Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, -One of the paramount duties of the Superior Courts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable complaint. What was the share of the respective co-sharers is a question which is purely a civil dispute; a criminal court cannot determine the same.
this Court in Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy and Anr. (2003) 1 SCC 734, wherein it was opined that second complaint was not completely barred in law. This Court, however, in that decision itself held that the second complaint can lie only on fresh facts and/or if a special case is made out.
Further, second complaint on the same facts could be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, namely, where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced.
Jan 30, 2011
Lakshmi and Anr Vs Chinnammal @ Rayyammal and Ors, Decided On 08.04.2009
interpretation of Order XIII Rule 10-
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under - Order XIII of the Code provides for production, impounding and return of documents. Rule 1 of the said Order mandates production of original documents by the parties at or before the settlement of issues. Rule 9 of the Order XIII provides for return of admitted documents. Rule 10 empowers the Court to send papers from its own records or from other courts.
If bringing on record a document is essential for proving the case by a party, ordinarily the same should not be refused; the Court's duty being to find out the truth. The procedural mechanics necessary to arrive at a just decision must be encouraged. We are not unmindful of the fact that the court in the said process would not encourage any fishing inquiry. It would also not assist a party in procuring a document which he should have himself filed.
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under - Order XIII of the Code provides for production, impounding and return of documents. Rule 1 of the said Order mandates production of original documents by the parties at or before the settlement of issues. Rule 9 of the Order XIII provides for return of admitted documents. Rule 10 empowers the Court to send papers from its own records or from other courts.
If bringing on record a document is essential for proving the case by a party, ordinarily the same should not be refused; the Court's duty being to find out the truth. The procedural mechanics necessary to arrive at a just decision must be encouraged. We are not unmindful of the fact that the court in the said process would not encourage any fishing inquiry. It would also not assist a party in procuring a document which he should have himself filed.
Jan 29, 2011
Kashibai v. Parwatibai (1995) 6 SCC 213
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed that in the absence of the consent of one of the two wives, the adoption by the husband could not be treated as valid one.
Jan 28, 2011
Kailash Vs and Ors (2005) 4 SCC 480
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed -
All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation.
All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation.
Jan 27, 2011
Kalyani Vs Janak C Mehta and Ors (2009) 1 SCC 516
(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.
Jan 26, 2011
Shanti Kumar Panda Vs Shakuntala Devi (2004) 1 SCC 438
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed-
A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal court.
A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal court.
Jan 25, 2011
Uday Shankar Triyar Vs Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Anr (2006) 1 SCC 75,
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed -
Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a hand-maiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well recognized exceptions to this principle are:
i) where the Statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of noncompliance.
ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court.
v) in case of Memorandum of Appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.
Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a hand-maiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well recognized exceptions to this principle are:
i) where the Statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of noncompliance.
ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court.
v) in case of Memorandum of Appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.
Jan 24, 2011
Narendra Vs State of Karnataka, Decided On: 05.05.2009
A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
Jan 23, 2011
Leo Roy FRey Vs The Suprentendent District Jail Amritsar and Another AIR 1958 SC 119
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed -It is true that the Collector of Customs has used the words 'punishment' and 'conspiracy', but those words were used in order to bring out that each of the two petitioners was guilty of the offence under s. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. The petitioners were not and could never be charged with criminal conspiracy before the Collector of Customs and therefore Art. 20(2) cannot be invoked.
Jan 22, 2011
Monica Bedi Vs State of AP
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed, -Article 20 (2) embodies a protection against a second trial and conviction for the same offence. The fundamental right guaranteed is the manifestation of a long struggle by the mankind for human rights. A similar guarantee is to be found in almost all civilised societies governed by rule of law. The well known maxim `nemo delset bis vexari pro eadem causa; embodies the well established common law rule that no one should be put on peril twice for the same offence. BLACKSTONE referred to this universal maxim of the common law of England that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence.
The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) has its roots in common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari - a man shall not be brought into danger for one and the same offence more than once. If a person is charged again for the same offence, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of autrefois convict. This in essence is the common law principle. The corresponding provision in the American Constitution is enshrined in that part of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The principle has been recognised in the existing law in India and is enacted in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. This was the inspiration and background for incorporating sub- clause (2) into Article 20 of the Constitution. But the ambit and content of the guaranteed fundamental right are much narrower than those of the common law in England or the doctrine of `double jeopardy' in the American Constitution.
What is the meaning of expression used in Article 20 (2) "for the same offence"? What is prohibited under Article 20 (2) is, the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable.
It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20 (2) is not available. It is settled law that a person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence.
In Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Volume-IX, the law is succinctly summarised on this aspect of the matter as:
"If the defendant pleads autrefois convict or autrefois acquit, the prosecution replies or demurs. If the prosecution replies, which is the usual course, a jury is sworn to try the issue(x). The onus of proving the plea is on the defendant (a). He may prove it by producing a certified copy of the record or proceedings of the alleged previous conviction or acquittal (b), and showing by such copy or by other evidence, if necessary, that he has been convicted or acquitted of the same, or practically the same, offence as that on which he has been arraigned (c), or that he might on his former trial have been convicted of the offence on which he has been arraigned (d). The question for the jury on the issue is whether the defendant has previously been in jeopardy in respect of the charge on which he is arraigned (e), for the rule of law is that a person must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other, not that the facts relied on by the Crown are the same in the two trials (f)."
The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) has its roots in common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari - a man shall not be brought into danger for one and the same offence more than once. If a person is charged again for the same offence, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of autrefois convict. This in essence is the common law principle. The corresponding provision in the American Constitution is enshrined in that part of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The principle has been recognised in the existing law in India and is enacted in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. This was the inspiration and background for incorporating sub- clause (2) into Article 20 of the Constitution. But the ambit and content of the guaranteed fundamental right are much narrower than those of the common law in England or the doctrine of `double jeopardy' in the American Constitution.
What is the meaning of expression used in Article 20 (2) "for the same offence"? What is prohibited under Article 20 (2) is, the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable.
It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20 (2) is not available. It is settled law that a person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence.
In Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Volume-IX, the law is succinctly summarised on this aspect of the matter as:
"If the defendant pleads autrefois convict or autrefois acquit, the prosecution replies or demurs. If the prosecution replies, which is the usual course, a jury is sworn to try the issue(x). The onus of proving the plea is on the defendant (a). He may prove it by producing a certified copy of the record or proceedings of the alleged previous conviction or acquittal (b), and showing by such copy or by other evidence, if necessary, that he has been convicted or acquitted of the same, or practically the same, offence as that on which he has been arraigned (c), or that he might on his former trial have been convicted of the offence on which he has been arraigned (d). The question for the jury on the issue is whether the defendant has previously been in jeopardy in respect of the charge on which he is arraigned (e), for the rule of law is that a person must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other, not that the facts relied on by the Crown are the same in the two trials (f)."
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