Hitesh Bhatnagar vs Deepa Bhatnagar Supreme Court of India on 18.04.11

the parties filed a petition under Section 13B of the Act before the District Court, Gurgaon, for dissolution of the marriage by grant of a decree of divorce by mutual consent. However, before the stage of second motion and passing of the decree of divorce, the respondent withdrew her consent...
This withdrawal was made after 18 months of first motion- it was argued that as respondent failed to withdraw within one month, court is bound to pass a decree of divorce- not accepted.
"As a last resort, the appellant submits that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and prays that the Court should dissolve the marriage by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In support of his request, he invites our attention to the observation made by this Court in the case of Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415, wherein though the consent was withdrawn by the wife, this Court found the marriage to have been irretrievably broken down and granted a decree of divorce by invoking its power under Article 142. We are not inclined to entertain this submission of the appellant since the facts in that case are not akin to those that are before us. In that case, the wife was agreeable to receive payments and property in terms of settlement from her husband, but was neither agreeable for divorce, nor to live with the husband as his wife. It was under these extraordinary circumstances that this Court was compelled to dissolve the marriage as having irretrievably broken down. Hence, this submission of the appellant fails.
She has stated that from the beginning, she never wanted the marriage to be dissolved. Even now, she states that she is willing to live with her husband putting away all the bitterness that has existed between the parties. In light of these facts and circumstances, it would be travesty of justice to dissolve this marriage as having broken down. Though there is bitterness amongst the parties and they have not even lived as husband and wife for the past about 11 years, we hope that they will give this union another chance, if not for themselves, for the future of their daughter."

Smruti Pahariya Vs Sanjay Pahariya, (2009) 13 SCC 338

HMA - section 13(1) B - mutual consent - absence of one party does not gave presumption of his consent

Smt Sureshta Devi Vs Om Prakash, (1991) 2 SCC 25

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed “9. The ‘living separately’ for a period of one year should be immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. It is necessary that immediately preceding the presentation of petition, the parties must have been living separately. The expression ‘living separately’, connotes to our mind not living like husband and wife. It has no reference to the place of living. The parties may live under the same roof by force of circumstances, and yet they may not be living as husband and wife. The parties may be living in different houses and yet they could live as husband and wife. What seems to be necessary is that they have no desire to perform marital obligations and with that mental attitude they have been living separately for a period of one year immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The second requirement that they ‘have not been able to live together’ seems to indicate the concept of broken down marriage and it would not be possible to reconcile themselves. The third requirement is that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. 10. Under sub-section (2) the parties are required to make a joint motion not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition and not later than 18 months after the said date. This motion enables the court to proceed with the case in order to satisfy itself about the genuineness of the averments in the petition and also to find out whether the consent was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. The court may make such inquiry as it thinks fit including the hearing or examination of the parties for the purpose of satisfying itself whether the averments in the petition are true. If the court is satisfied that the consent of parties was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved, it must pass a decree of divorce."
"There is a period of waiting from 6 to 18 months. This interregnum was obviously intended to give time and opportunity to the parties to reflect on their move and seek advice from relations and friends. In this transitional period one of the parties may have a second thought and change the mind not to proceed with the petition. The spouse may not be a party to the joint motion under sub-section (2). There is nothing in the section which prevents such course. The section does not provide that if there is a change of mind it should not be by one party alone, but by both"

Dayanandi Vs Rukma D Suvarna and others 2002

The plain language of Section 71 makes it clear that any alteration made in an unprivileged Will after its execution has no effect unless such
alteration has been executed in the same manner in which the Will is executed. The proviso to this section carves out an exception and lays down that such alterations shall be deemed to be duly executed if the signature of the testator and the subscription of the witnesses is made in the margin or on some other part of the Will opposite or near to such alterations or at the foot or end or opposite to a memorandum referring to such alterations and written at the end or some part of the Will.

R. S. Madanappa and Others Vs Chandramma and Another AIR 1965 SC 1812

No man who, knowing fully well that he has no title to property spends money on improving it can be permitted to deprive the original owner of his right to possession of the property except upon the payment for the improvements which were not effected with the consent of that person....
Future mesne profit may be granted even if same is not asked

Cairncross Vs Lorimer [3 Macq. 827]

Lord Chancellor, "The doctrine will apply, which is to be found, I believe, in the laws of all civilized nations that if a man either by words or by conduct has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done, and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent, and he thereby induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned, to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct. I am of opinion that, generally speaking, if a party having an interest to prevent an act being done has full notice of its being done, and acquiesces in it, so as to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it, and the position of others is altered by their giving credit to his sincerity, he has no more right to challenge the act to their prejudice than he would have had if it had been done by his previous license."

Pickard Vs Sears [6 Ad. & E. 469]

"Where one by his word or conduct wilfully causes another to believe for the existence of a certain state of thing and induced him to act on that belief so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the letter a different state of things as existing at the first time

Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law

“Under the Mahomedan law the three essential requisites to make a gift valid : (1) declaration of the gift by the donor: (2) acceptance of the gift by the donee expressly or impliedly and (3) delivery of possession to and taking possession thereof by the donee actually or constructively. No written document is required in such a case. Section 129 Transfer of Property Act, excludes the rule of Mahomedan law from the purview of Section 123 which mandates that the gift of immovable property must be effected by a registered instrument as stated therein. But it cannot be taken as a sine qua non in all cases that whenever there is a writing about a Mahomedan gift of immovable property there must be registration thereof. Whether the writing requires registration or not depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

Chota Uddandu Sahib Vs Masthan Bi (died) and others AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 271

Hon,ble Supreme Court of India observed "Under Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act, nothing in Chapter VII relates to gifts of movable property made in contemplation of death or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Mohammadan Law. According to the Mohammedan Law, there can be a valid gift, if three essentials of the gift are satisfied. (1) a declaration of the gift by the donor, (2) the acceptance of the gift express or implied by or on behalf of the donee and (3) delivery of possession of the subject of gift by the donor to the donee. If these conditions are complied with the gift is complete. According to Muslim law it is not necessary that there should be a deed of gift in order to make it a valid gift, but of course, if there is a deed it should be registered. But if the deed is merely a memoranda of an already effected gift, then it stands on a separate footing. In view of this specific provision of Muslim Law, which is saved by Section 129, it cannot be held that the gifts amongst muslims also should satisfy the provisions of Chapter VII. . . . . . . . . . . . Hence if all the formalities, as prescribed by Muslim Law, regarding the making of gifts are satisfied, the gift is valid notwithstanding the fact that it is oral and without any instrument. If there is a contemporaneous document it should be registered. But if the gift is antecedent and the deed is subsequent merely evidencing the past transaction, it does not require registration, because it does not by itself make or complete the gift. . . . . . . . . .”

Black’s Law Dictionary

“costs is a pecuniary allowance made to the successful party for his expenses in prosecuting or defending a suit or a distinct proceeding with a suit”