Gyarsibai W/O Jagannath Vs The State 1953 CriLJ 588

In this case a woman have some fighting with sister in law- husband also take side of sister in law- she said that she will jump in the well with children - children died -she was convicted for offence u/s 302& 309 IPC - as per court case is different from mst Dhirajia case as here there is no question of any panic or fright of the appellant as it was in that case
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/109424/

Emperor Vs Mt Dhirajia AIR 1940 All 486

Woman of 20 years age tried for sec 302 and 309- want to go parental home - husband gave beating to her- she left matrimonial house in the night- her Mt. Dhirajia turned round in a panic, ran a little distance with the baby girl in her arms and then either jumped or fell into an open well which was at some little distance from the path. It is important to observe that obviously she did this in panic because we have the clearest possible evidence that she looked behind her and was evidently running away from her husband. The result was, to put it briefly, that the little child died while the woman was eventually rescued and suffered little or no injury- -Some degree of knowledge must, we think, be attributed to every sane person. Obviously, the degree of knowledge which any particular person can be assumed to possess must vary. For instance, we cannot attribute the same degree of knowledge to an uneducated as to an educated person. But we think that to some extent knowledge must be attributed to everyone who is sane. -
however primitive a man or woman may be, and however frightened he or she may be, knowledge of the likely consequence of so imminently dangerous an act must be supposed to have remained with him or her-
hat is the fourth case in which culpable homicide is murder. We have already found that Mt. Dhirajia must be taken to have known that what she did must in all probability cause the death of her baby. But this is qualified by the further requirement that "such act" must be "without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death...." The construction of this particular passage of Section 300 is well settled. It is well settled that it is not murder merely to cause death by doing an act with the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. In order that an act done with such knowledge should constitute murder it is necessary that it should be committed without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing the death or bodily injury. An act done with the knowledge of its consequences is not prima facie murder. It becomes murder only if it can be positively affirmed that there was no excuse. The requirements of the section are not satisfied by the act of homicide being one of extreme recklessness. It must in addition be wholly inexcusable. When a risk is incurred-even a risk of the gravest possible character which must normally result in death-the taking of that risk is not murder unless it was inexcusable to take it. That, as we understand it, in terms of this case, is the meaning of this passage of Section 300, I.P.C. Now looking at the facts of this case which we need not repeat again, we think that it is not possible to say that Mt. Dhirajia in jumping into this well did so without excuse--
Difference from Supadi Lukadu v. Emperor (25) 12 AIR 1925 Bom 310 is that in that case child was on back of lady and court reached to the conclusion that she was not aware of child-
She did so in an effort to escape from her husband. The taking of her own life was not, we think, for one moment present to her mind. For that reason we think that Mt. Dhirajia was rightly acquitted under Section 309, I.P.C--
Punish only for 6 month u/s 304 IPC

Gangula Mohan Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1301 of 2002

As Deliverd by Hon'ble Dalveer Bhandari, J. “Appellant was convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Nagarkurnool under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the case of the prosecution, the appellant, who is an agriculturist, had harassed his agriculture labour (servant) deceased Ramulu by leveling the allegation that he had committed theft of some gold ornaments two days prior to his death. It was also alleged that the appellant had demanded Rs.7,000/- from the deceased which was given in advance to him at the time when he was kept in employment.
The word suicide in itself is nowhere defined in the Indian Penal Code, however its meaning and import is well known and requires no explanation. ‘Sui’ means ‘self’ and ‘cide’ means ‘killing’, thus implying an act of self-killing. In short a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself.
Suicide by itself is not an offence under either English or Indian criminal law, though at one time it was a felony in England. In England, the former law was of the nature of being a deterrent to people as it provided penalties of two types: Degradation of corpse of deceased by burying it on the highway with a stake through its chest. Forfeiture of property of deceased by the State.
This penalty was later distilled down to merely not providing a full Christian burial, unless the deceased could be proved to be of unsound mind. However, currently there is no punishment for suicide after the enactment of the Suicide Act, 1961 which proclaims that the rule of law whereby it was a crime for a person to commit suicide has been abrogated.
In our country, while suicide in itself is not an offence, considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach of law, attempt to suicide is an offence under section 309 of IPC.
a judgment of this Court in Mahendra Singh & Another v. State of M.P. 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 731. In the case of Mahendra Singh , the allegations levelled are as under:“My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband’s elder brother’s wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in-law. Because of these reasons and being harassed I want to die by burning.” The court on aforementioned allegations came to a definite conclusion that by no stretch the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased. According to the appellant, the conviction of the appellant under section 306 IPC merely on the basis of aforementioned allegation of harassment of the deceased is unsustainable in law.
In the instant case, the deceased was undoubtedly hyper sensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day life. Human sensitivity of each individual differs from the other. Different people behave differently in the same situation.
Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2009 (11) SCALE 24 had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the word “instigation” and “goading”. The court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person’s suicidability pattern is different from the others. Each person has his own idea of self esteem and self respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straight-jacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.
In order to convict a person under section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.”