Satyanarain Bajoria and another Vs Ramnarain Tibrewal and another AIR 1994 SC 1583

CPC - order 21 rule 54- execution-lower appellate court totally messed the points which were required to be determined and merely by assuming that even if notice under Order 21 Rule 54 of the Code is not served, by virtue of explanation to Rule 90 of Order 21 of the Code it is not a material irregularity or illegality to auction sale. The lower appellate court totally misunderstood the importance and efficacy of notices being served in execution proceedings under Order 21 Rule 22; Order 21 Rule 54 (1A), notice for settlement of terms of proclamation in the presence of the judgment-debtor which leg to the finding recorded by it and the finding on fact in the circumstances, is totally vitiated.

Civil judges’ selection may face legal hurdle - The Times of India on Mobile

decision to exclude law graduates working in the high court service, from writing the civil judges examination. "Assistant public prosecutors and practicing advocates have been allowed to sit for the examination, but we are expressly barred from participating in the process. The chief justice has been quoted as saying that he took the decision on requests from advocates. How is it fair?" asks a court employee, who is a law graduate
http://m.timesofindia.com/city/chennai/Civil-judges-selection-may-face-legal-hurdle/articleshow/11680318.cms

Praveen Gupta

Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak Vs State Of Gujarat AIR 2003 SC 2855

A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. to bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC is not defined in the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passion to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved fats of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage.

Cherubin Gregory Vs The State Of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 205

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as " The appellant was charged with an offence under S. 304A of the Indian Penal Code for causing the death of one Mst. Madilen by contact with an electrically charged naked copper wire which he had fixed up at the back of his house with a view to prevent the entry of intruders into his latrine.....
an electric light was burning some distance away. But it is manifest that neither of these could constitute warning as the conditions of the wire being charged with electric current could not obviously be de- tected merely by the place being properly lit.....
The right of private defence of property which is set out in s. 97 of the Indian Penal Code is, as that section itself provides, subject to the provisions of s. 99 of the Code. It is obvious that the type of injury caused by the trap laid by the accused cannot be brought within the scope of s. 99, nor of course of s. 103 of the Code....
The contention was that the deceased was a trespasser and that there was no duty owed by an occupier like the accused towards the trespasser and therefore the latter would have had no cause of action for damages for the injury inflicted and that if the act of the accused was not a tort, it could not also be a crime. There is no substance in this line of argument. In the first place, where we have a Code like the Indian Penal Code which defines with particularity the ingredients of a crime and the defences open to an accused charged with any of the offences there set out we consider that it would not be proper or justifiable to permit the invocation of some Common Law principle outside that Code for the purpose of treating what on the words of the statute is a crime into a permissible or other than unlawful act. But that apart, learned Counsel is also not right in his submission that the act of the accused as a result of which the deceased suffered injuries resulting in her death was not an actionable wrong. A trespasser is not an outlaw, a Caput lupinem. The mere fact that the person entering a land is a trespasser does not entitle the owner or occupier to inflict on him personal in- jury by direct violence and the same principle would 203 govern the infliction of injury by indirectly doing some- thing on the land the effect of which he must know was likely to cause serious injury to the trespasser."