poisoned or merely thinking that it was not fit to be eaten, threw it away in some unfrequented place so as to put it out of harm's way and Rajalakshmi happening afterwards to pass that way, picked it up, and ate it and was killed, the act of the accused in mixing the poison in the sweetmeat could in that case hardly be said to have caused her death within the meaning of Section 299.
though the case must be decided solely upon the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, I may observe that there can be no doubt that under the English Law as well the accused would be guilty of murder. In English Law it is sufficient to show that the act by which death was caused was done with malice aforethought, and it is not necessary that malice should be towards the person whose death has been actually caused. This is well illustrated in the well-known case of Agnes Gore (1614)77 E.R. 853 and in Saunder's case I. Hale P.C. 431 and also in Regina V. Michael 9 C and P. 356. No doubt" malice aforethought," at least according to the old interpretation of it as including an intention to commit any felony, covers a wider ground in the English Law than the criminal intention or knowledge required by Sections 299 and 300, Indian Penal Code, but the law in India on the point in question in this case is undoubtedly, in my opinion, the same as in England. 26. Agreeing therefore with Benson J., I set aside the order of the Sessions Judge acquitting the accused of the charge of murder and convict him of an offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code.

Dec 25, 2011

Janak Raj Vs Gurdial Singh and Anr AIR 1967 SC 608

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as "appellant-auction purchaser was entitled to a confirmation of the sale notwithstanding the fact that after the holding of the sale the decree had been set aside. The policy of the Legislature seems to be that unless a stranger auctionpurchaser is protected against the vicissitudes of the fortunes of the suit, sales in execution would not attract customers and it would be to the detriment of the interest of the borrower and the creditor alike if sales were allowed to be impugned merely because the decree was ultimately set aside or modified. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 makes ample provision for the protection of the interest of the judgment-debtor who feels that the decree ought not to have been passed against him. On the facts of this case, it is difficult to see why the judgment-debtor did not take resort to the provisions of O. XXI r. 89. The decree was for a small amount and he could have easily deposited the decretal amount besides 5 per cent. of the purchase money and thus have the sale set aside -We are not here concerned with the question as to whether restitution can be asked for against a stranger auction-purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree under s. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure and express no opinion thereon."

Dec 24, 2011

Challamane Huchha Gowda Vs M R Tirumala and Anr 2004(1) SCC 453

CPC - order 21 - execution - setting aside of sell- decree money was deposited by JD and objection to sell was filed before confirmation of sell- no formal application for setting aside was move. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as "It is also a settled position of law that a mere non-mentioning or wrong mentioning of a provision in an application is not a ground to reject an application. Since, there is no bar in treating the objection (filed in the present case) as an application to setting aside the sale."

Dadi Jagannadham Vs Jammulu Ramulu and Ors AIR 2001 SC 2699

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed on period of limitation for application for deposit of money as "The settled principles of interpretation are that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The Court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The Court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.----an application can be made within 60 days and, as stated above, no period for making a deposit is prescribed under Order 21, Rule 92(2) the deposit can also be made within 60 days."

Dec 23, 2011

Kishun Lal Vs Hardevi Kaur AIR 1946 Oudh 45

Hon'ble High Court observed as "the prayer that an auction sale to be set aside is implicit in the making of deposit...We do not think that the deposit in order to be valid must necessarily be made along with application."

Dec 21, 2011

Chinnamal and others Vs P Arumugham and another AIR 1990 SC 1828

In our opinion, the person who purchases the property in court auction with the knowledge of the pending appeal against the decree cannot resist restitution. His knowledge about the pending litigation would make all the difference in the case. He may be a stranger to the suit, but he must be held to have taken calculated risk in purchasing the property. Indeed, he is evidently a speculative purchaser and in that respect he is in no better position than the decree holder purchaser. The need to protect him against restitution therefore, seems to be unjustified. Similarly the auction purchaser who was a name lender to the decree holder or who has colluded with the decree holder to purchase the property could not also protected to retain the property if the decree is subsequently reversed

Babulal Parate Vs State of Bombay, AIR 1960, SC 51

Parliament is not bound by recommendation of State on bill to amend the boundary of that State

Dec 19, 2011

Divine Retreat Centre Vs State of Kerala

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed on 11.03.08 as---- Neither the accused nor the complainant or informant are entitled to choose their own investigating agency to investigate a crime in which they may be interested.
No judicial order can ever be passed by any court without providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person likely to be affected by such order and particularly when such order results in drastic consequences of affecting ones own reputation. In our view, the impugned order of the High Court directing enquiry and investigation into allegations in respect of which not even any complaint/information has been lodged with the police is violative of principles of natural justice.
the Public Interest Litigant must disclose his identity so as to enable the court to decide that the informant is not a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern.
It is clear from the record that the learned Judge was not dealing with any public interest litigation cases as on the date of entertaining anonymous petition. It is beyond pale of any doubt and controversy that the administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice of the High Court alone and it is his prerogative to distribute business of the High Court both judicial and administrative; that the Chief justice is the master of the roster. He alone has the prerogative to constitute benches of the court and allocate cases to the benches so constituted; and the puisne judges can only do that work as is allotted to them by the Chief Justice or under his directions; that the puisne judges cannot pick and chooseany case pending in the High Court and assign the same to himself or themselves for disposal without appropriate orders of the Chief Justice

State of Punjab Vs Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & Ors decided on 07.12.11

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as---- legal maxim - nemo debet esse judex in causa propria sua. It applies only when the interest attributed is such as to render the case his own cause. This principle is required to be observed by all judicial and quasi-judicial authorities as non-observance thereof, is treated as a violation of the principles of natural justice.
The failure to adhere to this principle creates an apprehension of bias on the part of the Judge. The question is not whether the Judge is actually biased or, in fact, has really not decided the matter impartially, but whether the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision.
The issue of bias must be raised by the party at the earliest.
If a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice or where the order has been pronounced without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it or where an order was obtained by abuse of the process of court which would really amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to recall such order for the reason that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity and the provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C. would not operate. In such eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment. However, the party seeking recall/alteration has to establish that it was not at fault.
the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the criminal justice delivery system does not clothe the court to add or delete any words, except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error as specifically been provided under the statute itself after pronouncement of the judgment as the Judge becomes functus officio. Any mistake or glaring omission is left to be corrected only by the appropriate forum in accordance with law.
35. The provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. closely resemble Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter called the `CPC'), and, therefore, the restrictions which are there to use the inherent powers under Section 151 CPC are applicable in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and one such restriction is that there exists no other provision of law by which the party aggrieved could have sought relief.
The rule of inherent powers has its source in the maxim "Quadolex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest" which means that when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist. The order cannot be passed by-passing the procedure prescribed by law.
Before directing CBI to investigate, the court must reach a conclusion on the basis of pleadings and material on record that a prima facie case is made out against the accused. The court cannot direct CBI to investigate as to whether a person committed an offence as alleged or not. The court cannot merely proceed on the basis of `ifs' and `buts' and think it appropriate that inquiry should be made by the CBI.
CBI cannot be directed to have a roving inquiry as to whether a person was involved in the alleged unlawful activities.

Popular Muthiah Vs State represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as "The High Court cannot issue directions to investigate the case from a particular angle or by a particular agency." (i) Power can be exercised suo motu in
the interest of justice. If such a power is not conceded, it may even lead to
injustice to an accused.
(ii) Such a power can be exercised
concurrently with the appellate or
revisional jurisdiction and no formal
application is required to be filed therefor.
(iii) However, the power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is not unlimited

Dec 14, 2011

K N Govindan Kutty Menon Vs C D Shaji

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on 28.11.11- N I Act - Sec 138- compounding in Lok Adalat- may be enforced by Civil Court as decree even if refer by criminal court

Dec 13, 2011

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs NCT, Delhi (2001) 4 SCC 280

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as "The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of the evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."

Dec 12, 2011

State of UP Vs Amarmani Tripathi

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as (2005) 8 SCC 21-"18. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail

Ranjitham Vs Basavaraj & Ors

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed on 28.11.11 as - Right of private defence cannot be weighed in a golden scale and even in absence of physical injury, in a given case, such a right may be upheld by the court provided there is reasonable apprehension to life or reasonable apprehension of a grievous hurt to a person.- whether a person legitimately acted in exercise of his right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. In a given case it is open to the Court to consider such a plea even if the accused has not taken it

Iqbal Singh Narang & Ors Vs Veeran Narang

Supreme Court of India on 03.12.11 -though the Rent Controller discharges quasi- judicial functions, he is not a Court, as understood in the conventional sense and he cannot, therefore, make a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. Consequently, as held by the High Court, a complaint could be made by a private party in the proceedings.

S P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath AIR 1994 SC 853

"...The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be passed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, taxevaders, bank-loan dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation... A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage... A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him, which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party."

Dec 11, 2011

To investigate fire in Kolkata hospital State government 'constituted a special legal team comprising senior advocate Kalyan Bandyopadhyay, high court public prosecutor Debasish Roy and assistant public prosecutor Rajdeep Majumdar, who represented the police.' http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/Kolkata/Day-after-Kolkata-mourns/Article1-780714.aspx

Dec 10, 2011

Mulla and Another Vs State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 3 SCC 508


“It is settled legal position that the punishment must fit the crime. It is the duty of the court to impose proper punishment depending upon the degree of criminality and desirability to impose such punishment. As a measure of social necessity and also as a means of deterring other potential offenders, the sentence should be appropriate befitting the crime.”

Dec 9, 2011

Maxim salus populi est suprema lex and salus reipublicae suprema lex— Latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex – the safety of the people is supreme law; and salus reipublicae suprema lex – safety of the State is supreme law

Dec 8, 2011

Ram Chandra Singh Vs Savitri Devi and Ors (2003) 8 SCC 319

Effect of fraud on court - Counsel " submit that the respondents, having obtained a decree by practising fraud on the court, cannot be allowed to take the benefit thereof. Having regard to the fact that the father of the mortgagor died in the year 1944, the learned counsel would urge, the question of his sisters becoming his co-sharers did not arise as the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 did not come into force"-
"Fraud as is well-known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwells together. 16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person, or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of former either by word or letter. 17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. 18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad."-
"In Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 AC 337, if was held: In an 'action of deceit the plaintiff must prove actual fraud. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it be true or false. A false statement, made through carelessness and without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, may be evidence of fraud but does not necessarily amount to fraud. Such a statement, if made in the honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent and does not render the person make it liable to an action of deceit."-
"Kerr on Fraud and Mistake at page 23, it is stated: "The true and only sound principle to be derived from the cases represented by Slim v. Croucher is this that a representation is fraudulent not only when the person making it knows it to be false, but also when, as Jessel, M.R., pointed out, he ought to have known, or must be taken to have known, that it was false. This is a sound and intelligible principle, and is, moreover, not inconsistent with Derry v. Peek, A false statement which a person ought to have known was false, and which he must therefore be taken to have known was false, cannot be said to be honestly believed in. "A consideration of the grounds of belief", said Lord Herschell, "is no doubt an important aid in ascertaining whether the belief was really entertained. A man's mere assertion that he believed the statement he made to be true is not accepted as conclusive proof that he did so." 21. In Bigelow on Fraudulent Conveyances at page 1, it is stated : "If on the facts the average man would have intended wrong, that is enough." -
"24. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would, render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.."-
"Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res-judicata..."

Dec 3, 2011

R Vijayan Vs Baby & Anr

Supreme Court of india on 11.10.11
NI Act- sec 138 - dishonour of cheque- amount of compensation - " State of Punjab vs. Gurmej Singh [2002 (6) SCC 663], this Court held : "A reading of sub-section (3) of Section 357 would show that the question of award of compensation would arise where the court imposes a sentence of which fine does not form a part." This Court also held that section 357(3) will not apply where a sentence of fine has been imposed"- "the difficulty caused by the ceiling imposed by section 29(2) of the Code has been subsequently solved by insertion of section 143 in the Act (by Amendment Act No.55 of 2002) with effect from 6.2.2003. Section 143(1) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, all offences under Chapter XVII of the Act should be tried by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of sections 262 to 265 of the Code (relating to summary trials) shall, as far as may be, apply to such trials. The proviso thereto provides that it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term extending one year and an amount of fine exceeding Rs.5,000/-, in case of conviction in a summary trial under that section. In view of conferment of such special power and jurisdiction upon the First Class Magistrate, the ceiling as to the amount of fine stipulated in section 29(2) of the Code is removed. Consequently, in regard to any prosecution for offences punishable under section 138 of the Act, a First Class Magistrate may impose a fine exceeding Rs.5000/-, the ceiling being twice the amount of the cheque"- a three Judge Bench of this Court in Damodar S.Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H. [2010 (5) SCC 663], addressed the question of reluctance of offenders to compound the cases at earlier stages of the case prosecution leading to a huge pendency of cheque dishonour cases, and issued the following guidelines proposing levy of `a graded scale of fine' to encourage compounding at earlier stages of the case : "(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made, compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any costs on the accused. (b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit. (c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs. (d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque amount. xxxxx The graded scheme for imposing costs is a means to encourage compounding at an early stage of litigation. In the status quo, valuable time of the Court is spent on the trial of these cases and the parties are not liable to pay any Court fee since the proceedings are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though the impact of the offence is largely confined to the private parties. Even though the imposition of costs by the competent court is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs has been suggested in the interest of uniformity. The competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance. Bona fide litigants should of course contest the proceedings to their logical end."-
"A stage has reached when most of the complainants, in particular the financing institutions (particularly private financiers) view the proceedings under section 138 of the Act, as a proceeding for the recovery of the cheque amount, the punishment of the drawer of the cheque for the offence of dishonour, becoming secondary. 16. Having reached that stage, if some Magistrates go by the traditional view that the criminal proceedings are for imposing punishment on the accused, either imprisonment or fine or both, and there is no need to compensate the complainant, particularly if the complainant is not a `victim' in the real sense, but is a well-to-do financier or financing institution, difficulties and complications arise. In those cases where the discretion to direct payment of compensation is not exercised, it causes considerable difficulty to the complainant, as invariably, by the time the criminal case is decided, the limitation for filing civil cases would have expired. As the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act strongly lean towards grant of reimbursement of the loss by way of compensation, the courts should, unless there are special circumstances, in all cases of conviction, uniformly exercise the power to levy fine upto twice the cheque amount (keeping in view the cheque amount and the simple interest thereon at 9% per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss) and direct payment of such amount as compensation. Direction to pay compensation by way of restitution in regard to the loss on account of dishonour of the cheque should be practical and realistic, which would mean not only the payment of the cheque amount but interest thereon at a reasonable rate."-

Nov 29, 2011

in written reply to a question in the Rajya Sabha today, Shri Salman Khurshid, Minister for Law & Justice, said that as regards shortage of public prosecutors and Government Lawyers, there does not appear to be any shortage http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=77689

Nov 28, 2011

Sanjay Chandra vs Cbi on 23 November, 2011

seriousness of the charge is, no doubt, one of the relevant considerations while considering bail applications but that is not the only test or the factor : The other factor that also requires to be taken note of is the punishment that could be imposed after trial.

Nov 26, 2011

Jaya Bachan Vs Union of India and Ors 2006 (5) SCALE 511

Supreme Court of India declared
Chairperson of Uttar Pradesh Film Development Council that is held by the petitioner as ‘office of profit’ - inspite of the fact that she was not claiming any reimbursement or allowance for her work- but as per post she was entitled

Nov 25, 2011

Manohar Lal Chopra Vs Raj Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal AIR 1962 SC 527

Hon'ble Court observed "The Code of Civil Procedure is undoubtedly not exhaustive: it does not lay down rules for guidance in respect of all situations nor does it seek to provide rules for decision of all conceivable cases which may arise. The civil courts are authorized" to pass such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of court, but where an express provision is made to meet a particular situation the Code must be observed, and departure therefrom is not permissible."

Nov 24, 2011

Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt Ltd Vs State of Haryana dated 11.10.11

Supreme court of India observed on property deal through sale agreement/GPA/will -
"These transactions are not to be confused or equated with genuine transactions where the owner of a property grants a power of Attorney in favour of a family member or friend to manage or sell his property, as he is not able to manage the property or execute the sale, personally. These are transactions, where a purchaser pays the full price, but instead of getting a deed of conveyance gets a SA/GPA/WILL as a mode of transfer, either at the instance of the vendor or at his own instance. Ill-Effects of SA/GPA/WILL transactions 3. The earlier order dated 15.5.2009, ( Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt.Ltd. vs. State of Haryana & Anr. - 2009 (7) SCC 363) noted the ill-effects of such SA/GPA/WILL transactions (that is generation of black money, growth of land mafia and criminalization of civil disputes) as under: "Recourse to `SA/GPA/WILL' transactions is taken in regard to freehold properties, even when there is no bar or prohibition regarding transfer or conveyance of such property, by the following categories of persons: (a) Vendors with imperfect title who cannot or do not want to execute registered deeds of conveyance. (b) Purchasers who want to invest undisclosed wealth/income in immovable properties without any public record of the transactions. The process enables them to hold any number of properties without disclosing them as assets held. (c) Purchasers who want to avoid the payment of stamp duty and registration charges either deliberately or on wrong advice. Persons who deal in real estate resort to these methods to avoid multiple stamp duties/registration fees so as to increase their profit margin. Whatever be the intention, the consequences are disturbing and far reaching, adversely affecting the economy, civil society and law and order. Firstly, it enables large scale evasion of income tax, wealth tax, stamp duty and registration fees thereby denying the benefit of such revenue to the government and the public. Secondly, such transactions enable persons with undisclosed wealth/income to invest their black money and also earn profit/income, thereby encouraging circulation of black money and corruption. This kind of transactions has disastrous collateral effects also. For example, when the market value increases, many vendors (who effected power of attorney sales without registration) are tempted to resell the property taking advantage of the fact that there is no registered instrument or record in any public office thereby cheating the purchaser. When the purchaser under such `power of attorney sales' comes to know about the vendors action, he invariably tries to take the help of musclemen to `sort out' the issue and protect his rights. On the other hand, real estate mafia many a time purchase properties which are already subject to power of attorney sale and then threaten the previous `Power of Attorney Sale' purchasers from asserting their rights. Either way, such power of attorney sales indirectly lead to growth of real estate mafia and criminalization of real estate transactions." It also makes title verification and certification of title, which is an integral part of orderly conduct of transactions relating to immovable property, difficult, if not impossible, giving nightmares to bonafide purchasers wanting to own a property with an assurance of good and marketable title....
We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of `GPA sales' or `SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of section 53A of the TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales. 17. It has been submitted that making declaration that GPA sales and SA/GPA/WILL transfers are not legally valid modes of transfer is likely to create hardship to a large number of persons who have entered into such transactions and they should be given sufficient time to regularize the transactions by obtaining deeds of conveyance. It is also submitted that this decision should be made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship. 18. We have merely drawn attention to and reiterated the well-settled legal position that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are not `transfers' or `sales' and that such transactions cannot be treated as completed transfers or conveyances. They can continue to be treated as existing agreement of sale. Nothing prevents affected parties from getting registered Deeds of Conveyance to complete their title. The said `SA/GPA/WILL transactions' may also be used to obtain specific performance or to defend possession under section 53A of TP Act. If they are entered before this day, they may be relied upon to apply for regularization of allotments/leases by Development Authorities. We make it clear that if the documents relating to `SA/GPA/WILL transactions' has been accepted acted upon by DDA or other developmental authorities or by the Municipal or revenue authorities to effect mutation, they need not be disturbed, merely on account of this decision. 19. We make it clear that our observations are not intended to in any way affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine transactions. For example, a person may give a power of attorney to his spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister or a relative to manage his affairs or to execute a deed of conveyance. A person may enter into a development agreement with a land developer or builder for developing the land either by forming plots or by constructing apartment buildings and in that behalf execute an agreement of sale and grant a Power of Attorney empowering the developer to execute agreements of sale or conveyances in regard to individual plots of land or undivided shares in the land relating to apartments in favour of prospective purchasers. In several States, the execution of such development agreements and powers of attorney are already regulated by law and subjected to specific stamp duty. Our observations regarding `SA/GPA/WILL transactions' are not intended to apply to such bonafide/genuine transactions

Nov 23, 2011

State of Rajasthan vs Basant Nehata - 2005 (12) SCC 77

Supreme Court of India observed
"A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the agent. The agent derives a right to use his name and all acts, deeds and things done by him and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney is, as is well known, a document of convenience. Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the provisions of the Contract Act as also the Powers-of-Attorney Act is valid. A power of attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is executed by the donor so as to enable the donee to act on his behalf. Except in cases where power of attorney is coupled with interest, it is revocable. The donee in exercise of his power under such power of attorney only acts in place of the donor subject of course to the powers granted to him by reason thereof. He cannot use the power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter between the donor and the donee."

Nov 22, 2011

Hitesh Bhatnagar vs Deepa Bhatnagar Supreme Court of India on 18.04.11

the parties filed a petition under Section 13B of the Act before the District Court, Gurgaon, for dissolution of the marriage by grant of a decree of divorce by mutual consent. However, before the stage of second motion and passing of the decree of divorce, the respondent withdrew her consent...
This withdrawal was made after 18 months of first motion- it was argued that as respondent failed to withdraw within one month, court is bound to pass a decree of divorce- not accepted.
"As a last resort, the appellant submits that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and prays that the Court should dissolve the marriage by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In support of his request, he invites our attention to the observation made by this Court in the case of Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415, wherein though the consent was withdrawn by the wife, this Court found the marriage to have been irretrievably broken down and granted a decree of divorce by invoking its power under Article 142. We are not inclined to entertain this submission of the appellant since the facts in that case are not akin to those that are before us. In that case, the wife was agreeable to receive payments and property in terms of settlement from her husband, but was neither agreeable for divorce, nor to live with the husband as his wife. It was under these extraordinary circumstances that this Court was compelled to dissolve the marriage as having irretrievably broken down. Hence, this submission of the appellant fails.
She has stated that from the beginning, she never wanted the marriage to be dissolved. Even now, she states that she is willing to live with her husband putting away all the bitterness that has existed between the parties. In light of these facts and circumstances, it would be travesty of justice to dissolve this marriage as having broken down. Though there is bitterness amongst the parties and they have not even lived as husband and wife for the past about 11 years, we hope that they will give this union another chance, if not for themselves, for the future of their daughter."

Nov 20, 2011

Smruti Pahariya Vs Sanjay Pahariya, (2009) 13 SCC 338

HMA - section 13(1) B - mutual consent - absence of one party does not gave presumption of his consent

Nov 19, 2011

Smt Sureshta Devi Vs Om Prakash, (1991) 2 SCC 25

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed “9. The ‘living separately’ for a period of one year should be immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. It is necessary that immediately preceding the presentation of petition, the parties must have been living separately. The expression ‘living separately’, connotes to our mind not living like husband and wife. It has no reference to the place of living. The parties may live under the same roof by force of circumstances, and yet they may not be living as husband and wife. The parties may be living in different houses and yet they could live as husband and wife. What seems to be necessary is that they have no desire to perform marital obligations and with that mental attitude they have been living separately for a period of one year immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The second requirement that they ‘have not been able to live together’ seems to indicate the concept of broken down marriage and it would not be possible to reconcile themselves. The third requirement is that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. 10. Under sub-section (2) the parties are required to make a joint motion not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition and not later than 18 months after the said date. This motion enables the court to proceed with the case in order to satisfy itself about the genuineness of the averments in the petition and also to find out whether the consent was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. The court may make such inquiry as it thinks fit including the hearing or examination of the parties for the purpose of satisfying itself whether the averments in the petition are true. If the court is satisfied that the consent of parties was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved, it must pass a decree of divorce."
"There is a period of waiting from 6 to 18 months. This interregnum was obviously intended to give time and opportunity to the parties to reflect on their move and seek advice from relations and friends. In this transitional period one of the parties may have a second thought and change the mind not to proceed with the petition. The spouse may not be a party to the joint motion under sub-section (2). There is nothing in the section which prevents such course. The section does not provide that if there is a change of mind it should not be by one party alone, but by both"

Nov 12, 2011

Dayanandi Vs Rukma D Suvarna and others 2002

The plain language of Section 71 makes it clear that any alteration made in an unprivileged Will after its execution has no effect unless such
alteration has been executed in the same manner in which the Will is executed. The proviso to this section carves out an exception and lays down that such alterations shall be deemed to be duly executed if the signature of the testator and the subscription of the witnesses is made in the margin or on some other part of the Will opposite or near to such alterations or at the foot or end or opposite to a memorandum referring to such alterations and written at the end or some part of the Will.

R. S. Madanappa and Others Vs Chandramma and Another AIR 1965 SC 1812

No man who, knowing fully well that he has no title to property spends money on improving it can be permitted to deprive the original owner of his right to possession of the property except upon the payment for the improvements which were not effected with the consent of that person....
Future mesne profit may be granted even if same is not asked

Cairncross Vs Lorimer [3 Macq. 827]

Lord Chancellor, "The doctrine will apply, which is to be found, I believe, in the laws of all civilized nations that if a man either by words or by conduct has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done, and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent, and he thereby induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned, to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct. I am of opinion that, generally speaking, if a party having an interest to prevent an act being done has full notice of its being done, and acquiesces in it, so as to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it, and the position of others is altered by their giving credit to his sincerity, he has no more right to challenge the act to their prejudice than he would have had if it had been done by his previous license."

Pickard Vs Sears [6 Ad. & E. 469]

"Where one by his word or conduct wilfully causes another to believe for the existence of a certain state of thing and induced him to act on that belief so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the letter a different state of things as existing at the first time

Nov 11, 2011

Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law

“Under the Mahomedan law the three essential requisites to make a gift valid : (1) declaration of the gift by the donor: (2) acceptance of the gift by the donee expressly or impliedly and (3) delivery of possession to and taking possession thereof by the donee actually or constructively. No written document is required in such a case. Section 129 Transfer of Property Act, excludes the rule of Mahomedan law from the purview of Section 123 which mandates that the gift of immovable property must be effected by a registered instrument as stated therein. But it cannot be taken as a sine qua non in all cases that whenever there is a writing about a Mahomedan gift of immovable property there must be registration thereof. Whether the writing requires registration or not depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

Chota Uddandu Sahib Vs Masthan Bi (died) and others AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 271

Hon,ble Supreme Court of India observed "Under Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act, nothing in Chapter VII relates to gifts of movable property made in contemplation of death or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Mohammadan Law. According to the Mohammedan Law, there can be a valid gift, if three essentials of the gift are satisfied. (1) a declaration of the gift by the donor, (2) the acceptance of the gift express or implied by or on behalf of the donee and (3) delivery of possession of the subject of gift by the donor to the donee. If these conditions are complied with the gift is complete. According to Muslim law it is not necessary that there should be a deed of gift in order to make it a valid gift, but of course, if there is a deed it should be registered. But if the deed is merely a memoranda of an already effected gift, then it stands on a separate footing. In view of this specific provision of Muslim Law, which is saved by Section 129, it cannot be held that the gifts amongst muslims also should satisfy the provisions of Chapter VII. . . . . . . . . . . . Hence if all the formalities, as prescribed by Muslim Law, regarding the making of gifts are satisfied, the gift is valid notwithstanding the fact that it is oral and without any instrument. If there is a contemporaneous document it should be registered. But if the gift is antecedent and the deed is subsequent merely evidencing the past transaction, it does not require registration, because it does not by itself make or complete the gift. . . . . . . . . .”

Nov 10, 2011

Black’s Law Dictionary

“costs is a pecuniary allowance made to the successful party for his expenses in prosecuting or defending a suit or a distinct proceeding with a suit”

Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Vs Union of India AIR 2005 SC 3353

A committee was formed by Salem bar 2003 case to gave report on amendment in CPC....
Regarding the apprehension that the payment of fee to the Commissioner will add to the burden of the litigant, we feel that generally the expenses incurred towards the fee payable to the Commissioner is likely to be less than expenditure incurred for attending the Courts on various dates for recording evidence besides the harassment and inconvenience to attend the Court again and again for the same purpose and, therefore, in reality in most of the cases, there could be no additional burden....
It was also decided by Hon'ble Court that a commissioner appointed for the purpose of recording of evidence have no power to declare witness hostile u/s 154 evidence act. Parties have to apply to trial court for declaring a witness
hostile and court may relate him hostile and even can withdraw commission for further recording in the court....
High Courts may frame necessary rules, regulations or issue practice directions so as to ensure safe and proper custody of the documents when the same are before the Commissioner. It is the duty and obligation of the Commissioners to keep the documents in safe custody and also not to give access of the record to one party in absence of the opposite party or his counsel....
In case of non filing of WS Court may pass judgment in favour of plaintiff. thus it is pointed out that even if WS is not filed it is not mandatory to pass order....
the provision of Order VIII Rule 1 providing for upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to file written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time limit of 90 days. The discretion of the Court to extend the time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed by Order VIII Rule 1..
On the issue of service of summon by private courier agency - provision for the same was upheld and it was left to High Courts to make rule in this regard with provision " It can also be provided that if affidavit or any endorsement as to service is found to be false, the deponent can be summarily tried and punished for perjury and the courier company can be black-listed."
On adjournment Court held, "Order XVII Rule 1 and Order XVII Rule 2 have to be read together. So read, Order XVII does not forbid grant of adjournment where the circumstances are beyond the control of the party. In such a case, there is no restriction on number of adjournments to be granted. It cannot be said that even if the circumstances are beyond the control of a party, after having obtained third adjournment, no further adjournment would be granted. There may be cases beyond the control of a party despite the party having obtained three adjournments. For instance, a party may be suddenly hospitalized on account of some serious ailment or there may be serious accident or some act of God leading to devastation. It cannot be said that though circumstances may be beyond the control of a party, further adjournment cannot be granted because of restriction of three adjournments as provided in proviso to Order XVII Rule 1.
31. In some extreme cases, it may become necessary to grant adjournment despite the fact that three adjournments have already been granted (Take the example of Bhopal Gas Tragedy, Gujarat earthquake and riots, devastation on account of Tsunami). Ultimately, it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, on the basis whereof the Court would decide to grant or refuse adjournment. The provision for costs and higher costs has been made because of practice having been developed to award only a nominal cost even when adjournment on payment of costs is granted. Ordinarily, where the costs or higher costs are awarded, the same should be realistic and as far as possible actual cost that had to be incurred by the other party shall be awarded where the adjournment is found to be avoidable but is being granted on account of either negligence or casual approach of a party or is being sought to delay the progress of the case or on any such reason. Further, to save proviso to Order XVII Rule 1 from the vice of article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is necessary to read it down so as not to take away the discretion of the Court in the extreme hard cases noted above. The limitation of three adjournments would not apply where adjournment is to granted on account of circumstances which are beyond the control of a party. Even in cases which may not strictly come within the category of circumstances beyond the control of a party, the Court by resorting to the provision of higher cost which can also include punitive cost in the discretion of the Court, adjournment beyond three can be granted having regard to the injustice that may result on refusal thereof, with reference to peculiar facts of a case. We may, however, add that grant of any adjournment let alone first, second or third adjournment is not a right of a party."

It was also pointed out - By mistake, instead of 'defendant's witnesses', the words 'plaintiff's witnesses' have been mentioned in Order VII Rule (4). To avoid any confusion, we direct that till the legislature corrects the mistake, the words 'plaintiffs witnesses, would be read as 'defendant's witnesses' in Order VII Rule 4....
Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many unscrupulous parties take advantage of the fact that either the costs are not awarded or nominal costs are awarded on the unsuccessful party. Unfortunately, it has become a practice to direct parties to bear their own costs...
The costs have to be actual reasonable costs including the cost of the time spent by the successful party, the transportation and lodging, if any, or any other incidental cost besides the payment of the court fee, lawyer's fee, typing and other cost in relation to the litigation. It is for the High Courts to examine these aspects and wherever necessary make requisite rules, regulations or practice direction so as to provide appropriate guidelines for the subordinate courts to follow...
Notice to government u/s 80 discussed as "The object also is to curtail the area of dispute and controversy. Similar provisions also exist in various other legislations as well. Wherever the statutory provision requires service of notice as a condition precedent for filing of suit and prescribed period therefore, it is not only necessary for the governments or departments or other statutory bodies to send a reply to such a notice but it is further necessary to properly deal with all material points and issues raised in the notice. The Governments, Government departments or statutory authorities are defendants in large number of suits pending in various courts in the country. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that in large number of cases either the notice is not replied or in few cases where reply is sent, it is generally vague and evasive. The result is that the object underlying section 80 of the Code and similar provisions gets defeated. It not only gives rise to avoidable litigation but also results in heavy expense and cost to the exchequer as well. Proper reply can result in reduction of litigation between State and the citizens. In case proper reply is sent either the claim in the notice may be admitted or area of controversy curtailed or the citizen may be satisfied on knowing the stand of the State. There is no accountability in the Government, Central or State or the statutory authorities in violating the spirit and object of section 80 .
40. These provisions cast an implied duty on all concerned governments and States and statutory authorities to send appropriate reply to such notices. Having regard to the existing state of affairs, we direct all concerned governments, Central or State or other authorities, whenever any statute requires service of notice as a condition precedent for filing of suit or other proceedings against it, to nominate, within a period of three months, an officer who shall be made responsible to ensure that replies to notices under section 80 or similar provisions are sent within the period stipulated in a particular legislation. The replies shall be sent after due application of mind. Despite such nomination, if the Court finds that either the notice has not been replied or reply is evasive and vague and has been sent without proper application of mind, the Court shall ordinarily award heavy cost against the Government and direct it to take appropriate action against the concerned Officer including recovery of costs from him."
section 89 uses both the word 'shall' and 'may' whereas Order X, Rule 1A uses the word 'shall' but on harmonious reading of these provisions it becomes clear that the use of the word 'may' in section 89 only governs the aspect of reformulation of the terms of a possible settlement and its reference to one of ADR methods. There is no conflict...
Settlement in Lok Adalat means settlement by Lok Adalat as contemplated by the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987. 'Judicial settlement' means a final settlement by way of compromise entered into before a suitable institution or person to which the Court has referred the dispute and which institution or person are deemed to be the Lok Adalats under the provisions of the Legal Service Authority Act, 1987....
So far as awarding of costs at the time of judgment is concerned, awarding of costs must be treated generally as mandatory in as much as the liberal attitude of the Courts in directing the parties to bear their own costs had led parties to file a number of frivolous cases in the Courts or to raise frivolous and unnecessary issues. Costs should invariably follow the event. Where a party succeeds ultimately on one issue or point but loses on number of other issues or points which were unnecessarily raised, costs must be appropriately apportioned. Special reasons must be assigned if costs are not being awarded....
The proceedings in a suit shall not be stayed merely because of the filing of Miscellaneous Application in the course of suit unless the Court in its discretion expressly thinks it necessary to stay the proceedings in the suit....
Filing of Written submissions : Both the appellants and the respondents shall be required to submit their written submissions two weeks before the commencement of the arguments in the appeal. The cause-list should indicate if written submissions have been filed or not. Wherever they have not been filed, the Court must insist on their being filed within a particular period to be fixed by the Court and each party must serve a copy thereof on the opposite side before the date of commencement of arguments.

Nov 9, 2011

P Rajendran Vs State of Madras

the court upheld the test of backwardness which was predominantly based on caste as it quoted

“Now if the reservation in question had been based only on caste and had not taken into account the social and educational backwardness of the caste in question, it would violate Article 15(1). But it must not be forgotten that a caste is also a class of citizens and if the caste as a whole is socially and educationally backward, reservation can be made in favor of such a caste on the ground that it is socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Article 15(4) and 15(5).”

Nov 7, 2011

Carlill Vs Carbolic smoke Ball co

“a wagering contract is one by which two persons, professions to hold opposite views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, mutually agree that , dependent upon the determination of that event, one shall win from the other and that other shall pay or hand over to him, a sum of money or other stake; neither of the parties having any other interest in the contract than the sum or stake he will so win or lose, there being no other consideration for making of such contract by either of the parties. If either of the parties may win but can’t lose, or may lose but can’t win, it is not a wagering contract

Nov 6, 2011

@Archana_AZian, 11/6/11 11:54 AM

Archana Negi (@Archana_AZian)
11/6/11 11:54 AM
@ShashiTharoor It is said that everybody has to pay for d wrong done by them,but it seems that d honest ppl r always first in d firing line.......naked truth


greatness

Once the V.V.Giri was President of India, there was an occasion to attend before the Court. The doubtfulness arose whether the first citizen of India can be summoned or not? He voluntarily attended before the court in respective gesture to magistrate by saying namaskaram and made an oath. The Magistrate offered one small stool respecting his elder age and offered to sit due to his obesity and VV Giri simply and gently refused his offer. It is the greatness of VV Giri.

Nov 5, 2011

DPP v Jones [1999] 2 AC 240

court ruled "the public highway is a public place which the public may enjoy for any reasonable purpose, providing that the activity in question does not amount to a public or private nuisance and does not obstruct the highway by reasonably impeding the primary right of the public to pass and repass; within these qualifications there is a public right of peaceful assembly on the highway."

Nov 4, 2011

PN Bhagwati

“The judicial system in the country is almost on the verge of collapse. Our judicial system is creaking under the weight of arrears.”

Salem Advocate Bar Association Vs Union of India AIR 2003 SC 189

The words added by amendment, it appears, fix outer time frame, by providing that steps must be taken within thirty days from the date of the institution of the suit, to issue summons.
It is quite evident that if all that is required to be done by a party, has been performed within the period of thirty days, then no fault can be attributed to the party. If for any reason, the court is not in a position or is unable to or does not issue summons within thirty days, there will, in our opinion, compliance with the provisions of Section 27 once within thirty days of the issue of the summons the party concerned has taken steps to file the process fee along with completing the other formalities which are required to enable the court to issue the summons.
it is quite obvious that the reason why Section 89 has been inserted to try and see that all the cases which are filed in court need not necessarily be decided by the court itself. Keeping in mind the laws delay and the limited number of Judges which are available, it has now become imperative that resort should be had to Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism with a view to bring to an end litigation between the parties at an early date. If there is any defect as contemplated by Rule 11(e) or non-compliance as referred to in Rule 11(f), the court should ordinarily give an opportunity for rectifying the defects and in the event of the same not being done the court will have the liberty or the right to reject the plaint.

Nov 3, 2011

Haridas Aildas Thadani and Ors Vs Godraj Rustom Kermani (1984) 1 SCC 668

It is well settled that the court should be extremely liberal in granting prayer for amendment of pleading unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. It is also clear that a revisional court ought not to lightly interfere with a discretion exercised in allowing amendment in absence of cogent reasons or compelling circumstances

Nov 2, 2011

Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs Narayanaswamy and Sons and Ors JT 2009 (13) SC 366

CPC -6/17- Suit was filed for recovery of consideration on the ground of violability of contract - can not be amended to claim that it was valid contract- Order VI Rule 17 is one of the important provisions of the CPC, but we have no hesitation in also observing that this is one of the most misused provision of the Code for dragging the proceedings indefinitely, particularly in the Indian courts which are otherwise heavily overburdened with the pending cases....
WHETHER AMENDMENT IS NECESSARY TO DECIDE REAL CONTROVERSY: 61. The first condition which must be satisfied before the amendment can be allowed by the court is whether such amendment is necessary for the determination of the real question in controversy. If that condition is not satisfied, the amendment cannot be allowed. This is the basic test which should govern the courts' discretion in grant or refusal of the amendment.
NO PREJUDICE OR INJUSTICE TO OTHER PARTY: 62. The other important condition which should govern the discretion of the Court is the potentiality of prejudice or injustice which is likely to be caused to other side. Ordinarily, if other side is compensated by costs, then there is no injustice but in practice hardly any court grants actual costs to the opposite side....
following parameters must be taken into consideration while imposing the costs. These factors are illustrative in nature and not exhaustive. (i) At what stage the amendment was sought?
(ii) While imposing the costs, it should be taken into consideration whether the amendment has been sought at a pre-trial or post-trial stage;
(iii)The financial benefit derived by one par- ty at the cost of other party should be properly calculated in terms of money and the costs be awarded accordingly.
(iv) The imposition of costs should not be symbolic but realistic;
(v) The delay and inconvenience caused to the opposite side must be clearly evaluated in terms of additional and extra court hearings compelling the opposite party to bear the extra costs.
(vi) In case of appeal to higher courts, the victim of amendment is compelled to bear considerable additional costs. All these aspects must be carefully taken into consideration while awarding the costs.
66. The purpose of imposing costs is to: a) Discourage malafide amendments designed to delay the legal proceedings;
b) Compensate the other party for the delay and the inconvenience caused;
c) Compensate the other party for avoid- able expenses on the litigation which had to be incurred by opposite party for opposing the amendment; and
d) To send a clear message that the par- ties have to be careful while drafting the original pleadings. FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WHILE DEALING WITH APPLICATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS 67. On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment. (1) Whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case?
(2) Whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide?
(3) The amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money;
(4) Refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multi- ple litigation;
(5) Whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case? and
(6) As a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application

Oct 23, 2011

Hiragauri Ratilal And Ors Vs Hajam Sumar Ladha

Gujarat High Court on 21 August, 2006
- one of the co owner or successor may apply for redemption of mortgage without joining other

Oct 22, 2011

Ganduri Koteshwaramma Vs. Chakiri Yanadi

Decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on 15.06.11- Hindu succession Act- section 6-
there is no impediment for the court to amend the preliminary decree or pass another preliminary decree redetermining the rights and interests of the parties having regard to the changed situation...- in this case preliminary was passed before the amendment of 2005- thus it was held that same is not barred to passing a final decree on the basis of amendment

Oct 18, 2011

Thota Venkateswarlu Vs State of A P

Decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on 02.09.11-
CrPC - section 188- offence by Indian outside India- after discussing the case of Ajay Aggarwal Vs Union of India & Ors [(1993) 3 SCC 609] Hon'ble Court held that only trial can not proceed with unless sanction of govt is obtained - Magistrate may take cognisance of offence

Sep 23, 2011

High Court sets aside order to book 13 cops for 2002 ‘encounter’ - Express India

High Court sets aside order to book 13 cops for 2002 ‘encounter’ - Express India: "Dayal Krishan, the prosecutor appearing for the government, further pointed that the CBI had not adduced before the CMM the statements of three material witnesses — the then DCP (East) and two mediapersons who had said that the policemen fired in self-defence.

"

'via Blog this'

Sep 22, 2011

Pal @ Palla Vs State of UP (2010) 10 SCC 123


"Sub-section (2) of Section 210 provides that if a report is made by the investigating officer under Section 173 and on such report cognizance of any offence is taken by the Magistrate against any person, who is an accused in a complaint case, the Magistrate shall inquire into or try the two cases together, as if both the cases had been instituted on a police report. Sub-section (3) provides that if the police report does not relate to any accused in the complaint case, or if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on a police report, he shall proceed with the inquiry or trial which was stayed by him, in accordance with the provisions of the Code....

As was observed in Harjinder Singh case clubbing and consolidating the two cases, one on a police challan and the other on a complaint, if the prosecution versions in the two cases are materially different, contradictory and mutually exclusive, should not be consolidated but should be tried together with the evidence in the two cases being recorded separately, so that both the cases could be disposed of simultaneously."

Sep 21, 2011

Revanasiddappa & Another Vs Mallikarjun & Others


HMA- section 16(2)- legitimacy of child from second marriage and their share in ancestral property- matter referred to larger bench-  

25. The legislature has used the word "property" in Section 16(3) and is silent on whether such property is meant to be ancestral or self-acquired. Section 16 contains an express mandate that such children are only entitled to the property of their parents, and not of any other relation.

26. On a careful reading of Section 16 (3) of the Act we are of the view that the amended Section postulates that such children would not be entitled to any rights in the property of any person who is not his parent if he was not entitled to them, by virtue of his illegitimacy, before the passing of the amendment. However, the said prohibition does not apply to the property of his parents. Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 16 expressly declare that such children shall be legitimate. If they have been declared legitimate, then they cannot be discriminated against and they will be at par with other legitimate children, and be entitled to all the rights in the property of their parents, both self-acquired and ancestral. The prohibition contained in Section 16(3) will apply to such children with respect to property of any person other than their parents.

27. With changing social norms of legitimacy in every society, including ours, what was illegitimate in the past may be legitimate today. The concept of legitimacy stems from social consensus, in the shaping of which various social groups play a vital role. Very often a dominant group loses its primacy over other groups in view of ever changing socio- economic scenario and the consequential vicissitudes in human relationship. Law takes its own time to articulate such social changes through a process of amendment. That is why in a changing society law cannot afford to remain static. If one looks at the history of development of Hindu Law it will be clear that it was never static and has changed from time to time to meet the challenges of the changing social pattern in different time....
With the amendment of Section 16(3), the common law view that the offsprings of marriage which is void and voidable are illegitimate `ipso-jure' has to change completely. We must recognize the status of such children which has been legislatively declared legitimate and simultaneously law recognises the rights of such children in the property of their parents. This is a law to advance the socially beneficial purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on such children who are as innocent as any other children....
However, one thing must be made clear that benefit given under the amended Section 16 is available only in cases where there is a marriage but such marriage is void or voidable in view of the provisions of the Act.
In the instant case, Section 16(3) as amended, does not impose any restriction on the property right of such children except limiting it to the property of their parents. Therefore, such children will have a right to whatever becomes the property of their parents whether self acquired or ancestral.