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Feb 28, 2011

Dass Chadha Vs State of Rajasthan AIR 1966 SC 1418

scope of Section 406 of Code of Criminal Procedure--
A case is transferred if there is a reasonable apprehension on the part of a party to a case that justice will not be done. A petitioner is not required to demonstrate that justice will inevitably fail. He is entitled to a transfer if he shows circumstances from which it can be inferred that he entertains an apprehension and that it is reasonable in the circumstances alleged. It is one of the principles of the administration of justice that justice should not only be done but it should be seen to be done. However, a mere allegation that there is apprehension that justice will not be done in a given case does not suffice. The Court has further to see whether apprehension is reasonable or not. To judge the reasonableness of the apprehension the state of the mind of the person who entertains the apprehension is no doubt relevant but that is not all. The apprehension must not only be entertained, but must appear to the court to be a reasonable apprehension.

Feb 27, 2011

Vikas Kumar Roorkewal Vs State of Uttarakhand and others

In jan 2011 Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
The fact that the driver had turned hostile is not in dispute. The fact that in spite of the receipt of several summons neither the petitioner nor his wife nor his family members nor other witnesses have been able to go to Haridwar to depose before the Court is not denied by the State Government. Therefore, this Court is inclined to accept the case of the petitioner that he and other witnesses have not been able to respond the summons only because of fear to their lives due to the threats administered by the accomplices of the accused. Case is transfer to Delhi.

Feb 26, 2011

Maneka Sanjay Gandhi Vs Rani Jethmalani (1979) 4 SCC 167


Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
“Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party or easy availability of legal services or like mini-grievances. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperilling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from case to case. We have to test the petitioner’s grounds on this touchstone bearing in mind the rule that normally the complainant has the right to choose any court having jurisdiction and the accused cannot dictate where the case against him should be tried. Even so, the process of justice should not harass the parties and from that angle the court may weigh the circumstances.

Feb 25, 2011

Himanshu Singh Sabharwal Vs State of MP and others (2008) 4 SCR 783


Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
"Witnesses" as Benthem said: are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of trial process. If the witness himself is incapacitated from acting as eyes and ears of justice, the trial gets putrefied and paralysed, and it no longer can constitute a fair trial. The incapacitation may be due to several factors like the witness being not in a position for reasons beyond control to speak the truth in the Court or due to negligence or ignorance or some corrupt collusion. Time has become ripe to act on account of numerous experiences faced by Courts on account of frequent turning of witnesses as hostile, either due to threats, coercion, lures and monetary considerations at the instance of those in power, their henchmen and hirelings, political clouts and patronage and innumerable other corrupt practices ingenuously adopted to smoother and stifle truth and realities coming out to surface rendering truth and justice, to become ultimate casualties. Broader public and societal interests require that the victims of the crime who are not ordinarily parties to prosecution and the interests of State represented by their prosecuting agencies do not suffer even in slow process but irreversibly and irretrievably, which if allowed would undermine and destroy public confidence in the administration of justice, which may ultimately pave way for anarchy, oppression and injustice resulting in complete breakdown and collapse of the edifice of rule of law, enshrined and jealously guarded and protected by the Constitution. There comes the need for protecting the witness. Time has come when serious and undiluted thoughts are to be bestowed for protecting witnesses so that ultimate truth is presented before the Court and justice triumphs and the trial is not reduced to mockery. The State has a definite role to play in protecting the witnesses, to start with at least in sensitive cases involving those in power, who has political patronage and could wield muscle and money power, to avert trial getting tainted and derailed and truth becoming a casualty. As a protector of its citizens it has to ensure that during a trial in Court the witness could safely depose truth without any fear of being haunted by those against whom he has deposed. Some legislative enactments like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (in short the 'TADA Act') have taken note of the reluctance shown by witnesses to depose against dangerous criminals-terrorists. In a milder form also the reluctance and the hesitation of witnesses to depose against people with muscle power, money power or political power has become the order of the day. If ultimately truth is to be arrived at, the eyes and ears of justice have to be protected so that the interests of justice do not get incapacitated in the sense of making the proceedings before Courts mere mock trials as are usually seen in movies.
Legislative measures to emphasise prohibition against tampering with witness, victim or informant have become the imminent and inevitable need of the day. Conducts which illegitimately affect the presentation of evidence in proceedings before the Courts have to be seriously and sternly dealt with. There should not be any undue anxiety to only protect the interest of the accused. That would be unfair as noted above to the needs of the society. On the contrary, the efforts should be to ensure fair trial where the accused and the prosecution both get a fair deal. Public interest in the proper administration of justice must be given as much importance if not more, as the interests of the individual accused. In this courts have a vital role to play."

Feb 24, 2011

K Anbazhagan Vs Superintendent of Police (2004) 3 SCC 767

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
“Free and fair trial is sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution. It is trite law that justice should not only be done but it should be seen to have been done. If the criminal trial is not free and fair and not free from bias, judicial fairness and the criminal justice system would be at stake shaking the confidence of the public in the system and woe would be the rule of law. It is important to note that in such a case the question is not whether the petitioner is actually biased but the question is whether the circumstances are such that there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner."

Feb 23, 2011

Abdul Nazar Madani Vs State of Tamil Nadu (2000) 6 SCC 204


“The purpose of criminal trial is to dispense fair and impartial justice uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. When it is shown that public confidence in the fairness of a trial would be seriously undermined, any party can seek the transfer of a case within the State under Section 407 and anywhere in the country under Section 406 Cr.P.C. The apprehension of not getting a fair and impartial inquiry or trial is required to be reasonable and not imaginary, based upon conjectures and surmises. If it appears that the dispensation of criminal justice is not possible impartially and objectively and without any bias before any court or even at any place, the appropriate court may transfer the case to another court where it feels that holding of fair and proper trial is conducive. No universal or hard-and-fast rules can be prescribed for deciding a transfer petition which has always to be decided on the basis of the facts of each case. Convenience of the parties including the witness to be produced at the trial is also a relevant consideration for deciding the transfer petition. The convenience of the parties does not necessarily mean the convenience of the petitioners alone who approached the court on misconceived notions of apprehension. Convenience for the purposes of transfer means the convenience of the prosecution, other accused, the witnesses and the larger interest of the society."

Feb 22, 2011

Ramabai Padmakar Patil Vs Rukminibai Vishnu Vekhande

A will is executed to alter the mode of succession and by the very nature of things it is bound to result in either reducing or depriving the share of a natural heir. If a person intends his property to pass to his natural heirs, there is no necessity at all of executing a will. It is true that a propounder of the will has to remove all suspicious circumstances. Suspicion means doubt, conjecture or mistrust. But the fact that natural heirs have either been excluded or a lesser share has been given to them, by itself without anything more, cannot be held to be a suspicious circumstance, especially in a case where the bequest has been made in favour of an offspring.

Feb 21, 2011

Sunita Gupta Vs Inderjeet Singh & Anr

Decided on 31.01.11 by Delhi High Court as
A compromise is nothing but an agreement. The imprimatur of the Court in accepting the compromise and in passing a decree in terms thereof, confers the said agreement with the status of a lawful contract.

Feb 20, 2011

In re the Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979) 1 SCC 380

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed that Article 14 include
"(2) The State, in the exercise of its governmental power, has of necessity to make laws operating differently on different groups or classes of persons within its territory to attain particular ends in giving effect to its policies, and it must possess for that purpose large powers of distinguishing and classifying persons or things to be subjected to such laws.

(3) The constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary.

(4) The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same.

(5) By the process of classification, the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. This power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. Classification thus means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily.

(6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.

(7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act."

Feb 19, 2011

Yogita state Vs GNCT Delhi

in this case which was decided on 31.01.11 by Hon'ble Delhi High Court,
Court has no hesitation in holding that Respondent No.1 Government of NCT Delhi is liable to compensate the Petitioner and her two children for the death of her husband as a result of the bomb blast that took place at the Liberty Cinema Hall.

Feb 18, 2011

Dastane Vs Dastane, 1975 SC 1534


Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
"Condonation means forgiveness of the matrimonial offence and the restoration of offending spouse to the same position as he or she occupied before the offence was committed. To constitute condonation there must be, therefore, two things forgiveness and restoration."

Feb 17, 2011

Pershad Vs Darshana Devi (2001) 7 SCC 69


Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under

"There is an age old rule that if you dispute the correctness of the statement of a witness you must give him opportunity to explain his statement by drawing his attention to that part of it which is objected to as untrue, otherwise you cannot impeach..."

Feb 16, 2011

Vinita Saxena Vs Pankaj Pandit

As to what constitute the required mental cruelty for purposes of the said provision, will not depend upon the numerical count of such incidents or only on the continuous course of such conduct but really go by the intensity, gravity and stigmatic impact of it when meted out even once and the deleterious effect of it on the mental attitude, necessary for maintaining a conducive matrimonial home. If the taunts, complaints and reproaches are of ordinary nature only, the court perhaps need consider the further question as to whether their continuance or persistence over a period of time render, what normally would, otherwise, not be so serious an act to be so injurious and painful as to make the spouse charged with them genuinely and reasonably conclude that the maintenance of matrimonial home is not possible any longer.
The modern view of cruelty of one spouse to another in the eye of law has been summarised as follows in (1977) 42 DRJ 270 Halsbury Laws of England Vol.12, 3rd edition page 270:- The general rule in all kinds of cruelty that the whole matrimonial relations must be considered and that rule is of special value when the cruelty consists not of violent acts, but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations of taunts. Before coming to a conclusion, the judge must consider the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other, and all incidents and quarrels between the spouses must be weighed from the point of view. In determining what constitutes cruelty, regard must be had to the circumstances of each particular case, keeping always in view the physical and mental condition of the parties, and their character and social status.

Feb 15, 2011

Naveen Kohli Vs Neetu Kohli AIR 2006 SC 1675


Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
"to constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear of married life". The conduct taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party."

Feb 14, 2011

Jaya Ghosh Vs Samar Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511


Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under
"On proper analysis and scrutiny of the judgments of this Court and other Courts, we have come to the definite conclusion that there cannot be any comprehensive definition of the concept of 'mental cruelty' within which all kinds of cases of mental cruelty can be covered. No court in our considered view should even attempt to give a comprehensive definition of mental cruelty....Human mind is extremely complex and human behavior is equally complicated. Similarly human ingenuity has no bound, therefore, to assimilate the entire human behavior in one definition is almost impossible. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in other case. The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value system. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system etc. etc. What may be mental cruelty now may not remain a mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any strait-jacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking aforementioned factors in consideration."

Feb 13, 2011

Dr Seema Vs Dr Aklesh decided by High court of Delhi

Hon'ble High Court of Delhi observed,
"counsel contended that even if any alleged act of cruelty was committed by the appellant prior to the said date, the same stood condoned by the passionate letters sent by the respondent to the appellant. The other limb of argument taken by the counsel for the appellant was that a child was born.
It is also a settled legal position that there cannot be condonation if the offending spouse continues to indulge in the commission of further acts of cruelty either physical or mental. Either a temporary stay or even resumption of conjugal rights though may be strong circumstances to infer condonation on the part of the offending spouse but the same by itself would not be sufficient to draw an inference of condonation unless such a stay and resumption of conjugal relationship is with an intent to restore back the marital relationship with a sense of forgiveness and consequently not to indulge in either repeating the previous acts or to inflict more cruelty.

The conception of the child is thus an unflinching proof of condonation of the acts of the offending spouse.
From her callousness and brutal remarks about the respondent and his family members, it is clear that her cruelty continued and the previous acts also stood revived in the face of such a conduct. Even though the respondent by resuming connubial relations and showing overtures of forbearance had explicitly condoned the acts of cruelty prior to August, 1995, but in the face of the subsequent conduct of the appellant, the acts of cruelty would stand revived and the respondent would be entitled to the decree of divorce."

Feb 12, 2011

Feb 7, 2011

Yogita vs Government Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr. on 31 January, 2011

In D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court
observed that the Court was required to order compensatory relief " not by way of damages as in the civil action but by way of compensation in the public law jurisdiction for the wrong done, due to breach of public duty by the State of not protecting the fundamental right to life of the citizen. To repair the wrong done and give judicial redress for legal injury is a compulsion of judicial conscience." It was held that the award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed in Article 21 of the Constitution "is a remedy available in the public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure citizens that they live in a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of W.P. (C) No.21139 of 2005 Page 7 of 17 compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the Courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalizing the wrong doer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen."
State is liable to compensate the Petitioner and her two minor children for the death of her husband in the bomb blast that took place at the Liberty Cinema Hall.
full judgment

Feb 6, 2011

The Volokh Conspiracy » Supreme Court of the United Kingdom Apparently Holds That Shouting, Frequent “Denigration of … Personality,” and Denial of “Money for Housekeeping” May Qualify as “Domestic Violence”

Punjab Istri Sabha v. Surjit Singh Barnala


Hon'ble Punjab & Hariyana High Court observed
"The failure of the State to protect the life and limbs of its citizens itself is sufficient to give rise to the liability. Nothing more needs to be said - res ipsa loquitor. Such sufferance goes against the very grain of creation of a State or comity of individuals. The individual has surrendered certain individual rights for such safety. Taxes are paid for the functioning of a government. Safe environment is the very basic function. The citizens gave to themselves the Constitution of India and adopted a democratic polity. Franklin Roosevelt said:
"Democracy, the practice of self government, is a covenant among free man to respect the rights and liberties of their follows."
It is this respect of the rights of the petitioner which have been violated. He suffered grievous injuries and 90% disability on account of the wrongful acts of other persons which the State was not able to prevent. It was undoubtedly the duty of the State to have done so."

Feb 5, 2011

Shyama Devi Vs NCT of Delhi


"In such like cases the Courts expect strict and high standard of care from them. When there is a failure to perform duty which results in physical injury, deprivation of life or loss of property, Article 21 of the Constitution is attracted and the aggrieved party is entitled to invoke Article 226 to claim monetary or pecuniary compensation as such a remedy is available in pubic law based on strict liability for breach of fundamental right."

The Volokh Conspiracy » The Lesson to You Schoolchildren for Today: People in Authority Are Often Idiots

Feb 2, 2011

Brajendra Singh Vs State of MP (2008) 13 SCC 161

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under -"A married woman cannot adopt at all during the subsistence of the marriage except when the husband has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. If the husband is not under such disqualification, the wife cannot adopt even with the consent of the husband whereas the husband can adopt with the consent of the wife. This is clear from Section 7 of the Act. Proviso thereof makes it clear that a male Hindu cannot adopt except with the consent of the wife, unless the wife has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. It is relevant to note that in the case of a male Hindu the consent of the wife is necessary unless the other contingency exists. Though Section 8 is almost identical, the consent of the husband is not provided for. The proviso to Section 7 imposes a restriction in the right of male Hindu to take in adoption. In this respect the Act radically departs from the old law where no such bar was laid down to the exercise of the right of a male Hindu to adopt oneself, unless he dispossesses the requisite capacity. As per the proviso to Section 7 the wife's consent must be obtained prior to adoption and cannot be subsequent to the act of adoption. The proviso lays down consent as a condition precedent to an adoption which is mandatory and adoption without wife's consent would be void. Both proviso to Sections 7 and 8(c) refer to certain circumstances which have effect on the capacity to make an adoption"