THE GRAM NYAYALAYAS ACT, 2008

An Act to provide for the establishment of Gram Nyayalayas at the grass roots level for the purposes of providing access to justice to the citizens at their doorsteps and to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of social, economic or other disabilities and for matters connected therewith or incidental

Nyayadhikari to hold mobile courts and conduct proceedings in villages.

Gram Nyayalaya shall exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction in the manner and to the extent provided under this Act.

Gram Nyayalaya to follow summary trial procedure.

every suit, claim or dispute under this Act shall be instituted by making an application to the Gram Nyayalaya in such form, in such manner, and accompanied by such fee, not exceeding rupees one hundred, as may be prescribed by the High Court

A Gram Nyayalaya may receive as evidence any report, statement, document, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

THE FIRST SCHEDULE (See sections 12 and 14) PART I OFFENCES UNDER THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (45 OF 1860), ETC. (i) offences not punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years; (ii) theft, under section 379, section 380 or section 381 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where the value of the property stolen does not exceed rupees twenty thousand; (iii) receiving or retaining stolen property, under section 411 of the Indian Penal Code(45 of 1860), where the value of the property does not exceed rupees twenty thousand; (iv) assisting in the concealment or disposal of stolen property, under section 414 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where the value of such property does not exceed rupees twenty thousand; (v) offences under sections 454 and 456 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); (vi) insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, under section 504, and criminal intimidation, punishable with imprisonment for aterm which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both, under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); (vii) abetment of any of the foregoing offences; (viii) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, when such attempt is an offence. PART II OFFENCES AND RELIEF UNDER THE OTHER CENTRAL ACTS (i) any offence constituted by an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle-trespass Act, 1871(1 of 1871); (ii) thePayment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936); (iii) the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948); (iv) the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (22 of 1955); (v) order for maintenance of wives, children and parents under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); (vi) the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 (19 of 1976); (vii) the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 (25 of 1976); (viii) the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005). PART III OFFENCES AND RELIEFUNDER THE STATE ACTS (To be notified by the State Government) THE SECOND SCHEDULE (See sections 13 and 14) PART I SUITS OF A CIVIL NATURE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF GRAM NYAYALAYAS (i) Civil Disputes: (a) right to purchase of property; (b) use of common pasture; (c) regulation and timing of taking water from irrigation channel. (ii) Property Disputes: (a) village and farm houses (Possession); (b) water channels; (c) right to draw water from a well or tube well. (iii)Other Disputes: (a) claims under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936); (b) claims under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948); (c) money suits either arising from trade transaction or money lending; (d) disputes arising out of the partnership in cultivation of land; (e) disputes as to the use of forest produce by inhabitants of Gram Panchayats.
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Surender Kumar Sharma Vs. Makhan Singh, SC on 18.09.2009

In our view, this is a case in which the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, and the trial Court had fallen in grave error in refusing amendment of the plaint filed in a suit for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. As noted herein earlier, the prayer for amendment was refused by the High Court on two grounds. So far as the first ground is concerned i.e. the prayer for amendment was a belated one, we are of the view that even if it was belated, then also, the question that needs to be decided is to see whether by allowing the amendment, the real controversy between the parties may be resolved. It is well settled that under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wide powers and unfettered discretion have been conferred on the Court to allow amendment of the pleadings to a party in such a manner and on such terms as it appears to the Court just and proper.

Manish Satpal Agarwal, vs Dolly Manish Agarwal Bom. HC CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 67 OF 2009

Simply because at some occasion the respondent wife might have told to the husband that he is mentally weak or bhondu, it cannot be presumed that uttering of such words may amount to cruelty. Respondent wife has clearly stated that she has never used these words in the presence of the parents of the appellant. In our view, the appellant should not have been so sensitive, even if few words are uttered by respondent during the married life. In a family life between husband and wife, occasionally there may be some exchanges of wits/anger/jokes or satire, that itself may not be treated as an act of cruelty. Similarly, even if the respondent has told the appellant that he is not C.A. but only a Commerce Graduate, such uttering should not be treated as an act of cruelty as the same can be said to be a statement of fact. It is not in dispute that before the marriage an impression was given to the parents of the respondent that the appellant is C.A. May be ultimately after marriage it was noticed by the respondent that the appellant is only a Commerce Graduate and when this fact is told to him, it cannot be considered as an act of cruelty on the part of the respondent. There is nothing on the record to show that the respondent regularly used to utter such words. The appellant knew that he is not C.A. and, therefore, if the said fact is uttered by the wife, the appellant should not have become so hypersensitive on this.

DEVENDRAKUMAR RAMCHANDRA DWIVEDI - Petitioner(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT, HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT, Date: 24/09/2009

Music recording to be heard in public or Garba and Dandiya dance performance in an enclosed room or hall for the common use of the residents in any residential premises as part of the amenities provided exclusively or mainly for residents therein would not amount to infringement of copyright. So also the activities of a club or similar organization which is not established or conducted for profit. Further, the performance of a literary dramatic or musical work by an amateur club or society, if theperformance is given to a non-paying audience or for the benefit of a religious institution would not infringe copyright. So also in the case of Folk Music or public domain music. The Central Government State Government or any local authority can arrange the performance of a literary, dramatic or musical work, officially which will not amount to infringement of copyright or also in connection with a bonafide religious ceremony like Navratri Pooja, Arati etc. so also marriage procession or other social festivities associated with a marriage, would not amount to infringement of copy right. Therefore, the main thrust of Section 52(1) of the Copyright Act, 1957 is to exempt live performance of such works when there is no commercial purpose and when there is no admission charge and/or when admission proceeds are used exclusively for educational, religious or charitable purpose and not for private personal financial gain. Above principle is generally called fair or honest use doctrine which constitutes the most significant limitation on the exclusive rights held by a copyright owner. `Fair Use Doctrine' was first articulated by Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 in the year 1841. Learned Judge, opined that quoting copyrighted material in the course of preparing a biography or a critical commentary might be excusable, but not if so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labours of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another.

Manishi jain vs state decided by Gujrat HC on 04/09/2009

Law is settled that when the Government is exercising the powers under Section 95 of the Cr.P.C., the government has to form an opinion and those opinion will give rise to the grounds and grounds have to be stated in the notification issued in exercise of the powers under Section 95 of the Cr.P.C..No opinion has been expressed by the State in the notification. Lack of opinion means lack of thinking. Lack of thinking means lack of understanding. Gujrat High Court set aside the ban on book of Jaswant Singh on Jinnah.

Virendra Bandhu v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1980 Rajasthan 241

the Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court has examined the scope of Section 95 of Cr.P.C. and other related provisions and the Court held that total absence of grounds for the opinion of the Government in the order of forfeiture would render such an order invalid and void.

Tata Tea Limited Vs SEBI

it would be legitimate for the acquirer to enter into a non-compete agreement with the promoter sellers if he feels threatened by a lurking fear of competition from them.

State of U.P. through C.B.I. Vs. Amar Mani Tripathi 2005 SCC(Criminal) 1960

It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonableground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v)character,behaviour,means,positionandstandingoftheaccused;(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with;and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.

Jamuna Nishad Vs. State of U.P. decided by Allahabad High Court on 09.09.2009

it was the applicant who led the unruly armed crowd. Being a member of cabinet, it was expected of him that he will set an example to the citizens of the State to follow the law. It is really worrying and appalling that the caravans which followed the applicant, Cabinet Minister, carried those people who were armed with lethal weapon and wielded them against law enforcing agencies. The incident started by destroying the public property inside the police station and even the constables present there were roughed up.
Carrying a cavalcade of people armed with illegal lethal fire arms by the public representatives have become a matter of pride for them with show of force to deter ordinary people who are the real constitution framers as they have adopted and given to themselves The Constitution( See Preamble). It is the need of the hour that all these types of show of muscle power and illegal weaponry in public places must be curbed.
Looking to the record of acquittal which has been appended along with this bail application and the fact that the applicant was a minister in a Ruling Government, which is still in power in the State, the fair trial and exertion of pressure on the witnesses is not a remote possibility.

Vakeel Ahmad Vs State Of U.P. & Another decided by Allahabad High Court on 03.9.2009.

Whether the Magistrate is bound to grant remand for judicial custody in those sections only for which prayer has been made by the investigating officer in remand application.
During the course of investigation, remand under section 354, 506 IPC was sought by the investigating officer.When the applicant-accused was brought to court for seeking remand, an application was moved on behalf of the prosecution to grant remand under section 376 IPC also. The learned magistrate after hearing parties counsel, allowed the application of prosecution and granted remand sending the applicant in judicial custody under section 376, 323, 506 IPC.
If in any case, the investigating officer deliberately commits mischief and with a view to help the accused, he does not seek remand in proper sections, then the magistrate can not sit as silent spectator. While granting remand under section 167 Cr.P.C., the magistrate is required to go through the case diary.
Investigating officer is not the sole authority to decide as to what offence is made out on the basis of material in case diary.