Oleum Gas Leak case, AIR 1987 SC 1086

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, Enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-à-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands Vs Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330.

Information Technology Act

you can read information Technology Act 2000 (as amended till date) Here

Miss Mohini Jain Vs State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1992 SC 1858

The Karnataka State Legislature, with the object of eliminating the practice of collecting capitation fee for admitting students into educational institutions, enacted the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 (the Act)…. Under the notification the candidates admitted against "Government seats" are to pay Rs. 2,000/- per year as tuition fee. The Karnataka students (other than those admitted against "Government seats") are to be charged tuition fee not exceeding Rs. 25,000/- per annum. The third category is of "Indian students from outside Karnataka", from whom tuition fee not exceeding Rs. 60,000/- per annum is permitted to be charged….
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The directive principles which are fundamental in the governance of the country cannot be isolated from the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III. These principles have to be read into the fundamental rights. Both are supplementary to each other. The State is under a constitutional mandate to create conditions in which the fundamental rights guaranteed to the individuals under Part III could be enjoyed by all. Without making "right to education" under Article 41 of the Constitution a reality the fundamental rights under Chapter III shall remain beyond the reach of large majority which is illiterate….
The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education. The State Government is under an obligation to make endeavour to provide educational facilities at all levels to its citizens….”

Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs Union of India and Ors [1984] 2 SCR 67

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and particularly Clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of workers men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and no State - neither the Central Government nor any State Government - has the right to take any action which will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essential.”

Francis Coralie Mullin Vs The Administrator Union Territory of Delhi, 1981 CriLJ 306

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self.”

M S Narayana Menon Vs State of Kerala and Anr, AIR 2006 SC 3366

NI Act- sec 138- Cheque dishonored with the remarks "account closed"- dispute was what is the burden of accused to rebut the presumption- Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The standard of proof evidently is pre-ponderance of probabilities. Inference of pre-ponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials on records but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. Presumption drawn under a statute has only an evidentiary value. Presumptions are raised in terms of the Evidence Act. Presumption drawn in respect of one fact may be an evidence even for the purpose of drawing presumption under another…. It is not in dispute that transactions comprising purchases and sales of shares by investors is a matter of confidence. Both parties would have to rely upon one another…. Whether in the given facts and circumstances of a case, the initial burden has been discharged by an accused would be a question of fact. It was matter relating to appreciation of evidence…. A presumption is a probable inference which common sense draws from circumstances usually occurring in such cases. The slightest presumption is of the nature of probability, and there are almost infinite shades from slight probability to the highest moral certainty. A presumption, strictly speaking, results from a previously known and ascertained connection between the presumed fact and the fact from which the inference is made…. The Appellant clearly said that nothing is due and the cheque was issued by way of security. The said defence has been accepted as probable. If the defence is acceptable as probable the cheque therefore cannot be held to have been issued in discharge of the debt as, for example, if a cheque is issued for security or for any other purpose the same would not come within the purview of Section 138 of the Act….”

UOI Vs Pramod Gupta, AIR 2005 SC 3708

Evidence Act- sec4- Shall presume- Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “It is true that the legislature used two different phraseologies "shall be presumed" and "may be presumed" in Section 42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act and furthermore although provided for the mode and manner of rebuttal of such presumption as regards the right to mines and minerals said to be vested in the Government vis-à-vis the absence thereof in relation to the lands presumed to be retained by the landowners but the same would not mean that the words "shall presume" would be conclusive. The meaning of the expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" have been explained in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872, from a perusal whereof it would be evident that whenever it is directed that the court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless disproved. In terms of the said provision, thus, the expression "shall presume" cannot be held to be synonymous with "conclusive proof....”

Keshardeo Chamria Vs Radha Kissen Chamria and Ors, AIR 1953 SC 23

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The proceedings that commenced with the decree-holder's application for restoration of the execution and terminated with the order of revival can in no sense be said to relate to the determination of any question concerning the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Such proceedings are in their nature collateral to the execution and are independent of it…. It was not contended and could not be seriously urged, that an order under section 151 simpliciter is appealable….”

K Bhaskaran Vs Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, AIR 1999 SC 3762

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the Act can legally be inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date which the cheque bears…. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. Following are the acts which are components of the said offence : (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice…. The more important point to be decided in this case is whether the cause of action has arisen at all as the notice sent by the complainant to the accused was returned as 'unclaimed.'… when a notice is returned by the sender as unclaimed such date would be the commencing date in reckoning the period of 15 days contemplated in Clause (c) to the proviso of Section 138 of the Act….”

Taylor Vs Portington

An agreement to take a lease of a house if put into thorough repair, and the drawing-rooms handsomely decorated according to the present style. Held, too uncertain for the Court to enforce.

Hadley & Anor v Baxendale & Ors,1854 EWHC Exch J70

One broken shaft, to be conveyed by the defendants as carriers and although such second day elapsed before the commencement of this suit, yet the defendants did not nor would deliver the said broken shaft at Greenwich on the said second day, but wholly neglected and refused so to do for the space of seven days after the said shaft was so delivered to defendant. Due to absence of that shaft, mill of plaintiff was closed. The plaintiffs' servant told the clerk of defendant that the mill was stopped, and that the shaft must be sent immediately; and in answer to the inquiry when the shaft would be taken, the answer was, that if it was sent up by twelve o'clock an day, it would be delivered at Greenwich on the following day.
if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made where communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract.
The rule that the immediate cause is to be regarded in considering the loss, is applicable here. There was no special contract between these parties. A carrier has a certain duty cast upon him by law, and that duty is not to be enlarged to an indefinite extent in the absence of a special contract, or of fraud or malice. The maxim "dolus circuitu non purgatur", does not apply. The duty of the clerk, who was in attendance at the defendants' office, was to enter the article, and to take the amount of the carriage; but a mere notice to him, such as was here given, could not make the defendants, as carriers, liable as upon a special contract.

Goa Plast (P) Ltd Vs Chico Ursula D'Souza AIR 2004 SC 408

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “….cheque was dishonoured by the Bank on the ground that the respondent had issued instructions to stop payment…. the High Court and the learned Magistrate treated the proof adduced by the respondent, namely, the letter, denying the liability and that some other person is liable as sufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the Act…. To fulfil the objective, the Legislature while amending the Act has made the following procedure:

"(i) Under Section 138 a deeming offence is created.

(ii) In Section 139, a presumption is ingrained that the holder of the cheque received it in discharge of liability.

(iii) Disallowing a defence in Section 140 that drawer has no reason to believe that cheque would be dishonoured.

(iv) An explanation is provided to Section 138 to define the words "debt or other liability" to mean a legally enforceable debt or other liability."….
Both the Courts, in our view, failed to consider the important aspect as to the stop payment instructions issued by the respondent. Ordinarily, the stop payment instructions are issued to the Bank by the account holder when there is no sufficient amount in the account….
Both the Courts below have ignored the admission of the liability by the respondent who stated that the liability did exist but he was not responsible for it. While considering this, the Courts below treated the proof adduced by the respondent, namely, letter denying liability and that some other person is liable for it, as sufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the Act….
Certain comments were made by the High Court in regard to the relationship of the parties. For the cases filed under Section 142 of the Act for offence committed under the Act the relationship between the drawer and the drawee is not material because the liability admitted is one which can be legally enforced by way of suit…..”

K N Beena Vs Muniyappan and Anr 2001 CrLJ 4745

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, "In this case admittedly the Ist respondent has led no evidence except some formal evidence. The High Court appears to have proceeded on the basis that the denials/averments in his reply dated 21.5.1993 were sufficient to shift the burden of proof on to the appellant complainant to prove that the cheque was issued for a debt or liability. This is an entirely erroneous approach. The Ist respondent had to prove in the trial, by leading cogent evidence, that there was no debt or liability.”

Balwant Singh and another etc Vs Daulat Singh, AIR 1997 SC 2719

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “Khushal Singh, died issueless on 5.9.1950. Subsequently, the suit lands were mutated in the name of one Durga Devi widow of deceased Khushal Singh on 19.7.1952. The said Durga Devi purporting to fulfil her husband's desire of taking in adoption one Balwant Singh and Kartar Singh (both minors) expressed her desire to mutate the lands in favour of the said minors Balwant Singh and Kartar Singh. Accordingly, the mutation was effected on 19.1.1954 under Mutation No. 1311…. One of the reversioners of Khushal Singh, Chet Singh filed a suit bearing No. 194 of 1955 in the court of Senior Sub-Judge, Gurdaspur praying for a declaration that the mutation of 'gift-deed' dated 19.7.1954 would not affect the reversionary rights of the plaintiff after the death or after the remarriage of Durga Devi…. After the judgment of the appellate court, the suit lands were again mutated under Mutation No. 1348 in favour of Durga Devi…. After the latest Mutation No. 1348 the said Durga Devi claiming to be the absolute owner of the suit property after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, had executed four separate gift-deeds in favour of the appellants/their predecessors in title…. mutation entries do not convey or extinguish any title and those entries are relevant only for the purpose of collection of land revenue….
the widow had not divested herself of the title in the suit property as a result of mutation No. 1311 dated 19.7.54. The assumption on the part of the courts below that as a result of the mutation, the widow divested herself of the title and possession was wrong. If that be so legally, she was in possession on the date of coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act and she as a full owner had every right to deal with the suit properties in any manner she desired….”

Ahmmadsahab Abdul MillaVs Bibijan and Ors, AIR 2009 SC 2193

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “The relevant question is whether the use of the expression "date" used in Article 54 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the `Act') is suggestive of a specific date in the calendar…. Article 113 of the Old Act is in pari materia with Article 54 of Schedule to the Act….
There are two decisions of this Court i.e. Ramzan v. Hussaini and Tarlok Singh v. Vijay Kumar Sabharwal. In Tarlok Singh's case (supra) the factual scenario was noticed and the case was decided after referring to Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act. Ramzan's case (supra) related to the specific performance of contingent contract. It was held that the expression `date fixed for performance' need not be ascertainable in the face of the contract deed and may be ascertainable on the happening of a certain contingent event specified in the contract….
"Date", though sometimes used as the shortened form of "day of the date", is not its synonym; but mean the particular time on which an instrument is given, executed, or delivered….
`Fixed' in essence means having final or crystallized form or character not subject to change or fluctuation….
The expression `date' used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act definitely is suggestive of a specified date in the calendar.”

Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1892] EWCA Civ 1

LORD JUSTICE LINDLEY- Advertisement…. "£100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the iufluenza after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball."
We must first consider whether this was intended to be a promise at all, or whether it was a mere puff which meant nothing.Was it a mere puff? My answer to that question is No, and I base my answer upon this passage:
"£1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, shewing our sincerity in the matter."

Now, for what was that money deposited or that statement made except to negative the suggestion that this was a mere puff and meant nothing at all? The deposit is called in aid by the advertiser as proof of his sincerity in the matter.
Unquestionably, as a general proposition, when an offer is made, it is necessary in order to make a binding contract, not only that it should be accepted, but that the acceptance should be notified. But is that so in cases of this kind? I apprehend that they are an exception to that rule,or, if not an exception, they are open to the observation that the notification of the acceptance need not precede the performance. This offer is a continuing offer. It was never revoked, and if notice of acceptance is required - which I doubt very much… I,however, think that the true view, in a case of this kind, is that the person who makes the over shews by his language and from the nature of the transaction that he does not expect and does not require notice of the acceptance apart from notice of the performance.
Let us see whether there is no advantage to the defendants. It is said that the use of the ball is no advantage to them, and that what benefits them is the sale; and the case is put that a lot of these balls might be stolen, and that it would be no advantage to the defendants if the thief or other people used them. The answer to that, I think,is as follows. It is quite obvious that in the view of the advertisers a use by the public of their remedy, if they can only get the public to have confidence enough to use it, will react and produce a sale which is directly beneficial to them. Therefore, the advertisers get out of the use an advantage which is enough to constitute a consideration.
LORD JUSTICE BOWEN: I am of the same opinion. We were asked to say that this document was a contract too vague to be enforced.

The first observation which arises is that the document itself is not a contract at all, it is only an offer made to the public.

The defendants contend next, that it is an offer the terms of which are too vague to be treated as a definite offer, inasmuch as there is no limit of time fixed for the catching of the influenza, and it cannot be supposed that the advertisers seriously meant to promise to pay money to every person who catches the influenza at any time after the inhaling of the smoke ball. It was urged also, that if you look at this document you will find much vagueness as to the persons with whom the contract was intended to be made - that, in the first place, its terms are wide enough to include persons who may have used the smoke ball before the advertisement was issued; at all events, that it is an offer to the world in general, and, also, that it is unreasonable to suppose it to be a definite offer, because nobody in their senses would contract themselves out of the opportunity of checking the experiment which was going to be made at their own expense……
The intention was that the circulation of the smoke ball should be promoted, and that the use of it should be increased…. It has been said that the words do not apply only to persons who contract the epidemic after the publication of the advertisement, but include persons who had previously contracted the influenza. I cannot so read the advertisement…. it means that the smoke ball will be a protection while it is in use….
if a person chooses to make extravagant promises of this kind he probably does so because it pays him to make them, and, if he has made them, the extravagance of the promises is no reason in law why he should not be bound by them….
you cannot contract with everybody. It is not a contract made with all the world. There is the fallacy of the argument. It is an offer made to all the world;and why should not an offer be made to all the world which is to ripen into a contract with anybody who comes forward and performs the condition? It is an offer to become liable to any one who,before it is retracted, performs the condition, and, although the offer is made to the world, the contract is made with that limited portion of the public who come forward and perform the condition on the faith of the advertisement. It is not like cases in which you offer to negotiate, or you issue advertisements that you have got a stock of books to sell, or houses to let, in which case there is no offer to be bound by any contract. Such advertisements are offers to negotiate - offers to receive offers- offers to chaffer, as, I think, some learned judge in one of the cases has said. If this is an offer to be bound, then it is a contract the moment the person fulfils the condition….
If I advertise to the world that my dog is lost, and that anybody who brings the dog to a particular place will be paid some money, are all the police or other persons whose business it is to find lost dogs to be expected to sit down and write me a note saying that they have accepted my proposal?Why, of course, they at once look after the dog, and as soon as they find the dog they have performed the condition….
A further argument for the defendants was that this was a nudum pactum - that there was no consideration for the promise… there is here a request to use involved in the offer. Then as to the alleged want of consideration….
The definition of "consideration" given in Selwyn's Nisi Prius, 8th ed. p. 47, which is cited and adopted by Tindal, C.J., in the case of Laythoarp v.Bryant 3 Scott, 238, 250, is this:
"Any act of the plaintiff from which the defendant derives a benefit or advantage, or any labour, detriment, or inconvenience sustained by the plaintiff,provided such act is performed or such inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff, with the consent, either express or implied, of the defendant."….
defendants received a benefit from this user, for the use of the smoke ball was contemplated by the defendants as being indirectly a benefit to them, because the use of the smoke balls would promote their sale….

Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel & Anr Vs State of Gujarat 2009 (6) SCC 332

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “it is beyond any cavil that ‘further investigation’ and ‘reinvestigation’ stand on different footing. It may be that in a given situation a superior Court in exercise of its Constitutional power, namely, under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India could direct a “State” to get an offence investigated and/or further investigated by a different agency. Direction of a reinvestigation, however, being forbidden in law, no superior Court would ordinarily issue such a direction.”

Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati Vs CBI (2003) 5 SCC 257

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, 'for establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. From his failure to keep promise subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the beginning cannot be presumed.'

Mohd Guffran Vs State, Decided by Delhi High Court on 12.08.10

Hon'ble High Court observed, "court in view of Section 393 Cr.P.C. cannot re-appreciate the entire evidence to arrive at a different conclusion than one arrived at by the appellate court."

Vir Prakash Sharma Vs Anil Kumar Agarwal (2007) 7 SCC 373

Hon'ble Supreme Court observed,“The ingredients of Section 420 of the Penal Code are as follows: (i) Deception of any persons;
(ii) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or
(iii) To consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit. No act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been alleged by the respondent. No allegation has been made that he had an intention to cheat the respondent from the very inception.”

Pepsi Foods Ltd & Anr Vs Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors (1998) 5 SCC 749

Hon'ble Supreme Court observed, “ Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.”

MCQ -3

Please attempt some multiple choice questions on Indian Penal code here- IPC(2)

S V L Murthy etc Vs CBI (2009) 6 SCC 77

Hon'ble Supreme Court observed, “An offence of cheating cannot be said to have been made out unless the following ingredients are satisfied: ( i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or omission; (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or ( iii) to consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit. For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code can be said to have been made out.”

MCQ -2

Please attempt some multiple choice questions on evidence act here- evidence(2)

MCQ -1

Please attempt some multiple choice questions on criminal procedure here- CrPC(2)

Naramada Bachao Andolan Vs Union of India (1999) 8 SCC 308

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed, “We wish to emphasise that under the cover of freedom of speech and expression no party can be given a licence to misrepresent the proceedings and orders of the court and deliberately paint an absolutely wrong and incomplete picture which has the tendency to scandalise the court and bring it into disrepute or ridicule. ……….Courts are not unduly sensitive to fair comment or even outspoken comments being made regarding their judgments and orders made objectively, fairly and without any malice, but no one can be permitted to distort orders of the court and deliberately give a slant to its proceedings, which have the tendency to scandalise the court or bring it to ridicule, in the larger interest of protecting administration of justice.”