Pragati Mahila Mandal, Nanded Vs Municipal Council, Nanded & Ors decided on 18.02.11

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under

"As soon as the information is received that a sole petitioner to the writ petition in the nature of a PIL filed pro bono publico, is dead, the Court can issue a notice through newspapers or electronic media inviting public spirited bodies or persons to file applications to take up the position of the petitioner. If such an application is filed, the court can examine the antecedents of the person so applying and find out if allowing him to be impleaded as petitioner could meet the ends of justice."

Hakam Singh Vs Gammon AIR 1971 SC 740

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under, "When there is choice of forum, it is certainly open to the parties to agree on an exclusive forum for settlement of disputes. But such an agreement must be clearly spelled out either by express words or by necessary implication. Ouster of jurisdiction of Courts cannot be lightly assumed or presumed. If there is such a concluded agreement, it will certainly operate as estoppel against the parties to the contract. If it is merely a unilateral affirmation or statement made by one of the parties, as long as it is not shown that the statement has been accepted by the other party as a term or condition of the agreement, it cannot be held that there is an agreement to confer exclusive jurisdiction on any Court. Particular caution is necessary in regard to such a clause contained in a printed form, as in this case. Where the printed form is signed by both the parties or where a form printed by one party is signed by the other party and forwarded by the latter to the former and the printed form contains clear words conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a Court at any particular place or ousting jurisdiction of the Court at any other place, it may not be difficult to hold that the parties have agreed on such a term. Even in such cases, Courts must remember that, people often sign order forms containing a good deal of printed matter without caring to read what is printed. It cannot always be said that everything which is printed may be deemed to form part of the contract. Where a form printed by one party is signed only by third party and delivered to the other party, without anything more it will be difficult for the Court to hold that there has been consensus ad idem in regard to the particular clause. Of course, if there is some other material to indicate acceptance or consent of the party who received the printed form, then the Court is free to infer that the clause formed part of the agreement.

18. If it can be held that the printed clause in the consignment note in this case formed part of the agreement, there is clearly ouster of jurisdiction of Courts at Calicut. The form was got printed by the transport undertaking. It was signed by an employee of the undertaking. It was not signed by the consignor, second plaintiff. It was merely delivered to the consignor. Contract was entered into not by correspondence. It was a case of a single transaction covered by a single bill. The words themselves are printed in small letters at the very bottom of the way bill. There is no other material before the Court to show that this printed material was brought to the notice of the second plaintiff or that the second plaintiff had accepted the same. In these circumstances, I hold that this particular clause did not form part of the agreement between the parties. Parties did not agree to oust the jurisdiction of the Court at Calicut or to vest exclusive jurisdiction in Courts at Calcutta.''

Kerala High Court in the case of United India Insurance Co Ltd Vs Associated Transport Corporation Pvt Ltd & Anr AIR 1988 Kerala 36

Hon’ble High Court observed as under

"Ext. B1 series in this case also contain printed words "subject to Bombay jurisdiction alone"; Apart from the existence of these printed words, respondent has no case that there was a meeting of minds between the consignor and the carrier and there was a specific agreement in that behalf. The consignment was delivered to the carrier, the carrier took custody of the goods and thereafter issued the receipt or consignment note which contained the printed words. The note was signed only by an employee of the respondent. No doubt, they were handed over to the consignor. Hut there was nothing to indicate that there was an agreement between the parties to confer exclusive jurisdiction to Bombay Court. These printed words by themselves and without anything more would not be sufficient to constitute an agreement to oust the jurisdiction of all Courts other than the Court specified. In these circumstances, we set aside the finding of the Court below that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. We find that the Court below had answered all the issues either in favour of one party or the other. The parties have no right of appeal against those findings in as much as the plaint itself was returned. In these circumstances, we deem it expedient to direct the Court below to re-try all the issues and dispose of the suit afresh. Learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that the Court below had held that the appellant was incompetent to sue. This issue also will be retried along with the other issues."

New Moga Transport Company Vs United India Insurance Co Ltd. & Ors

Hon’ble Court observed as under "On a plain reading of the Explanation to Section 20 CPC it is clear that Explanation consists of two parts,   before the word "or" appearing between the words "office in India" and the word "in respect of" and the other thereafter. The Explanation applies to a defendant which is a Corporation which term would include even a company. The first part of the Explanation applies only to such Corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place. In that event, the Court within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the company is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if the defendant may not actually be carrying on business at that place, it will be deemed to carry on business at that place because of the fiction created by the Explanation. The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another place. The expression "at such place" appearing in the Explanation and the word "or" which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case falls within the latter part of the Explanation it is not the Court within whose jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate but the Court within whose jurisdiction it has a subordinate office which alone have the jurisdiction "in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office".

Pt. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India and others, (1989) 4 SCC 286

Apex Court observed
"There can be no second opinion that preservation of human life is of paramount importance. That is so on account of the fact that once life is lost, the status quo ante cannot be restored as resurrection is beyond the capacity of man. The patient whether he be an innocent person or be a criminal liable to punishment under the laws of the society, it is the obligation of those who are in charge of the health of the community to preserve life so that the innocent may be protected and the guilty may be punished. Social laws do not contemplate death by negligence to tantamount to legal punishment.
 Article 21 of the Constitution casts the obligation on the State to preserve life. The provision as explained by this Court in scores of decisions has emphasised and reiterated with gradually increasing emphasis that position. A doctor at the Government hospital positioned to meet this State obligation is, therefore, duty bound to extend medical assistance for preserving life. Every doctor whether at a Government hospital or otherwise has the professional obligation to extend his services with due expertise for protecting life. No law or State action can intervene to avoid/delay the discharge of the paramount obligation cast upon members of the medical profession. The obligation being total, absolute and paramount, laws of procedure whether in statutes or otherwise which would interfere with the discharge of this obligation cannot be sustained and must, therefore, give way."

Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab and others, (1996) 2 SCC 336

Apex Court has observed
"It is otherwise important to bear in mind that self- preservation of one's life is the necessary concomitant of the right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, fundamental in nature, sacred, precious and inviolable. The importance and validity of the duty and right to self-preservation has a species in the right of self-defence in criminal law. Centuries ago thinkers of this great land conceived of such right and recognised it. Attention can usefully be drawn to Verses 17, 18, 20 and 22 in Chapter 16 of the Garuda Purana (A Dialogue suggested between the Divine and Garuda, the bird) in the words of the Divine:
Vinaa dehena kasyaapi canpurushaartho na vidyate Tasmaaddeham dhanam
rakshetpunyakarmaani saadhayet

Without the body how can one obtain the objects of human life? Therefore protecting the body which is the wealth, one should perform the deeds of merit.

Rakshayetsarvadaatmaanamaatmaa sarvasya
bhaajanam Rakshane yatnamaatishthejje
vanbhaadraani pashyati

One should protect his body which is responsible for everything. He who protects himself by all efforts, will see many auspicious occasions in life.

Sharirarakshanopaayaah kriyante sarvadaa budhaih Necchanti cha punastyaagamapi
kushthaadiroginah

The wise always undertake the protective measures for the body. Even the persons suffering from leprosy and other diseases do not wish to get rid of the body.

Aatmaiva yadi naatmaanamahitebhyo nivaarayet Konsyo
hitakarastasmaadaatmaanam taarayishyati

If one does not prevent what is unpleasant to himself, who else will do it? Therefore one should do what is good to himself."

Dr. P.G. Najpandey Vs. State of M.P. and Others, AIR 2008 MP 55

Hon'ble High Court of MP observed
"It should be borne in mind that in the name of demonstration or protestation, the life in a civilized society cannot be paralyzed, in the name of legitimate exercise of ones right to protest the fundamental right of others cannot be scuttled. In a democratic polity the fundamental right of each citizen is sacrosanct. The collective cannot destroy the same. No one, however big he may be should foster a misgiving that he can create a tremor in the fundamental rights of others and tremble the spine of the members of the society at large by forming a group or a political party. The splendor of right to move the glory to live with dignity by carrying out a lawful profession or calling cannot be abridged in the name of mass protest or mass demonstration. The collective protest cannot be allowed to take the shape of collective passion to project a fractured mind thereby creating a dent in the concept of 'Rule of law' and bringing in a concavity in the constitutional philosophy which sings the song of highly cherished fundamental rights of millions of people. Be it noted the rights of others cannot be crucified at the fanciful pedestal of a group or a party and by no stretch of imagination it can be guillotined in a cavalier fashion from any pupil. The law of this country does not so countenance.
The great society gets further nurtured and fostered by the high ideals of Rule of Law'. The essentiality of' Rule of Law' cannot be allowed to be sent to the sky in a huge balloon to burst. The serenity of body polity cannot be permitted to be destroyed in the name of political pulse making a citizen 'A traveler betwixt the life and death'. The law should be allowed to reign supreme with the splendid vision, in its glorious resplendence."

Radesh Singh & Ors Vs State & Anr

On 21 February, 2011 Hon,ble Delhi High Court held, "it was incumbent upon the learned MM to spell out for which offence she was taking cognizance qua the petitioners and how that offence was made out and what was the role played by different offenders. No doubt, a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and not of the offenders, but when he sends summons to an offender, he sends summons asking the offender to face trial. The Magistrate must be clear in her mind as to what were the offences made out against the offender and that there was prima facie evidence against him, more specifically when the police during investigation has not been able to find out evidence of involvement of the offender. Since the Magistrate disagreed with the report of the police and considered that there was evidence to summon the petitioners and asked them to face trial, she must have spelt out the reasons for summoning the petitioners placed in Column No.2. If the police had collected sufficient evidence and forwarded challan in respect of the offenders, the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence and summon all such offenders for facing trial as named by police on the basis of evidence collected by the police but where the police has not found evidence and the Magistrate considered that there was sufficient evidence, then the Magistrate must pass a speaking order for summoning such offenders against whom, in the opinion of the police there was no evidence."

Machhi Singh and Ors Vs State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470

Supreme Court of India followed the guidelines flowing from Bachan Singh's case and held that death sentence could be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases when the collective conscience of the community is so shocked that it would expect the holders of judicial power to inflict the death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards the desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty as a sentencing option.
circumstances in which such a sentiment could be entertained by the community:
"(1) When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community.
(2) When the murder is committed for a motive which evinces total depravity and meanness; e.g. murder by hired assassin for money or reward; or cold-blooded murder for gains of a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating position or in a position of trust; or murder is committed in the course for betrayal of the motherland.
(3) When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste or minority community etc., is committed not for personal reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath; or in cases of "bride burning" or "dowry deaths" or when murder is committed in order to remarry for the sake of extracting dowry once again or to marry another woman on account of infatuation.
(4) When the crime is enormous in proportion. For instance when multiple murders, say of all or almost all the members of a family or a large number of persons of a particular caste, community, or locality, are committed.
(5) When the victim of murder is an innocent child or a helpless woman or old or infirm person or a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating position, or a public figure generally loved and respected by the community"

Sunita Gupta Vs Inderjeet Singh & Anr

Decided on 31.01.11 by Delhi High Court as
A compromise is nothing but an agreement. The imprimatur of the Court in accepting the compromise and in passing a decree in terms thereof, confers the said agreement with the status of a lawful contract.