Un-aided P School of Rajasthan Vs UOI SC of India on 12.04.12

A child who is denied right to access education is not only deprived of his right to live with dignity, he is also deprived of his right to freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Article 19(1)(a).

the controversy in T.M.A. Pai Foundation arose in the light of the scheme framed in Unni Krishnan's case and the judgment in P.A. Inamdar was almost a sequel to the directions in Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka [(2003) 6 SCC 697] in which the entire focus was Institution centric and not child centric and that too in the context of higher education and professional education where the level of merit and excellence have to be given a different weightage than the one we have to give in the case of Universal Elementary Education for strengthening social fabric of democracy through provision of equal opportunities to all and for children of weaker section and disadvantaged group who seek admission not to higher education or professional courses but to Class I.

Is the 2009 Act intended to apply to unaided minority schools? In answer to the above question, it is important to note that in the case of P.A. Inamdar, this Court held that there shall be no reservations in private unaided colleges and that in that regard there shall be no difference between the minority and non-minority institutions. However, by the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005, Article 15 is amended. It is given Article 15(5). The result is that P.A. Inamdar has been overruled on two counts: (a) whereas this Court in P.A. Inamdar had stated that there shall be no reservation in private unaided colleges, the Amendment decreed that there shall be reservations; (b) whereas this Court in P.A. Inamdar had said that there shall be no difference between the unaided minority and nonminority institutions, the Amendment decreed that there shall be a difference. Article 15(5) is an enabling provision and it is for the respective States either to enact a legislation or issue an executive instruction providing for reservation except in the case of minority educational institutions referred to in Article 30(1). The intention of the Parliament is that the minority educational institution referred to in Article 30(1) is a separate category of institutions which needs protection of Article 30(1) and viewed in that light we are of the view that unaided minority school(s) needs special protection under Article 30(1). Article 30(1) is not conditional as Article 19(1)(g).
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 is constitutionally valid and shall apply to the following: (i) a school established, owned or controlled by the appropriate Government or a local authority; (ii) an aided school including aided minority school(s) receiving aid or grants to meet whole or part of its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local authority; (iii) a school belonging to specified category; and (iv) an unaided non-minority school not receiving any kind of aid or grants to meet its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local authority. However, the said 2009 Act and in particular Sections 12(1)(c) and 18(3) infringes the fundamental freedom guaranteed to unaided minority schools under Article 30(1).

Accused are entitled for legal aid at each stage of proceedings

in Rajoo @ Ramakant vs State Of MP on 9 August, 2012 Hon'ble Madan B Lakur, Judge Supreme court of India
"we are of the opinion that neither the Constitution nor the Legal Services Authorities Act makes any distinction between a trial and an appeal for the purposes of providing free legal aid to an accused or a person in custody. We are also of the view that the High Court was under an obligation to enquire from Rajoo whether he required legal assistance and if he did, it should have been provided to him at State expense. However, since the record of the case does not indicate any such endeavour having been made by the High Court, this case ought to be re- heard by the High Court after providing Rajoo an opportunity of obtaining legal representation."

एक बार एक भक्त ने बड़ी श्रद्धा के साथ भगवान से कहा

एक बार एक भक्त ने बड़ी श्रद्धा के साथ भगवान से कहा
भगवन,
ये दुनिया आप के अस्तित्व पर शक करती है क्या करूं।
भगवन मुस्कराने लगे,
और बोले ऐ मूर्ख
ये कलयुग है जिनके काम तु भी नहीं कर सकेगा
वो तेरा अस्तित्व भी नहीं मानेंगे।



Praveen Gupta

श्रद्धा

एक बार एक भक्त ने बड़ी श्रद्धा के साथ भगवान से कहा
भगवन,
ये दुनिया आप के अस्तित्व पर शक करती है क्या करूं।
भगवन मुस्कराने लगे,
और बोले ऐ मूर्ख
ये कलयुग है जिनके काम तु भी नहीं कर सकेगा
वो तेरा अस्तित्व भी नहीं मानेंगे।



Praveen Gupta

श्रद्धा

एक बार एक भक्त ने बड़ी श्रद्धा के साथ भगवान से कहा
भगवन,
ये दुनिया आप के अस्तित्व पर शक करती है क्या करूं।
भगवन मुस्कराने लगे,
और बोले ऐ मूर्ख
ये कलयुग है जिनके काम तु भी नहीं कर सकेगा
वो तेरा अस्तित्व भी नहीं मानेंगे।



Praveen Gupta

Imprisonment may be awarded in default to pay compensation u/s 357 CrPC.

2012 STPL(Web) 338 SC- R Mohan Vs A K Vijaya Kumar
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed on imprisonment in default of paying compensation as

In Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. [(1988) 4 SCC 551], the accused were convicted and sentenced under Section 325 read with Section 149, Section 323 read with Section 149 and Section 148 of the IPC. They were released on probation of good conduct. Each of them was ordered to pay compensation of Rs.2,500/- to the injured. In default of payment of compensation, they were directed to serve their sentence. This court inter alia considered whether the compensation awarded to the injured could be legally sustained. This court observed that the power of the court under Section 357(3) to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences, but it is in addition thereto and is intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. This court further observed that it is a measure of responding appropriately to crime as well as of reconciling the victim with the offender. Describing it as a constructive approach to crime, this court recommended to all courts to exercise this power liberally so as to meet the ends of justice in a better way. It was clarified that the order to pay compensation may be enforced by awarding sentence in default. The relevant observations of this court may be advantageously quoted. "11. The payment by way of compensation must, however, be reasonable. What is reasonable may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The quantum of compensation may be determined by taking into account the nature of crime, the justness of claim by the victim and the ability of accused to pay. If there are more than one accused they may be asked to pay in equal terms unless their capacity to pay varies considerably. The payment may also vary depending upon the acts of each accused. Reasonable period for payment of compensation, if necessary by instalments, may also be given. The court may enforce the order by imposing sentence in default."

Undoubtedly, there is no specific provision in the Code which enables the court to sentence a person who commits breach of the order of payment of compensation. Section 421 of the Code provides for the action which the court can take for the recovery of the fine where the accused has been sentenced to pay a fine.
In K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan [(1997) 7 SCC 510] while considering Section 357 (3) of the Code this Court expressed that if the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class were to order compensation to be paid to the complainant from out of the fine realised the complainant will be the loser when the cheque amount exceeded the said limit. In such a case a complainant would get only the maximum amount of rupees five thousand because Judicial Magistrate First Class can as per Section 29 (2) of the Code pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding Rs. 5,000/-, or of both (the said amount is now increased to Rs. 10,000/-). This Court clarified that in such cases the Magistrate can alleviate the grievance of the complainant by taking resort to Section 357(3) of the Code. 18. The idea behind directing the accused to pay compensation to the complainant is to give him immediate relief so as to alleviate his grievance. In terms of Section 357(3) compensation is awarded for the loss or injury suffered by the person due to the act of the accused for which he is sentenced. If merely an order, directing compensation, is passed, it would be totally ineffective. It could be an order without any deterrence or apprehension of immediate adverse consequences in case of its non- observance. The whole purpose of giving relief to the complainant under Section 357(3) of the Code would be frustrated if he is driven to take recourse to Section 421 of the Code. Order under Section 357 (3) must have potentiality to secure its observance. Deterrence can only be infused into the order by providing for a default sentence. If Section 421 of the Code puts compensation ordered to be paid by the court on par with fine so far as mode of recovery is concerned, then there is no reason why the court cannot impose a sentence in default of payment of compensation as it can be done in case of default in payment of fine under Section 64 of the IPC. It is obvious that in view of this, in Vijayan, this court stated that the above mentioned provisions enabled the court to impose a sentence in default of payment of compensation and rejected the submission that the recourse can only be had to Section 421 of the Code for enforcing the order of compensation. Pertinently, it was made clear that observations made by this Court in Hari Singh are as important today as they were when they were made. The conclusion, therefore, is that the order to pay compensation may be enforced by awarding sentence in default.



Praveen Gupta

Compensation to victim

Hari Singh Vs Sukhbir Singh & Ors (1988) 4 SCC 551

11. The payment by way of compensation must, however, be reasonable. What is reasonable may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The quantum of compensation may be determined by taking into account the nature of crime, the justness of claim by the victim and the ability of accused to pay. If there are more than one accused they may be asked to pay in equal terms unless their capacity to pay varies considerably. The payment may also vary depending upon the acts of each accused. Reasonable period for payment of compensation, if necessary by instalments, may also be given. The court may enforce the order by imposing sentence in default


Praveen Gupta

कल हमें किसी ने रोका,

कल हमें किसी ने रोका,
और पुछा इतनी गफलत में क्यों रहते हो,
इतनी लापरवाही से क्यों चलाते हो,
अंग्रेजी मिल जाती है या देशी में काम चलाते हो,
हमने सोचा कि बता दे,
अंग्रेजी या देशी अब असर नहीं करती,
किन्हीं आँखों से इतनी पी आए है कि अब तो दवा भी असर नहीं करती।


Praveen Gupta

State of U P Vs Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as
“18. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail [see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)]. While a vague allegation that the accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused. We may also refer to the following principles relating to grant or refusal of bail stated in 22. While a detailed examination of the evidence is to be avoided while considering the question of bail, to ensure that there is no prejudging and no prejudice, a brief examination to be satisfied about the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case is necessary.”

हमें तो अहसास है दुनिया वालो कि हम पागल है,

हमें तो अहसास है दुनिया वालो कि हम पागल है,
पर कोई उन्हे भी तो बताओ कि उनके लिए पागल है।
वो इस तरह से मुँह फेरे बैठे है जैसे पहचानते न हो,
हम इस तरह उम्मीद में है जैसे वो भगवान ही हो।
कोई उन्हे दीवाना कर दे या हमें समझा दे
ये बेखुदी का आलम एक तरफ़ सा ही क्यों है।



Praveen Gupta