Cpc – Sec 21 Jurisdiction Subhash Mahadevasa Habib v. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas, AIR 2007 (SC) 1828 What is relevant in this context is the legal effect of the so-called finding in O.S. No. 4 of 1972 that the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1971 was passed by a court which had no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass that decree. The Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas, an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied. It may be noted that Section 21 provided that no objection as to place the suing can be allowed by even an appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. Though Section 21A of the Code speaks of a suit not being maintainable for challenging the validity of a prior decree between the same parties on a ground based on an objection as to "the place of suing", there is no reason to restrict its operation only to an objection based on territorial jurisdiction and excluding from its purview a defect based on pecuniary jurisdiction. But the fact that Section 21(2) or Section 21A of the Code may not apply would not make any difference in view of the fact that the position was covered by the relevant provision in the Suits Valuation Act. Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 578 (Section 99 of the present Code covering errors or irregularity) of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over a suit had exercised it by reason of under-valuation could not be entertained by an appellate court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at or before the hearing at which the issues were first framed or the appellate court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that the over-valuing or under-valuing of the suit has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit. There was some confusion about the content of the Section.

Cpc – Sec 21 Jurisdiction Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu & Anr. 1966(1) SCR 461 Section 21 is a statutory recognition of the principle that the defect as to the place of suing under Sections 15 to 20 of the Code may be waived and that even independently of Section 21, a defendant may waive the objection and may be subsequently precluded from taking it.

Cpc – Sec 21 Jurisdiction Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath 1962(2) SCR 747 "It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure."

U.P. Rent Act – fixation of rent Abdul Jalil v. Special Judge E.C. Act/Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 2007 (4) RCR (Civil) 675 (Allahabad) under the Temporary Rent Control Act No. 3 of 1947 the rent was freezed at the level of 1940 and that in the present U.P. Rent Act No. 13 of 1972 has freezed the rent to those prevailing immediately before the date of commencement of the Act i.e. 15th July, 1972 or in case of a building let out subsequently, the rental value of the building on the date of letting. There is virtually no provision for revision of rent as a result of inflation and rise in price of immovable properties except on account of improvement as defined under Section 3(n), or as a result of increase in taxes (Section-7); or in case of commercial buildings let out by public religious institutions (Section 9-A). Since the Rent Control Act does not contain any alike provision for fixing of quantum of rent in absence of agreed rent. It becomes the duty of the Court to grant mense profits even though they are not asked for in order to meet the ends of justice provided enquiry is made under Order 20 Rule 12 C.P.C. before passing the decree. Covering the period prior institution of suit till the delivery of possession for ascertaining the mesne profits. This power and duty is imposed by CPC by order 2 Rule 12 dealing with mense profits. On the date of suit except for purpose of eviction, the tenant loses his contract and identity/status as tenant though he happens to be occupying the premises on account of procedural delay. The rights of the landlord are therefore crystallized on the date of suit. Procedural delay in disposal of suit cannot adversely effecting his rights. The statute provides the mode of fixation of standard rent of tenant under Section 9 of the Act but in those cases where there is total absence of any agreed rent on the date of suit. This Court need not delve on the questions regarding validity of the provisions relating to fixation of standard rent in the present (UP Rent ) Act, as they have already been declared ultra vires by this Court in Milap Chandra Jain vs State of UP. In cases of monthly tenancy, the life of tenancy is only one month. It starts from a particular day of the month and end after thirty-days/one month. Thereafter in next month a fresh tenancy is created. The suit is filed after determination of tenancy hence there exists no relationship of landlord and tenant on date of suit. There is no prohibition under Rent Act against termination of tenancy.

Rent Chiranji Lal v. Kunwar Prasad and another AIR 1963 Allahabad 249 When a tenant refused to vacate the accommodation after his tenancy is terminated, he becomes trespasser and liable to pay the landlord mesne profits. These are to be assessed according to the reasonable market value of the premises. If the rent represents a fair value mesne profits may be assessed at the amount of the rent, but if the real value is higher than the rent, mesne profits must be assessed at a higher value. I cannot accept learned counsel's agreement that this value should be equal to the controlled rent and no more.

Rent Rattan Arya etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and another AIR 1986 SC 1444 the Apex Court has laid down the law that the Court can take judicial notice of enormous manifold increase of rents throughout the country, particularly in urban area

Res judicata Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail, AIR 1995 (SC) 1205 It must, therefore, be that all the persons who have right, title and interest are made parties to the suit and that they should have knowledge that the right, title and interest would be in adjudication and the finding or the decree therein would operate as a res judicata to their right, title and interest in the subject-matter of the former suit. Even in their absence a decree could be passed and it may be used as an evidence of the plaintiff's title either accepted or negatived therein. The doctrine of res judicata would apply even though the party against whom it is ought to be enforced, was not eo-nomine made a party nor entered appearance nor did he contest the question. The doctrine of res judicata must, however, be applied to co-defendants with great care and caution. The reason is that fraud is an extrinsic collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of court of justice. If a party obtains a decree from the court by practicing fraud or collusion, be cannot be allowed to say that the matter is res judicata and cannot be re-opened. There can also be no question of res judicata in a case where signs of fraud or collusion are transparently pregnant or apparent from the facts on record. Therefore, in applying the doctrine of res judicata between co-defendant or co-plaintiff, care must, of necessity, be taken by courts to see that there must in fact be a conflict of interest between the co-defendants or co-plaintiffs concerned and it is necessary to decide the conflict in order to give relief which the plaintiff in the suit claimed and the question must have been directly and substantially in issue and was finally decided therein. As found by the appellate court, Maqdoom was playing fraud upon his creditors by creating false oral gifts or spurious claims of mortgages with a view to defraud them. Section 44 of the Evidence Act envisages that any party to a suit or proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree, which is relevant under s.40, 41 or 42 has been obtained by fraud or collusion. Under s.40, the existence of the judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.

Mahomedan Law by Mulla- gift, minor, Guardian Under s. 147 of the Principles of Mahomedan Law by Mulla, 19th Ed., Edited by Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah, envisages that writing is not essential to the validity of a gift either of movable or of immovable property. Section 148 requires that it is essential, to the validity of a gift, that the donor should divest himself completely of all ownership and dominion over the subject of the gift. Under s.149, three essentials to the validity of the gift should be, (i) a declaration of gift by the donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee and (iii) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee as mentioned in s.150. If these conditions are complied with, the gift is complete. Section 150 specifically mentions that for a valid gift there should be delivery of possession of the subject of the gift and taking of possession of the gift by the donee, actually or constructively. Then only gift is complete. Section 152 envisages that where donor is in possession, a gift of immovable property of which the donor is in actual possession is not complete unless the donor physically departs from the premises with all his goods and chattels and the donee formally enters into possession. It would, thus, be clear that though gift by a Mohammadan is not required to be in writing and consequently need not be registered under the Registration Act, a gift to be complete, there should be a declaration of the gift by the donor, acceptance of the gift, expressed or implied, by or on behalf of the donee and delivery of possession of the property, the subject-matter of the gift by the donor to the donee. The donee should take delivery of the possession of that property either actually or constructively. On proof of these essential conditions, the gift becomes complete and valid. In case of immovable property in the possession of the donor, he should completely divest himself physically of the subject of the gift. No evidence has been adduced to establish declaration of the gift, acceptance of the gift by or on behalf of the minor or delivery of possession or taking possession or who had accepted the gift actually or constructively. Admittedly he was in possession and enjoyment of the property till it was sold to the appellant. Equally, in Mohamadan Law mother cannot act nor be appointed as property guardian of the minor. She equally cannot act as legal guardian. Section 348 defines "minor" to mean "a person who has not completed the age of eighteen years". Section 349 provides that "all application for the appointment of a guardian of the person of property or both of a minor are to be made under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890". Section 359 enumerates the persons entitled, in the order mentioned therein, to be guardian of the property of a minor, namely, (1) the father, (2) the executor appointed by the father's will; (3) the paternal grand father; and (4) the executor appointed by the will of the paternal grand father. Section 362 limits the power of the legal guardian to alienate immovable property except in the circumstances enumerated therein. Similarly, the court guardian has no power to mortgage or charge or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise and part with possession of immovable property of the ward or to lease that property except with the previous permission of the court and subject to the conditions mentioned in s.363.

Parnership V.H. Patel & Company v. Hirubhai Himabhai Patel, 2000(2) RCR (Civil) 735 (SC) While mere disagreement or quarrel arising from impropriety of partners is not sufficient ground for dissolution, interference should not be refused where it is shown to the satisfaction of the adjudicating authority that the conduct of a partner has been such that it is not reasonably practicable for other partners to carry on the business in partnership. For instance, dissolution should be ordered if it is shown that the conduct of a partner has resulted in destruction of mutual trust or confidence which is the very basis for proper conduct of partnership.

CPC- sec 11 Munni Bibi v. Trilokinath, 58 IA 158, 165, where it has been said that to apply the rule of res judicata as between co-defendants three conditions are requisite. "(1) There must be a conflict of interest between the defendants concerned; (2) it must be necessary to decide this conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims; and (3) the question between the defendants must have been finally decided."