PC for separation of investigation, prosecution

The Home Minister said the Committee on Reforms of the Criminal Justice System, constituted under the Chairmanship of Justice V Malimath considered measures for revamping criminal justice system. 

The Committee gave recommendations on various aspects of criminal justice system including investigation, prosecution and the trial procedure in its report submitted in March,2003. 

Chidambaram said since the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure are on the Concurrent List of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and are administered by state governments, any amendment to these requires consultation with states. 

"In view of this, the report was forwarded to the state governments and Union Territories Administrations to obtain their views or comments," he said. 

http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/pc-for-separation-of-investigation-prosecution_761201.html

Praveen Gupta 

Hardev Singh Dhillon Vs Department of Revenue Intelligence, 2010 (251) ELT 359 (Del)

Hon'ble High Court observed as
“The purpose of sanction for prosecution is to prevent malicious and unnecessary prosecutions leading to harassment; it is a condition precedent for the launch of a prosecution. What the prosecution has to prove is that the sanction has been accorded with respect to the facts Constituting the offence. Narration of facts on the face of it is desirable but not always essential; if there is no such narration the prosecution must in the course of trial by extraneous evidence prove that those facts were before Sanctioning Authority who applied its mind to them before the grant of sanction; an opportunity of hearing is not necessary to be given before the grant of sanction. It is purely an administrative act.”

Office of the Chief Post Master General Vs Living Media India Ltd

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as on 24.02.2012
- it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay

For section 14 of limitation act- four conditions:(1)The plaintiff who filed the suit had been prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence.
(2) The earlier proceeding resorted by the plaintiff was based on the same cause of action.
(3) The former proceeding was prosecuted by the plaintiff in good faith in a Court.
(4) The Court, due to the defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, was unable to entertain such proceeding.

What is disputed is that the Court where the proceeding was taken was not one which was unable to entertain it (i) from the defect of jurisdiction or (ii) other cause of a like nature and, secondly, the earlier proceeding was not prosecuted in good faith.

In this case after dismissal of objection under order 21 rule 97, party file a revision instead of suit as per rule 103-

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

"A landlord of a premises governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is entitled to have increase(s) in rent only in accordance with Section 6A and 8 thereof and not otherwise; such a landlord cannot approach the civil vourt contending that the rent stands increased or should be increased in accordance with the inflation or cost price index," the bench observed.
http://m.economictimes.com/news/politics/nation/inflation-no-reason-to-increase-rent-rules-court/articleshow/11967204.cms

Ashan Devi and Anr Vs Phulwasi Devi and Ors 2003(9) SCALE 783

whether a purchaser of a vacant land under registered Sale Deed and claiming to be in possession of the land can maintain an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure complaining of his alleged dispossession in execution of the decree of specific performance of contract of sale obtained ex parts by the decree holder against the original owner of the suit property?--yes.
provisions of Order XXI Rule 97 and 99 have been widely and liberally construed to enable the executing court to adjudicate the inter se claims of the decree holder and the third parties in the executing proceedings themselves to avoid prolongation of litigation by driving parties to file independent suits.
Salmond on jurisprudence explains that the word "possession" is a word of 'open texture'. Its legal meaning has to be ascertained from the context. The property involved in the present case is open vacant land. Such property is possessed by a person who has control over the same. This 'control' over the property means 'power to exclude all others'. The test then for determining whether a man is in possession of anything is whether he is in 'general control' of it - maybe that he is not in actual and physical possession or using the same.

Horil Vs Keshav & Anr civil appeal 776 of 2012 SC

CPC - order 23 rule 3 - though compromise decree could be challenge only in the same court on ground of fraud - compromise decree before collector under UP zamindari abolition act may be challenge in civil court as collector is court only for limited purpose

Banwari Lal Vs Chando Devi (1993) 1 SCC 581

CPC- order 23 rule 3 - compromise decree - “ When the amending Act introduced a proviso along with an explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 saying that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at,”the Court shall decide the question”, the Court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded such compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the compromise more comprehensive, the explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise “which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act….” shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1-A of Order 43 of the Code…..
The court before which it is alleged by one of the parties to the alleged compromise that no such compromise had been entered between the parties that court has to decide whether the agreement or compromise in question was lawful and not void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. If the agreement or the compromise itself is fraudulent then it shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of the explanation to the proviso to Rule 3 and as such not lawful. The learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly justified in entertaining the application filed on behalf of the appellant and considering the question as to whether there had been a lawful agreement or compromise on the basis of which the court could have recorded such agreement or compromise on February 27, 1991. Having come to the conclusion on the material produced that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of Rule 3, there was no option left except to recall that order.”

Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika Vs State Of Gujarat & Ors on 18 January 2012

what would be the status of a person, one of whose parents belongs to the scheduled castes/scheduled tribes and the other comes from the upper castes, or more precisely does not come from scheduled castes/scheduled tribes....
The High Court seems to have read the decisions in Valsamma Paul, Punit Rai and Anjan Kumar as laying down the rule that in all cases and regardless of other considerations the offspring of an inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal would take his/her caste from the father....
in an inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal the determination of the caste of the offspring is essentially a question of fact to be decided on the basis of the facts adduced in each case.

Rajendra Shrivastava Vs State of Maharashtra, (2010) 112 BomLR 762

SC woman marries an upper cast male- latter on want to file 498A and SC ST Act complaint- objection was taken on ground that by marries she became upper cast - held can file a complaint -"When a woman born in a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe marries to a person belonging to a forward caste, her caste by birth does not change by virtue of the marriage. A person born as a member of a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe has to suffer from disadvantages, disabilities and indignities only by virtue of belonging to the particular caste which he or she acquires involuntarily on birth. The suffering of such a person by virtue of caste is not wiped out by a marriage with the person belonging to a forward caste. The label attached to a person born into a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe continues notwithstanding the marriage. No material has been placed before us by the applicant so as to point out that the caste of a person can be changed either by custom, usage, religious sanction or provision of law."