Supreme Court clarifies arbitrator's power to award interest - International Law Office

Supreme Court clarifies arbitrator's power to award interest - International Law Office:

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High Court sets aside order to book 13 cops for 2002 ‘encounter’ - Express India

High Court sets aside order to book 13 cops for 2002 ‘encounter’ - Express India: "Dayal Krishan, the prosecutor appearing for the government, further pointed that the CBI had not adduced before the CMM the statements of three material witnesses — the then DCP (East) and two mediapersons who had said that the policemen fired in self-defence.

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Pal @ Palla Vs State of UP (2010) 10 SCC 123

"Sub-section (2) of Section 210 provides that if a report is made by the investigating officer under Section 173 and on such report cognizance of any offence is taken by the Magistrate against any person, who is an accused in a complaint case, the Magistrate shall inquire into or try the two cases together, as if both the cases had been instituted on a police report. Sub-section (3) provides that if the police report does not relate to any accused in the complaint case, or if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on a police report, he shall proceed with the inquiry or trial which was stayed by him, in accordance with the provisions of the Code....

As was observed in Harjinder Singh case clubbing and consolidating the two cases, one on a police challan and the other on a complaint, if the prosecution versions in the two cases are materially different, contradictory and mutually exclusive, should not be consolidated but should be tried together with the evidence in the two cases being recorded separately, so that both the cases could be disposed of simultaneously."

Revanasiddappa & Another Vs Mallikarjun & Others

HMA- section 16(2)- legitimacy of child from second marriage and their share in ancestral property- matter referred to larger bench-  

25. The legislature has used the word "property" in Section 16(3) and is silent on whether such property is meant to be ancestral or self-acquired. Section 16 contains an express mandate that such children are only entitled to the property of their parents, and not of any other relation.

26. On a careful reading of Section 16 (3) of the Act we are of the view that the amended Section postulates that such children would not be entitled to any rights in the property of any person who is not his parent if he was not entitled to them, by virtue of his illegitimacy, before the passing of the amendment. However, the said prohibition does not apply to the property of his parents. Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 16 expressly declare that such children shall be legitimate. If they have been declared legitimate, then they cannot be discriminated against and they will be at par with other legitimate children, and be entitled to all the rights in the property of their parents, both self-acquired and ancestral. The prohibition contained in Section 16(3) will apply to such children with respect to property of any person other than their parents.

27. With changing social norms of legitimacy in every society, including ours, what was illegitimate in the past may be legitimate today. The concept of legitimacy stems from social consensus, in the shaping of which various social groups play a vital role. Very often a dominant group loses its primacy over other groups in view of ever changing socio- economic scenario and the consequential vicissitudes in human relationship. Law takes its own time to articulate such social changes through a process of amendment. That is why in a changing society law cannot afford to remain static. If one looks at the history of development of Hindu Law it will be clear that it was never static and has changed from time to time to meet the challenges of the changing social pattern in different time....

With the amendment of Section 16(3), the common law view that the offsprings of marriage which is void and voidable are illegitimate `ipso-jure' has to change completely. We must recognize the status of such children which has been legislatively declared legitimate and simultaneously law recognises the rights of such children in the property of their parents. This is a law to advance the socially beneficial purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on such children who are as innocent as any other children....
However, one thing must be made clear that benefit given under the amended Section 16 is available only in cases where there is a marriage but such marriage is void or voidable in view of the provisions of the Act.
In the instant case, Section 16(3) as amended, does not impose any restriction on the property right of such children except limiting it to the property of their parents. Therefore, such children will have a right to whatever becomes the property of their parents whether self acquired or ancestral.

Allauddin Mian and others Sharif Mian and another Vs State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5,

"....Therefore, in order to fasten vicarious responsibility on any member of an unlawful assembly the prosecution must prove that the act constituting an offence was done in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or the act done is such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of that assembly. Under this section, therefore, every member of an unlawful assembly renders himself liable for the criminal act or acts of any other member or members of that assembly provided the same is/are done in prosecution of the common object or is/are such as every member of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. This section creates a specific offence and makes every member of the unlawful assembly liable for the offence or offences committed in the course of the occurrence provided the same was/were committed in prosecution of the common object or was/were such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. Since this section imposes a constructive penal liability, it must be strictly construed as it seeks to punish members of an unlawful assembly for the offence or offences committed by their associate or associates in carrying out the common object of the assembly. What is important in each case is to find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the common object of the assembly or was one which the members knew to be likely to be committed. There must be a nexus between the common object and the offence committed and if it is found that the same was committed to accomplish the common object every member of the assembly will become liable for the same. Therefore, any offence committed by a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of any one or more of the five objects mentioned in Section 141 will render his companions constituting the unlawful assembly liable for that offence with the aid of Section 149, IPC...." 

State of Rajasthan Vs Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180

Evidence - sec 24- extra judicial confession -

"An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not open to any court to start with a presumption that extra- judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility."

State Of Uttaranchal Vs M/S. Golden Forest Co (P) Ltd, on 11 April, 2011 SC

The only question which arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the Board of Revenue, U.P. could hear and decide the revisions filed by the appellant after creation of the State of Uttranchal (renamed as Uttrakhand) by the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000.

Held - No

Associated Hotels of India Ltd Vs RN Kapoor, [1960] 1

whether a transaction amounts to a lease or a license - "27. There is a marked distinction between a lease and a license. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease of immovable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration for a price paid or promised. Under Section 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A lease is thereforee a transfer of an interest in land. The interest transferred is called the leasehold interest. The Lesser parts with his right to enjoy the property during the term of the lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that right to the exclusion of the Lesser. Whereas Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act defines a license.

Under the aforesaid section, if a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a license. The legal possession, thereforee, continues to be with the owner of the property, but the licensee is permitted to make use of the premises for a particular purpose. But for the permission his occupation would be unlawful. It does not create in his favor any estate or interest in the property. There is, therefore, clear distinction between the two concepts. The dividing line is dear through sometimes it becomes very thin or even blurred

Qudrat Ullah Vs Municipal Board Bareilly, (1974) 1 SCC 202

"... If an interest in immovable property, entitling the transferors to enjoyment is created, it is a lease; if permission to use land without right to exclusive possession is alone granted, a license is the legal result."

Chandran @ Manichan @ Maniyan Vs State of Kerala, SC

extract of the judgment-
Alcohol has already proved itself to be one of the major enemies of the human beings. However, its grip is not loosened in spite of the realization of the evil effects of alcohol on the human life. On the other hand, the unholy grip is being tightened day by day. Therefore, when the standard and healthy alcohol in the form of liquor is not available or is too costly for a common man, the poor section of the society goes for illicitly distilled liquor which is sold by the bootleggers. The conscienceless bootleggers - thanks to their avarice for money - take full advantage of this human weakness and without any compunction or qualms of conscience, distill illicit liquor and then to increase the sale and to gain astronomical profits make their product more potent at least in taste so as to attract the poor customers. Such poor customers invariably become the prey of such unholy avarice on the part of the bootleggers and in the process even lose their lives at times or suffer such injuries which are irreparable like total blindness etc. and that is precisely what has happened in this case....

The argument raised was that this evidence could not be taken into consideration and it would be inadmissible because this witness, though was an accomplice he was neither granted pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. nor was he prosecuted and the prosecution unfairly presented him as a witness for the prosecution. The contention is clearly incorrect in view of the decision of this Court in Laxmipat Choraria & Ors. V. State Of Maharashtra [AIR 1968 SC 938]. While commenting on this aspect, Hidayatullah, J. observed in paragraph 13 that there were number of decisions in the High Courts in which the examination of one of the suspects as the witness was not held to be legal and accomplice evidence was received subject to safeguards as admissible evidence in the case. The Court held:"On the side of the State many cases were cited from the High Courts in India in which the examination of one of the suspects as a witness was not held to be illegal and accomplice evidence was received subject to safeguards as admissible evidence in the case.

In those cases, s. 342 of the Code and s. 5 of the Indian Oaths Act were considered and the word 'accused' as used in those sections was held to denote a person actually on trial before a court and not a person who could have been so tried. The witness was, of course, treated as an accomplice. The evidence of such an accomplice was received with necessary caution in those cases. These cases have all been mentioned in In re Kandaswami Gounder and it is not necessary to refer to them in detail here....

it has been consistently held that the evidence of an accomplice may be read although he could have been tried jointly with the accused.

In some of these cases the evidence was re-ceived although the procedure of s. 337, Criminal Procedure Code was applicable but was not followed. It is not necessary to deal with this question any further because the consensus of opinion in India is that the competency of an accomplice is not destroyed because he could have been tried jointly with the accused but was not and was instead made to give evidence in the case. Section 5 of the Indian Oaths Act and s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not stand in the way of such a procedure."The Court finally observed:"It is not necessary to deal with this question any further because the consensus of opinion in India is that the competency of an accomplice is not destroyed because he could have been tried jointly with the accused but was not and was instead made to give evidence in the case." The Court has also observed in paragraph 11:

The position that emerges is this : No pardon could be tendered to Ethyl Wong because the pertinent provisions did not apply. Nor could she be prevented from making a disclosure, if she was so minded. The prosecution was not bound to prosecute her, if they thought that her evidence was necessary to break a smugglers' ring. Ethyl Wong was protected by s. 132 (proviso) of the Indian Evidence Act even if she gave evidence incriminating herself. She was a competent witness although her evidence could only be received with the caution necessary in all accomplice evidence. The expression 'criminal proceeding' in the exclusionary clause of s. 5 of the Indian Oaths Act cannot be used to widen the meaning of the word accused. The same expression is used in the proviso to S. 132 of the Indian Evidence Act and there it means a criminal trial and not investigation.

The same meaning must be given to the exclusionary clause of s. 5 of the Indian Oaths Act to make it -conform to the provisions in pari materia to be found in Ss. 342, 342A of the Code and s. 132 of the Indian Evidence Act. The expression is also not rendered superfluous because if given the meaning accepted by us it limits, the operation of the exclusionary clause to criminal prosecution as opposed to investigations and civil proceedings. It is to be noticed that although the English Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, which (omitting the immaterial words) provides that "Every person charged with an offence...... shall be a competent witness for the defence at every stage of the proceedings" was not interpreted as conferring a right on the prisoner of giving evidence on his own behalf before the grand jury or in other words, it received a limited meaning; see Queen v. Rhodes (1899) 1 QB 77.

"This case would bring about the legal position that even if the prosecution did not prosecute PW-53 and used his evidence only as an accomplice, it was perfectly legal. The evidence of such witness subject to the usual caution was admissible evidence. The contention of Shri Radha Krishnnan that his evidence would be inadmissible because he was not granted pardon or he was not made accused would, thus, be of no consequence and is rejected. In this backdrop, after considering the whole material and the findings of the Trial Court and the appellate Court, we have no hesitation to hold that the Trial Court and the appellate Court were right in convicting A-7.

Pradeep Oil Corporation Vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi, on 6 April, 2011 SC

TPA - lease & license -A license may be created on deal or parole and it would be revocable. However, when it is accompanied with grant it becomes irrevocable. A mere license does not create interest in the property to which it relates. License may be personal or contractual. A licensee without the grant creates a right in the licensor to enter into a land and enjoy it. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 27 at page 21 it is stated: - "license coupled with grant of interest: A license coupled with a grant of an interest in property is not revocable. Such a license is capable of assignment, and covenants may be made to run with it. A right to enter on land and enjoy a profit a prendre or other incorporeal hereditament is a license coupled with an interest and is irrevocable. Formerly it was necessary that the grant of the interest should be valid; thus, if the interest was an incorporeal hereditament, such as a right to make and use a watercourse, the grant was not valid unless tinder seal, and the license, unless so made, was therefore a mere license and was revocable but since 1873 the Court has been bound to give effect to equitable doctrines and it will restrain the revocation of a license coupled with a grant which should be, but is not, under seal."

14. Lease on the other hand, would amount to transfer of property....

A license, inter alia, (a) is not assignable; (b) does not entitle the licensee to sue the stranger in his own name; (c) it is revocable and (d) it is determined when the grantor makes subsequent assignment. The rights and obligations of the lessor as contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are also subject to the contract to the contrary. Even the right of assignment of leasehold property may be curtailed by an agreement....
It is well settled legal position that a deed must be read in its entirety and reasonably. The intention of the parties must also as far as possible be gathered from the expression used in the document itself....
an agreement for erection of oil storage tank together with pump house, chowkidar cabins, switch room, residential rooms and verandah for storing oil decanted from the railway tankers, which bring petroleum products to the site at which they are decanted, would amount to lease and not a license

Shambu Nath Mehra Vs State of Ajmer, [1956] SCR 199

Evidence Act - section 106- "Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not abrogate the well-established rule of criminal law that except in very exceptional classes of cases the burden that lies on the prosecution to prove its case never shifts and section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of that burden. On the contrary, it seeks to meet certain exceptional cases where it is impossible, or a proportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused and which can be proved by him without difficulty or inconvenience.

M Nagaraj & Ors Vs Union of India & Ors (2006) 8 SCC 212

"It is a fallacy to regard fundamental rights as a gift from the State to its citizens. Individuals possess basic human rights independently of any Constitution by reason of the basic fact that they are members of the human race."

Rekha Vs State Of TN, on 5 April, 2011 SC

extract of judgment -
Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is : Was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation ? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal....

Articles 22(3)(b) is only an exception to Article 21 and it is not itself a fundamental right. It is Article 21 which is central to the whole chapter on fundamental rights in our Constitution. The right to liberty means that before sending a person to prison a trial must ordinarily be held giving him opportunity of placing his defence through his lawyer. It follows that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried, for a criminal offence, but the ordinary criminal law (Indian Penal Code or other penal statutes) will not be able to deal with the situation, then, and only then, can the preventive detention law be taken recourse to....

Preventive detention is often described as a :

'jurisdiction of suspicion', (Vide State of Maharashtra Vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande ). The detaining authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clauses (1) and (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of this potentially dangerous power the law of preventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however, technical, is, in our opinion, mandatory and vital.

It has been held that the history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. (See : Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel Vs Union of India and others (1995) 4 SCC 51, vide para 49). These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged activities of the detenu....

Suraz India Trust Vs Union Of India & Anr, on 4 April, 2011 SC

petitioner has sought the review of the judgment by nine Judges' Bench of this Court in Advocate on 

Record Association Vs Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441; so also in the case of Special Reference No.1 of 1998 (reported in (1998) 7 SCC 739), whereby this Court declared the primacy of the collegium in the matter of appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

Referred to larger bench. 

KK Velusamy Vs N Palanisamy, SC 30.03.11

section 151 of CPC can be used for re-opening evidence or for recalling witnesses but not routinely invoked for reopening evidence or recalling witnesses....

"We may summarize as follows: 

(a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognizes the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is `right' and undo what is `wrong', that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. 

(b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, section 151 recognizes and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is co-extensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. 

(c) A Court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. 

(d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the Legislature. 

(e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the court, and the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. 

(f) The power under section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court.

11. The Code earlier had a specific provision in Order 18 Rule 17A for production of evidence not previously known or the evidence which could not be produced despite due diligence. It enabled the court to permit a party to produce any evidence even at a late stage, after the conclusion of his evidence if he satisfied the court that even after the exercise of due diligence, the evidence was not within his knowledge and could not be produced by him when he was leading the evidence. That provision was deleted with effect from 1.7.2002. The deletion of the said provision does not mean that no evidence can be received at all, after a party closes his evidence. It only means that the amended structure of the Code found no need for such a provision, as the amended Code contemplated little or no time gap between completion of evidence and commencement and conclusion of arguments. Another reason for its deletion was the misuse thereof by the parties to prolong the proceedings under the pretext of discovery of new evidence.

12. The amended provisions of the Code contemplate and expect a trial court to hear the arguments immediately after the completion of evidence and then proceed to judgment. Therefore, it was unnecessary to have an express provision for re-opening the evidence to examine a fresh witness or for recalling any witness for further examination. But if there is a time gap between the completion of evidence and hearing of the arguments, for whatsoever reason, and if in that interregnum, a party comes across some evidence which he could not lay his hands earlier, or some evidence in regard to the conduct or action of the other party comes into existence, the court may in exercise of its inherent power under section 151 of the Code, permit the production of such evidence if it is relevant and necessary in the interest of justice, subject to such terms as the court may deem fit to impose.

13. The learned counsel for respondent contended that once arguments are commenced, there could be no re-opening of evidence or recalling of any witness. This contention is raised by extending the convention that once arguments are concluded and the case is reserved for judgment, the court will not entertain any interlocutory application for any kind of relief. The need for the court to act in a manner to achieve the ends of justice (subject to the need to comply with the law) does not end when arguments are heard and judgment is reserved. If there is abuse of the process of the court, or if interests of justice require the court to do something or take note of something, the discretion to do those things does not disappear merely because the arguments are heard, either fully or partly. The convention that no application should be entertained once the trial or hearing is concluded and the case is reserved for judgment is a sound rule, but not a straitjacket formula. There can always be exceptions in exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances, to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court, subject to the limitation recognized with reference to exercise of power under section 151 of the Code. Be that as it may. In this case, the applications were made before the conclusion of the arguments....

We may add a word of caution. The power under section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used routinely, merely for the asking. If so used, it will defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials. But where the application is found to be bonafide and where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence. But if it does so, it should ensure that the process does not become a protracting tactic. The court should firstly award appropriate costs to the other party to compensate for the delay. Secondly the court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly if the application is found to be mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs. If the application is allowed and the evidence is permitted and ultimately the court finds that evidence was not genuine or relevant and did not warrant the reopening of the case recalling the witnesses, it can be made a ground for awarding exemplary costs apart from ordering prosecution if it involves fabrication of evidence. If the party had an opportunity to produce such evidence earlier but did not do so or if the evidence already led is clear and unambiguous, or if it comes to the conclusion that the object of the application is merely to protract the proceedings, the court should reject the application. If the evidence sought to be produced is an electronic record, the court may also listen to the recording before granting or rejecting the application..."

E Krishnan Nayanar Vs Dr M A Kuttappan & Others 1997 Crl L J 2036

Hon'ble Court observed as under "12. A reading of Section 3 shows that two kinds of insults against the member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes are made punishable - one as defined under sub-section (ii) and the other as defined under sub-section (x) of the said section.

A combined reading of the two sub-sections shows that under section (ii) insult can be caused to a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes by dumping excreta, waste matter, carcasses or any other obnoxious substance in his premises or neighbourhood, and to cause such insult, the dumping of excreta etc. need not necessarily be done in the presence of the person insulted and whereas under sub-section (x) insult can be caused to the person insulted only if he is present in view of the expression "in any place within public view"

Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd Vs Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC 122

 "It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."

Tata Cellular Vs Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 651]

In this regard, theHon'ble Supreme Court laid down the areas of scope of judicial review in tender process

"69. A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is communicated to notify acceptance. Broadly stated, the following are the requisites of a valid tender :

1. It must be unconditional.

2. Must be made at the proper place.

3. Must conform to the terms of obligation.

4. Must be made at the proper time.

5. Must be made in the proper form.

6. The person by whom the tender is made must be able and willing to perform his obligations.

7. There must be reasonable opportunity for inspection.

8. Tender must be made to the proper person.

9. It must be of full amount." 

Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs State of West Bengal, 6 (2004) 3 SCC 349

Hon,ble Court observed as "Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity- seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, court must be careful to see that a body of persons or a member of the public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or othoblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases, with exemplary costs."

Rubabbuddin Sheikh Vs State of Gujarat & Ors (2010) 2 SCC 200

"Therefore, in view of our discussions made hereinabove, it is difficult to accept the contentions of Mr Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Gujarat that after the charge-sheet is submitted in the court in the criminal proceeding it was not open for this Court or even for the High Court to direct investigation of the case to be handed over to CBI or to any independent agency. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that in an appropriate case when the court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in the proper direction and in order to do complete justice in the case and as the high police officials are involved in the said crime, it was always open to the court to hand over the investigation to the independent agency like CBI. It cannot be said that after the charge-sheet is submitted, the court is not empowered, in an appropriate case, to hand over the investigation to an independent agency like CBI.

61. Keeping this discussion in mind, that is to say, in an appropriate case, the court is empowered to hand over the investigation to an independent agency like CBI even when the charge-sheet has been submitted, we now deal with the facts of this case whether such investigation should be transferred to the CBI Authorities or any other independent agency in spite of the fact that the charge-sheet has been submitted in court. On this ground, we have carefully examined the eight action taken reports submitted by the State police authorities before us and also the various materials produced and the submissions of the learned counsel for both the parties."

Neetu Vs State of Punjab

"When a particular person is the object and target of a petition styled as PIL, the court has to be careful to see whether the attack in the guise of public interest is really intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or some other mala fide object."

Maharashtra v. Suresh 2000 Vol I SCC 471

Three possibilities are there when an accused points out the place where a dead body or incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was concealed by him. One is that he himself could have concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it and the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there.

Ramesh Kumari Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors AIR 2006 SC 1322


At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157....

In case, an officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on the information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by Sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.

32. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression "information" without qualifying the sama as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, "reasonable complaint" and "credible information" are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word "information" in Section 154(1) unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, 'reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word "information" without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that 'every complaint or information' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that 'every complaint' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station shall be reduced in writing....

Delhi Pradesh .. Vs Union Of India & Ors

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed on 11.03.11 as under

"entertaining the review petition is proved not only a futile exercise but sheer wastage of judicial time. Applicant has not disclosed anywhere as to whether any grievance has ever been raised by it against the counsel who remained negligent and did not render any service to it. Reply to our first order dated 27.1.2011 has been filed urging that Court is bound to give way to the entitlements of litigants. We are of the considered opinion that such conduct of the litigant has not only been reprehensible but is tantamount to abuse of the process of the court. We are not able to appreciate as to whether the petition was filed to satisfy the ego of the litigant or the litigant was ill-advised by the members of the Bar just for petty pecuniary gain. The petition has been filed without realizing that the courts are over burdened and no litigant should mis-use the forum of the court merely because litigation is a luxury for him."

Ramesh Kumari Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors AIR 2006 SC 1322

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under

At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157....
In case, an officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on the information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by Sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.
Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression "information" without qualifying the sama as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, "reasonable complaint" and "credible information" are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word "information" in Section 154(1) unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, 'reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word "information" without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that 'every complaint or information' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that 'every complaint' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station shall be reduced in writing....

Asmathunnisa Vs State of A P, SC on 29.03.11

SC & ST Act  - sec 3 - appellant and her husband came to  the house of complainant and met the wife of complainant - complainant was not there  - husband of appellant used insulting language about the cast of complaint - public must view the person being  insult for which he must be present and no offence on the allegation